Adhik. Ill (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non- intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes—as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted xlviii VEDANTA-SU TR AS.
and thereby become simple gold again—do not continue to exist in those causes.—Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sankhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal sub¬ stance participating in the same characteristics.
Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol¬ lowed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.
The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, accord¬ ing to Sankara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may prac¬ tically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.—The Sri-bhashya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanuja’s view, the Sutra runs as follows: f If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circum¬ stance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day ex¬ perience.’ That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essen¬ tially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord’s having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.—The construction which Ramanuja puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears INTRODUCTION.
xlix from a quotation made by Ramanuja from the Drami- dabhashyakara \ Adhik. VI (14-30) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is de¬ fended by its adherents against the Vaueshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause. —The divergent views of 5 ankara and Ramanuja on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.
Adhik. VII (31-33) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutra- kclra remarks, the creative principle of the world is addi¬ tional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.—The way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikara^a are treated by Sankara on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other is characteristic. Ramanuja throughout simply follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formu¬ lates the objection based on such texts as £ Thou art that/ while Sutra 33 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scrip¬ ture..Sankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sfitra 33, is not real, but due to the soul’s fictitious limiting adjuncts.
Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although des¬ titute of material and instruments of action, may yet pro¬ duce the world, just as gods by their mere power create 1 Lokavat. Yatha loke ra^ajasananuvartinaw ka. ra^anugrahanigrahakrzta- sukhadukhayoge 1 pi na saj-ariratvamatre^a J-asake ra^any api jasananuvrzttya- tivr/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhoktrz t vaprasanga^. Yathaha Drami^/abha- shyakara^ yatha loke ra^a pra^uradanda^uke ghore*narthasawkafe *pi prade^e vartamano * pi vya^anadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprzVyate abhipre- ta ms ka. lokan paripipalayishati bhogawj ka. gandhadin avijva^anopabhogyan dharayati tathasau loke^varo bhramatsvasamarthyaHmaro doshair na spmyate rakshati ka. lokan brahmalokadiwj Hvirva^anopabhogyan dharayatiti.
palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.
Adhik. IX (2,6-2 9) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, ac¬ cording to Sankara, because the world is unreal; according to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brah¬ man in a subtle imperceptible condition.
Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although des¬ titute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.
Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.
Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.
Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman—omniscience and so on—are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.
Pada II.
The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philo¬ sophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view.—The first adhikarazza (1-10) is directed against the Sankhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the Sankhyas, is unable to create and dispose.—The second adhikarazza (11-17) refutes the INTRODUCTION.
li INTRODUCTION.
li VaLeshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrzsh/a.—The third and fourth adhika- razzas are directed against various schools of Bauddha phi¬ losophers. Adhik. Ill (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvastitvavddins, or bahy&rthavadins, who main¬ tain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vi^anavadins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.—The last Sutra of this adhikarazza is treated by Ram 4 nu^*a as a separate adhikarazza refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing what¬ ever is real.—Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doc¬ trine of the Gainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philo¬ sophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.
The last adhikarazza of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pazz^aratras. But Sankara and Ramanuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sfttrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.— S&tras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated Sankarshazza, i.e. the ^iva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul’s eternity; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sankarshazza there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.—The Sutra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally trans¬ lated it runs, 4 Or, on account of there being’ (or, ‘their being’) ‘knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.’—This means, according to Sankara, 4 Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sankarshazza, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).’— d 2 lii vedAnta-s<jtras.
According to Raminu^a, on the other hand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows: ‘ Or, rather there is non¬ contradiction of that (i. e. the Pa^aratra doctrine) on ac¬ count of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account of their being Brahman)/ Which means: Since San- karsha^a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pa^aratra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.—The form of the Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the ‘vd’ and of the ‘tat/ implied in R&manu^a’s comment, are more natural than those resulting from Sankara’s interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which—in spite of objec¬ tions—has to be viewed as the true one.
Pada III.
The third pada discusses the question whether the dif¬ ferent forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co¬ eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.
The first seven adhikara^as treat of the five elementary substances.—Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.—Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 13) that fire springs from air, water from tire, earth from water.—Adhik. Ill (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is/ cannot have originated from anything else.
Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.
Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.
Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which INTRODUCTION.
liii the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary sub¬ stances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted to¬ gether with the elements of which they consist.
The remainder of the pdda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the £*iva.—Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 4 Devadatta is born/ 4 De- vadatta has died/ strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.
Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, accord¬ ing to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.—This Sutra is of course com¬ mented on in a very different manner by.Sankara on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the former, the ^iva is in reality identical—and as such co¬ eternal — with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul’s connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that con¬ nexion is moreover illusory.—According to R&manu£*a, the ^-iva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prak&ra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikaj-a), contrasting w T ith the unevolved or contracted state (sanliv vedAnta-s^tras.
koka) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svaru- p&nyathabhava), and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.
Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that the soul is ‘ gna' This means, according to.Sankara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai^eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.—Ramanuja, on the other hand, explains ‘ gna’ by ‘ gnatri’ i.e.knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the VaLreshikas, but also against those philo¬ sophers who—like the Sinkhyas and the Vedantins of Sankara’s school—maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure ^aitanya.—The wording of the Sutra cer¬ tainly seems to favour Ramanuja’s interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of.Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul’s nature, use the term gna of which the most obvious interpretation is gnatri, not gnanam.
Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/m, i. e. of very minute size, or omni¬ present, all-pervading (sarvagata, vy^pin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.— In.Sankara’s opinion the Stitras 19-28 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the giva is a/m, while Sutra 29 formu¬ lates the siddhanta, viz. that the gtva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as anu in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ—which itself is anu —constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the samsara.—According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the first Sultra of the adhi- karana gives utterance to the siddMnta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the INTRODUCTION.
lv Sfitras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (gnatri) stands to knowledge (gnana). —In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.—.Sankara maintains that Sfitras 19-28 state and enforce a ptirvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be re¬ jected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with Sankara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus im¬ plicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that .Sankara’s interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word ‘ pra^avat 5 ) the Sutra runs as follows: ‘ But on account of that quality (or “those qualities; ” or else “ on account of the quality—or qualities—of that ”) being the essence, (there is) that designation (or “ the designation of that 55 ).’ This.San¬ kara maintains to mean, ‘ Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the samsaxa state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/m.’ Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first ‘ tat 5 by buddhi. And—which is more important — in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on.Sankara’s own system the qualities of the buddhi—such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.—can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the samsara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara’s sys¬ tem, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
lvi association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.
There are no similar difficulties in the way of R&manu^a’s interpretation of the adhikara/za. He agrees with Sankara in the explanation of Sfitras 19-25, with-this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddh&nta. Sfitras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from.Sankara’s, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the sub¬ stratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vi^Tzana when meaning the indi¬ vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ‘ The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,’ i. e. because knowledge is the essential character¬ istic quality of the soul, therefore the term ‘knowledge ’ is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The ‘tu’ of the Sutra which, according to Sankara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha, serves on R 4 manu^a’s view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.
Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/za (30-32), 30 explains, according to Sankara, that the soul may be called a/zu, since, as long as it exists in the sa//zsara con¬ dition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called vigTZclna because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.—Sutra 31 intimates, according to Sankara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is poten¬ tially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Raminu^a, teaches that ^zzatrztva is properly said to constitute the soul’s essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.—In Stitra 32, finally, Sankara sees a statement of the INTRODUCTION.
lvii doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or perma¬ nently non-cognizing; while, according to Rctm&nu^a, the Stitra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being gn&tri and a^u, as it is in reality).—The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul’s connexion with the buddhi.
Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kartntva of the £*iva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to Sankara’s system, this cannot be the final view,—the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upadhis,—he looks upon the next following Sutra (40) as constituting an adhikara^a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instru¬ ments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, ‘just as the carpenter acts in both ways,’ i. e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.— Ramcinqg'a, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40 from the preceding Stitras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.
Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.
Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the indivi¬ dual soul to Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a^a) of Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely lviii VEDANTA-S$ TR AS.
different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to Riminu^a the souls are in reality parts of Brahman 1; according to Sankara the ‘ az/wa ’ of the Sfttra must be understood to mean ‘ a^a iva,’ £ a part as it were; 5 the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts. — One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/za calls for special notice. According to Sankara the words ‘dbhasa eva k a’ mean ‘(the soul is) a mere reflection/ which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavada; i. e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called ava££^edav&da, i. e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.—According to R&manug'a the cLbMsa of the Sutra has to be taken in the 1 6ivasya kartritvam paramapurushayattam ity uktam. Idsaiim kim ayaw givah parasmad atyantabhinna^ uta param eva brahma bhrantam uta brahmaivo- padhyava^Minnam atha brahmamsa. iti sa.msa.yya.te mitivipratipatte^ samsayak. Nanu tadananyam arambha^ajabdadibhya^ adhikaw tu bhedanirde^ad ity atraivayam artho mxmtah. Satya m sa eva nanatvaikatvamitivipratipattya * kshipya ga vasya brahmaw^atvopapadanena vlreshato nirmyate. Yavad dhi ^ivasya brahmawsatvaw na nimitam tava^* ^ivasya brahmano * nanyatvaw brahma^as tasmad adhikatvaw ka na pratitishMati. Ki m tavat praptam. Atyantaw bhinna iti. Kutah. Gnagnaa dvav ityadibhedanirde.rat. Gnagnayox abhedajrutayas tv agnina sinked itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa^arikya^. Brahmano * mso ^iva ity api na sadhiya^, ekavastvekade^ava^i hy amsasabdah, giwasya brahmaikade^atve tadgata dosha brahmam bhaveyu^. Na ka brahma- khaWo giva ity aw^atvopapatti^ kha^ananarhatvad brahma^a^ pragukta- doshaprasanga^ ka, tasmad atyantabhinnasya tadamsatvam durupapadam. Yadva bhrantaw brahmaiva ^iva^. Kutak. Tat tvam asi ayam atma brah- metyadibrahmatmabhavopadejat, nanatmatvavadinyas tu pratyakshadisiddhar- thanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade^aparabhi^.rrutibhi/6 pratyakshadayaj ka avidyantargata^ khyapyante.—Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/£Minnazrc g\\ah. Kuta h. Tata eva brahmatmabhavopade^at. Na kayam. upadhir bhrantiparikalpita ita vaktuw sakyam bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter.
Ity eva m prapte ^ bhidhiyate. Brahma^wa iti. Kuta^. Nanavyapade^ad anyatha /^aikatvena vyapade^ad ubhayatha hi vyapade.ro drisyate. Nanavya- pade^as tavat sra shtritYasrigyatva — niyantrztvaniyamyatva — sarva^atva- gnatva —svadhinatvaparadhinatva— juddhatva^uddhatva — kalyawagu^akarat- vaviparitatva—patitva^eshatvadibhir dmyate. Anyatha Hbhedena vyapa- de.ro pi tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibhir drisyate. Api da^akita- vaditvam apy adhiyate eke, brahma da.ra brahma da.ra brahmeme kitava ity atharvamka brahmano dsurakitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tata s ka sarva^ivavya- pitvena abhedo vyapadiryata ity artha^. Evam ubhayavyapade.ramukhyatva- siddhaye ^ivo^-yaw brahmano * msa ity abhyupagantavya^.
INTRODUCTION.
lix sense of hetv&bh&sa, a fallacious argument, and the Sfitra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedintins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts \ Pada IV.
Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the prazzas (by which generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen- driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (azzu).
Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya prazza, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the pr&zzas discussed above; and that it is minute (azzu).
Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the prazzas are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya prazza.
Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the namarupavyakarazza) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord.
THIRD ADHYAYA.
PAda I.
Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhutasukshma) which serve as an abode to the prazzas attached to the soul.
Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodi¬ ment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anusaya) of their 1 Nanu bhrantabrahma^ivavade * py avidyakrztopadhibhedad bhogavya- vasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva ka. Akha^/aikarasapraklrama- tratvarupasya svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva. Prakajaikasvarupasya prakajatirodhanaw prakajanaja eveti prag evopapaditam. Abhasi eveti va p&/^a-6, tatha sati hetava abhasa^.
lx VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.
Adhik. Ill (12-2,1) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.
Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.
Pada II.
Pada II.
Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to.Sankara the three first Sfitras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sfitra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 4 Maya, 5 since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Maya, yet have a prophetic quality. Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such parti¬ cipates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul’s knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.
The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara^a by Ramanuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sutras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the indi¬ vidual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras 1 and 2 set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: ‘ And the followers of some ^akhas declare (the INTRODUCTION.
lxi INTRODUCTION.
lxi soul to be) a creator/ &c. The third Sutra states the siddhanta view: ‘But the creations of dreams are Maya, i. e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested/ Concerning the word ‘ maya,’ Ramanuja remarks, ‘ maycLabdo hy askaryavaM janakajya kule j&ta devamayeva nirmita ityadishu tatha dananat.’ The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in the Sri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra, according to Sankara, being the sixth according to Rama¬ nuja. Sutras 4 and 5 (according to Ramanuja’s numera¬ tion) are explained by Ramanuja very much in the same way as by Sankara; but owing to the former’s statement of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara^a they connect themselves more intimately with the preceding Sutras than is possible on Sankara’s interpretation. In Sutra 6 (siikakas ka hi) Ramanuja sees a deduction from the siddhanta of the adhikara^a, ‘Because the images of a dream are pro¬ duced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.’
Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.
Adhik. Ill (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.—Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.