Neither could Arjuna's question with which the Third Discourse opens be satisfactorily explained (on that theory). How might Arjuna falsely impute to the Lord— as he did in iii, I — that which is alleged (by the opponent) to have 26 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. II.
been taught before by the Lord and to have not been heard by Arjuna, — namely, the impossibility of both knowledge and works being followed by one and the same person, as well as the superiority of knowledge to works?
Moreover, if conjunction of knowledge and works be intended for all, it must have been intended for Arjuna as well. In that ase how might Arjuna ask about only one of the two.
* Tell roe conclusively that which is the better of the two*" (v. 1)?
If a physician has prescribed a mixture composed of both sweet and cooling articles for a man who wishes to reduce bilious heat (in the system), there cannot arise the question 1 which one alone of the two ingredients can alleviate bilious heat *?
Arj una's question, it might be alleged on the other sidt, was due to his not having understood aright the teaching of the Lord. Even theni the reply of the Lord should have been given in accordance with the question and in the following form: " I meant a conjuncti6n of knowledge and works; why are you thus mistaken?'* It would not, on the other hand, be proper to answer in the words " A twofold path was taught by Me " (iii. 3), — an answer which is not in accordance with the question and is altogether beside it.
If it be held that knowledge is to be conjoined with such works only as are enjoined in the smriti, even then the assign- ing of the two paths to two distinct classes of people respectively and other statements in that connection would be equally inexplicable. Moreover, Arj una's blame of the Lord as conveyed by his words " why dost Thou command me to do this horrible deed?" (iii. 1) would be inexplicable, 10] SANKHYA YOGA. 27 since he knew that figting was enjoined in the smriti as a Kshatriya's duty.
It is not, therefore, possible for anybody to show that the Gita-Sastra teaches a conjunction of knowledge with any work whatever, enjoined in the sruti or in the smriti.
Some cases of apparent conjunction explained.
Now a person who, having been first engaged in works owing to ignorance and worldly attachment and other evil tendencies, and having since attained purity of mind by sacrificial rites, gifts, austerity, etc., arrives at the knowledge of the grand truth that "all this is one, the Brahman, the Abso- lute, the non-agent," may continue performing works in the same manner as before with a view to set an example to the masses, though neither works nor their results attract him any* longer. This semblance of active life on his part cannot constitute that course of action with which knowledge is sought to be conjoined as a means of attaining moksha, any more than Lord Vasudeva's activity in His disharge of the duty of the military caste can constitute the action that is to be conjoined with His knowledge as a means to moksha, or that conduces to the attainment of any specific end of His; egotism and hope of reward being absent in both alike. He who knows the truth does not think 'I act,' nor does he long for the results.
Or to take another example: suppose a man seeking svarga or other such objects of desire goes through the ceremony of the Agui-ldhana as a preliminary to the perfor- mance of sacrificial rites such as the Agnihotra whereby to attain his desire, and then commences the Agnihotra, which bas thus become a kamya (interested) rite; and suppose further that the desire vanishes when the sacrifice is half completed* 28 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS II.
but that the man goes on with it all the same: the Agnihotra can no longer be regarded as an interested rite- Accordingly our Lord says " though doing, he is not tainted," (v. 7), and " The Self neither acts nor is tainted." (xiii. 31).
Now as regards the passages, *' Do thou also perform action as did the ancients in the olden time** (iv. 15), and " By action alone, indeed, did Janaka and others aim at perfection " (iii. 20), we must distinguish two cases and interpret the passages thus: First, suppose that Janaka and the rest were engaged in works though they knew the truth. Then, they did so lest people at large might go astray; whereas they were sincerely convinced that * the senses '-—but not the Self — were engaged in the objects (iii. 28). Thus they reached perfection by knowledge alone. Though the stage of renunciation had been reached, they attained perfection without abandoning works; that is to say, they did not formally renounce works.
Secondly, suppose that they had not known the truth. Then the passages should be interpreted thus; — By means of work dedicated to Is vara, Janaka and the rest attained perfection, — ' perfection * meaning here either 'purity of mind * or 'the dawn of true knowledge.' It is to this doctrine, that the Lord refers when he says " The Yogin performs action for the purification of the self.'* (v. 11) Elsewhere, after having said that ' man attains perfection by worshipping Him with his own duty ' (xviii. 46), the Lord again recommends the path of knowledge, to him who has attained perfection, in the following words: " How he who has attained perfection reaches Brahman, that do thou learn from Me." (xviii. 50).
The conclusion, therefore, of the Bhagavad-glta is that salvation is attained by knowledge alone, not by knowledge 11] SANKHYA YOGA. 29 conjoined with works. That such is the teaching of the Gita. we shall shew here and there in the following sections accord- ing to the context.
The Self is immortal.
How finding no means other than Self-knowledge for the deliverance of Arjuna who was thus confounded as to his duty and was deeply plunged in the mighty ocean of grief, Lord Vasudeva who wished to help him out of it introduced him to* Self-knowledge in the following words:— The Lord said: ii. For those who deserve no grief thou hast grieved, and words of wisdom thou speakest. For the living and for the dead the wise grieve not* Such people as Bhishmaand Dro«a deserve no grief t, for they are men of good conduct and are eternal in their real nature. You have grieved for them saying " I am the cause of their death; of what avail are pleasures of dominion and other things to me left alone without them? " And you also * He who knows not the Self is subject to illusion. He who is subject to illusion will obtain right knowledge by devoutly listening to the words of the Scripture and the spiritual teacher, and by investigating into the nature of things as they are with a view to clearly understand such teachings. This shews to what class of persons this teaching is addressed. — (A.)
t Whether you regard their present personalities or their real nature. Personally they are men of good conduct; in their real nature (as identi- cal with the Absolute) they are eternal.
30 THE BHGAVAD GITA. [DlS. II.
speak the words - of wise men. Thus you 'exhibit inconsist- ency in yourself, — foolishness and wisdom, — like a maniac. For t, the wise (pa«<iita/j) — those who know the Self — grieve neither for the living nor for the dead. They alone are wise who know the Self. For, the sruti says: " Having obtained wisdom (p^wiitya, i- e, know- ledge of the Self) in its entirety..." (BHL Up. III.
5,1.)
That is, you grieve those who are really eternal and who really deserve no grief; wherefore you are foolish.
(Question): — Why do they deserve no grief? (Answer): — For, they are eternal. (Question):— How? (Answer):-~The Lord says: I 2. Never did I not exist, nor thou, nor these rulers of men; and no one of us will ever hereafter cease to exist.
Never did I cease to exist; on the other hand, I always did exist; that is, through the past bodily births and deaths, I always existed. So always, never did- you cease to exist j •on the other hand, you always did exist. So, never did these rulers of men cease to exist; on the other hand, they always did exist- So, neither shall we ever cease to exist; on the other hand, we shall all certainly continue to exist even after * Bef erring to what Arjuna said in i. 43 et seq. — (A.)
f The second half of the verse is intended to show that Arjuna's delusion was due to his ignorance of the true nature of the Self.— (A.)
12—13] SANKHYA YOGA. 31 the death of these bodies. As the Self, the Atman, we are -eternal in all the three periods of time (past, present and future.)
The plural ' us ' is used with reference to the bodies that are different; it does not mean that there are more than one Self.
(Question): — Now, how is the Self eternal? (Answer): — Here follows an illustration: 13, Just as in this body the embodied (Self) passes into childhood and youth and old age, so does He pass into another body. There the wise man is not distressed.
We see how the embodied Self passes unchanged in the present body into the three stages (avasthas) of childhood, youth or the middle age, and old age or the age of decay, all distinct from one another. At the close of the first of thess stages the Self is not dead, nor is He born again at the com- mencement of the second; on the other hand, we see the Self passing unchanged into the second and, third stages. Just so does the Self pass unchanged into another body. Such being the case- the wise man is not troubled (in mind) about it.
Endurance is a condition of wisdom.
Now Arjuna might argue as follows: It is true that when one knows the Self to be eternal there is no room for the distressful delusion that the Self will die. But quite common 32 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. II.
among people, as we see, is the distressful delusion that the Self is subject to heat and cold, pleasure and pain, as also to grief due to the loss of pleasure or to the suffering of pain.
As against the foregoing, the Lord says: 14. The sense-contacts it is, O son of Kunti* which cause heat and cold; pleasure and pain; they come and go, they are impermanent. Them endure bravely, O descendant of Bharata.
The senses are those of hearing and the like, by which sound and other things are perceived. It is the contacts of the senses with their objects such as sound—or, according to another interpretation, it is the senses and the contacts — i. e., the sense- objects, such as sound, which are contacted by the senses, — which produce heat and cold, pleasure and pain. Cold is pleasant at one time and painful at another. So also heat is of an inconstant nature, t But pleasure and pain are constant in their respective natures as pleasure and pain. Wherefore heat and cold are mentioned separately # Here Arjuna is addressed as the * son of Kunti ' and again as the- descendant of Bharata,' to show that he alone is fit to receive the teaching who is well descended on the father's as well as on the mother's, side. — (AO t The separate mention of heat and cold which should properly be included under the category of objects (vishayas) implies that the sub- jective feelings of harmony and discord are the immediate antecedents of pleasure and pain. The external objects first produce subjective changes, such as the sensations of heat and cold or the feelings of harmony and disoord, and then produce pleasure and pain,-— (A.)
14—15] SANKHYA YOGA. 33 from pleasure and pain. Because * these sense-contacts, etc., have, by nature, a beginning and an end, therefore they are •not permanent. Wherefore do thou bravely endure t them, heat and cold &c.; i.e., give not thyself up to joy or grief on their account.
(Question): — What good will accrue to him who bears heat and cold and the like P 15. That wise man whom, verily, these afflict not, O chief of men, to whom pleasure and pain are same, he for immortality is fit.
That person to whom pleasure and pain are alike,— who neither exults in pleasure nor feels dejected in pain, — who is a man of wisdom, whom heat and cold and other things such as those mentioned above do not affect in virtue of his vision of the eternal Self, — that man, firm in his vision of the eternal Self and bearing calmly the pairs of opposites (such as heat and cold), is able to attain immortality fmoksha). * #Some MSS. of the Bhashya liere add. " It may be objected that if the objects of the senses or their contacts give pleasure and pain, the wheel of mundane existence will be endless, since those objects and their contacts with the senses are endless. This objection does not apply here, for these..."
f Here is laid down a second condition of right knowledge, viz,t calm endurance in pleasure and pain — (A).
% Though by endurance alone one may not be able to secure the highest human end, still, when coupled with discrimination and indiffer- ence to worldly objects and pleasures, it becomes a means to the right knowledge, which leads to deliverance. He who has satisfied all the conditions laid down can realize the nature of his own eternal Self, and then only is he fit for the final teaching that leads to deliverance. — (A).
34- THE BHAGAVAD GITA, [DlS. II.
The Real and the Unreal.
For the following reason also it is proper that thou shculdst abandon grief and distressful delusion and calmly endure heat and cold, etc. For, 16. Of the unreal no being there is; there is no non being of the real. Of both these is fhe truth seen by the seers of the Essence.
There is no bhava — no being, no existence — of the unreal (asat) such as heat and cold as well as their causes. Heat cold, etc. i and the causes thereof, which are {no doubt) perceived through the organs of perception, are not absolutely real (vastu-sat); for they are effects or changes (vikara), and every change is temporary. For instance, no objective form, such as an earthen pot, presented to consciousness by the eye, proves to be real, because it is not perceived apart from clay. Thus every effect is unreal, because it is not perceived as distinct from its cause. Every effect, such as a pot, is unreal, also because it is not perceived before its production and after its destruction. * And likewise the cause, such as clay, is un- real because it is not perceived apart from its cause, t (Objection): — Then it comes to this: nothing at all ©XISlS' <|* * Op. ' Whatever exists not in the beginning or in the end exists not really in the present.' (Gandap^dakorikas on the Mandwkya- upanishad. IV, 31).—-(A).
fThis implies that the Absolute Reality is not conditioned by causality; and therefore the perception of the series of causes and effects mast be. illusory.— -(A).
t The objector evidently thinks that there cannot be a thing which is neither a cause nor an effect.
6] SANKHYA YOGA. 35 (Answer):-— No (such objection applies here). For, every fact of experience involves twofold consciousness (buddhi), the consciousness of the real (sat) and the consciousness of the unreal (asat). Now that is (said to be) real, of which our consciousness fails; and that to be unreal, of which our con- sciousness fails.* Thus the distinction of reality and unreality depends on our consciouness. Now, in all our experience, twofold consciousness arises with reference to one and the same substratum (samanadhikara«a^, as ' a cloth existent,' c a pot existent/ * an elephant existent* — not as in the expression a blue lotus * t— and so on everywhere. Of the two, the con- sciousness of pot, etc., is temporary as was already pointed out, but not the consciousness of existence. Thus, the object corres- ponding to our consciousness of pot, etc., is unreal, because the consciousness is temporary; but what corresponds to our * There must be an Absolute Reality which is neither a cause nor an effect. For, what is fleeting mast be uureal, and what is constant must be real. In the case of our illusory perception of a rope mistaken for a snake, we hold that the snake is unreal because our consciousness of it fails, whereas what corresponds to " this " in the perception "this is a, snake, " — viz., the rope, — is real, because our consciousness of it is con- stant through all its illusory manifestations. The reality and the unreality of things are thus to be inferred from our own experience.
f Blue and lotus being two realities. Existence and the pot refer — as in the sentence * this is the man we saw ' — to only one thing really existing. They are not two distinct realities, related to each other as" the universal and the particulars, or as a substance and its attribute. If the pot, etc., were as real as existence we should be at a loss to explain why, with reference to one and the same substratum, the two— existence and. the pot or the like — should always present themselves together to our consciousness any more than a pot and a cloth. Illusion, on the other hand, can account for the twofold consciousness of existence and the pot and so on, arising with reference to one and the same substratum, there being only one Reality — namely, that which corresponds to existence— and all the rest being unreal, as in the case of a rope mistaken for various other things which are unreal.— (A).
36 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. II consciousness of existence is not unreal, because the conscious- ness is unfailing.
{Objection): — When the pot is absent and the conscious- ness of it fails, the consciousness of existence also fails.
(Answer):— No * (such objection applies here). For the consciousness of existence still arises with reference to other objects such as cloth. The consciousness of existence corres- ponds indeed only to the attributive (vise»ha»a)« (Objectioti)v — Lite the consciousness of existence, the consciousness of the pot also arises with reference to another pot (present).
(Answer): — You cannot say so, for the consciousness of the pet does not arisewith reference to a cloth.- (Objection): — Neither does the consciousness of existence arise in the case of the pot that has disappeared.
(Answer):— You cannot say so, for there is no substantive (viseshya) present The consciousness of existence corres- ponds to the attributive; and as there can be no consciousness of the attributive without that of the corresponding substan- tive, how can the consciousness of the attributive arise in the absence of the substantive? — Not that there is no objective reality present, corresponding to the consciousness of existence.
(Objection): — If the substantive such as the pot be unreal, the twofold consciousness arising with reference to one and the same substratum is inexplicable, t * The consciousness of existence still arises in conjunction with the absence of the pot. "When we say ' here is no pot/ existence is- signified by reference to the place where the pot is said to be absent t The objector means this: In all our experience, we find both substantive and the attributive to be real. So, here, the pot must be a* isjalfcs existence.— (A) 16—17] SANKHYA YOGA. 37 (-Answer): — No; for, we find the twofold consciousness arising with reference to one and the same substratum, even • though one of the two objects corresponding to the twofold consciousness is unreal, as for instance in the case of a mirage, where our consciousness takes the form "this is water*** Therefore, there is no existence of the unreal, the fictitious — such as the body and the pairs of opposites— -or of their causes. Neither does the real —the Self (Atman)— ever cease to exist; for, as already pointed out, our consciousness of the Self never fails.
This conclusion — that the real is ever existent and the unreal is never existent — regarding the two, the Self and the non-Self, the real and the unreal, is always present before the minds of those who attend only to truth, to the real nature of the Brahman, the Absolute, the All, * That.* Thou hadst therefore better follow the view of such truth-seers, shake off grief and delusion, and, being assured that all phenomena (vik&ras) are really non-existent and are, like the mirage, mere false appearances, do thou calmly bear heat and cold and other pairs of opposites, of which some are constant and others inconstant in their nature as productive of pleasure or pain.
What, then, is that which is ever real? Listen:— 17. But know that to b<a, imperishable by which all this is pervaded. None can cause the destruction of That, the Inexhaustible.
Uulike the unreal, That— you must understand— does not vanish; That, the Brahman, the ' Sat ', the Real, by which all this world, including the akasa, is pervaded, just as pots and 38 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. II.
other objects are pervaded by the akasa or space. Brahman does not undergo increase or diminution and is therefore inexhaustable. This Brahman, the ' Sat *, is not exhausted in Itself; for, unlike the bcdy It has no parts. Nor does It diminish by (loss of) anything belonging to It; for, nothing belongs to the Self. Devadatta, for instance, is ruined by loss of wealth; but Brahman does not suffer loss in that way. "Wherefore, nobody can bring about the disappearance or destruction of the inexhaustible Brahman. Nobody — not even the Isvara, the Supreme Lord— can destroy the Self. For, the Self is Brahman Itself and one cannot act upon oneself.
What, then, is the unreal (asat), whose existence is not constant? Listen: 18. These bodies of the embodied (Self) who is eternal, indestructible and unknowable, are said to have an end. Do fight, therefore, O descendant of Bharata.
It is said by the enlightened that these bodies of the Self, who is eternal, indestructible and unknowable, have an end, like those seen in dreams or produced by a juggler. — The end of such objects as the mirage consists in the cessation — as the result of investigation into their nature by proper tests of truth — of the idea of reality which has been associated with them. So also these bodies have an end.
[No tautology is involved in the use of both 'eternal* and ' indestructible; * for, two kinds of eternality and of des- truction are met with in our experience. The physical body, for instance, entirely disappearing when reduced to ashes, is 18] SANKHYA YOGA. 39 said to have been destroyed. The physical body, while exist- ing as such, may be transformed owing to sickness or such •other causes, and it is then said to have ceased to be (some- thing) and to have become (something else). " Eternal " and ' indestructible * here imply that the Self is subject to neithef sort of destruction. Otherwise, the eternality of Atman, the Self, might perhaps be understood to be like that of clay or other material objects. It is the denial of this which is conveyed by the two epithets.]
The Self is unknowable, — not determinable by the senses (pratyaksha) or any other means of knowledge.
{Objection):— The Self is determined by the Agama or Revelation, and by perception, etc., prior to Revelation.
(Answer): — The objection is untenable, for the Self is .self-determined (svatas-siddba). When the Self, the knower (pramatri), has been determined, then only is possible a search for proper authorities on the part of the knower with a view to obtain right knowledge. In fact, without determining the Self — 'I ami'— none seeks to determine the knowable objects. Indeed the Self- is unknown (aprasiddha^ to nobody. And the Scripture (Sastra) which is the final * authority obtains its authoritativeness regarding the Self, as serving only to eliminate the adhyaropana or superim position (on the Self) of the attributes t alien to Him, but not as revealing.what has been altogether unknown. The sruti also describes the Self thus: — " That which is the Immediate, the Unremote, the Brahman, which is the Self, which is within all." (Bri- Up. ii. 4. I.).
**•«., the last. The Sruti teaches that the Self is the only real thing and that all others are illusory and non-existent. No prama*ta or authority can survive the realisation of this truth taughtby the sruti- — (A) f Such as humanity and agency.
40 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. IL Because the Self is thus eternal (nitya) and immutable (avikriya), therefore, do thou fight,— do not abstain from fighting.
Here the duty of fighting is not enjoined. Arjuna had already been engaged in fighting. But overpowered by grief and delusion he abstained from fighting. It is only the removal of obstructive causes (pratibandha, viz-, grief and delusion) that is here attempted by the Lord. Wherefore in the words ' do thou fight * the Lord issues here no new command (vidhi); He only refers to what is commonly known already.* Tne Self is unconcerned in action.
The Lord now quotes two Vedic verses to confirm the view that the Gita-sastra is intended to remove the cause of sawsara, such as grief and delusion, but not to enjoin works.
It is only a false notion of yours, says the Lord, that you think thus: " Bhishma and others will be killed by me in the battle; I will be their slayer." — How? — 19. Whoever looks upon Him as the slayer, and whoever looks upon Him as the slain, both these know not aright- He slays not, nor is He slain.
He who understands the Self — of whom we are speak- ing— as the agent in the act of slaying, and he who regards Him as the sufferer in the act of slaying when the body * That, is to say, the Lord does not here mean that fighting is abso- lutely necessary. He has simply shewn that Arjuna had no reason to desist from the fighting in which he had engaged of himself.
19—20] SANKHYA YOGA. 41 is slain, neither of these two has understood the Self aright, for want of discrimination. Those who think ' I slay ' or { I am slain ' when the body is slain, and thus identify the Self with the object of the consciousness of ' I,' the ego (aham),— they do not understand the real nature of the Self. Being immutable (avikriya). the Self is neither the agent nor the object of the action of slaying.
The Self is immutable How is the Self immutable? — This is answered by the aiext verse • <mi?*m omits* gcmr 20. He is not born, nor does He ever die; after having been, He again ceases not to be; nor the reverse. Unborn, eternal, unchangeable and primeval, He is not slain when the body is slain.
He is not born; no such change of condition as birth takes place in the Salf. Nor does He die; this denies the last change of condition called death — * Ever * should be construed with the denial of every change, thus: He is never born, never dies, and so on. — For, the Self, having once exist- ed does not afterwards cease to be any more. In ordinary parlance he is said to die who, having once existed, after- wards ceases to be. Neither does the Self come into existence, like the body, having not existed before- Where- fore He is unborn. For, he is said to be born who, having not existed, comes into existence. Not so is the Self.
42 THE BHAGAVAD GITA. [DlS. II.