An objection is raised against the assertion that prazza de¬ notes Brahman. The word prazza, it is said, does not denote the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates him¬ self. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana, ‘ Know me only, 5 and later on, ‘ I am pr&zza, the intelligent Self. 5 How, it is asked, can the pr&zza, which this latter passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance, Bri, Up. Ill, 8,8, Tt is without speech, without mind. 5 Further on, also, the speaker, i. e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attri¬ butes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no way belong to Brahman, ‘ I slew the three-headed son of Tvash tri; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves, 5 and so on. Indra may be called prazza on account of his strength. Scripture says, ‘ Strength indeed is pr&zza, 5 and Indra is known as the god of strength; and of any deed of strength people say, ‘ It is Indra’s work. 5 The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unob¬ structed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that some passages convey information about the personal Self H 2 IOO VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
of some deity, the other passages also—as, for instance, the one about what is most beneficial for man—must be inter¬ preted as well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence prazza does not denote Brahman.
This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are found a multitude of references to the in¬ terior Self. For the passage,‘ As long as prana dwells in this body so long surely there is life/ declares that that prazza only which is the intelligent interior Self—and not some particular outward deity—has power to bestow and to take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the pranas as founded on the existence of the prazza, it shows that that prazza is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the sense-organs \ Of the same tendency is the passage, ‘ Prazza, the intel¬ ligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up; 5 and the passage (which occurs in the passus, ‘Let no man try to find out what speech is/ &c.), ‘ For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the prazza. And that prazza indeed is the Self of pragna, blessed, imperishable, immortal. 5 So also the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up as follows, ‘ He is my Self, thus let it be known; 5 a summing up which is appropriate only if prazza is meant to denote not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural passage declares ‘this Self is Brahman, omniscient 25 (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at 1 The text runs, ‘ astitve ka prazzanazzz niArreyasam/ and Go. An. explains ‘ astitve prazzasthitau prazzanazzz indriyazzam sthitir ity arthata^ jrutrm aha.’ He as well as An. Gi. quotes as the text of the scriptural passage referred to ‘athato ni/breyasadanam ity adi.’ But if instead of ‘ astitve ka ’ we read ‘ asti tv eva/ we get the con¬ cluding clause of Kau. Up. Ill, 2, as given in Cowell’s edition.
2 Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the Kau. Up. is Brahman.
IOI the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regard¬ ing Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity.—How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring to himself be explained?
30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva.
The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of rzshi-like intuition 1 —the existence of which is vouched for by Scripture—its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words £ Know me only. 5 By intuition of the same kind the rzshi Vamadeva reached the knowledge expressed in the words, c I was Manu and Surya; 5 in accordance with the passage, ‘ Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that ’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying, ‘ Know me only, 5 glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/rz’s son and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of Tvash/rz’s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge—in which case the sense of the passage would be, c Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore know me 5 —but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the slaying of Tvash tri$> son and the like, goes on in the clause next following to exalt knowledge, ‘ And not one hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no* deed of his is his life harmed. 5 —(But how does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)—Because, we reply, its meaning is as follows: ‘ Although I do such cruel deeds, 1 I. e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered possible through the knowledge acquired In former existences.
yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his/ And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 4 I am prazza, the intelligent Self/ Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.
31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of (the meaning advocated by us) being ac¬ cepted (elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the pas¬ sage under discussion).
Although we admit, the pfirvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the prazza does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.—For what reason?—Because it mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 4 Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker/ mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage, 4 But prazza alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up/ which points to the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 4 Then prazza (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it/ Those, again, who in the 103 passage quoted above read c this one (masc.), the bodymust give the following explanation, Prazza having laid hold of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other prazzas, viz. the sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if the word prazza be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the chief vital air, the prazza and the intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual concomit¬ ance, or as being different on account of their (essentially different) individual character; and in these two different ways they are actually spoken of in the two following passages, £ What is prazza that is pra^vm, what is pra.gnk that is prazzaand, ‘ For together do these two live in the body and together do they depart.’ If, on the other hand, prazza denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what? For these reasons prazza does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both.
All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, ‘ on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.’ Your inter¬ pretation would involve the assumption of devout medi¬ tation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inap¬ propriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the prazza really constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause c Know me only/ followed by ‘ I am prazza, the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;’ and in the end we read, c And that prazza indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal/ The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we 1 Imaz# jariram instead of idazzz jariram.
therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers) 1 cannot rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, pr&zza must denote Brahman ‘on account of (that meaning) being accepted/ i. e. because in the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word prazza is taken in the sense of ‘ Brahman. 5 And another reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is that here also, i. e. in the passage itself there is ‘ connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the passage, ‘ Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up/ contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, ‘ No mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose 5 (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5 )* Nor does the indication of the in¬ dividual soul which you allege to occur in the passage, ‘Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker/ preclude the view of prazza denoting Brahman. For, as the passages, ‘ I am Brahman/ ‘ That art thou, 5 and others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from Brahman r but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz. ‘ let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker, 5 ) which, by setting aside all the dif¬ ferences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the 1 Yanka j'abdadaya^ ^anka prfthivyadaya^ ka dasa bhutamatra^ ^anka buddhindriyam ^anka buddhaya iti dasa. pra^amatra^. Yadva ^anendriyartha^ ipanka karmendriyartha^ ka pa^eti da^a bhfitamatra^ dvividhanindriyam pra^zzamatra dajeti bhavak. An. Gi.
105 individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, ‘ That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the difference of prazza and pra^7?a (contained in the passage, ‘ Together they dwell in this body, together they depart 5 ) does not agree with that interpretation according to which prazza is Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those twb adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be identified, as is done in the passage ‘pr&zza is pra gn& The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner also 1, as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so? ‘ On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.’ The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of pr&zza, under the aspect of pra^rn, and in itself. The passages, ‘ Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is prazza,’ and ‘ Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as uktha,’ refer to the prazza aspect. The introductory passage, ‘Now we shall explain how all things become one in that pra gn&l and the subsequent passages, ‘ Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside •/ and, ‘ Having by pra^vza taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c., } refer to the pra^a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, ‘ These ten 1 Viz. by the vrz'ttik&ra.
objects have reference to pra gnk, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone no¬ thing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the pr&zza.’ Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here repre¬ sented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2), £ He who consists of mind, whose body is prazza.’ The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the prazza chapter 1; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of prazza, pra^Yia, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled con¬ clusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.
1 Ihapi tad yugyate explaining the ‘ iha tadyogat' of the Sutra.
107 SECOND PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. More¬ over, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all- pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indica¬ tions of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points.
i. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) be¬ cause there is taught what is known from everywhere.
Scripture says, ‘All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him there¬ fore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),’ &c. (. Kh. Up. Ill, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.
The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.—Why?— Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1,2), io8 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
£ He is without breath, without mind, pure.’—But, it may be objected, the passage, ‘ All this indeed is Brahman,’mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?—This objec¬ tion does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because Brahman is all this, ta^al&n, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman 1; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, £ Let him form the determination, i. e. reflection. 5 And thereupon the subsequent passage, £ He who consists of mind, whose body is breath, 5 &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, £ He to whom all works, all desires belong, 5 &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the pas¬ sage, £ He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley, 5 may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the immediately following passage, £ greater than the earth,’ &c., cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute 1 The clause £ he is to meditate with a calm mind 5 if taken as a guzzavidhi, i. e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence (vakyabheda).
109 only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the great¬ ness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, f That is Brahman 5 (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul 1, as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.
To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on.—Why?— £ On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere. 5 What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, (‘ all this indeed is Brahman,’) the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic.—But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunc¬ tion of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself.—True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i. e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.
2. And because the qualities desired to be ex¬ pressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).
Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed 1, there being no speaker, still such phrases as ‘desired to be expressed/ may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as c desired to be expressed; 5 so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is ‘desired to be expressed/ everything else ‘not desired to be expressed/ What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i. e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsist¬ ence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, ‘The Self which is free from sin * ( Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, ‘ He whose Self is the ether/ means ‘ he whose Self is like the ether;’ for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, ‘ Greater than the earth/ And the other explanation also, accord¬ ing to which the passage means ‘he whose Self is the ether ’ is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called ‘ he to whom all works belong, and so on/ Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms ‘ consisting of mind/ and ‘ having breath for its body/ which the pfirvapakshin asserts 1 The discussion is brought on by the term ‘ vivakshita ’ in the Sutra whose meaning is ‘ expressed, aimed at/ but more literally ‘ desired to be expressed/ I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. Ill cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly vSruti and Smrz’ti say of Brahman, ‘ Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere 5 ( 5 ve. Up. IV, 3), and ‘ its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world 5 (Bha. Gita III, 13).
The passage (quoted above against our view), ‘ Without breath, without mind, pure, 5 refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms ‘ consisting of mind; having breath for its body, 5 on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation.
3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).
The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the em¬ bodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, ‘ He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth, 5 cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term ‘ embodied 5 (^arira) we have to understand ‘ residing 5 in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body 1, we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for jruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, ‘ He is greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal. 5 The individual soul, on the other 1 Because he is vyapin.
hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.
4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.
The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage, 4 When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4), the word 4 him 5 refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained; while the words, 4 1 shall obtain, 5 represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i. e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time. The relation existing between a person medi¬ tating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.—And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.
5. On account of the difference of words.
That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words.
That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (Sat. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 4 Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self. 5 There one word, i. e. the locative 4 in the Self, 5 denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 4 person, 5 denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of con¬ sisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.
6. And on account of Smrzti.
Smrz’ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self 113 and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 6r, ‘The Lord, O Ar^una, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.’
But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the preceding Sutras? vSruti passages, as well as Smrzti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for instance, Brz. Up. Ill, 7, 23, ‘There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer but he;’ and Bha. Giti XIII, 2, ‘And know me also, O BMrata, to be the kshetra^a in all kshetras.’
True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Simi¬ larly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned— from the passage, ‘That art thou’—that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like.
7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i. e* of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and be¬ cause the case is analogous to that of ether.
On account of the limitation of its abode, which is men¬ tioned in the clause, ‘ He is my Self within the heart,’ and on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, ‘ He is smaller than a grain of rice,’ &c.; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl’s point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not [34] I ii4 vedanta-s£jtras.
the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purva- paksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of Ayodhy£ although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole earth.—But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be minute?—He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, ‘because he is to be contemplated thus.’ The passage under discus¬ sion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar qualities—which apprehension of the Lord is ren¬ dered possible through a modification of the mind—just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called 5 alagr 4 m. Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter