Vyasa and others state in their smrztis that the highest Self is not afflicted by the pain of the individual soul, 1 That highest Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities, nor is it stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus leaf by water. But that other Self whose essence is action is connected with bondage and release; again and again it is joined with the seventeenfold aggregate 1.’—On the ground of the particle ‘ and ’ (in the Sutra) we have to supply 4 and scripture also records that.’ So, for instance, ‘ One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating ’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), and ‘The one Self within all things is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being him¬ self without ’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 11).
Here the purvapakshin raises a new objection.—If there is only one internal Self of all beings, what room is there for permissions and prohibitions, worldly as well as Vedic? You must not reject this objection on the ground of your having proved that the individual soul is a part of the Lord, and that thus injunctions and prohibitions may, without any mutual interference, apply to the soul which is different from the Lord. For there are other scriptural passages which teach that the soul is not different from the Lord, and therefore not a part of him, as, for instance, the following ones: 1 I. e. the subtle body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five prawas, manas, and buddhi.
4 Having sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt.Up. 11, 6 ); 4 There is no other seer but he 5 (B ri, Up. Ill, 7, 23); 4 From death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity ’ (B ri, Up. IV, 4, 19); 4 Thou art that ’ (Kk, Up. VI, 8, 7); 4 1 am Brahman’ (B ri, Up. I, 4, 10). Should you say that just from this concurrence of intimations of difference on the one hand and non-difference on the other hand it follows that the soul is a part of the Lord, we reply that such might be the case if the intention of the texts were to teach differ¬ ence as well as non-difference. But the fact is that the texts aim solely at teaching non-difference, because through the knowledge of Brahman being the universal Self the highest end of man is obtained. About difference on the other hand mere occasional statements (anuvada) are made as about something already established naturally (i.e. apart from scripture). Moreover, we have already maintained that Brahman as not composed of parts can have no parts. Hence it follows that the one highest Self which is within all beings appears as individual soul, and it therefore remains to show how injunctions and prohibitions are possible.
48. (The possibility of) injunctions and prohibi¬ tions (results) from the connexion (of the Self) with bodies; as in the case of light and so on.
Passages such as 4 He is to approach his wife at the proper time,’ and 4 he is not to approach the wife of his guru/ are examples of permissions (or injunctions) and prohibitions; or again passages such as 4 He is to kill the animal devoted to Agnishomau,’ and 4 He is not to hurt any being.’ Corresponding examples from ordinary life are: 4 A friend is to be served/ and ‘Enemies are to be shunned.’ Permissions and prohibitions of this kind are possible, be¬ cause the Self although one only is connected with various bodies.—Of what kind then is that connexion?—It consists in the origination in the Self of the erroneous notion that the Self is the aggregate consisting of the body and so on. This erroneous notion is seen to prevail in all living beings, and finds its expression in thoughts such as the following: ' / go/ 4 1 come,’ 4 / am blind,’ 4 1 am not blind/ 4 / am con- II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 48.
67 fused/ ‘ I am not confused.* That erroneous notion cannot be removed by anything but perfect knowledge, and before the latter supervenes, it remains spread among all living beings. And thus, although the Self must be admitted to be one only, injunctions and prohibitions are possible owing to the difference effected by its connexion with bodies and other limiting adjuncts, the products of Nescience.—It then follows that for him who has obtained perfect knowledge, injunctions and prohibitions are purportless.— No, we reply, (they are not purportless for him, but they do not refer to him), since to him who has obtained the highest aim no obligation can apply. For obligations are imposed with reference to things to be avoided or desired; how then should he, who sees nothing, either to be wished or avoided, beyond the universal Self, stand under any obligation? The Self certainly cannot be enjoined on the Self.—Should it be said that injunctions and prohibitions apply to all those who discern that the soul is something different from the body (and therefore also to him who possesses perfect knowledge), we reply that (such an assertion is too wide, since) obligation depends on a man’s imagining his Self to be (actually) connected with the body. It is true that obligation exists for him only who views the soul as some¬ thing different from the body; but fundamentally all obli¬ gation is an erroneous imagination existing in the case of him only who does not see that his Self is no more con¬ nected with a body than the ether is with jars and the like. For him, on the other hand, who does not see that connexion no obligation exists, much less, therefore, for him who discerns the unity of the Self.—Nor does it result from the absence of obligation, that he who has arrived at perfect knowledge can act as he likes; for in all cases it is only the wrong imagination (as to the Self’s connexion with a body) that impels to action, and that imagination is absent in the case of him who has reached perfect knowledge.—From all this it follows that injunctions and prohibitions are based on the Self s connexion with the body; 4 as in the case of light.’ The case under discussion is analogous to cases such as the following: Light is one only, and yet we shun 68 vedanta-s(jtras.
a fire which has consumed dead bodies, not any other fire. The sun is one only; yet we shun only that part of his light which shines on unholy places, not that part which falls on pure ground. Some things consisting of earth are desired, e.g. diamonds and beryls; other things likewise consisting of earth are shunned, e.g. dead bodies. The urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as such; those of other animals are shunned. And many similar cases.
49. And on account of the non-extension (of the individual soul), there is no confusion (of the results of actions).
Well, let it be granted that injunctions and prohibitions are valid, because the Self although one is joined with particular bodies.—From the admission, however, of the unity of the Self it follows that there must be a con¬ fusion of the fruits of actions, there being only one master (i.e. one soul to enjoy the fruits of action).—This is not so, we reply, because there is no extension of the acting and enjoying Self, i.e. no connexion on its part with all bodies. For, as we have shown, the individual soul depends on its adjuncts, and owing to the non-extension of those adjuncts there is also non-extension of the soul. Hence there is no confusion of actions or fruits of actions.
50. And (the individual soul is) an appearance (reflection) only.
And that individual soul is to be considered a mere appearance of the highest Self, like the reflection of the sun in the water; it is neither directly that (i.e. the highest Self), nor a different thing. Hence just as, when one re¬ flected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not on that account tremble also; so, when one soul is connected with actions and results of actions, another soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is therefore no confusion of actions and results. And as that ‘appearance’ is the effect of Nescience, it follows that the sa;^sara which is based on it (the appearance) is also the II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 50.
69 effect of Nescience, so that from the removal of the latter there results the cognition of the soul being in reality nothing but Brahman.
For those, on the other hand, who maintain that there are many Selfs and all of them all-pervading, it follows that there must be a confusion of actions and results.—In what way?—According to the opinion of the Sankhyas there exist many all-pervading Selfs, whose nature is pure intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable ex¬ cellence. For the common purpose of all of them there exists the pradhana, through which the souls obtain enjoy¬ ment and release.—According to the followers of Ka?/ada there exist many all-pervading Selfs, but they are, like so many jars or stools, mere substances and unintelligent in themselves. With those Selfs there co-operate the internal organs (manas), atomic and also unintelligent. From the conjunction of these two classes of substances, viz. the Selfs and the internal organs, there spring the nine special qualities of the Selfs, viz. desire, &C. 1 These qualities inhere in the individual Selfs separately, without any confusion, and that constitutes the sawsara-state. Final| release, on the other hand, consists in the absolute non-j origination of those nine qualities.
With regard to these opinions we remark that, as far as the Sankhyas are concerned, their doctrine that all Selfs are of the nature of intelligence, and that there is no difference between them in the point of proximity (to the pradhana), &c. 2, implies that, if one Self is connected with pleasure and pain, all Selfswill be so connected.—Well but, the Sankhya might reply, a difference (in the connexion of the individual Selfs with pleasure and pain) may result from the circumstance that the activity of the pradhana aims at the isolation (emancipation) of the Selfs 3. Other- 1 Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, and bhavana.
2 The &c. implies the non-activity (audasinya) of the Selfs.
3 And therefore proceeds in a special definite direction capable of effecting in the end the emancipation of some particular Self.
70 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
wise the activity of the pradhana would serve no other end but to manifest the pradhana’s power, in consequence whereof no final release would ever take place.—This argu¬ mentation, we reply, is not sound. For we have no right to assume a difference which has for its only motive the accomplishment of an end desirable (to us, viz. the emanci¬ pation of the Selfs), but we must rather bring forward some proof for that difference. If no such proof can be brought forward, the desired end, i. e. the emancipation of the soul, must be supposed not to take place; while at the same time the absence of any cause of difference establishes the confusion of actions and their results.— Against the Kazzadas we urge that if, on their theory, the internal organ is connected with one soul, it must in the same way be connected with all other souls as well, as there is no difference in the point of proximity, &C. 1 Hence, there being no difference of cause and consequently no difference of effect, it follows that, when one soul is connected with pleasure and pain, all souls are thus con¬ nected.—But may not the limitation (of actions and their results) be caused by the unseen principle (adrzsh/a)? By no means, the following Sutra replies.
51. On account of the unseen principle being non- limitative.
While there are many souls, all-pervading like ether, and in equal proximity to all bodies from within as well as without, the so-called unseen principle (adrzsh/a), which is of the nature of religious merit or demerit, is acquired through mind, speech, and body (i. e. thoughts, words, and actions).—Now, according to the Sankhyas, that principle inheres not in the Self, but abides in the pradhana and cannot, on account of the pradhana being the same (for all souls), be the limitative cause of the enjoyment of pleasure and pain for each individual Self.—And according to the Kazzadas also the unseen principle is due to the non-particular conjunction of the Selfs with the internal 1 The 4 &c.’ implies substantiality and so on.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53.
71 organs, and as thus there is no limitative reason for any particular adrzsh/a belonging to any particular soul, the doctrine is open to the same objection.—Well, but there are at work in every particular Self resolutions, &c., such as, ‘ I wish to obtain that result/ ‘ I wish to avoid that other result/ 4 1 am striving for that purpose/ ‘ I wish to act in that way/ &c. &c., and these may, we assume, define the relation of ownership in which particular Selfs stand to particular adrzsh/as.—This objection is negatived in the following Sutra.
52. And this is also the case in resolutions, &c.
The objection pointed out before applies also to resolu¬ tions, &c., for they also are made through the non¬ particular conjunction of the internal organ and the Self, in proximity to all Selfs. Hence they also cannot furnish a reason for limitation.
53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure, pain, &c., results) from (difference of) place; we say no, on account of the (Selfs) being within (all things).
Here it might be objected that, although all Selfs are all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ which is seated in the body must take place in that part of each Self which is limited by the body; and that thus there may result from difference of locality a limitative distinction of resolutions, &c., of the adrzsh/a, and of pleasure and pain.—This also, we reply, is not possible ‘on account of the being within/ For, as being equally infinite, all Selfs are within all bodies. Thus the Vabe- shikas have no right whatever to assume any part of the Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume such a part of the Self which in reality is without any parts, that part because merely assumptive will be in¬ capable of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible to limit the body which originates in proximity to all (omnipresent) Selfs to one particular Self to the exclusion of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due 72 vedanta-sOtras.
to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two Selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain might effect their fruition by one and the same body, since it may happen that the unseen principle of two Selfs occupies the same place. For we may observe, e. g. that after Devadatta’s body has moved away from a certain spot in which Deva- datta had enjoyed a certain amount of pleasure or pain, and the body of Ya^vzadatta has moved into that very same place, Ya^adatta enjoys an equal amount of pleasure or pain; a thing which (on the theory discussed) could not happen if the unseen principles of the two men did not occupy the same place. From the doctrine that the unseen principles occupy fixed places it would, moreover, follow that no enjoyment of the heavenly world, &c. can take place; for the adrzshfe is effected in definite places such as e. g. the body of a Brahma/za, and the enjoyment of the heavenly world is bound to a definite different place.—It further 1 is impossible to maintain that there exist many all-pervading Selfs 2, as there are no parallel instances. Mention if you can a plurality of other things occupying the same place!—You will perhaps bring forward colour and so on 3. But we refuse to accept that instance as parallel, because colour, &c., although non-different in so far as they are attributes of one substance, yet differ through their essential characteristics. On the other hand there is no difference of characteristics between your (alleged) many Selfs. If you say that a difference of characteristics can be established on the ground of the ultimate special differences (of all substances), we point out that you implicate yourself in a logical circle as the assumption of difference of characteristics and the as¬ sumption of ultimate differences presuppose each other.
1 And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sankhyas as well as of the Vaheshikas.
2 Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same space.
3 Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one place as belonging to one material object.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53.
73 Should you adduce as parallel instances the all-pervading- ness of ether, &c. (the ‘ &c.’ implying place and time), we reply that their all-pervadingness is not proved for him who holds the doctrine of Brahman and looks upon ether and so on as mere effects.
All which establishes the conclusion that the only doc¬ trine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity of the Self.
74 vedanta-s6tras.
FOURTH PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
i. Thus the vital airs.
In the third p&da it has been shown that a conflict of Vedic passages as to ether, &c., does not exist. The same is now done in this fourth pada with regard to the vital airs. On the one hand the chapters treating of the origin of things do not record an origin of the vital airs; so e.g. (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3) ‘ It sent forth fire/ &c.; and (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ‘ From that Self sprang ether/ &c. On the other hand it is said expressly in some places that the vital airs were not produced. The following passage, e.g. ‘Non- being indeed was this in the beginning; they say: what was that non-being? those rishis indeed were the non-being in the beginning; they say: who are those rzshis? the vital airs indeed are the rzshis ’ (Sat Br. VI, 1, 1, 1), states that the vital airs existed before the origin of things.—In other passages again we read of the origin of the vital airs also, so e. g. ‘ As small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all vital airs come forth from that Self’ (Br/. Up. II, 1, 20); ‘From that is born the vital air, mind, and all organs of sense 5 (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); ‘The seven vital airs also spring from him 5 (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8); ‘ He sent forth the vital air; from the vital air.sraddha, ether, air, light, water, earth, sense, mind, food 5 (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Hence as there is a conflict of scriptural passages, and as no reason can be made out for deciding in favour of either alternative, the purvapakshin thinks that either no opinion can be formed, or that the passages relative to the origin of the vital airs must be taken in a metaphorical sense, since scripture expressly states the pranas to have existed before the creation.
In reply to this the author of the Sutras says, ‘ thus the II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I.
75 pranas.’—What then, it will be asked, is the fitness of the word ‘thus/ as there is no point of comparison with the matter under discussion? The matter under discussion at the conclusion of the preceding pada was the refutation of those who maintain a plurality of omnipresent Selfs, and with this no comparison can be instituted because there is no similarity. For a comparison is possible only where there is similarity; as when we say, e.g. c as a lion so is Bala- varman.’ Possibly it might be said that the comparison is meant to intimate similarity with the adrzshfe; the meaning being that as the adrzsh/a is not limited because it is pro¬ duced in proximity to all Selfs, so the pranas also are not limited with regard to all the different Selfs. But, on that explanation, the Sutra would be an idle repetition, as it has already been explained that that absence of limitation is due to the non-limitation of bodies.—Nor can the prazzas be com¬ pared with the individual soul, because that would be con¬ trary to the conclusion about to be established. For it has been shown that the individual soul is without an origin, while the intention is to declare that the prazzas have an origin. Hence it appears that the word ‘ so * is devoid of connexion.—Not so, we reply. A connexion may be established by means of a comparison based on the exem¬ plifying passages. Under that category fall those passages which state the origin of the prazzas, as e.g. ‘From that Self come forth all prazzas, all worlds, all gods, all beings’ (B ri. Up. II, 1, 20); which passage means that as the worlds and so on are produced from the highest Brahman so the prazzas also. Such passages also as (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) ‘ From him are born prazza, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth the support of all,’ are to be considered as intimating that the origin of the prazzas is analogous to that of the ether, &c.—Or else, as a con¬ nexion with a somewhat remote object of comparison is resorted to in such cases as the one treated of in Pti. Mi. Su. Ill, 4, 32 (‘ and the accident in drinking Soma, in the same manner’) 1, we may construe our Sutra in the following 1 The ‘ tadvat 5 in the quoted Sutra refers not to the immediately preceding adhikarazza but to Sfttra III, 4, 28.
way: in the same way as ether and so on, which are men¬ tioned in the beginning of the preceding pada, are under¬ stood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the pranas also are effects of the highest Brahman. And if it be asked what reason we have for assuming the pranas to be so, we reply: the fact of this being stated by scripture.— But it has been shown above that in some places the origin of the pranas is not mentioned.—That is of no weight, we reply, as it is mentioned in other places. For the circumstance of a thing not being stated in some places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it in other places. Hence, on account of equality of scrip¬ tural statement, it is proper to maintain that the pranas also are produced in the same way as ether and so on.
2. On account of the impossibility of a secondary (origin of the pranas).
Against the objection that the origin of the pranas must be understood in a secondary sense because the text states that they existed before the origin of the world, the Sutra- kara declares ‘ on account of the impossibility of a secondary origin/ The statement as to the origin of the pranas cannot be taken in a secondary sense because therefrom would result the abandonment of a general assertion. For after the text has asserted that the know¬ ledge of everything depends on the knowledge of one (‘ What is that through which when it is known everything else becomes known? ’ Mu. Up. I, i, 3), it goes on to say, in order to prove that assertion, that 4 From him is born prazza,’ &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3). Now the assertion is made good only if the whole world including the pranas is an effect of Brahman, because then there is no effect in¬ dependent of the material cause; if on the other hand the statement as to the origin of the pra/zas were taken in a secondary sense, the assertion would thereby be stultified. The text, moreover, makes some concluding statements about the matter asserted, 4 The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal’ (II, 1, 10), and 4 Brahman alone is all this; it is the Best/—That same II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3.
77 assertion is to be connected with such passages as the following, ‘ When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self, then all this is known ’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 5).—How then have we to account for the statement that the pranas existed before the creation?—That statement, we reply, does not refer to the fundamental causal substance; for we ascertain from scriptural passages, such as Mu. Up. II, 1, 2 (‘ That heavenly Person is without breath and without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable ’), that the funda¬ mental causal substance is devoid of all distinctions such as breath and the like. We must rather view the statement about the existence of the pranas before the creation as having for its object a subordinate causal substance 1, and being made with reference to the effects of the latter only. For it is known from Sruti and Smrzti that even in the universe of evolved things many states of being may stand to each other in the relation of causal substance and effect. — In the adhikarazza treating of the ether there occurred a Sutra (composed of the same syllables) 4 gauzzyasambhavat/ which as being the purvapaksha-sutra had to be explained as 4 gauzzi asambhavat,’ 4 the statement about the origin of ether must be taken in a secondary sense on account of the impossibility (of the primary sense)/ There the final conclusion was established by means of the abandonment of the general assertion. Here on the other hand the Sutra is the Siddhanta Sutra and we have therefore explained it as meaning 4 on account of the impossibility of a secondary meaning/—Those who explain the present Sutra in the same way as the previous Sutra overlook the fact of the general assertion being abandoned (viz. if the passages referring to the origin of the prazzas were taken in a secondary sense).
3. O11 account of that (word which indicates origin) being enunciated at first (in connexion with the pranas).
That the scriptural statement about the origin of the 1 Such as Hirazzyagarbha.
78 vedanta-sOtras.
pranas is to be taken in its literal sense just as the state¬ ments about the ether, &c., appears from that circumstance also that the one word which (in the passage from the Mu. Up.) indicates origination, viz. ‘is born ’ (^dyate), is in the first place connected with the pranas and has afterwards to be joined with ether, &c., also (‘ from him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air/ &c.). Now as it is a settled matter that the phrase ‘ is born ’ must be taken in its primary sense with reference to ether and so on, it follows that the origin of the pranas also to which the same word is applied must be understood as a real origin. For it would be impossible to decide that a word enunciated once only in one chapter and one sentence, and connected with many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its primary sense, and in others in a secondary sense; for such a decision would imply want of uniformity.—So likewise in the passage, ‘ He sent forth prazza, from prazza jraddha/ &c. (Pr. Up. VI, 4), the phrase ‘he sent forth’ which the text exhibits in conjunction with the pranas has to be carried on to jraddha and the other things which have an origin.— The same reasoning holds good in those cases where the word expressing origination occurs at the end and has to be connected with the preceding words; as e.g. in the passage ending ‘ all beings come forth from the Self/ where the word ‘ come forth 5 must be connected with the pranas, &c., mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence.
4. Because speech is preceded by that (viz. fire and the other elements).
Although in the chapter, ‘ That sent forth fire/ &c., the origin of the pranas is not mentioned, the origin of the three elements, fire, water, and earth only being stated, nevertheless, the fact of the text declaring that speech, prazza, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth—which in their turn have Brahman for their causal substance—proves that they—and, by parity of reasoning, all prazzas—have sprung from Brahman. That speech, prazza, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth is told in the same chapter, ‘ For truly, my child, mind consists of earth, breath of water, II ADHYAYA, 4 pAdA, 5.
79 speech of fire’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 5, 4). If their consisting of earth and so on is taken literally, it follows at once that they have sprung from Brahman. And if it be taken in a metaphorical sense only, yet, as the sentence forms part of the chapter which treats of the evolution of names and forms effected by Brahman; and as the introductory phrase runs, ‘ That by which we hear what is not heard ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3); and as the concluding passage is ‘In it all that exists has its Self’ [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); and as the matter is moreover known from other scriptural passages; we under¬ stand that also the statement about mind and so on consisting of earth, &c., is meant to teach that they are products of Brahman.—It is therefore an established con¬ clusion that the pranas also are effects of Brahman.
5. (The prazzas are) seven, on account of this being understood (from scriptural passages) and of the specification (of those seven).
So far we have shown that there is in reality no conflict of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the prazzas. It will now be shown that there is also no conflict regarding their number. The chief vital air (mukhya prazza) will be discussed later on. For the present the Sutrakara defines the number of the other prazzas. A doubt arises here owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages. In one place seven prazzas are mentioned, ‘ The seven prazzas spring from him’ (Mu. Up. II, t, 8). In another place eight prazzas are mentioned as being grahas, ‘ Eight grahas there are and eight atigrahas ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 2, 1). In another place nine, ‘ Seven are the prazzas of the head, two the lower ones’ (Taitt. Sazzzh. V, 3, 2, 5). Sometimes ten, ‘Nine prazzas indeed are in men, the navel is the tenth’ (Taitt. Sazzzh. V, 3, 2, 3). Sometimes eleven, ‘ Ten are these prazzas in man, and Atman is the eleventh’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 4). Sometimes twelve, ‘ All touches have their centre in the skin,’ &c. (B ri. Up. II, 4, 11). Sometimes thirteen, ‘ The eye and what can be seen,’ &c. (Pr. Up. IV, 8).—Thus the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the prazzas.
8 o VEDANTA-SUTRAS.