This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non¬ existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the passage, ‘ In the beginning this was non-existent only, 5 we remark that what is there denoted by the word ‘Non-existing 5 is—in the complementary passage, ‘That became existent’ — referred to by the word ‘that, 5 and qualified as ‘ Existent. 5 The word ‘ was 5 would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.—Hence with refer¬ ence to the other passage also, 4 Non-existing indeed, 5 &c., the complementary part, ‘That made itself its Self, 5 shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant—It follows from all this that the designation of ‘ Non-existence 5 applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished 1 For simplicity’s sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non¬ existing.
by name and form are in ordinary language called ‘ existent/ the term "non-existent’ is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.
18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is nondifferent from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.—Ordinary expe¬ rience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal sub¬ stances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible.
For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?—Let us then main¬ tain, the asatkaryavctdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (atLaya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.—What, we ask in return, do you understand by that £ atLaya? ’ If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origi¬ nation), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the atuaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?)
Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power.—Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavaya connexion 1.) —If, we reply, you assume the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions; or else you will have to main¬ tain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation 2.—Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.—Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/zzyoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya 1 Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate rela¬ tion, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.
2 Samavayasya svatantryapakshazzz diishayati anabhyupagamyamane^eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi^ sambandho neshyate kim tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyaguzzadina/ra ka. viprakarsha^ syat sazzmidhayakabhavad ity artha^. An. Gi.
vp:danta-s6tr as.
connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1.— Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavaya relation has really no purport.
In what manner again do you—who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation— assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i. e. in the material parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?—If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i. e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.—Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts 2.—In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regress us in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain 1 A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that sawyoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (guzza) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.
2 So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers. given parts we should always have to assume further parts 1. —Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.—That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in.Srughna and in Pa^aliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yagviadatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at 5 rughna and the other at Pa/aliputra.— If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.
We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.— That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origi¬ nation of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent 2, just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradic- 1 Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha ka yathavayavai/^ sutraw kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha^e *pi gnhyate tatha katipayavayavagraha7ze*pi bhavaty avayavino graha/zarn ity artha^. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta kim va tadatiriktavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana^ drfsh/am iti dr/sh/antagarbhaztf hetum a^ash/e ko^eti. Dvitiyam dushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prakrftavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/^atvam pa/asya na syad iti bhava^. An. Gi.
2 I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.
tion. But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origi¬ nation of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 4 the jar is originated, 5 means as much as 4 the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated V But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in exist¬ ence.—Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origi¬ nation is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.—How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 4 The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Phraavarman,’ the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal 1 Every action, ^Sankara says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.
agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non¬ existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never be.—But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is alto¬ gether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour.
But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non¬ existence of the effect previously to its origination.—Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above.—Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on.
If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as some¬ thing altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term ‘ birth 5 (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term c death 5 only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non¬ existing; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mothers womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used.—The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only \ The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous con¬ clusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else 1 Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of this adhy&ya.
34* (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (atuaya) of the inherent cause; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea¬ soning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origina¬ tion, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra is the one ( Kh. Up. VI, a, i) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, 4 Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,’ refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world ( 4 Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning’), raises an objection against that doctrine ( 4 How could that which is be born of that which is not?’), and, finally, re¬ affirms the view first set forth, 4 Only Being was this in the beginning.’ The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word 4 this,’ is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, co¬ ordinated with the cause denoted by the term 4 Being,’ proves that the effect exists in—and is non-different from— the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, 4 That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,’ &c.
34 2 34 2 (VI, i, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in— and is not different from—the cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we per¬ haps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.—Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we con¬ clude that the latter is non-different from the former.
20. And as in the case of the different vital aifs. It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air—such as prazza the ascending vital air, apana the descending vital air, &c.—are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be ac¬ complished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.—Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non¬ difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.— As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that ‘ What is not heard is heard, what is not per¬ ceived is perceived, what is not known is known 5 ( Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) is fulfilled 1.
2i. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brah¬ man) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is bene¬ ficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.—If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i. e. Brahman), ‘on ac¬ count of the other being designated/ For Scripture declares the other, i. e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, c That is the Self; that art thou, O.SVetaketu! 5 {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7.)—Or else (if we interpret ‘ the other ’ of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, c Having created that he entered into it/ declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage also, ‘ Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms’ {Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word ‘ Self,’ shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an inde¬ pendent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless, 1 Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.
vedanta-s6tras.
look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Fur¬ ther, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that c what would be beneficial is not done/ the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference. The word ‘but’ discards the purvapaksha.—We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its charac¬ teristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of ‘the declaration of difiference., For scriptural passages (such as, ‘ Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked/ Brt. Up. II, 4, 5; ‘The Self we must search out, we must try to understand/ Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1; ‘ Then he becomes united with the True, 5 Kh. Up. VI, 8,1; 4 This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self, 5 Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.—And if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 4 That art thou ’), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.—Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the decla¬ ration of non-difference contained in such passages as 4 that art thou, 5 the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self’s) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the pre¬ sentations of Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 4 That we must search for,’ &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul;