ness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradMna all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience 1.—Well then (say those Sankhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradh&na possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is im¬ parted to an iron ball by fire.—No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.
The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be con¬ sidered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sankhya, is Brah¬ man’s all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman’s knowledge to be permanent.—But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.—Why not? we reply; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent 1 The excess of Sattva in theYogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle in¬ dependent of Sattva.
when we say, { he burns, he gives light 1 /—But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel.—This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying ‘the sun shines/ even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as ‘ it thought/ &c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required (‘ knowing ’ being a transitive verb while ‘shining’ is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.—What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world?—Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-.s*astra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition—as the sun’s nature is eternal luminous- 1 Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapattim ni- rasitum ])rikkhaX\ idam iti. Prakrz’tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad va brahmazzo sarvagTzateti pramam eva praka/ayatikatham iti. Pra- thamazzz pratyaha yasyeti. Uktazzz vyatirekadvara vivrz/zoti anityatve hlti. Dvitiyazzz jankate £$aneti. Svato nityasyapi ^zzanasya tatta- darthava^^innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brah- mazza^ sidhyatfty aha.—The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is in¬ dependent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the verbal affix in ‘^anati' indicating the particularity of the act.
51 ness—can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa^sarin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. £ There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force. 5 £ Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person ’ (Sv. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).
But, to raise a new objection, there exists no trans¬ migrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for *Sruti expressly declares that £ there is no other seer but he; there is no other knower but he 5 (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23). How then can it be said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?—True, we reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in con¬ sequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as £ the hollow (space) of a jar,’ &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like 52 52 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.
The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pra¬ dhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the second Adhy&ya (II, i, 4, &c.).
Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty started by you, he says, viz. that the non- intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figura¬ tively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, £ the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),’ and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the after¬ noon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.—But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word £ thought ’ and for taking it in a figurative sense? -—The observation, the Sankhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, £ That fire thought; that water thought’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3 5 4). We therefrom con¬ clude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there 53 also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figura¬ tive sense l.
To this argumentation of the Sankhya the next Sutra replies: 6. If it is said that (the word ‘seeing’) has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).
Your assertion that the term ‘Being’ denotes the non- intelligent pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term ‘ Self.’ For the passage Kh. Up. VI, a, which begins ‘ Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning/ after having related the creation of fire, water, and earth (‘ it thought/ &c.; ‘ it sent forth fire/ &c.), goes on—denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the term ‘ divinities’—as follows, ‘ That divinity thought: Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self (gtva. citman) and evolve names and forms. 5 If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that the same pradhana—as once constituting the subject-matter of the chapter—is referred to by the term ‘ that divinity. 5 But in that case the divinity would not speak of the ^iva as ‘ Self. 5 For by the term ‘ Civa 5 we must understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhana? By ‘ Self 5 we understand (a being’s) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Giva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to 1 In the second Kha#da of the sixth Prapa/^aka of the Kh. Up. ‘ aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.
54 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word ‘Self’ with reference to the Gtv a is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, * That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O SVetaketu 5 (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c.). Here the clause ‘It is the Self’ designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word ‘ Self,’ and the concluding clause, ‘ that art thou, O SVetaketu,’ declares the intelligent SVetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense—while the employment of the word ‘Self’ furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat—the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figura¬ tive sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be under¬ stood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word ‘ Self, 5 not to be understood in a figurative sense 1.
Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The word f Self, 5 he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of ‘that which effects all purposes of another as, for instance, a king applies the word ‘ Self 5 to some servant who carries out all the king’s intentions, ‘ Bha- drasena is my (other) Self/ For the pradhana, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word ‘ Self’ may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as ‘ the Self of the elements,’ ‘ the Self of the senses, 5 are made use of, and as the one word ‘ light ’ (gy otis) denotes a certain 1 So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word ‘ thinking' in any of the three pas¬ sages.
55 sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word ‘ Self ’ that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?
To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies: 7. (The pradh&na cannot be designated by the term ‘ Self’) because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).
The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term ‘ Self’ because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, % ff., where the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, ‘ That is the Self/ and where the subsequent clause, ‘ That art thou, O SVetaketu/ declares the intelligent SVetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage sub¬ sequent to the two quoted (viz. ‘ a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect’) declares final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term ‘Sat,’ and did comprehend—by means of the phrase ‘ That art thou ’—persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be ‘ Thou art non-intelligent; ’ so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right know¬ ledge. But to assume that the faultless jastra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the sk stra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would—comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox’s tail 1 —cling to the view of that being the Self, 1 A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.
5<3 vedAnta-sOtras.
and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be de¬ barred from what constitutes man’s good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the j-astra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage ‘ that is the Self, that art thou, G *SVetaketu,’ teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe ( Kh. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ‘ that art thou ’ would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only 1, like the knowledge derived from the passage, c I am the hymn 5 (Ait. Ar. II, i, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ‘ Self’ is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word c Self ’ can—in such phrases as ‘ Bhadrasena is my Self’—be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by per¬ ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word ( Self 9 may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word c ^yotis ’ signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word ‘ Self 5 in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative 1 Cp. above, p. 30.
57 attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such phrases as ‘ the Self of the elements/ ‘the Self of the senses/ And even if we assume that the word ‘ Self ’ primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determina¬ tive attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and *Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with 6Vetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances determine the object of the word ‘ Self’ here to be something intelli¬ gent. The word ‘^yotis’ does moreover not furnish an appropriate example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of ‘light’ only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.
A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding Sfttra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word ‘Self’ having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sfttra is to be explained as con¬ taining an independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.
Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by the word ‘ Self/ This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.
8. And (the pradh&na cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.
If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term ‘Being’ (Sat), and if the passage ‘That is the Self, that art thou, O >SVetaketu/ referred to the pradhana; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the 58 vedanta-s6tras.
true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhati at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star, saying ‘ that is Arundhati,’ although it is really not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/^aka arrives at a conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat).
The word ‘ and’ (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapa/^aka it is intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, ‘Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely/ &c. Now if the term ‘ Sat ’ denoted the pradhana, which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not denoted by the term ‘ Sat.’—For this the Sutrakara gives a further reason.
59 9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).
With reference to the cause denoted by the word 4 Sat/ Scripture says, 4 When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, 44 he sleeps ” (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita)/ (Kk. Up. VI, 8,1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 4 to sleep/ with refer¬ ence to the soul. The word, 4 his own/ denotes the Self which had before been denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e. into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i, which means * to be resolved into/ The individual soul (^iva) is called awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by means of the modifications of the mind—which thus constitute limiting adjuncts of the soul—it apprehends those external objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external objects 1. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 4 mind 2 / When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modi¬ fications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word 4 hrzdaya ’ is given by jruti, 4 That Self abides in the heart.
And this is the etymological explanation: he is in the heart (hrzdi ayam)/ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words a^anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised: ‘ water is carrying away what has been eaten by him; ’ 4 fire carries away what has been drunk by him 5 (. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 4 Sat/ by means of the etymology of the word 4 sleep/ But the intelligent 1 So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.
2 With reference to Kh, Up. VI, 8, 2.
6o VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhana. If, again, it were said that the pradhana is denoted by the word ‘ own/ because belonging to the Self (as being the Self’s own), there would remain the same ab¬ surd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. ‘ embraced by the intelligent— pr&gna.—Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within/ Bn. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in the condition of dream¬ less sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word ‘ Sat/ and not the pradhana.—A further reason for the pradhana not being the cause is subjoined.
io. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Ved&nta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the cause).
If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedanta-texts also, there were set forth different views con¬ cerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine, and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in with the pradhana theory. But the stated condition is absent since all the Vedanta-texts uni¬ formly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, ‘ As from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pranas proceed each towards its place; from the pranas the gods, from the gods the worlds ’ (Kau. Up. Ill, 3). And ‘from that Self sprang ether’ (Taitt. Up. II, i). And ‘all this springs from the Self’ (. Kh. Up. VII, 26,1). And ‘this pra^a is born from the Self’ (Pr. Up. Ill, 3); all which passages declare the Self to he the cause. That the word ‘Self’ denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, II.
61 And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a uniform character re-f garding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman is\ therefore to be considered the cause of the world, ‘ on account \ of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta^texts)/—A further / reason for this conclusion is advanced.
ii. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).
That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the following passage of the man- tropanishad of the 6Veta.svataras (VI, 9) where the word ‘ he ’ refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord, ‘He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord.’ It is therefore finally settled that the all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent pradhana or anything else.
In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate arguments, that the Vedanta^texts exhibited \ under Sutras I, 1-11, are capable of proving that the all-; knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view ( 1,10), that all Vedclnta-texts whatever maintain an intelli¬ gent cause. The question might therefore be asked, ‘ What reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedanta- sfitras?’ (as the chief point is settled already.)
To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is appre¬ hended under two forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolu¬ tions of name and form (i. e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the opposite of this, i. e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare 62 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.