In the words * the body * the Lord specifies the thing referred to by the pronoun ' this.' Kshetrar** the field, the body, matter — is so called because it is shielded from injury, or because it is destructible, or because it. is liable to decay, or.because the fruits of actions are reaped in it as in a field. This body is designated as ' Kshetra,' *the field* * matter.* He who knows this Kshetra, i.e„ he who comprehends it in understanding from head to foot, He who perceives it as distinct from himself by knowledge, natural or imparted by others,— him they designate as Kshetrajwa, * the knower of the field,' ' the comprehender of matter/ — they who know of Kshetra and Kshetraj«a.
Identity of the soul with the lord.
Thus Kshetra and Kshetrajwa have been described. — Is this all the knowledge that one has to acquire about them? — No Listen: d3$5Wfaft4 srasfR TOOTHS U 318 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XIII.
2. And do thou also know Me as Kshetrajwa in all Kshetras, O Bharata. The knowledge of Kshetra and Khetrajfla is deemed by Me as the knowledge.
Do thou also know the Kshetrajraa, described above, to be Myself, to be the Supreme Lord, not a being of the world (samsara). The meaning is this: — The Kshetrajrca who is in all Kshetras, and who is differentiated by the manifold upadhis or Kshetras, from Brahma down to a clump of grass, is, you should understand, really devoid of all the various upadhis (conditions) and is inaccessible to any such word or thought as * sat ' or * asat,' existent or non-existent. As nothing else remains to be known apart from the true nature of Kshetra, Kshetrajwa and the Isvara, that knowledge by which the two objects of knowledge, Kshetra and Kshetrajwa, are known is considered by Me — the Lord, Vishnu — to be the right knowledge.
The soul is subject to evil only through ignorance.
(Objection): — If only one Being, namely, Isvara, exists in all Kshetras, if there exists no being, no other enjoyer, distinct from Him, it would follow either that the Isvara is a sawsarin; or that there is no sawsara because there is no sawsarm— -none else apart from the Isvara, Neither conclusion is acceptable; for, then, it would follow that the scriptures which treat of bondage and liberation and their respective causes would have no purpose to serve. Moreover, the conclusion is opposed to all evidence, including sensuous perception (pratyaksha). In the first place, pleasure and pain and their causes, which together constitute the sawsara, are known to us by immediate perception. And from our per- ception of variety in the world may also be inferred the 2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 319 existence of samsara arising from dharma and a-dharma. All this would be inexplicable if the Atman and the Isvara, the Self and the Lord, be identical.
(Answer): — No j for, that can be explained as due to a distinction between jwana and ajrcana, between knowledge and ignorance. It has been said: " These, what is known as wisdom and what is known as unwisdom, are quite distinct and lead to different goals." — (Ka*ha-Up. ii. 4.)
And so also a distinction through effect between vidya and avidya, wisdom and unwisdom, as producing quite opposite results,— the right and the sweet,— is pointed out (in the same Upanishad and in the same context), wisdom leading to the light, while the sweet is the effect of unwisdom. Accordingly, Vyasa says: ' Then there are these two paths, etc.,— (Mokshadharma. 24-6.)
' There are only these two paths,' &c Here (in the Gita) also two paths have been spoken of. Now we learn from the sruti, smHti and reasoning, that unwisdom with its effect should be got rid of. As to the sruti, the following passages may be quoted: " If in this world a person knows (the Self), then the true end is gained; if a person in this world does not know (the Self), then there will be a great calamity/*— (Kena-Upa- nishad, 2-5.)
* He who knows Him (the Supreme Self) thus becomes immortal here; there is no other way to reach the Goal.*— (Purusha-sukta.)
* The wise man is afraid of nothing '— (Taittiriya-Upa* nishad 2-4.)
320 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XIIL As regards the ignorant person: — 1 But to him there is the fear (of samsara).*— (Ibid. 2-7.)
1 Those who live in the midst of avidya or ignorance go round and with an erring step, deluded as blind people led by the blind I '— (Kafha-Upanishad, 2-5).
1 He who knows Brahman is Brahman Itself.'— (Muwdaka-Up. 3-2-9.)
" Whoever worships another Deity, thinking, ' He is another, another am I,' he does not know; for, he is like a beast for the Gods."~(Bnhadara»yaka-Up. 1-4-10).
As to him who knows the Self, ' He becomes all this.' — (Ibid. 1-4-10).
" When men can roll up the sky like leather, (then only, not till then) can the end of sorrow be, without men knowing God." (Sveta. Up. 6-20).
And passages from the smriti— the Bhagavad-Gita v. 15, 19, and xiii. 28,— may also be quoted. By reasoning (nyaya) also we come to the same conclusion. It is said: * Men avoid by knowledge serpents, thorns and wells j by ignorance some, fall into them; see how estimable is the effect of knowledge.'— (Mokshadharma, 201-16).
So also* we see that an ignorant man regards the physical body, etc., as the Self, is impelled *by attachment and hatred and the like, performs righteous and unrighteous deeds (Dharma and A-dharma), and is born and dead, while those are liberated who, knowing the Self to be distinct from the body and the like, give up attachment and hatred, and no longer engage in righteous or unrighteous deeds to which those passions may lead. This nobody can deny by argument • Here follows the nyaya or reasoning above referred to,— (A), 2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 321 Such # being the case, the Kshetrajna, who is the Isvara Himself, appears to be a samsarin owing to a distinction in the upadhis set up by avidya, in the same way that the Atman or individual Self appears (by avidya) to be identical with the physical body, etc. It is a well-ascertained truth that that notion of identity of the individual Self with the not-Self, — with the physical body and the like, — which is common to all mortal creatures is caused by avidya, just as a pillar (In darkness) is mistaken (through avidya) for a human being. But thereby no essential quality of the man is actually tranferred to the pillar, nor is any essential quality of the pillar actually transferred to the man. Similarly; consciousness never actually pertains to the body; neither can it be that any attributes of the body — such as pleasure, pain and dulness — actually pertain to Consciousness, to the Self; for, like decay and death, such attributes are ascribed to the Self through avidya.
Kshetra is really unaffected by samsara. (Objection) -— No, the two cases are dissimilar. The pillar and the man are both objects of cognition (i.e., external to the Self) and are as such mistaken one for the other by the cogniser through avidya, whereas you say that the body and the Self, which are respectively the cognised and the cogniser, are mistaken one for the other. Thus the illus- tration differs from what has to be illustrated. Wherefore t the attribute of the body, though- an object of cognition, actually pertains to the Self, the cogniser.
* Knowledge and ignorance being, as shewn above, distinct in kind and in effect, the Supreme Being and. the individual Self must be essentially identical, though, through the upadhis such as Buddhi, the Self appears to be a sawsarin— an illusion set up by avidya.— (A).
f The identifying of the Self with the body heing no mere illusion (bhrama).
322 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XIII.
(Answer): — No; for, then the Self would also become unconscious, etc. If the attributes — such as pleasure, pain, delusion, desire, hatred — of the body, etc.. i.e., of Kshetra (Matter) which is an object of cognition, could ever pertain to the Self, the cognizer, then it would be necessary to state a reason for the difference, — i.e., to explain why a few attributes only of Kshetra (an object of cognition) which are ascribed to the Self by avidya actually pertain to the Self, while others such 'as decay and death do not. On the other hand, we are led to infer that those qualities of Kshetra do not actually pertain to the Self, because, like decay and death, tney also are attributed to the Self, by avidya; also because they are objects shunned or sought for, and so on. Such being the case, inasmuch as sawssara which consists in doing and enjoying, and which has its root in the cognized, is only attributed to the cognizer by avidya, — the cognizer is not thereby affected, just as the akasa or ether is not affected by the attributes of dirtiness and concavity which are ascribed to it by children through ignorance- Thus, it cannot be imagined that the Kshetrajna, the Lord, though existing in all Kshetras, can ever so much as smell of the nature of a sawsarin. Nowhere in our experi- ence have we found anything improved or spoiled by a quality being falsely attributed to it through avidya.
As to the contention that the illustration is not quite analogous, we reply that it is wrong to say so.— Why?— For the intended point of agreement between the illustration and the thing illustrated consists in something being falsely attributed through ignorance. In this respect, both agree. But as to the contention that no false attribution of the qualities of the object to the subject is ever experienced, it has been shewn that even the contention fails in the case of decay and death.
2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 323 Avidya inheres in the organ, not in the Self* {Objection): — As possessed of avidya, Kshetraj^a is a sawfcsarin.
{Answer);— -No; for avidya is bora of Tamas. As partaking of the nature of a veil, avidya — whether causing perception of what is quite the contrary of truth, or causing -doubt, or causing nescience or non- perception of a truth— is a Tamasic notion, i.e., a notion born of Tamas; for, on the •dawn of the light of discrimination, it disappears; and ffor instance) we find the same three modes of avidya — such as non*perception» etc.,— arising also from timira (an eye-disease causing dimness of sight), which is Tamasic, as partaking of the nature of a veil.* (Objection):' — The avidya is an inherent property (dharma) of the cogniser.
(Answer) =— No; for, we see that it is the organ of sight that is affected with the disease of timira.
(To explain):— You (the opponent) say: Avidya is an inherent property of the cogniser. As possessed of this avidya, Kshetraj^a is a sam-sarin. It is therefore unjust to say that Kshetrajwa is the Isvara Himself and not a samsariri.
We reply: It is not right to say so; for, we see that such diseases as lead to the "perception of what is contrary to truth, and so on, pertain to the eye, to the organ. Neither the perception of what is contrary to truth, nor the cause thereof (viz., the disease of timira), pertains to the perci- pient; for, when timira is removed by the treatment of the eye, the percipient is no -longer subject to such perception, which is therefore not a property of the percipient. Simi- larly, non-perception, false perception, and doubt, as well as * That is to say, the three forms or avidya are due to a certaha disorder, and are not therefore attributes of the Self— (A), 324 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS, XIIL th'eir cause, properly pertain to the instrument, to one or another sense-organ, but not to the Kshetrajna, the cogniser. More- over, they are all objects of cognition and cannot therefore form the properties of the cogniser, any more than the light of a lamp. And because they are cognisable, it follows also that they can be cognised only through some organ which is distinct from the cogniser; and no philosopher admits that, in the state of liberation wherein all the sense-organs are absent, there is any such evil as avidya. If they (false preception, etc) were essential properties of the Self, the Kshetrajna, as the heat is an essential property of fire, there could be no getting rid of them at any time; and it is impossible for the immutable and formless Self, all-pervadtng like the aliasa, to unite or part with any thing whatsoever- Wherefore we conclude that the Kshetrajwa is ever identical with Is vara. The Lord also says, " Being beginningless and' without qualities."* (xiii. 31).
Scriptural injunctions apply only to the state of bondage.
(Objection):•— Then, in the absence of sa^sara and sawsarins, the conclusion is inevitable that the sastra or scripture serves no purpose, and so on.
(Answer)— No; for, it is admitted by all. The burden of explaining an objectionable point admitted into their systems by all those philosophers who argue the existence of Atman does not lie on only one of them.*— In what way do- all classes of philosophers admit into their systems this objectionable point? — All philosophers who admit the exis- tence of a Self agree that liberated Selfs are not conscious of sawsara or of the state of being bound to samsara j still, it is not believed that their systems are open to the objection that the sastra serves no purpose. So, according to our view, when. * The Lord teaches here that the Self is devoid of attributes.— ( A).
2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 325 the Kshetrajwas become one with the Lord, then let the jastra serve no purpose. It has, however, a purpose to serve where there is avidya. Just as, with the dualists (dvaitins) of all classes, the sastra has a purpose to serve only in the state of bondage but not in the state of liberation, so with us also.
Bondage and liberation are not real states of the Self.
Objection.—All dualistic philosophers (Dvaitins) hold that states of bondage and liberation are real conditions of the Self, real in the literal sense of the terms. Since thus there really exist something, to be avoided and something attained, as also the means thereto, the sastra has,some purpose to serve. But in the case of the non-dualists (Advaitins), the dual world is unreal; and as the bondage of the self is caused- by avidya, it is also unreal. Thus thesastra would have no subject to treat, of and would therefore serve no purpose.
(Answer).•—■No; for, the Self cannot (really) exist in different states. — If bondage and liberation be states of the Self, they must be either simultaneous or successive. They cannot be simultaneous states of the Self as they are mutually opposed, just as motion and rest cannot be simultaneous states of one and the same thing. If successive, they are either caused or uncaused by another. If uncaused by another, there can be no liberation. If caused by another, they cannot be inherent in the Self and cannot therefore be real. And this is opposed to the hypothesis*. Moreover, if we wouid deter- mine the order of their occurrence, the state of bondage should come first, without a beginning, but having an end; and this is opposed to all evidence, Similarly, ifc has tobs admitted that the state of liberation has a beginning and has * That the states of bondage and liberation are real conditions of the Self.
326 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XIIL no end; which is alike opposed to all evidence. Nor is it possible to maintain the eternal ity of that which passes from one state to another.
Now, if, in order to avoid the objection of non-eternality, it be held that the states of bondage and liberation do nc* pertain to the Self, then even the dualists cannot avoid the objection that the sastra has no purpose to serve. The dualists and the non-dualists being thus similarly situated, the burden of answering the objection does not lie on the non-dualists alone.
Scriptural injunctions concern the unenlightened.
In point of fact, the objection that the sastra would have no purpose to serve cannot be brought against non-dualism. for, the sastra is concerned with the ignorant who view things as they present themselves to their consciousness. — It is, indeed, the ignorant wb,o identify themselves with the cause and the effect, * with the not-Self. But not the wise j for, these latter do not identify themselves with the cause and the effect, since they knew that the Self is distinct frcm the cause and the effect. Not even the dullest or the most insane person regards water and fire, or light and darkness, as indentical; how much less a wise man. Wherefore, the injunctions and prohibitions of the sastra do not apply to him who knows the Self to be distinct from the cause and the effect. Of course, when a certain person has been command- ed to do an action in the words • " Do this, O Devadatta," no other person, such as Vishwu-mitra,. though standing near and hearing the word of command, thinks that he (Vishwu-mitra) has been so ordered; he might, however, think so if he did * The cause is agency and the effect is enjoyment; or the cause is fcaraia, adrishta, arvd the t fleet is the beefy to which karma has given xise.— (A-) 2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 327 not understand to- whom the injunction has been addressed. So, too, in the case of the cause and the effect here.
(Objection): — Notwithstanding his knowledge that the Self is unconnected with the cause and the effect, it is quite possible for a wise man to regard himself — in reference to the connection (between the Self and the body, etc,) once set up byavidya.(praknti) — as still bound by the injunctions of the sastra,- thinking that he has been enjoined to adopt a certain course of action by which to attain a desirable end, and to avoid a certain other course of action which leads to an evil; just as a father and his sons # regard every one among themselves as bound by the injunctions and prohibitions addressed to every other, notwithstanding their knowledge that they are all persons distinct from each other.
(Answer): — No; it is only prior to the knowledge of the Self unconnected with causes and effects that it is possible for one to identify the Self with them; for, it is only after. having duly observed the injurctions and prohibitions of the sastra — but not before t — that a person attains to the know- ledge that the Self is quite unconnected with causes and effects. Hence the conclusion that the injunctions and prohibitions of the sastra concern only the ignorant (Objection): — Neither those who know that the Self is independent of the body, etc, nor those who regard the mere body as the Self are, (according to non-dualists), concerned with the -injunctions such as *' He who desires svarga must sacrifice,'* " Let none eat kalanja"; thus, there being no person who would observe scriptural injurxtions, the sastra would have no purpose to serve.
(Answer): — Performance of enjoired acts and abstention from prohibited acts are possible in the case of those who * Vide Bnha. Up. 1-5-H 328 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XIII.
know of the Self only through the Scriptures. — He who knows Brahman and has realised the identity of the Kshetra- jna with the Lord does not certainly engage in the Vidic rites. Neither does the person who denies the existence of the Self and of the other world engage in such rites. But, he who derives his idea of the Self only from the scriptural injunc- tions,— i.e., who believes in the existence of the Self* because the teaching of the sastra enjoining certain actions and prohibiting (certain others) would otherwise be inexplicable, but who does not directly know the Self in His essential nature, — cherishes a longing for the results of the Vedic rites and devoutly performs them: a fact which is evident to us all. Wherefore, it cannot be said that the sastra would have no purpose to serve.
(Objection): — On seeing the wise not performing Vedic rites, their followers also may not perform them; and thus the sastra would serve no purpose at all.
(Answer): — No; for very rare is the person who attains wisdom. It is, indeed, only one among many that attains wisdom- As we now see. Nor do the ignorant follow the wise men j for, attachment and other evil passions necessarily lead to action. We do see people engaging in the practice of Black Magic, t Lastly, action is natural to man, as has been said already, "It is nature that acts." (v. 14).
Therefore, sawsara is only based on avidya and exists only for the ignorant man who sees the world as it appears to him- Neither avidya nor its effect pertains to Kshetrajwa pure and simple. Nor is illusory knowledge able to affect the * Knowing nothing more than that the Self exists and survives, the body; this conviction being formed on the basis of the teaching of the Karma-kawda..
t This fact shews that the ignorant do not always follow the wise men. In spite of protests of wise men, we find some ignorant men resorting to Sorcery or Black Magic.
2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 329 Real Thine- The water of the mirage, for instance, can by no means render the saline soil miry with moisture. So, too, avidya can do nothing to Kshetrajwa. Wherefore it has been said, ' Do thou also know Me as Kshetrajwa * (xiii. 2); and ' By unwisdom wisdom is covered ' (v. 15).
Learned but deluded.
(Objection): — How is it that the learned (pandits) als^ feel — " I am so and so*," "thist is mine,"-— like the saw-- ■sarins?
(Answer); — Listen. Their learning consists in regard- ing the body itself as their Self! $ If, on the other hand, they really see the immutable Kshetrajna, they would desire neither pleasure nor action with the attachment ' let it be mine *; for, pleasure and action are but changes of state.
Thus, then, it is the ignorant man who, longing for results, engages in action- The wise man, On the contrary, who sees the immutable Self, cherishes no longing for results and does not therefore engage in action; and when, as a consequence, the activity of the aggregate — of the body and the senses — ceases, we say, only figuratively, that he abstains from action.
There is, again, another sort of learning professed by some other (class of panr^its), which may be stated as follows — The Lord Himself is Kshetrajna, and Kshetra is quite distinct from Kshetrajna who perceives it; but I am a * Referring to superior birth, etc.
f Referring to wife, children, etc.
X That is to say, those who bold this belief are not pandits in the proper sense of the terra. We do admit the existence of such a belief; only we regard it as pratlbhasika, as due to illusion, while, in point of absolute truth, the Self is unaffected by sawsara.
330 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XIIL samsarin subject to pleasure and pain. To bring about the .cessation of sawsara I should first acquire a discriminative knowledge of Kshetra and Kshetrajwa then attain a direct perception of the Kshetrajwa, the Lord, by means of dhyana or meditation of the Lord, and then dwell in the true nature of the Lord.* He who is given to know thus and he who teaches thus f, neither of them is the Kshetrajwa.
He who holds this view and hopes to make out that the tfastra concerning bondage and liberation has a meaning is the meanest of the learned. He is the slayer of the Self. Ignorant in himself, he confounds others, devoid as he is of the traditional key (sampradaya) to the teaching of the *astras. Ignoring what is directly taught t, he suggests what is not taught. Therefore, not being acquainted with the traditional interpretation, he is to be neglected as- an ignorant man, though learned in all sastras.
The relation of the Self to samsara is a mere illusion Now as to the objections that Isvara would be a samsarin if He be one with Kshetrajwa, and that if Kshetraj- was be one with the Isvara there can be no samsara because there is no samsarin: these objections have been met by saying that knowledge and ignorance are distinct in kind and in effects, as admitted by alls — To explain: The Real Entity (viz., Isvara) is not affected by the defect (samsara) attribut- ed to Him through ignorance of that Real Entity. This has * The individual Ego is distinct from the Lord, and should strive to attain to the state of Isvara by means of the knowledge which can be brought about through dhyana.— (D).
t i.e., The pupil and the Teacher— (A.)
t In such passages as " That Thou art " " This Self is Brahman,"— (Mawdukya— Up-) § That is to say, by saying that the Lord and the soul are one in reality, while illusion makes Kshetrajwa a samsarin— (A).
2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 331 also been illustrated by the fact that the water of the mirage does not wet the saline soil. And the objection raised on the ground that in the absence of a samsarin there can be no sa»»sara has been answered by explaining thai the sawsara, and the sawsarin are creatures of avidya.
(Objection): — The very fact that Kshetrajraa is possess- ed of avidya makes Him a sa^sarin; and the effect thereof — happiness and misery and so on — is directly perceived.
(Answer); — No; for, what is perceived is an attribute of Kshetra (matter) j and Kshetrajwa, the cogniser, cannot be vitiated by the blemish due to it To explain.* whatever, blemish — not inhering in Kshetrajna — you ascribe to Him, it comes under the cognised, and therefore forms a property of Kshetra, and not a property of Kshetrajwa. Nor is Kshetra- j«a affected by it, since such intimate association of the cogniser and the cognised is impossible. If there should be such an association, then that blemish could not be cognised That is to say, if misery and nescience were properties of the Self, how could they be objects of immediate perception *? Or, how coul d they ever be regarded as the properties of the Self P t Since it has been determined that all that is know- able is Kshetra (xiii. 5-6), and that Kshetrajna is the knower and none else (xiii. 1). it is nothing but sheer ignorance which may lead one to contradict it by saying that nescience and misery and the like are the attributes and specific properties of Kshetrajna and that they are immediately perceived as such.
* If the Self could perceive His own properties, He oould also perceive Himself; which is absurd, since one and the same thing cannot be both the agent and the object of an action.
t Whatever is perceived, as for instance form and colour, cannot be a property of the perceiver.
332 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XIII.
The perception of the relation of avidya, etc, to the Self is due to illusion.
* Now asks (the opponent): — Whose is this avidya?
[To explain: — This avidya which accounts for the mis- taken notion is not an independent entity and should inhere in something else which has an independent existence. But it cannot inhere in Chit or Consciousness which is vidya by nature, and there is no independent entity outside Chit. Hence the question. — (A).]
(Reply): — By whomsoever it is seen- [To explain: Do you ask to know whether avidya inheres asan attribute in something else which is an indepen- dent entity, or to know in particular what that entity is wherein it inheres? In the first case, there is no occasion for the question at all, for, if avidya be cognised, then, since it cannot exist by itself, it must be cognised as inhering in something else. If, on the other hand, avidya be not cog. nised, then how do you know that avidya exists at all?
The opponent perhaps means to ask what that entity is wherein avidya inheres. Hence the question that follows. (A).]
(Opponent): — By whom is it seen?
(Beply) — As regards this we say: There is no use asking the question. " By whom is avidya seen?" For, if avidya is perceived, you perceive also the one who has that avidya. When its possessor is perceived, it is not proper to ask, " Whose is it?" When the possessor of cows is seen, there is no occasion for the question '* whose are the cows?'* * In the following discussion, the opponent tries to drive the Advaitin to the conclusion that the Kshetrajna is tainted with Avidya and cannot therefore be identical with the isvara, while the Advaitin avoids it by shewing that the Kshetrajwa can really have no connection what- ever with Avidya which, cognised as it is by Him, is always distinct from him.
2] MATTER AND SPIRIT. 333 [To explain: Since avidya is an object of cognition, and since the Self wherein it inheres reveals Himself in one's own consciousness — there is no occasion for the question. — (A)].
(Opponent): — The illustration is not analogous to the case in point. Since the cows and their possessor are objects of immediate perception, their relation is also on object of immediate perception; and so the question has no meaning. But not so are avidya and its possessor both object of immediate perception- If they were, the question Id have been meaningless.
{Reply) ' — If you know to what particular entity, not immediately perceived, avidya is related, of what avail is it to you?
[The meaning is -.—Though - the possessor of avidya is not immediately perceived, still, you know in what entity avidya inheres- Where is then any occasion for your question?