Aurora. Reflexions sobre els prejudicis morals
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
- Extensió:
- ~100.000 paraules · 477 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APANietzsche. (n.d.). The Dawn of Day [Aurora. Reflexions sobre els prejudicis morals]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/nietzsche/the-dawn-of-day
- MLANietzsche. The Dawn of Day [Aurora. Reflexions sobre els prejudicis morals]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/nietzsche/the-dawn-of-day.
- ChicagoNietzsche. The Dawn of Day [Aurora. Reflexions sobre els prejudicis morals]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/nietzsche/the-dawn-of-day.
Referència de l'edició que reprodueix SigPhi: SigPhi n'és la reproducció digital, no l'editor. L'any de l'edició no consta a les metadades (per això «n.d.») i el traductor només hi surt quan consta.
De què tracta
«Aurora» (1881): la campanya contra la moral, feta a poc a poc i sense cridar.
Context i història
Nietzsche en deia el llibre del «sí» abans dels grans «no». Aquí no destrueix la moral, la mina: mostra com els sentiments que creiem més purs tenen una història i uns interessos al darrere. És el més subestimat dels seus llibres. Traducció anglesa de l'edició completa dirigida per Oscar Levy (1909-1913), que és la que hi ha en domini públic. Té més de cent anys i es nota. L'original és ALEMANY i per citar mana l'original, però d'aquesta obra aquí només hi ha la traducció.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
already laid in ruins? Oh, how wrong is the answer which, even in our own day, rolls glibly off the tongue when this question is asked: “Because they have all neglected the prerequisite, the examination of the foundation, a critique of all reason”—that fatal answer made by Kant, who has certainly not thereby attracted us modern philosophers to firmer and less treacherous ground! (and, one may ask apropos of this, was it not rather strange to demand that an instrument should criticise its own value and effectiveness? that the intellect itself should “recognise” its own worth, power, and limits? was it not even just a little ridiculous?) The right answer would rather have been, that all philosophers, including Kant himself were building under the seductive influence of morality—that they aimed at certainty and “truth” only in appearance; but that in reality their attention was directed towards “_majestic moral edifices_,” to use once more Kant’s innocent mode of expression, who deems it his “less brilliant, but not undeserving” task and work “to level the ground and prepare a solid foundation for the erection of those majestic moral edifices” (_Critique of Pure Reason_, ii. 257). Alas! He did not succeed in his aim, quite the contrary—as we must acknowledge to-day. With this exalted aim, Kant was merely a true son of his century, which more than any other may justly be called the century of exaltation: and this he fortunately continued to be in respect to the more valuable side of this century (with that solid piece of sensuality, for example, which he introduced into his theory of knowledge). He, too, had been bitten by the moral tarantula, Rousseau; he, too, felt weighing on his soul that moral fanaticism of which another disciple of Rousseau’s, Robespierre, felt and proclaimed himself to be the executor: _de fonder sur la terre l’empire de la sagesse, de la justice, et de la vertu_. (Speech of June 4th, 1794.…