1 The /ikas say that the contents of this last sentence are hinted at by the word ‘ and ’ in the Sutra.
2 I. e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred fires give to Upako^ala, Kh. Up. IV, 10 ff.
3 Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage ‘ the person that is seen in the eye/ &c. forms a part.
127 that the name Brahman is here symbolically 1 given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure, If 2 * in the passage referred to (viz. ‘ Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman’) the second Brahman (i. e. the word Brahman in the clause ‘ Ka is Brahman ’) were not added, and if the sentence would run ‘ Ka, Kha is Brahman/ the word Ka would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words—Ka as well as Kha—are joined with the word Brahman (‘ Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brah¬ man’). For the passage wishes to intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as some¬ thing in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words,‘ This is our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;’ wherein they point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words,‘ The teacher will tell you the way ’ (which form the last clause of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying, ‘ As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it 5 (which words intervene between the concluding 1 A^rayantarapratyayasyasrayantare kshepa^ pratika^, yatha brahma^abda^ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate. Bha.
2 The following sentences give the reason why, although there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.
128 vedanta-s6tras.
speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears that the teacher’s intention is to speak about that Brahman which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of Sa^eyadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, ‘ That person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.’
16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.
The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following reason also. From ^ruti as well as smrzti we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i. e. who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described (Pra. Up. I, io), ‘ Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From thence they do not returnand also (Bha. Gita VIII, 34), 4 Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.’ Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Kk. Up. IV, 15, 5), ‘Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to light;’ and later on, ‘From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brah¬ man. Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.’ From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.
129 17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on account of the non-perma¬ nency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the im¬ possibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).
To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cog- nitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.—No other Self such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on account of non-permanency.—The reflected Self, in the first place, does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage ‘That person within the eye ’ must, moreover, be held, on the ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man’s own eye is the object of (that man’s) devout medi¬ tation (and not the reflected image of his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another tnan approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye. Scripture, moreover, (viz. Kh. Up. VIII, 9, 1, ‘ It (the reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes,’) declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self.—And, further, ‘ on account of impossibility ’ (the person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be perceived in the reflected Self.—Of the cogni- tional Self, in the second place, which is in general con¬ nexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be [34] K 130 VED ANT A-SU TR AS.
spoken of as connected with particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already. The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhy&ropita) the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz. mortality and fear; so that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the sa^yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power (abvarya).—In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz. the sun) has its station in the eye—according to the scriptural passage, 4 He rests with his rays in him ’—still Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva). Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally belong to them; as the mantra declares, 4 From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.’—Hence the person in the eye must be viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known and established, which is contained in the words 4 is seen ’ (in the phrase ‘ the person that is seen in the eye ’), has to be taken as referring to (the mental perception founded on) the ^astra which belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.
18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brah¬ man) are designated.
In B ri. Up. Ill, 7, i ff. we read, 4 He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings/ and later on, 4 He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,’ &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self.— Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antar¬ yamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being. What alternative then does recommend itself?
As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all those mentioned above.— Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character, and that, on the other hand, the term antarya¬ min—which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within)— cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antar¬ yamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 16), ‘He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light, 5 &c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action; rulership is there¬ fore rightly ascribed to him.—Or else the rulership spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable to enter within all things.—The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are required for ruling).
To this we make the following reply.—The internal ruler, of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self, cannot be anything else.—Why so?— Because its qualities are designated in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate K 2 132 vedanta-sGtras.
attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.—The qualities of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage, ‘ He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,’ belong in their primary sense to the highest Self.—Further, the passage, 4 He whom the earth does not know,’ which declares that the internal ruler is not known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.—The attributes ‘unseen,’ ‘unheard,’ also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities.—The objection that the highest Self is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules.— If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other ruler (but the highest Self 1 ). The objection would be valid only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing. —For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.
19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Smrzti assumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not belonging to it.
Good so far, a S&nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana assumed by the S&nkhya-smrzti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their 1 According to Scripture, Nirankuya/tf sarvaniyantritva;^ srautam na ^a tadrhe sarvaniyantari bhedo na Mnumana^z mitibhaditam uttish/$ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as Go. An. remarks, we may ex¬ plain: as the highest Self is not really different from the individual soul. So also Bhamati: Na Hnavastha, na hi niyantrantara;/* tena niyamyate ki m tu yo £ivo niyanta lokasiddha^ sa paramatmevo- padhyava^edakalpitabheda^.
133 Smr/ti says, 4 Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in sleep 5 (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects. Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana. The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra 1,1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.
To this argumentation the Sutrak&ra replies that the word 4 internal ruler’ cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c., it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the S&nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 23) says expressly, ' Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.’ —And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradh&na.
Well, then, if the term 4 internal ruler 5 cannot be admitted to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (indi¬ vidual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is internal (pratya/?^), and there¬ fore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (B ri. Up. Ill, 4? 2 )> ‘Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.’ The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.—To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.
20, And the embodied soul (also cannot be under¬ stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e, both *34 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
recensions of the Brzhad Ara^yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).
The word e not’ (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both.Scikhcis, i. e. the Kazzvas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (B ru Up. Ill, 7, 33), ‘He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, ‘ He who dwells in the Self.’ If the latter reading is adopted, the word ‘ Self 5 denotes the individual soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word £ knowledge; 5 for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term ‘ internal ruler.’—But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him?—Why—we ask in return—should that be impossible?—Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ‘ There is no other seer but he, 5 &c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis¬ cussion.—May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?—No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.)
We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent’s objection.—The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, pre¬ sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the 135 Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per¬ ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural passage, ‘ Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another, 5 declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent passage, ‘ But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another? 5 declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.
21. That which possesses the attributes of invisi¬ bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.
Scripture says, ‘The higher knowledge is this by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is im¬ perishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings 5 (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).—Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.
We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel in¬ stances. ‘As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible. 5 —But, it 136 vedanta-sOtras.
may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.—No, the purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads; and so in the case of man also.—While, moreover, in the case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the pradh&na, no attribute of a contrary nature being men¬ tioned.—But the qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1,9), ‘He who knows all and perceives all, 5 do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana?—To this the purvapakshin replies: The passage, ‘ The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen/ &c., points, by means of the term ‘ the Indestructible/ to the source of all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This same ‘ Indestructible 5 is again mentioned later on in the passage, c It is higher than the high Imperishable/ Now that which in this latter passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradMna denoted by the term ‘the Imperishable 5 is the source of all beings.—If, however, the word ‘ source 5 (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative cause, we may by ‘ the source of the beings 5 understand the embodied Self also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin of the complex of things.
To this we make the following reply.—That which here is spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing else.—Whereupon is this conclusion founded?—On the statement of attributes. For the clause, r He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving/ clearly states an attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all beings—which latter is denoted by the term ‘the Imperishable 5 —not to the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible because the source of all beings, which—in the clause, ‘ From the Indestructible every¬ thing here arises ’—is designated as the material cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, i, 9), ‘From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is bom that Brahman, name, form, and food.’ As therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of dis¬ cussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are ascribed.—We further maintain that also the passage, ‘ Higher than the high Imperishable, 5 does not refer to any being different from the imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of discussion. We conclude this from the circum¬ stance that the passage, ‘He truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true person,’ (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by invisibility and the like—which formed the subject of the preceding chapter—will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the next Sutra.—Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that it comprises the is’zg-veda and so on, and then the text continues, ‘ The higher knowledge vedanta-sOtras.
138 is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended/ Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different from the highest Lord, the know¬ ledge referring to it would not be the higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would assume absolute bliss to result from the know¬ ledge of the pradhana.— Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be ac¬ knowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds only.—Further, the reference to the knowledge of every¬ thing being implied in the knowledge of one thing—which is contained in the passage (I, 1, 3), ‘ Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?’—is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which com¬ prises only what is non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of enjoyment.—The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman as the chief subject—which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), i He told the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest son Atharvan 5 —and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads to the com¬ prehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the term ‘ knowledge of Brahman 5 would become meaningless if that Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the AYg-veda, and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages in which it (the lower know¬ ledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I, 3, 7), ‘ But frail