The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea¬ soning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origina¬ tion, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra is the one ( Kh. Up. VI, a, i) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, 4 Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,’ refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world ( 4 Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning’), raises an objection against that doctrine ( 4 How could that which is be born of that which is not?’), and, finally, re¬ affirms the view first set forth, 4 Only Being was this in the beginning.’ The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word 4 this,’ is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, co¬ ordinated with the cause denoted by the term 4 Being,’ proves that the effect exists in—and is non-different from— the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, 4 That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,’ &c.
(VI, i, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in— and is not different from—the cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we per¬ haps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.—Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we con¬ clude that the latter is non-different from the former.
20. And as in the case of the different vital aifs.
It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air—such as prazza the ascending vital air, apana the descending vital air, &c.—are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be ac¬ complished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.—Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non¬ difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.— As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and II ADHyAyA, I PADA, 21.
343 non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that ‘ What is not heard is heard, what is not per¬ ceived is perceived, what is not known is known 5 ( Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) is fulfilled 1.
2i. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brah¬ man) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is bene¬ ficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.—If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i. e. Brahman), ‘on ac¬ count of the other being designated/ For Scripture declares the other, i. e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, c That is the Self; that art thou, O.SVetaketu! 5 {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7.)—Or else (if we interpret ‘ the other ’ of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, c Having created that he entered into it/ declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage also, ‘ Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms’ {Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word ‘ Self,’ shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an inde¬ pendent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless, 1 Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.
344 vedanta-s6tras.
look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Fur¬ ther, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that c what would be beneficial is not done/ the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.
The word ‘but’ discards the purvapaksha.—We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its charac¬ teristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of ‘the declaration of difiference., For scriptural passages (such as, ‘ Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked/ Brt. Up. II, 4, 5; ‘The Self we must search out, we must try to understand/ Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1; ‘ Then he becomes II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 23.
345 united with the True, 5 Kh. Up. VI, 8,1; 4 This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self, 5 Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.—And if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 4 That art thou ’), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.—Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the decla¬ ration of non-difference contained in such passages as 4 that art thou, 5 the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sub- lated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self’s) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the pre¬ sentations of Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 4 That we must search for,’ &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.
23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.
As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being 346 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandal¬ wood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objec¬ tions imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained.—Fur¬ ther 1 arguments are furnished by the fact of all effects having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream phan¬ toms (while the dreaming person remains one).
24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).
Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto by pro¬ viding themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing itself with instruments to work with?—We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause of the world.
This objection is not valid, because causation is possible 1 Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the ‘ and ’ of the Sutra.
II APHYAYA, I PADA, 25.
347 in consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal sub¬ stance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat. If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely com¬ pleted. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, ‘There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge’ (Sve. Up. VI, 8 ). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.
25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience.
Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelli- gent things have the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelli¬ gent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several work only after having provided themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any auxiliary?
We reply, c Like gods and others.’ As gods, fathers, rfshis, and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any 348 VEDANTA-sfi TRA?, extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings peculiar power—a fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, and pura?zas;— and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman also may be assumed to create the world by itself without ex¬ traneous means.
Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following style.—The go 's and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spiders devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane con¬ ceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being!; it rather wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper climbs up the tree.—Hence all these illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.
To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelli¬ gence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i. e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which 1 The right reading appears to be ‘ svayam eva ^etana ’ as found in some MSS. Other MSS. read ^etana h.
II ADHYAyA, I PADA, 26.
349 is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.
26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brah¬ man undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts.
Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without the employment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.—Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under discussion.— The consequence of the Vedanta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Com¬ pare, ‘ He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint’ (Sve. Up. VI, 19); ‘That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); ‘That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge ’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 12); ‘He is to be described by No, no* (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 26); ‘It is neither coarse nor fine’ (Bn. Up. Ill, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in Brahman.—As, therefore, a partial modi¬ fication is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.—Another consequence of the Vedantic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive ‘ to see ’ Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.—And, finally, the texts declaring Brah¬ man to be unborn are contradicted thereby.—If, on the other hand—in order to escape from these difficulties—we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts.
350 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.—Hence theVedantic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.
27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).
The word ‘but’ discards the objection.—We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.— That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 6 on account of sacred texts/ For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from its effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of cause and effect (‘ That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms; 5 and, ‘Such is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven 5 ( Kh. Up. Ill, 12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul’s union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the passage, ‘ then it is united with the True, my dear, 5 would be out of place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of Brah¬ man, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be admitted.—Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authori- II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 27.
351 tative—not the senses, and so on—must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruc¬ tion is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As the Pura^a says: ‘ Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes 1.’ Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.
But—our opponent will say—even the holy texts can¬ not make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions ‘ at the atiratra he is to take the sho^a^in- cup,’ and ‘ at the atiratra he is not to take the sho^ajin-cup’) any contradiction which may present itself to the under¬ standing is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.
1 Prakr/tibhya iti, pratyakshadrfsh/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat parazrc vilaksha^am a^dryadyupade^agamyaw tad a/£intyam ity artha^. An. Gi.
352 VE D ANT A-sft TR AS.
No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman’s nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts.—Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman’s Self as raised above this apparent world; that being an in¬ struction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning ‘ He can only be described by No, no’ (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words c O Canaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 2, 4).—Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties.
28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods \ &c.).
Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self 1 This is the way in which Sankara divides the Sutra; An. Gi. remarks to ‘loke^pi, &c.: atmani £eti vyakhyaya vi&traj* ka, hiti vya/fcash/e/ II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 29.
353 of a dreaming person, ‘ There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without in¬ terfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.
29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.
Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities—viz. the pradMna—is the cause of an effect—viz. the world—which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned.—But—it might be pleaded in favour of the Sankhyas—they do not maintain their pradhana to be with¬ out parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three guzzas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana forms a whole containing the three guzzas as its parts.—We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts 1. And each guzza by itself assisted merely by the two other guzzas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature 2.—So that the objection lies against the Sankhya 1 So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else—against the assumption—consist of parts.
2 The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three guzzas in combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.
view likewise.—Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts.—If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on.—Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.—Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.
The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom 1. If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the com¬ bination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.
As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objec¬ tions raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.
30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).
We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers.—How then—it may be asked—do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers?—He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, ‘ because that is seen.’ For various scriptural pas¬ sages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, ‘ He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is 1 As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 31.
355 never surprised 5 (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4); ‘He who desires what is true and imagines what is true 5 (. Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1); ‘ He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail 5 ) (Mu. Up. 1,1,9); ‘ By the command of that Im¬ perishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart 5 (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 9); and other similar passages.
31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).
Let this be granted.—Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action 1; so, for instance, in the passage, ‘ It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthav&das, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, ‘ No, no, 5 denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?