either Manu or Vyasa or other authorities, are to be con¬ sidered as ‘ explained/ i. e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common argu¬ ments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped ‘ otherwise ’ (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on.
13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versa) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.
Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.— Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge 1 ). Ana¬ logously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite 2.—Hence Scripture cannot be acknow¬ ledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, * Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?’ we give you the fol- 1 The following arthavada-passage, for instance, ‘the sacrificial post is the sun/ is to be taken in a metaphorical sense; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning.
2 Which are to be known from the Veda only.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13.
319 lowing instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoy¬ ment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doc¬ trine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinc¬ tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman’s causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established dis¬ tinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.
To the preceding objection we reply, ‘ It may exist as in ordinary experience.’ Even on our philosophic view the dis¬ tinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, ‘ Having created he entered into it,’ Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting 320 vedAnta-s(jtras.
adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non- different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.
14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as ‘ origin ’ and the like.
The 1 refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of en¬ joyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-dififerent from the cause, i. e. has no existence apart from the cause.— How so?—‘ On account of the scriptural word “ origin ” and others.’ The word ‘origin’ is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing everything is known; viz. Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4, ‘As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; thus,’ &c.—The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay 2, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far 1 Pari^amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/ft samadhaya vivar- tavadam arritya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.
2 Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramarthato vi^-watam iti sambandha^.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 14.
321 as they are clay they are true.—This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman; applying the phrase £ having its origin in speech 9 to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman.—Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, £ Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 4, 1).—Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the £ and others’ of the Sfitra. Such texts are, £ In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that 5 (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); ‘ This everything, all is that Self’ (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); ‘Brahman alone is all this 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); £ The Self is all this’ (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); £ There is in it no diversity’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).—On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares). We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe—for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from the surface of the desert 1 )—; so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman.—But—it might be objected—Brah¬ man has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers 1 Drfsh/eti kada&d drfsh/aw punar nash/am anityam iti yavat.— Drfsh/agraha«asu£ita/tf pratitikale*pi sattarahityaw tatraiva hetvan- taram aha svarfipeweti. An. Gi.
and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and mani¬ foldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the element of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity ac¬ cording to the Veda—which depend on the karmaki;/</a— may be established in connexion with the element of mani¬ foldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c. agree very well.
This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the in¬ stance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase ‘as clay they are true ’ asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase ‘ having its origin in speech 5 declares the unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, ‘ In that all this has its Self; ’ and, again, ‘ That is true; ’ whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage again, ‘ That is the Self; thou art that, O.SVetaketu! ’ teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the em¬ bodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world—which is based on the individual soul— having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 14.
323 addition to the element of unity.—Scriptural passages also (such as, 4 When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?’ B ri. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage 4 Thou art that 5 shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true- minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false-minded 1? Another scriptural passage ( £ from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity, 5 B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.—Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknow¬ ledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true?
Other objections are started.—If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts em¬ bodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their pur¬ port if the distinction on which their validity depends 1 In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being compared to the ‘ false-minded ’ thief who, knowing himself to be guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.
does not really exist. And further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without sus¬ pecting the perception to be a merely apparent one.—But how (to restate an objection raised above) can theVedanta- texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1.—This objection, we reply, is with¬ out force (because as a matter of fact we do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) 1 I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes.
and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person.—But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal!—These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise.—(We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be con¬ sidered as refuted h—Scripture also (in the passage, ‘ If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer there¬ from success in his work ’) declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain un¬ favourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues ‘ if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,’ intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified.—It is, moreover, known from the ex¬ perience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the 1 Svapna^agraddehayor vyabhi/£are*pi pratyabhi^Mnat tadanu- gatatmaikyasiddhes ^aitanyasya £a dehadharmatve rftpadivat tadanu- palabdhiprasangad avagates Mbadhat tadrfipasyatmano dehadvayati- rekasiddher dehamatratmavado na yukta ity artha^. An. Gi.
326 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction 1. An injunction as, for instance, ‘ He is to sacrifice ’ at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but passages such as, ‘Thou art that,’ ‘ I am Brahman,’ leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brah¬ man. Nor can it be maintained that such states of con¬ sciousness do not actually arise; for scriptural passages such as, ‘He understood what he said ’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any oppor¬ tunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements.
But—it may be said—(that would not be a mere assump¬ tion, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman 1 As long as the ‘vyavahara’presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahara; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4.
327 capable of modification; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications.—This objection—we reply—is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brah¬ man, teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/astha). Such passages are, ‘ This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘That Self is to be described by No, no 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 26); ‘ It is neither coarse nor fine 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, ‘Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)? 5 we remark that the quali¬ fication, ‘ absolutely changeless 5 (ku/astha), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated. — Moreover, while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passing over into the form of this world.
Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, ‘ That Self is to be described by No, no, 5 we read later on, ‘ O Canaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then 1 to accept the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own—as, for instance, the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this 1 Tatreti, srzsh/yadkrutinazrc svarthe phalavaikalye satiti yavat. An. Gi.
world—is merely to be applied as a means for the cogni¬ tion of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in con¬ nexion with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the latter x. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would undergo corresponding modifications 1 2 would be inappro¬ priate, as the state of final release (which the soul obtains through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brah¬ man to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.—This objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i. e. those qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, c From that Self sprang ether,’ &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhana or any other principle. That tenet we have stated in I, i, 4, and here we do not teach anything contrary to it.—But how, the question may be asked, can you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?—Listen how. Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either 1 A Mimawsa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is inde¬ pendent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act.
2 According to the *$ruti ‘in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he passes himself.’
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4.
329 as being (i. e. Brahman), nor as different from it 1, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called in vSruti and Smrzti the illusion (maya), power (^akti), or nature (prakrzti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scrip¬ tural passages such as the following, ‘ He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman’ (. Kh. Up. VIII, 14,1); ‘Let me evolve names and forms 5 (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2); 6 He, the wise one, who having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)’ (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7); c He who makes the one seed manifold ’ (Sve. Up. VI, 12).—Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nes¬ cience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting ad¬ juncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called ^ivas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vi^anatman), which indeed are one with his own Self—just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether—but are limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i. e. bodies) produced from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord’s being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence,