« Tho distinction of Jiy and Eesh resulta from Maja.
APPENDIX. 113 creatures im its pure, simple state; and Jiv is Being in a sentient active state. But perhaps it would be more agreeable to the etymology of the words to call Hesh the principle of energy or power, and Jiv the principle of sensation. Every thing rests on Brimh or Being; but to him is more immediately referred Eesh or power; and to Kutasth is referred Jiv or sen- sation. In common books,~nd language these terms denote separate individual beings; and also in some philosophical systems Brimh or Being and Jiv, that which feels, are considered distinct and different beings; but the Vedantas deny a plurality of beings, and assert that the visible phenomena and sensation, are only accidents of one Infinite Being, though in order to be understood they speak of them as distinct exist- ences; hence then it appears that the Vedanta philo- sophy is distinguished from all the other syaiems hy teaching, that the universe consists of one undivided wdivisible Being, and motion. Motion includes energy and sensation; energy includes the material world; and sensation includes the active and moral faculties, and corporeal feelings, as pleasure and pain. This explanation of the distinctions,which are constantly recurring in the Vedanta books, and on which the system is grounded, receives no inconsidey- able degree of support from the follgwing passage in the Panchdashi. “ Eshwar or the Lord is the principle of happiness, Jiv or the vital soul is the principle of consciousness; this distinction is caused by Maja, and these (two modes of Spirit) comprehend the uni- verse. The creation from “the beginuing to the con- summation of all things proceeds from Kesh or the Lord, life* from the time of awaking until it cease in the Infinite Being, proceeds from Jiv or the Soul.— sloks, 212-13.
* More ipropsly: the sensations and “actions in “which - &ensitive existence consiats..
14 APPENDIX.
The reason assigned for attending to these dis- tinctions, also corroborates the explanation? I have offered. It is not to point out different substances or beings, but to conduct the niind to the knowledge of that one and all-pervading Essence, in which the modifications exist from which result the distinctions we observe. Unless the nature of these distinctions were understood, the sovl must remain ignorant of its own nature, and continue for ever under the delu- sion that it is a sensitive, finite, individual being; but when by investigating these distinctions, it compre- hends the modifications from which they arise, the delusion is dispelled, and it knows itself to be one, Infinite and Eternal. “Though it was necessary to treat of Jiv as a preliminary step to cnable us to un- derstand what is Jiv or the soul, yet a person ought not to be immersed in this notidn, but he should immerse himself in Brimh,” slok 220. T shall also quote a passage to shew that I have given a correct view of the distinction between Brimh and Kutasth; « Kutasth and Brimh are different only in name; as the sky reflected in a vessel of water seems to differ from that reflected in the firmament; but besides this there is no other distinction,”—slok 237.
© It must have been observed in reading the Play, and tht treatise. of Shankar Acharya, that there are no attempts to establish the Vedanta doctrines by any process of reasoning. The authors announce the principles of their sect in a dogmatical authoritative style, as indubitable truthsfor establish their assertions by the authority of the sacred text alone, and attribute the disbelief of them to passion and ignorance. It is in this manner that the Vedanta doctrines are gencrally taught, but sometimes we find an appearance of reason- ing and argument. The following quotation hints at a philosophical argument of some weight in support of their denial of a material world. “The world is visi- ble, but it cannot be explained; the world is Maia, APPENDIX. Ws and therefore no hypothesis should be formed Tespect- ing it. If the Pandiis were to attempt an explanation éf the world, any one_by taking up the opposite argu- ment might expose their ignorance. How are the body and organs of sense produced by virtue of the seminal matter? Or supposing this could be answered, how can you account for the production of life? If you say that it results frora™the constitution of semi- nal matter; the instances of unproductive semen will reduce you to the absurdity of admitting that the ~ same proposition may be both negative and affirmative.
Tf you say I do not know how the world arose, and therefore request you to inform me, I reply that according to the opinion of the most learned men the world is merely an illusion of the senses; for what is there in man that surpasses the illusions of sense 2 He lics in the womb, he is vivified, be acquires hands, head, feet, and different other members, and afterwards this organized heing passes through the states of child- hood, youth, and old age; it takes various characters, it » sees, hears, smells, adores and as it came into the world so it goes out of it. The seed of the wurm tree ( ficus Indica ) bears analogy to the- body, and consi ering the smallness of the seed and the largeness of the tree, it is evident that this can proceed only from Maia or ~delusion. The Logicians proudly suppose that they can remove these difficulttes, but their opinions are completely refuted by Hursh Misra,” sloks 142—8 and Commentary. - ‘Fhe argument appeardy to rest «on two circums- tances, first. that the generation of animals cannot be ace counted for by its apparent cause; second, that even this, apparent cause sometimes fails in producing the effect as inthe case of sterile feniales, Hence it is con- cluded that animals and the visible world are not real ex- istences but mere illusions. The author has not stated his argument in a precise manner, but he seems to “assume that matter is itself inert and lifeless, and con- 116 APPENDIX.
sequently incapable of producing life and -motion; hence it must be admitted that there is a living Being who is different from what is called matter, and that this Being is the cause of sensible objects, and of life and perception. Of what use then is the supposition of inert matter? If ali effects proceed from the unceasing energy of the Infinite Being, is it not more rational to affirm that he if the immediate cause, than that he operates circuitously and by an intermediate substance.
The Vedanta philosophy does not correspond with any system which has been published in the Western world, It does not teach that the Supreme Being is the soul of the universe; that animate beings are goparate detached portions of his essence, or that the visible extended material frame ef things is God; hut it affirms that the world is one, living, unextended, indivisible Being, who puts forth his energy, and ex- cites in himself the phenomena of sensible things, 4s well as of sensation, passion, &c. In explaining this | system, however, the writers frequently make use of such figures as may mislead a person who has only read dutached passages of their books, or who has not closely examined the nature of their doctrines. In consequence of this the Vedantas have been supposed to teach the doctcine of emanations; and a passage oc- curs in the Atharvan Ved, vhich appears to countenance “this opinion. “As the sparks proceed from fire, so yerious kinds of animate and inanimate beings proceed from tke ineurruptible Being.” But the best commen- tators say that these expressions do not mean that there are “separate individual, beings, but only that whatever is beheld is the Divine Essence. The Vedanta opinions’cannot be accurately represented by any figure; they must be @educed from plain and simple declara. tions. The Vedanta philosophy has been supposed to agree with the system of the celebrated Bishop Berkeley, APPENDIX. Hi APPENDIX. Hi and it certainly does eo in denying a material world, and in referring sensjble things to the energy of living Being; but here the agreement ends, The Berkelian hypothesis is completely opposed to the Vedanta doc- trine by maintaining the existence of separate beings, upon whom this energy operates, and excites in their minds the ideas of externa? things, After this slight sketch of the philosophy of Ve- danta, the practical maxims of the sect will be easily understood, They teach that perfection consists in rest, and that motion or action is the origin of the moral distinctions of good and evil, both of which must be renounced, as they involve and imply each other, It is required in order to the attainment of this sublime state, that the active faculties be annihilated, the pas- sions and affections subdued, and that the individual be totally indifferent to external things, animate and inanimate, to parents, wives, children, relations, goods, or to whatever causes pleasure, pain, é&c. and this fur- nishes us with a reason for the disrespectful language made use of in the Play towards these relations and friends. When by the practice of rigid aysterity, retirement from the world, and contemplation, this quiescent state is attained, the soul perceives that it is Being, and that Being is all thirgs, and tius it be- comes the one Infinite Fssence. Action or religious performances do not conduct the soul to the state of the Eternal, but toa place called Swarg, where it gon- tinuss until the holiness it ‘had accumulated be nearly expended by the enjayment of happiness, after which it returns to earth, and takes a body ecrresponding to the remnant of Virtue, it brings along with it, Agreeably to this notion the Vedantas condemn the performance of action as it retaing, the soul in the prison of passion and affection; but whilst a person continues to perform the common acts of life, it is incumbent on him to attend to religious duties and rites. It also has been found expedient to modify the 118 APPENDIX.
doctrine in such a manner, as to reconcile it with the occupations and acts on which theexistence of societf depends, Accordingly they say that renunciation of the world does not require that a person cease from the acts and duties of life, but only that he preserve his mind in a state of perfect indifference and tran- quillity. “If it be alledgé& that the Paranas declare Bharata and others did not perform the acts of life; we would ask, why do you not listen to the Veds, which declare that wise men eat, act, and procreate.” 271.
Having given this short sketch of the Vedanta principles, I shall now notice in a very cursory manner, the other four Brahminical systems which are men- tioned in the translations.
The Nyayat is a system of Ingic and metaphy- sics. It contains two sects which were founded by the two celebrated teachers Gautam and Kanad. The sect of Gautam is the most ancient, and those who adhere to it are by way of eminence named Nyayaiks, and their philosophy is called Nyayai; the followers of Kanad are frequently named Veisheshiks, and their systeme'Tarkeek-Gautam is a celebrated character, not only in India, but in the countries to the eastward of the Ganges, where he has been raised to the rank of a divinity, and iseworshipped under a variety of names, which, however, are all easily traced to the primitive word. There is little distinction, if indeed any, be- tween the systems of Gautam and Kanad, except in the number ¢f orglers into Which they have divided the different classes of Being. Ggutgm divided them into twenty-three classes, which Kanad has reduced to seven; but to understard the opinions alluded to in the Play, it is not fequisite to name the different classes of Being,#o enumerate the accidents and logical divisions of the system, or to notice the arrangement of syllogisms, which perhaps is not less perfect than that of the Greek Logician.
The Nyayaiks ( under which term I include the APPENDIX. 119 followers* both of Gautam and Kanad ) believe that zhere are two eternal substances, spirit and matter; the one distinguished by life and thought, the other by being inert and lifeless, and moving only as it is impelled by Spirit. They do not however suppose that the world in its present from has existed from eternity, but only the primary mgtter from which it springs when operated on by the Almighty hand of,God. Matter in its primary state is an invisible figureless substance. It is very common to express this primary condition of matter, by the word beej, which signifies seed; from this seed or germ the world is called forth by the Intelligent Living being; and at its final dis- solution all things return to a seminal state, in which they remain until again spread out by creative energy. Tn the process of “creation, the first form of material substance is called anoo, two anods make a dwenook, three a trenook, and so forth; and on arriving at the bulk of a trenook, matter assumes figure and becomes visible, In the first or invisible atomical condition, matter is eternal; in the second or figured state it is perishable. Hence inthe Nyayai system the elements, water, earth, fire, &c. are always divided info what _ is temporary, and what is eternal; the visible state,of water, for example, is temporary, its primary,state or essence is eternal,. a The combinations or Aggregations which compose the material universe are produced by the energy of an Almighty and Intelligegt cause, who is considered the Supreme Being. Matter is inctpalie of action,, whence it is cvident tha’the motions of material objects are caused by being diferent from these Sbjects, and in this manner they prove th® egistence of God. Thus the author of the Miktawali in delivering the opinions of the Nyayaiks, says, “ Though we@have in ourselves the consciousness that I am, [ feel pleasure, &c. yet we have no evident knowledge that spirit and matter are different; but this is proved by the following ’ 120 AFPENDIX.
argument:—An instrument requires an ‘operator; thus without an operator no effect could result from cutting instruments, as an axe® &c. in like manner, without an operator no effect would result from the eyes, &c. which are the instruments of vision, dc. hence we infer the existence of an operative Being. Should it be said that oneration belongs to matter, we reply that matter does not possess life, as is evident in the case of an inanimate body. It may however be urged that life, as consisting in perception, sensation, &c. does not belong to a dead body, just as it cannot be ascribed to the individual, who, according to your opinion, is united to the Supreme Being. We reply, if life or sensation be a property of matter, how can the events of youth be remembered in old age, since the body is subject to growth aid decay.” Atma Prakarn.
The Nyayaiks conceive that Spirit is a figured substance, which means that it possesses magnitude, but this magnitude is indivisible. According to Hindd Metaphysics, whatever is the subject of active and moral qualities must have magnitude, for these qualitits imply action and change; but what is abso- lutely without magnitude and figure must be impossible and unchangeable; hence as the Nyayaiks maintain that the Supremé Being is the immediate and active agent in the creation of theworld, and that perception, desire, and action, are in him permanent qualities, they ascribe to him a prineiple of invisible magnitude. - This magnitude i§ so small, that it moves in the smallest nerves which are the one thoucandth part the diameter of a hair; and this opinion is stpported by the Veds, “Spirit is more minuté than the minutest atom, and more subtle than the subtlest thing.” But it must not be inferred fron this that they are materialists; for they maintain an essential distinction between the phenomena of matter and Spirit.
They believe that the soul is a portion of the © APPRXDIX. 121 Supreme Being, and has a separate individual existence. Itcis distinguished from the Creator by not possessing essentially and permanently the qualities of perception, desire, and action, and it is also subject to ignorance and sorrow; but the Supreme Spirit is perfect and eternally blessed —“ Truth and intelligence are the attributes of God, and are gnot to be ascribed to the soul, which is the subject both of knowledge and igno- rance, pleasure and pain, by which it is distinguished from the Supreme Spirit; therefore God and the soul are entirely distinct beings; if you deny this, how can you account for the soul being confined to material ha- bitations, and again released from them?”
While embodied in matter, the soul is in a state of imprisonment, apd is under the influence of evil passions; but having by intense study arrived at the knowledge of the natural elements and principles, it attains the place of the Eternal. In this state of Su- preme bliss, however, its individuality does not cease; but on this point they express themselves very obscure- ly. They admit that the soul is united to the Supreme Being, but conceive that it still retains the akgtract. nature of difinite or visible existence.
The dissolution of the world proceeds from the destruction of the visible forms and qualities of things, but their material essence gemains, and from it new worlds are formed by the creative energy of God; and thus the universe is dissolved and renewed in endless succession. ed a ae The Sanxnya Seqt was founded by a philosopher named Kapila. It has béen noticed by sone English writers as advancing thé doctgine of materialism: but “the Sankhyas believe in the efistence of two eternal substances or Beings, the one named Rjirish or Male, the other Prakrati or Nature. They conceive. that Parish, or the male, exists in an eternal state of’ rest, - impassible, and a mere spectator of ths motions of the universe, This state of the Supreme they illustrate 422 APPENDIX.
by saying that he resembles the water-lily, Which after the water passes over it, is left in its original condition. The motions of the material world, and also sentient beings, proceed from Prakrati or Nature. The argument by which this opinion is supported is not very clear, or perhaps I have not been able to comprehend it. “ Spirit is life; effect an¢ cause are inseparably united, consequently, when the effect ceases, the cause must also cease; therefore agency cannot be attributed to the Supreme Being, and the idea that he acts arises from the union of Life and Understanding.” Mikta- walli, Atma Prakarn. This passage, however, will receive some elucidation by remarking that Lite here denotes its simple abstract nature, divested of the qualities of thought, feeling, actiop, dc. This simple abstract Life is the Supreme Being: Understanding (which denotes the active and sensitive principles of being ) arises from the operation of nature; and the union of understanding or the active faculties with Life, which is the Supreme Being, produces the idea that he is the Agent in the motions of the universe, -The Vedanta sect affirm that understanding is the termination or completion of the One Being; the ankhyas on the contrary, assert that it is the com- pletion of nature, Nature is eternal, but it is upheld by Life, the Supreme Being. When the universe disappears, nature "remains in an invisible seminal state; but at the desire ot the Supgeme, it assumés a visible form and becomes the creator of the world. x The roul, or sensitive part of living beings, arises from the organization of, Nature, but is formed of its more refined parts. “It is probably this opinion con,* cerning the soul, which has led to the supposition that the Sankhyas are Materialists. By the efficacy of virtuous action. however, men are delivered from pas- sion, and united to the Supreme Spiritual Essence.
The Mimanasa was originally taught by Jaimini.
APPENDIX. 125 Kumaril Bhat and Prabhakar, who are mentioned in the Play, were two pf his most eminent disciples. There are two divisions of this sect; one named Parva or former, the other named Utter or latter Mimangsa. The Parva Mimangsa say that motion is the only Being, and that it has existed from eternity, and will exist for ever, producing and @naintaining all the phe- nomena which compose the universe. There is neither creation nor dissolution, the world had existed always in the same visible form which it now exhibits. Jai- mini seemed to deny the existence of Paramatma or Supreme Soul, and to admit only that of Jiv Atma or Vital Soul; for which reason he was charged with Atheism, and in the Play we find one of his pupils asking if there be agy other Being begides those visible beings whom we behold. This tenet, however, was rejected by others of the Sect, and accordingly, Ku- maril in reply to the above question, says, that there isa Being distinct from the universe, who is the judge of actions, and the dispenser of rewards and punish- ment, In asserting that motion is the only Being, the Mimangsa is directly opposed to the Vedanta system; and the Play exhibits a controversial conversation be® tween Religion and Mimangsa respectjng the fature of the Supreme Lord, and the means of obtaining de- liverance from this state of mortality, in which Mi- mangsa maintains the necessity of action, or religious performances in order to obtain beatituge, because tHe Supreme Lord is himself an active Being.
he doctrine of Var&nsen agrees with ¢the Shan- -khya philosophy in the Belief gf an infinite Being or Man, who is impassible and uftaffected by nature. But from the following passage it appears that the Patanjelists conceive the soul to be of the same nature with Purush or the Infinite Being, and not an éffect - of the organization of matter: The Lord is a Great Being ( Man ) whois free from pain or the influence - 124 APPBNDIX.
of action, is impassible like soul.” Chitra Dipa slok. - 105, ® The three remaining sects’ are those which deny’ the authority of the Veds.
The Jarwas are found in considerable numbers in different parts of India, especially in the Mysore, Canara, and Guzerat. Ip their philosophical opinions they have been supposed to resemble the Sankhyas, but their tenets exhibit rather a mixture of the, Sankhya and Mimangsa doctrines than an exclusive adoption of either. Like the Mimangsa they believe that the Supreme Being is motion, and that he is with- out figure, impassible, and all-pervading; and like the Sankhyas they believe in the eternity of the world, and conceive that the soul is only a refined species of matter, which possesses thought and understanding, and which pervading the whole body, illuminates it as. lamp does the apartment in which it is kept. Where~ ver there is blood, say they, there is soul.’ As the infinite Being is indescribable and incomprehen- sible, they direct their worship to Tirthakars or deified men, The Great Being is omniscient, but the soul possesses only finite knowledge. Man is elevated to sthe state of the Infinite Being by renouncing secular. concerns and devoting himself to contemplation and ivine Worship; but likethe Mimangsa they conceiv that holy actions are required to secure eternal beati- tude.
“The Bavupp'ua reliyion is now almost exéinct in India. Ihave never seen any who professed it, though Mr. Moor in the Hindu Inffnticide says that some may be met with in Guzerpt. I’ do not know whether ar account has yet beer given of their philosophical opi nions drawn from original authentic sources; but from the declarations of Mendicant in the Play, I should con- ceive that they profess a system of idealism excluding the existence both of matter and Spirit, and admitting ouly that of sensations.
APPENDIX.: 125 It is generally alledged by the Brahmans, that the .‘iarvakas are Atheists, but perhaps they are only “{aterialists, and maintain an hypothesis similar to the one advanced in Europe by Spinoza. This conjecture corresponds with the account given of them by passion, in which it is said, that they believe only what is proved by the evidence of the internal or external senses, The argument they 2mploy is stated in more precise terms in a Logical book called Dinkari + * There is no evidence that a Being ( different from the universe ) exists, for,as he is without figure and ~quality, he cannot be discerned by the external senses, and there cannot be the evidence of mental perception, for the mental perception of one person cannot dis- cover the existence of another Spirit.”
In perusing thesketch which I have thus given of the philosophical opinions noticed in the translations, it has perhaps occurred to the reader, that a more de- - tailed account of them would throw much light on the ~.ncient systems taught in Europe, and would be a aluable addition to the History of Philosophy and _ 4 the Human Mind.
THE END.