1 He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the breast.
2 Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the pray&g-as is to the dar^apurwamasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the darjapfin/amasa qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an inti¬ mation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place, vedanta-s6tras.
32 stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is pro¬ posed.—Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent condi¬ tions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one’s actions) both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means \ and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word ‘then 5 therefore intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above- mentioned (spiritual) means.
The word 4 therefore 5 intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which are means of happiness is non¬ eternal (as, for instance, Kh. Up. VIII, i, 6, ‘ As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious duty’), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, i, ‘ He who knows Brahman attains the highest ’); therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.
By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be given in the next Sutra (I, i, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the Sfitra the genitive case (‘of Brahman; 5 the literal translation of the Sutra being ‘then therefore the desire of knowledge of Brahman ’) denotes the object, not something generally supplementary (jesha 1 2 ); for the desire of knowledge 1 The 4 means ’ in addition to jama and dama are discontinuance of religious. ceremonies (uparati), patience in- suffering (titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and faith (jraddha).
2 According to Pacini II, 3, 30 the sixth (genitive) case ex¬ presses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.
13 demands an object of desire and no other such object is stated.—But why should not the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the general relation may base itself on the more particular one.—This assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an altogether needless procedure.—Not needless; for if we explain the words of the Sutra to mean ‘ the desire of knowledge connected with Brahman’ we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.— This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be men¬ tioned, especially in the Stitra. Analogously the sentence ‘ there the king is going 5 implicitly means that the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation (according to which the Sfitra represents Brahman as the direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance, the passage, 4 That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to know that. That is Brahman 5 (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1). With passages of this kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires having reference to results 1. Knowledge thus constitutes the 1 In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said ‘ gr&mazra ga^ati/ the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.
14 vedanta-s6tras.
means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire Sa^sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be entertained.
But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.
We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of the word ‘ Brahman,’ from the root brzh, ‘to be great,’ we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman 1. More¬ over the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks ‘ I am not. 5 If the existence of the Self were not known, every one would think ‘ I am not. 5 And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas are of opinion that the mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the inter¬ nal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a trans¬ migrating being different from the body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others teach 1 That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the Brahma-mtmaffzsa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.
15 that that being is enjoying only, not acting; others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all¬ knowing, all-powerful Lord 1. Others, finally, (i. e. the Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the en-i joyer (i. e. of the individual soul whose individual existenceI is apparent only, the product of Nescience).
Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them orl fallacious arguments and scriptural texts mis¬ understood 2. If therefore a man would embrace some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this reason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with the help of Con¬ formable arguments, and having for its aim the highest beatitude.
So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The question now arises what the character is*ks»-of that Brahman ar e, and the reverend author of the Sutras therefore propounds the following aphorism.
2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i. e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).
The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares the order 1 The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyaya, the Sankbya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philo¬ sophers.
2 As, for instance, the passages ‘this person consists of the essence of food‘the eye, &c. spoke; ’ ‘non-existing this was in the beginning,’ &c.
16 VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the passage, Taitt. Up. Ill, i, 4 From whence these beings are born,’ &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered, through origination, on the state of existence. The words ‘of this’ denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words ‘ from which ’ denote the cause. The full sense of the Sutra therefore is: That omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolu¬ tion of this world—which world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes 1, and the nature of whose arrange¬ ment cannot even be conceived by the mind,—that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination, subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in the Sutra, As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yaska 2 are possible only during the period of the world’s subsistence, it might—were they referred to in the Sutra—be suspected that what is meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to be taken as referring, in addition to the world’s origination from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into Brahman.
The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated qualities; not either from a non-intelligent pradhana 3, or from atoms, or from non- 1 So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and Go.; the BhL proposes another less plausible division.
2 According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara^ are: origina¬ tion, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.
3 The pradh&na, called also prakrzti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the Sankhya-system. It will be fully discussed in 17 being, or from a being subject to transmigration 1; nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i. e. spontaneously, without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects) special places, times, and Causes have invariably to be employed.
(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world 2, think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without re¬ course being had to Scripture at all).—But, it might be said, you yourself in the Sutra under discussion have merely brought forward the same argument!—By no means, we reply. The Sutras (i. e. literally £ the strings *) have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages referred to by the Sutras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertain¬ ment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedanta- texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages primarily declare the cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the Vedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascer¬ tained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation; for the passages, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5 0 the Self is to be heard, to be considered ’), and Kh. Up. VI, 14, % ( £ as the man, &c., having been informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhdra, in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge 5 ), declare that human understanding assists Scripture 3.
Scriptural text, &c. 4, are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhSna has been left untranslated. Cp. Sahkhya Karika 3.
2 Viz. the Vaueshikas.
3 Atmana^ jruter ity artha^. Ananda Giri.
4 Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical [ 34 ] C the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i. e. in the Purva Mim kmsk), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition 1, &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accom¬ plished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of knowledge. The origina¬ tion of something to be accomplished depends, moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture with sentences such as the following: 4 At the atiratra he takes the sho^in cup, 5 and 4 at the atirdtra he does not take the shods.sin cup; 5 or, ‘he makes the oblation after the sun has risen/ and, ‘he makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen. 5 Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional pro¬ cedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option depends on the Motions of man; but the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, ‘this is a post or a man, or something else/ is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, ‘ it is a man or something else/ being false, and only the third idea, ‘ it connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Purva Mima/rcsd.
1 The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.
19 is a post, 5 which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i. e. Brahman itself.—But, it might be said, as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purpose¬ less.—This we deny; for as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i. e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound in¬ ference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text.—Which, then, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?—It is the passage Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ‘ Bhrzgu V 4 ru ni went to his father Vanina, saying, Sir, teach me ‘Brahman, 5 &c., up to c That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman. 5 The sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6: ‘ From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into bliss they enter at their death. 5 Other passages also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.
That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the Sutrakara continues as follows: 3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture.
Brahman is the source, i. e. the cause of the great body of Scripture, consisting of the Rtg-ve da and other branches, which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura^a, &c.); which lamp-like illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience can¬ not be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is generally understood that the man from whom some special body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pkmni possesses a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the Rzg-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of mani¬ fold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him, ‘The Rzg-ve da, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being’ (Brz. Up. II, 4,10).
Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of the Rig-ve da, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i. e. the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the sense would be: through Scripture only as a means of know¬ ledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the preceding Sutra ‘ from which these beings are born/ &c.—But as the preceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra?—The words of the pre¬ ceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded.
But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mima/^sa 21 Sutra I, 2, 1,‘As the purport of Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purport- less’), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages en¬ joining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as ‘ he howled, &c.,’ which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7,‘ Because they stand in syntac¬ tical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions ’). In the same way mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, ‘ For strength thee (I cut; ’ which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the danrapunzamasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; noti¬ fying the agents, divinities, and results connected with those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmak&zzz/a of the Veda), we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above, viz.) that the 22 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.
To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows: 4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scrip¬ ture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport.
The word 4 but 5 is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prim a facie view as urged above). That all-knowing,all- (powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, sub- jsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for instance, c Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); 4 In the beginning all this was Self, one only 5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); e This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving everything’ {Bri, Up. II, 5, 19); 4 That immortal Brahman is before 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can we con¬ clude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 13, ‘ Then by what should he see whom? 5 (which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and the other means of 23 knowledge; for the fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural passage ‘That art thou 5 ( Kh. Up.VI, 8, 7). Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not connected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman’s Self, which is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain, and thereby the attainment of man’s highest aim. That passages notifying certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the know¬ ledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far as they are con¬ nected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right knowledge of Brahman.
Here others raise the following objection:—Although the Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brah¬ man, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other objects not known from the practice of common life is merely supplementary to certain injunctions 1. Why so?
1 So, for instance, the passage ‘ he carves the sacrificial post and 24 VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following declaration, c The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of actions’ (Bhashya on Gaimini Sutra I, i, 1); ‘ Injunction means passages impelling to action ’ (Bh. on Gaim. Sfi. I, 1,2); ‘ Of this (viz. active religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction * (part of Gaim. S&. 1,1,5); c The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose pur¬ port is action ’ (Gaim. Su. 1,1, 25); c As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purport¬ less ’ (Gaim. Sti. I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others; other passages (i. e. all those passages which are not directly injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the Vedinta-texts also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have a mean¬ ing in the same way only. And if their aim is injunc¬ tion, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of immortality.—But— somebody might object—it has been declared that there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the object of enquiry in the karma-ka^a (that part of the Veda which treats of active religious duty) being some¬ thing to be accomplished, viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman.