منطق هيغل

1.] PHILOSOPHY misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted. The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the Truth. Both in like manner go on to treat of the finite worlds of Nature and the human Mind, with their relation to each other and to their truth in God. Some _acquaintance_ with its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must presume, that and a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other reason than this: that in point of time the mind makes general _images_ of objects, long before it makes _notions_ of them, and that it is only through these mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking mind rises to know and comprehend _thinkingly._ But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the _necessity_ of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original acquaintance with them is thus discovered to be inadequate. We can assume nothing, and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a beginning at all. 2.] This _thinking study of things_ may serve, in a general way, as a description of philosophy. But the description is too wide.…