Tamasic Action, ^ 25. The action which is undertaken from delusion, without regarding the consequence, loss, injury, and ability, that is declared to be Tamasic. Loss: Loss of power and of wealth accruing from the action done. Injury to living beings. AbiUiy; one's own ability to complete the work* Sattvic Agent. Now the Lord proceeds to treat of the distinction amotig agents* 26. Free from attachment, not given to ego- tism, endued with firmness and vigour, unaffected in success and failure, an agent is said to be Sattvic.
Success: Attainment of the fruit of the action done. Unaffected: as having been impelled to act merely by the authority of the sastra, not by a desire for the fruits.
Rajasic Agent.
27. Passionate, desiring to attain the fruit of action, greedy, cruel, impure, subject to joy and sorrow, such an agent is said to be Rajasic.
Greedy: thirsting for another's property, not giving away one's own property to worthy persons, etc. Gruel: doing harm to others. Impure: devoid of external and internal purity. Subject to joy and sorrow: rejoicing on the attain- ment of what is desirable, and feeling sorry on the attainment of what is not desirable or on having to part with what is desirable. Joy or sorrow may arise at the success or failure of the action in which he is engaged Tamasic Agent.
28* Unsteady, vulgar, unbending, deceptive, wicked, indolent, desponding, and procrastinating, (such) an agent is said to be Tamasic.
466 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XVIII.
Vulgar: quite uncultured in intellect (buddhi), who is like a child. Unbending: not bowing like a stick to anybody. Deceptive: concealing his real power. Wicked: setting others at variance with each other. Indolent: not doing even what ought to be done. Desponding: always depressed in spirit. Procrastinating': postponing duties too long, always sluggish, not doing even in a month what ought to be done to-day or to-morrow. Intellect and Firmness are threefold according to gunas.
29. The threefold division of intellect and firmness according to qualities, about to be taught fully and distinctively (by Me), hear thou, O Dha- nanjaya.
Qualities: Guwas, such as Sattva. The first half of the verse contains in an aphoristic form what is going to be taught. Dhananjaya; the conqueror of wealth. Arjuna is so called because he acquired much wealth,— human and divine, material and spiritual,— during his tour of conquest through the four quarters of the earth.
Sattvic Intellect.
Sattvic Intellect.
30. That which knows action and inaction, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, fear and absence of fear, bondage and libera- tion, that intellect is Sattvic, O Partha.
Action (pravritti): the cause of bondage, the karma- snarga, the path of action as taught in the sastra. Inaction {nivritti) •* the cause of liberation, the path of samnyasa — As * action' (pravritti) and ' inaction* (niwitti) occur in connec- tion with ' bondage ' (bandha) and ' liberation ' (moksha), they have been interpreted to mean the paths of action and renun- ciation (karma and samnyasa). What...done: the necessity for doing or not doing — by one who relies on the sastra — at particular places and times,- actions producing visible or invisible results, according as they are enjoined or prohibited by the scriptural or social ethics. Fear etc.: the cause of fear and the cause of fearlessness, either visible or invisible. Bondage and liberation: together with their causes. Knowledge is a vritti or function or state of intellect (buddhi), whereas in- tellect is what functions or undergoes change of state.* Even firmness (dhnti) is only a paricular function or state of intellect.
ftajasie Intellect.
31. That by which one wrongly understands dharma and a-dharrna, and also what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, that intellect, O Partha, is Rajasic.
Dharma is what is ordained in the scriptures and a- dharma is what is prohibited in them. WIiat.„dom; the same that was mentioned already, (xviii, 30). f Wrongly; in opposition to what is determined by all (authorities.).
* This is to show how the knowledge (jrcana) whose threefold 'nature has been described already (xviii, 20-22) is different from the iatellect (buddhi) whose threefold nature is here described- — A.
f Dharma and a-dharma here spoken of refer to the * apurva * i*.e,, the forms which actions assume after their performance till th«ir effects become perceptible; whereas karya and a-karya refer to the performance •or the nou-psrformJince of the acts. Hence no tautology. — A.
468 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA [DlS. XVIIL Tamasic Intellect.
32. That which, enveloped in darkness, sees adharma as dharma and all things perverted, that intellect, O Partha, is Tamasic.
It takes quite a perverted view of all things to be known. Sattvic Firmness.
33. The firmness which is ever accompanied by Yoga, and by which the activities of thought, of life-breaths and sense-organs, O Partha, are held fast, such a firmness is Sattvic.
Toga: samadhi or concentration of mind. Held fast: restrained from rushing into ways which are opposed to the aastra. It is only when they are restrained by firmness (of the intellect) that they do not rush into ways which are opposed to the sastra. The meaning of the passage is this: He who, by unflinching firmness, restrains the activities of thought (manas), of life-breaths and sense-organs, restrains them by Yoga* Kajasic Firmness- es?? s vteraroK W wsirsiF 1 * That is to say. one can restrain these activities by the firmness only which is every accompanied by samadhi, by concentration of mind in the Brahman. By mere firmness, which is not so accompanied by samadhi, one cannot invariably restrain them. — A.
34. But the firmness with which one holds fast to dharma and pleasures and wealth, desiroos of the fruit of each on its occasion* that firmness, O Partha, is Rajasic.
Dharma etc.: when a person is firmly convinced at heart that dharma, pleasure and wealth ought always to be secured and is desirous of the fruit of each whenever that one (dharma or pleasure or wealth) occupies his attention, the firmness of such a person is Rajasic.
Tamasic Firmness.
35. That with which a stupid man does not give up sleep, fear, grift, depression and lust, that firmness, O Partha, is Tamasic.
The stupid man holds sensual gratification in high esteem and never gives up iascivfousness. He regards sleep, etc., as things that ought always to be resorted to.
Pleasure is threefold according to gttnas.
The threefold division of actions and of the several factors (karakas) concerned in action, has been described, Here follows the threefold division of pleasure which is the effect of actions.
36* And now hear from Me, — O lord of the Bharatas, — of the threefold pleasure, in which one 470 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XVIIL delights by practice and surely comes to the end of pain* Bear: Pay steady attention to. 'Practice: familiarity* frequency. The end; cessation or alleviation.
Sattvic Pleasure.
3J* That which is like poison at first, at the end, like nectar that pleasure is declared to be Sattvic, born of the purity of one's own mind.
Irike poison at first: on its first occurrence it is attended with pain as?t is preceded by much trouble in the acquisition of jnana or spiritual knowledge, of vairagya or indifference to worldly objects, of dhyana and samadhu At tfie end, the pleasure is like nectar, arising from mature knowledge and indifference to external objects. Declared; by the wise. Born, etc: born of the purity of one's own buddhi or antah- karawa: or born of the perfectly clear knowledge of the Self* Being so born, the pleasure is Sattvic.
Rajasic Pleasure.
38. That pleasure which arises from the contract of the sense-organ with the object, at first like nectar* in the end like poison, that is declared to be Rajasic.
* The second half of this verse is construed by other commentators, such as -Snali ara and Madhusudana, with the next verse. Though the bhashya does not make it clear how it should be construed, I have, following.Anandagiri, made the whole verse appear to be a description of the threefold pleasure— Tr In the end like poison: after indulgence, the (sensual) pleasure proves to be like poison, because it leads to deterio- ration in strength, vigour, colour, wisdom, intellect, wealth and energy; and because it leads to a-dharma, and, as an effect thereof, to hell (naraka).
Tamasic Pleasure: 39. The pleasure which at first and in the sequel is delusive of the self, arising from sleep, indolence, and heedlessness, that pleasure is declared to be Tamasic.
In the sequel: after the termination.
No man or god is free from gunas. Here follows the verse which concludes the present subject: 40. There is no being on earth, or againlin heaven among the Devas, that can be free Irani these three gums born of Prakriti.
Being: animate or inanimate. Gunas: such as Sattva. On Earth: among men.
The sequel sums up the whole Doctrine.
The whole samsara, manifested as action, instruments of action, and results, made up of the gunas (Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas), and set up by avidya,—- the evil of sawsara has been thus described as well as its root It has also been figura- tively represented as a tree, in xv. 1, et *eg. It has also 472 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XVIII, been said that after having cut the tree of sawsara asunder with the strong sword of non-attachment, " Then That Goal should be sought after" (xv. 3, 4). From this it may follow that, as everything is made up of the three gurcas, a cessation of the cause of samsara cannot be brought about. Now, it is with a view to show how its cessation can be brought about, with a view, further, to sum up the whole teaching of the Gita-sastra, and with a view to show what the exact teaching of the Vedas and the smritis is which should be followed by those who seek to attain the highest end of man,— it is with this view that the next section, from xviii. 41 onward, is commenced. Duties of the four castes ordained according to nature.
41. Of Brahmawas and Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, as also of Sudras, O Parantapa, the duties are divided according to the qualities born of nature.
Sudras are separated from others — who are all mentioned together in one compound v^ord — because Sudras are of one birth and are debarred from the study of the Vedas. Divided; the duties are allotted to each class, as distinguished from those pertaining to the other classes. — By what standard?— According to the qualities (gu^as) born of nature. Nature (svabhava) is the Isvara's Prakriti, the Maya made up of the three guwas. It is in accordance with the guwas of the Prakriti that duties — such as serenity and the like—are assigned to the Brahmanas, etc. respectively.
Or to explain in another way: The source of the Brah- mawa's nature (svabhava) is the guwa of Sattva; the source of the Kshatriya's nature is Rajas and Sattva, the latter being subordinate to the former; the source of the Vai*ya*s nature is Rajas and Tamas, the latter being subordinate to the former; the source of the Sudra's nature is Tamas and Rajas, the latter being subordinate to the former. For, as we see, the characteristic features of their nature are serenity, lordliness, activity, and dullness respectively.
Or to interpret yet in another way: — Nature (svabhava) is the tendency (Sawskara, Vasana) in living beings acquired by them in the past births, and manifesting itself in the present birth by way of being ready to yield its effects: and this nature is the source of the gunas, it being impossible for the guwas to manifest themselves without a cause. The assertion that nature (Sawskara* Vasana) is the cause (of the guwas) means that it is a kind of specific cause.* The duties, such as serenity, are assigned to the four classes in accordance with the guwas of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which are brought into manifestation by their respective natural tenden- cies, and which lead to those duties as their natural effects.
(Objection): — The duties of Bran maw as, etc, are enjoin" ed by the sastra and are assigned to them by the sastra- How then can it be said that they are divided according to Sattva and other gu«as?
(Jnswer): — There is no room here for any snch objection* By the sastra, too, are the duties — such as serenity-— assigned to the Brahmawas, etc., only in accordance with their respec- tive gu»ds» such as Sattva, but not independently of them. Wherefore it is said that duties are assigned according to gunas, though it has also been said that they are assigned by the sastra What then are those duties? — The answer follows: * Nimitta-karawa or secondary cause, as opposed to the Upadana- -karana or mateariai cause of the gwas, namely, Prakriti. — A.
474 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XVIIL 42. Serenity, self-restraint, austerity, purity, forgiveness, and also uprightness, knowledge, wisdom, faith, — these are the duties of the Brah- ma^as, born of nature.
* Serenity ' and * self-restraint * have already been explained (xvi. 1, 2). Austerity: physical austerity, and so on, mentioned above (xvif, 14, 15. 16). Purity: already explained. Faith • in the teaching of the scriptures. Bom of nature: this means the same here as in the latter portion of xviii. 41.
43. Bravery, boldness, fortitude, promptness, not flying from battle, generosity and lordliness are the duties of the Kshatriyas, born of nature.
Fortitude: that by which upheld one is not subject to depression, under any circumstances whatever. Promptness j the performing, without confusion, of duties which present themselves quite unexpectedly and demand ready action. Not flying from battle: not turning away from foes. Lordliness: exercise of ruling power over those who are to be ruled.
44. Ploughing, cattle-rearing, and trade, are the duties of the Vaisyas, born of nature. And of the nature of service is the duty of the Sudra> born of nature* Devotion to one's own duty leads to perfection.
These duties, respectively enjoined on the several castes, lead, when rightly performed, to Svarga as their natural result, as stated in the smritis, such as the following * "Men of several castes and orders, each devoted to his respective duties, reap the fruits of their actions after death, and then by the residual (karma) attain to births in superior countries* castes and families, possessed of comparatively superior dharma, span of life, learning, conduct, wealth, happiness and intelligence." (Apastamba-Dharmasutra, 2-2*2, 3). And in the Purawa also are specified the different results and worlds which the several castes and orders attain. But, from the operation of a new cause * the following result accrues.
45. Devoted each to his own duty; man attains perfection; how one, devoted to one's own duty, attains success, that do thou hear.
Each to his own duty: as ordained according to his nature. Man: he who is qualified (for Karma- Yoga). Perfection (sawsiddbi): which consists in the body and senses being qualified for the devotion of knowledge (jnana-mshtfha) after all their impurities have been washed away by the per- formance of one's own duty. — Can this perfection be attained directly by the mere performance of one's own duty t? — No. — How then? — Learn how it can be attained: * That is. when the same duties are performed, not for the sake of their immediate results, but for the sake of Moksha.— A.
t The questioner understands ' perfection ' in the sense of absolute perfection *\ c, Moksha. It is, of course, impossible to attain Moksha by works alone. — A.
476 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XVIII.
r\ ^ ♦ "s « <"s 46. Him from whom is the evolution of (all) beings, by whom all this is pervaded, — by worship- ping Him with his proper duty, man attains perfection.
'Pravntti ' (in the text) may mean either evdlution or activity; and it proceeds from the Isvara, the AntaTyamin, the Ruler within. Beings: living creatures. His proper duty: each according to his caste, as described above. Worshipping the Lord by performing his duty, man attains perfection, in so far only as he becomes qualified for the devo- tion of knowledge (jnana-nisbtfha).
Such being the causet therefore, 47. Better is one's own duty (though) desti- tute oi merits, than the duty of another well performed. Doing the. duty ordained according to nature one incurs no sin.
Just as a poisonous substance does not injure the worm born in that substance, so, he who does the duty ordained according to his own nature incurs no sin.
One ought not to abandon one's own duty.
It has been said that he who does the duty ordained according to his nature incurs no sin like a worm born in poison, that the duty of another brings on fear, and that he who does not know the Self cannot indeed remain even for a moment without doing action. Wherefore, 48. The duty born with oneself, O son of Ktmti, though faulty, one ought not to abandon; for, all undertakings are surrounded with evil, as fire with smoke.
Bom with oneself: born with the very birth of man. Faulty • as everything is composed of the three gums. All undertakings: whatever the duties are; by context, one's own as well as others duties; for. the reason here assigned is that they are all made up of the three guwas- Though a man may perform another's duty, abandoning what is called his own duty, the duty born with himself, he is not free from fault; and another's duty brings on fear.* And since it is not possible for any man who does not know the Self to give up action entirely, therefore he ought not to abandon action (karma).
Is entire renunciation of action possible?
(Now, let us enquire): Is it because of the impossibility of entire abandonment of action that no one ought to renounce one's own (nature-born) duty, or is it because some sin f accrues from the abandoning of the duty bom with oneself? (Qmstion); — Now, of what good is this enquiry f (Answer); — In the first place, if the duty born with one- self ought not to be abandoned (merely) because of the impossibility of renouncing action entirely, then it would follow that there can be nothing but merit in renouncing it entirely.
* Therefore, it Is not right to do another's duty. — A. f The sin (pratyavaya) arising from the neglect of the duty enjoiaed in the sruti as obligatory,— A- 478 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XVIII The Sankhya, Buddhistic and Vaiseshika theories.
(Objection) •* — Yes; but an entire renunciation is not possible. — Is the soul (Purusha) always mobile like the gu^as of the Sankhyas? Or, is action itself the actor (soul), like the five Skandhas of the Buddhists, undergoing destruction every moment? In either case, an entire renunciation of action is impossible.* Now there is also a third theory — When the thing (soul) acts, then it is active; when it does not act, then it is actionless. Such being the case, it is possible to renounce action entirely- And there is this peculiarity in this theory: neither is the thing (soul) ever mobile, nor is action itself the actor (the soul); but it is a permanent fixed substance, wherein action which was non-existent before arises, and wherein action which has been existent ceases, while the substance remains pure (actionless), with the potentiality (of the activity) in it, and as such forms the actor. — Thus say the followers of Karaada. What objection is there to this theory?
Hefutation of the Vaiseshika theory. [Answer): — There is certainly this objection, that it is contrary to the Lord's teaching.— How do you know? — For, the Lord has said ' there can be no existence of the non- existent* (ii. 16) and so on. But according to the followers of Kawada, the non-existent comes into existence, -and the existent becomes non-existent. Wherefore their theory is contrary to the Lord's teaching.
(Objection): — How can it be objected to if it agrees with reason, though it may be opposed to the Lord's teaching?
(Answer): — We reply: * Inasmuch as it would imply that the soul undergoes change in its ■ very nature: — A« This view is certainly objectionable, because it is opposed to all evidence. — How?— If a dvyanuka (an aggregate of two atoms) or other substance is absolutely non-existent before its production, and if, remaining for a time after production, if again becomes non-existent, then it follows that what was non-existent becomes existent, and what is existent will be- come non-existent; that non-entity becomes an entity and an entity becomes non-entity. In that case it must be that a non-entity fabhava^ which is to become an entity (bhava) is ■like a rabbit's horn before becoming an entity, and that it becomes an entity by the action of the threefold cause, —of the material, the non-material or accidental, and the efficient •causes, (samavayi-asamavayi-nimitta-karanas). Now it is not possible to hold fin the present case) that a non-entity is born and needs a cause; for, it does not apply to other non- entities, such as a rabbit's horn If a pot or the like, which is to be produced (as an effect), be of the nature of an entity, then we can understand that when it is to be produced as an effect, it needs a cause so far merely as regards its manifes- tation- Moreover, if the non-existent should become existent and the existent should become non-existent, then nobody can be certain as to anything whatsoever in matters of evidence and things ascertainable by evidence, inasmuch as there can be no certainty that the existent will continue to be existent and the non-existent will continue to be non-existent Moreover, when they (the followers of Kanada) say that a dvyanuka or such other substance is produced as an effect, they speak of it as connected with its cause and as existent. Having been non-existent before production, it becomes, in virtue of the operation of its cause connected with that cause — the ultimate atoms — and with existence, by the rela- tion known as samavaya, t.e., intimate or inseparable relation 480 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. DlS. XVIIL When (thus) related, i.e., when it is inseparably connected with the cause, it becomes existent. Here they may be asked to explain how the non-existent can have a cause of its own. We cannot indeed think of a thing which can cause the birth of a barren woman's son or his relation to anything else.
(Objection):— The Vaiseshikas do not hold that the non- existent is related to anything. It is substances, such as dvyanukas, that are said to be intimately related to their causes.
(Answer):— No; because they are not supposed to exist prior to this relation. — The Vaiseshikas do not argue that a pot or the like exists prior to the action of the potter, the potter's stick and wheel. Neither do they hold that clay assumes by itself the form of a pot. Wherefore, as the only other alternative, they have to admit that the non-existent (pot) becomes related (to the cause).
(Objection): — It is not opposed to reason to hold that, though non-existent, it may be related by samavaya or intimate relation (to the cause).
{Answer):— No so; for, no such thing can be admitted in the case of a barren woman's son. — If we are to hold that the antecedent non-existence (pragabhava) of a pot or the like becomes related to the cause, but not the barren woman's son, notwithstanding that both are alike non-entities (abhava), it is necessary to show how one non-entity can be distinguished from the other. Non-existence of one, non-existence of two, non-existence of all, antecedent non-existence (pragabhava^, non-existence after destruction (pradhvamsabhava), mutual non-existence (any ony abhava), absolute non-existence (atyanta- bhava),— nobody can point out any definite distinction among these in themselves. In the absence of a distinction, it is unreasonable to hold that only the antecedent non-existence of a pot becomes a pot through the action of a potter, etc., 48] CONCLUSION. 481 48] CONCLUSION. 481 that it becomes related to a cause of its own, viz., the pot- shreds which are existent, that when thus related it can very- well be spoken of as being produced and so on, but that such is not the case with regard to the non-existence after destruc- tion (pradhvawsabhava) of the same pot, though both alike are non-existent. It is unreasonable to hold that other non- existences (abhavas), such as non-existence after destruction,, can never become (an existent effect) and so on, whereas antecedent non-existence alone, such as that of dvyawuka and the like substances, can become (an existent effect) and so on, though it is an abhava or non-existent quite as much as non- existence after destruction or absolute non-existence.
(Objection) •* — We do not>hold that the nGrrexistent be- comes the existent.
(Answer): — Then the existent becomes existent, — for instance, a pot becomes a pot, a cloth becomes a cloth. Thist too, is opposed to all evidence* like the theory that non- existent becomes existent.
Refutation of the Parinama-Vada.
As to the Parmama (transformation) theory of the Sankhyas, even that theory does not differ from the theory of the 'Vaiseshikas, inasmuch as it postulates the production of properties non-existent before, as well as their destruction. Even. admitting their explanation that by manifestation or disappearance (an effect is said to come into existence or undergo destruction), the theory is all the same opposed to evidence* as may be found if we enquire whether the manifes- tation and disappearance are previously existent or non- existent.
For the same reason, we have to condemn that theory also which says that production etc., of an effect, are only different states of the cause itself.
482 THE BHAGAVAD-GITA. [DlS. XVIII.
The Lord's theory of illusion.
As the only other alternative, there remains this theory, that the One Existence, the sole Reality, is by avidya* imagined variously, as so many things undergoing production, destruction and the like changes, like an actor on the stage. This doctrine of the Lord has been stated in ii. 16 j the consciousness of the existent (sat) being constant and the consciousness of all the rest being inconstant.
The enlightened alone can renounce action entirely.
(Objection) •* — Then, the Self being immutable, where is the impossibility of renouncing all action entirely?