La genealogia de la moral
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
- Extensió:
- ~59.600 paraules · 283 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APANietzsche. (n.d.). The Genealogy of Morals [La genealogia de la moral]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/nietzsche/the-genealogy-of-morals
- MLANietzsche. The Genealogy of Morals [La genealogia de la moral]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/nietzsche/the-genealogy-of-morals.
- ChicagoNietzsche. The Genealogy of Morals [La genealogia de la moral]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/nietzsche/the-genealogy-of-morals.
Referència de l’edició reproduïda. SigPhi és la reproducció digital, no l’editor. S’hi inclouen l’any, l’editorial i el traductor quan consten; «n.d.» indica que no consta l’any. La responsabilitat d’un pròleg o d’una nota es determina segons el passatge citat.
De què tracta
«La genealogia de la moral» (1887): tres assaigs sobre d'on vénen realment el bé, la culpa i l'ideal ascètic.
Context i història
El seu llibre més sistemàtic i el més influent en la filosofia posterior: Foucault en va treure el mètode genealògic sencer. La tesi central —que «bo» volia dir «noble» abans de voler dir «altruista», i que el canvi és obra del ressentiment— es pot discutir, però la manera de preguntar ho va canviar tot. Traducció anglesa de l'edició completa dirigida per Oscar Levy (1909-1913), que és la que hi ha en domini públic. Té més de cent anys i es nota. L'original és ALEMANY i per citar mana l'original, però d'aquesta obra aquí només hi ha la traducció.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
Schopenhauer, to whom that book, with all its passion and inherent contradiction (for that book also was a polemic), turned for present help as though he were still alive. The issue was, strangely enough, the value of the "un-egoistic" instincts, the instincts of pity, self-denial, and self-sacrifice which Schopenhauer had so persistently painted in golden colours, deified and etherealised, that eventually they appeared to him, as it were, high and dry, as "intrinsic values in themselves," on the strength of which he uttered both to Life and to himself his own negation. But against _these very_ instincts there voiced itself in my soul a more and more fundamental mistrust, a scepticism that dug ever deeper and deeper: and in this very instinct I saw the _great_ danger of mankind, its most sublime temptation and seduction--seduction to what? to nothingness?--in these very instincts I saw the beginning of the end, stability, the exhaustion that gazes backwards, the will turning _against_ Life, the last illness announcing itself with its own mincing melancholy: I realised that the morality of pity which spread wider and wider, and whose grip infected even philosophers with its disease, was the most sinister symptom of our modern European civilisation; I realised that it was the route along which that civilisation slid on its way to--a new Buddhism?--a European Buddhism?--_Nihilism_? This exaggerated estimation in which modern philosophers have held pity, is quite a new phenomenon: up to that time philosophers were absolutely unanimous as to the worthlessness of pity. I need only mention Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant--four minds as mutually different as is possible, but united on one point; their contempt of pity. 6.…