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Sophistical Refutations (Organon)

Aristotle

Language:
English
Status:
Complete work
Authorship:
Written by the author
Condition of the text:
No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
Extent:
~25,700 words · 122 passages
Cite this work
  • APAAristotle. (n.d.). Sophistical Refutations (Organon). Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/sophistical-refutations-organon
  • MLAAristotle. Sophistical Refutations (Organon). Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/sophistical-refutations-organon.
  • ChicagoAristotle. Sophistical Refutations (Organon). Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/sophistical-refutations-organon.

Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.

How it begins
for both he who knows, and what is known, may signify in this sentence, the same thing as knowing; also ἆρ’ ὄ ὁρᾷ τις, τοῦτο ὁρᾷ—but he sees a pillar, so that the pillar sees: and, ἆρα ὁ σὺ φῂς εἶναι, τοῦτο σὺ φῂς εἶναι; φῂς δὲ λίθον εἶναι, σὺ ἀρα φῂς λίθος εἶναι and, ἆρ’ ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; for σιγῶντα λέγειν is two-fold, signifying both that he who speaks, is silent, and those things which are spoken. There are, however, three modes of the equivocal and ambiguous, one when the sentence or word properly signifies many things, as an eagle and a dog; another when we are accustomed thus to speak; and a third, when the conjoined signifies many things, but separated (is taken) simply, as ἐπίσταται γράμματα, for each ἐπίσταται, and γράμματα, signifies if it should so happen, one thing, but both (conjointly) many things, either that letters themselves have science, or that some one else knows letters. Ambiguity therefore, and equivocation, are in these modes, but the following belong to composition; as that he who sits, can walk, and that he who does not write, may write. For it does not signify the same if a person speaks separately and conjointly, that it is possible that a person sitting, may walk, and that one not writing, may write, and this in a similar manner, if some one should connect (the words), that he who does not write, writes; since it signifies that he has a power by not writing, of writing. If however he does not join (the words, it signifies), that he has a power, when he does not write, of writing; also he now learns letters, since he learned what he knows; moreover, that he who is able to carry one thing only, is able to carry many.

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