vedanta-s6tras.
at the same time of an opposite nature.—But what then is the position of those passages which refer to Brahman as possessing form?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
15. And as light (assumes forms as it were by its contact with things possessing form, so does Brah¬ man;) since (the texts ascribing form to Brahman) are not devoid of meaning. Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having passed through space enters into contact with a finger or some other limiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were; so Brahman also assumes, as it were, the form of the earth and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into connexion. Hence there is no reason why certain texts should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that Brahman has that and that form. We thus escape the conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to Brahman are devoid of sense; a conclusion altogether un¬ acceptable since all parts of the Veda are equally authori¬ tative, and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning. — But does this not imply a contradiction of the tenet main¬ tained above, viz. that Brahman does not possess double characteristics although it is connected with limiting ad¬ juncts?—By no means, we reply. What is merely due to a limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a sub¬ stance, and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented by Nescience only. That the primeval natural Nescience leaves room for all practical life and activity—whether or¬ dinary or based on the Veda—we have explained more than once.
16. And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist of that (i.e. intelligence).
And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelli¬ gence, is devoid of any other characteristics, and is alto¬ gether without difference; ‘As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus, indeed, has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 13). That means: That Self has neither inside nor outside any cha¬ racteristic form but intelligence; simple non-differentiated intelligence constitutes its nature; just as a lump of salt has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste, not any other taste.
17. (This scripture) also shows, and it is likewise stated in Smrzti. That Brahman is without any difference is proved by those scriptural passages also which expressly deny that it possesses any other characteristics; so, e.g. ‘Next follows the teaching by No, no’ (B ri. Up. II, 3, 6); ‘ It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown 5 (Ke. Up. I, 4); ‘From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it 9 (Taitt. Up. II, 9). Of a similar purport is that scriptural passage which relates how Bahva, being questioned about Brahman by Vashkalin, explained it to him by silence, ‘He said to him, “ Learn Brahman, O friend;” and became silent. Then, on a second and third question, he replied, “ I am teaching you indeed, but you do not understand. Silent is that Self.”’ The same teaching is conveyed by those Smrzti-texts which deny of Brah¬ man all other characteristics; so, e.g. ‘I will proclaim that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which one reaches immortality; the highest Brahman without either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to be or not to be’ (Bha. Gita XIII, 12). Of a similar pur¬ port is another Smrzti-passage, according to which the omniform Narayazza instructed Narada, 6 The cause, O Narada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all beings is the Maya emitted by me; do not cognize me as being such (in reality).’
18. For this very reason (there are applied to Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of the sun and the like.
Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be described only by denying of it all other characteristics, therefore the Moksha 5 &stras compare it to the images of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the two following passages: ‘ As the one luminous sun when entering into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the one divine unborn Self; ’ and ‘ The one Self of all beings separately abides in all the individual beings; hence it appears one and many at the same time, just as the one moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water/ The next Sutra raises an objection.
19. But there is no parallelism (of the two things compared), since (in the case of Brahman) there is not apprehended (any separate substance) compar¬ able to the water. Since no substance comparable to the water is appre¬ hended in the case of Brahman, a parallelism between Brah¬ man and the reflected images of the sun cannot be established. In the case of the sun and other material luminous bodies, there exists a separate material substance occupying a different place, viz. water; hence the light of the sun, &c., may be reflected. The Self, on the other hand, is not a material thing, and, as it is present everywhere and all is identical with it, there are no limiting adjuncts different from it and occupying a different place.—There¬ fore the instances are not parallel.
The next Sfttra disposes of this objection.
20. Since (the highest Brahman) is inside (of the limiting adjuncts), it participates in their increase and decrease; owing to the appropriateness (thus resulting) of the two (things compared) it is thus (i.e. the comparison holds good).
The parallel instance (of the sun’s reflection in the water) is unobjectionable, since a common feature—with reference to which alone the comparison is instituted—does exist. Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison. Nor does the sutrakara institute the comparison objected to on his own account; he merely sets forth the purport of a comparison actually met with in scripture.—Now, the special feature on which the comparison rests is ‘the par¬ ticipation in increase and decrease.’ The reflected image of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands; it contracts when the water shrinks; it trembles when the water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided. It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of the water; while the real sun remains all the time the same. —Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it abides; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them as it were, and so on. As thus the two things compared possess certain common features no objection can be made to the comparison.
21. And on account of the declaration (of scripture). Scripture moreover declares that the highest Brahman enters into the body and the other limiting adjuncts, ‘He made bodies with two feet, he made bodies with four feet. Having first become a bird he entered the bodies as purusha’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 18); and ‘Having entered into them with this living (individual) Self’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). —For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sutra 18 is unobjectionable.
Some teachers assume that the preceding discussion (beginning from Sutra 11) comprises two adhikara^as, of which the former discusses the question whether Brahman is an absolutely uniform being in which all the plurality of the apparent world vanishes, or a being multiform as the apparent world is; while the latter tries to determine i6o vedanta-sOtras.
whether Brahman—whose absolute uniformity was es¬ tablished in the former adhikara;za—is to be defined as that which is (sat), or as thought (intelligence; bodha), or as both.—Against this we remark that in no case there is a valid reason for beginning a second adhikara^a. For what should be the subject of a special second adhikara^a? Sutra 15 and foil, cannot be meant to disprove that Brahman possesses a plurality of characteristics; for that hypothesis is already sufficiently disposed of in Sutras 11-14. Nor can they be meant to show that Brahman is to be defined only as ‘ that which is,’ not also as c thought; ’ for that would imply that the scriptural passage, ‘consisting of nothing but knowledge’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 12), is devoid of meaning. How moreover could Brahman, if devoid of intelligence, be said to be the Self of the intelligent individual soul? Nor again can the hypothetical second adhikarawa be assumed to prove that Brahman must be defined as ‘thought’ only, not at the same time as ‘that which is;’ for if it were so, certain scriptural passages—as e.g. Ka. Up. II, 6, 13, ‘ He is to be conceived by the words, He is ’— would lose their meaning. And how, moreover, could we admit thought apart from existence?—Nor can it be said that Brahman has both those characteristics, since that would contradict something already admitted. For he who would maintain that Brahman is characterised by thought different from existence, and at the same time by existence different from thought, would virtually maintain that there is a plurality in Brahman, and that view has already been disproved in the preceding adhikara^a.—But as scripture teaches both (viz. that Brahman is one only and that it possesses more than one characteristic) there can be no objection to such a doctrine!—There is, we reply, for one being cannot possibly possess more than one nature.—And if it finally should be said that existence is thought and thought existence and that the two do not exclude each other; we remark that in that case there is no reason for the doubt 1 whether Brahman is that which is, or intelligence, ] And hence no reason for a separate adhikara^a.
or both.—On the other hand we have shown that the Sfttras can be explained as constituting one adhikarazza only. More¬ over, as the scriptural texts concerning Brahman disagree in so far as representing Brahman as qualified by form and again as devoid of form we, when embracing the alternative of a Brahman devoid of form, must necessarily explain the position of the other texts, and if taken in that sense the Sutras (15-21) acquire a more appropriate meaning. And if it is maintained that those scriptural passages also which speak of Brahman as qualified by form have no separate meaning of their own, but likewise teach that Brahman is devoid of all form, viz. by intimating that the plurality referred to has to be annihilated; we reply that this opinion also appears objectionable. In those cases, indeed, where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of the highest knowledge, we may assume them to be mentioned merely to be abstracted from; so e.g. in the passage, B ri. Up. II, 5, 19, ‘His horses are yoked hundreds and ten. This is the horses, this is the ten and the thousands, many and endless/ which passage is immediately followed by the words, * This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside.’ But where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of devout meditation, we have no right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set aside. This is the case e.g. in the passage, ‘He who con¬ sists of mind, whose body is prazza, whose form is light ’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2), which is connected with an injunction of devout meditation contained in the preceding passage, c Let him have this will and belief.’ In passages of the latter kind, where the determinations attributed to Brahman may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the purposes of devout meditation, we have no right to assume that they are mentioned with the indirect purpose of being discarded. Moreover, if all texts concerning Brahman equally aimed at discarding all thought of plurality, there would be no opportunity for stating the determinative reason (why Brahman is to be viewed as devoid of all form) as was done in Sutra 14. And further scripture [ 38 ] M i62 informs us that devout meditations on Brahman as charac¬ terised by form have results of their own, viz. either the warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else release by successive steps. All these reasons determine us to view the passages concerning devout meditation on the one hand and the passages concerning Brahman on the other hand as constituting separate classes, not as forming one whole. In what way moreover, we ask, could the two classes of texts be looked upon as constituting one whole? —Our opponent will perhaps reply, ‘Because we apprehend them to form parts of one injunction, just as we do in the case of the dari-apur^amasa-sacrifice and the oblations called pray&^as.’—But this reply we are unable to admit, since the texts about Brahman, as shown at length under I, i, 4, merely determine an existing substance (viz. Brahman), and do not enjoin any performances. What kind of activity, we moreover ask, are those texts, accord¬ ing to our opponent’s view, meant to enjoin? For whenever an injunction is laid upon a person, it has reference to some kind of work to be undertaken by him.—Our oppo¬ nent will perhaps make the following reply. The object of the injunction is, in the present case, the annihilation of the appearance of duality. As long as the latter is not destroyed, the true nature of Brahman is not known; hence the appearance of duality which stands in the way of true knowledge must be dissolved. Just as the Veda prescribes the performance of certain sacrifices to him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so it prescribes the dissolution of the apparent world to him who is desirous of final release. Whoever wants to know the true nature of Brahman must first annihilate the appearance of plurality that obstructs true knowledge, just as a man wishing to ascertain the true nature of some jar or similar object placed in a dark room must at first remove the darkness. For the apparent world has Brahman for its true nature, not vice versa; therefore the cognition of Brahman is effected through the previous annihilation of the apparent world of names and forms.
This argumentation we meet by asking our opponent of what nature that so-called annihilation of the ap¬ parent world is. Is it analogous to the annihilation of hardness in butter which is effected by bringing it into contact with fire? or is the apparent world of names and forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is removed by the application of medicine 1? If the former, the Vedic injunctions bid us to do something impossible; for no man can actually annihilate this whole existing world with all its animated bodies and all its elementary substances such as earth and so on. And if it actually could be done, the first released person would have done it once for all, so that at present the whole world would be empty, earth and all other substances having been finally annihilated.—If the latter, i.e. if our opponent maintains that the phenomenal world is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience and annihilated by knowledge, we point out that the only thing needed is that the knowledge of Brahman should be conveyed by Vedic passages sublating the apparent plurality superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience, such as ‘Brahman is one, without a second; 1 ‘ That is the true, it is the Self and thou art it. 5 ( Kh. Up.
VI, 2, 1; 8, 7.) As soon as Brahman is indicated in this way, knowledge arising of itself discards Nescience, and this whole world of names and forms, which had been hiding Brahman from us, melts away like the imagery of a dream. As long, on the other hand, as Brahman is not so indicated, you may say a hundred times, ‘Cognize Brahman 1 Dissolve this world! ’ and yet we shall be unable to do either the one or the other.
But, our opponent may object, even after Brahman has been indicated by means of the passages quoted, there is room for injunctions bidding us either to cognize Brahman or to dissolve the world.—Not so, we reply; for both these 1 1. e. does the injunction bidding us to annihilate the phenomenal world look on it as real or as fictitious, due to Nescience only?
M 2 things are already effected by the indication of the true nature of Brahman as devoid of all plurality; just as the pointing out of the true nature of the rope has for its immediate result the cognition of the true nature of the rope, and the dissolution of the appearance of a snake or the like. And what is done once need not be done again \ —We moreover ask the following question: Does the individual soul on which the injunction is laid belong to the unreal element of the phenomenal world or to the real element, i.e. Brahman, which underlies the phenomenal world? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as earth and the other elements are, as soon as the knowledge of Brahman’s true nature has arisen, and on whom then should the dissolution of the world be enjoined, or who should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release?—If the latter, we are led to the same result. For as soon as there arises the knowledge that Brahman, which never can become the subject of an injunction, is the true being of the soul while the soul as such is due to Nescience, there remains no being on which injunctions could be laid, and hence there is no room for injunctions at all.
What then, it may be asked, is the meaning of those Vedic passages which speak of the highest Brahman as something to be seen, to be heard, and so on?—They aim, we reply, not at enjoining the knowledge of truth, but merely at directing our attention to it. Similarly in ordinary life imperative phrases such as 4 Listen to this! ’ c Look at this! ’ are frequently meant to express not that we are immediately to cognize this or that, but only that we are to direct our attention to it. Even when a person is face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge may either arise or not; all that another person wishing to inform him about the object can do is to point it out to him; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of itself, according to the object of knowledge and according 1 I. e. after the true nature of Brahman has been once known, there is no longer room for a special injunction to annihilate this apparent world. to the means of knowledge employed.—Nor must it be said that an injunction may have the purpose of modifying the knowledge of a thing which was originally obtained by some other means of knowledge h For the modified knowledge due to such injunctions is not knowledge in the true sense of the word, but merely a mental energy (i.e. the product, not of an object of knowledge presented to us through one of the means of true knowledge, but of an arbitrary mental activity), and if such modification of knowledge springs up in the mind of itself (i.e. without a deliberate mental act) it is mere error. True knowledge on the other hand, which is produced by the means of true knowledge and is conformable to its object, can neither be brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably exists.—For this reason also injunctions of the knowledge of Brahman cannot be admitted.
A further point has to be considered here. If we admitted that injunctions constitute the sole end and aim of the entire Veda, there would remain no authority for the, after all, generally acknowledged truth that Brahman— which is not subject to any injunction—is the Self of all. —Nor would it be of avail to maintain that the Veda may both proclaim the truth stated just now and enjoin on man the cognition of that truth; for that would involve the conclusion that the one Brahma-^astra has two—and more¬ over conflicting—meanings.—The theory combated by us gives moreover rise to a number of other objections which nobody can refute; it compels us to set aside the text as it stands and to make assumptions not guaranteed by the text; it implies the doctrine that final release is, like the results of sacrificial works, (not the direct result of true knowledge but) the mediate result of the so-called unseen 1 The purvapakshin might refer e.g. to the Vedic injunction, 1 he is to meditate upon woman as fire/ and maintain that the object of this injunction is to modify our knowledge of woman derived from perception &c., according to which a woman is not fire.
principle (adr/sh/a), and non-permanent &c. &c. — We therefore again assert that the texts concerning Brahman aim at cognition, not at injunction, and that hence the pretended reason of ‘their being apprehended as parts of one injunction 5 cannot induce us to look upon the entire Veda as one whole.
And finally, even if we admitted that the texts concern¬ ing Brahman are of an injunctive character, we should be unable to prove that the texts denying plurality, and the texts setting forth plurality enjoin one and the same thing; for this latter conclusion cannot be accepted in the face of the several means of proof such as difference of terms 1, and so on, which intimate that there is a plurality of injunctions. The passages respectively enjoining the danyapur;zamasasacrifice and the offerings termed praya^*as may indeed be considered to form one whole, as the qualification on the part of the sacrificer furnishes an element common to the two 2. But the statements about the Brahman devoid of qualities and those about the qualified Brahman have not any element in common; for qualities such as ‘having light for one’s body’ contribute in no way towards the dissolution of the world, nor again does the latter help in any way the former. For the dissolution of the entire phenomenal world on the one hand, and regard for a part of that world on the other hand do not allow themselves to be combined in one and the same subject.—The preferable theory, there¬ fore, is to distinguish with us two classes of texts, accord¬ ing as Brahman is represented as possessing form or as devoid of it.
22. For (the clause ‘Not so, not so’) denies (of Brahman) the suchness which forms the topic of 1 ‘Difference of terms’ (.rabdantaram) is according to the Purva Mimatfzsa the first of the six means of proof showing karmabheda or niyogabheda. Cp. £abara bhashya on II, i, i.
2 For the sacrifice as well as its subordinate part—the offering of the praya^-as—has to be performed by a sacrificer acting for one end, viz. the obtainment of the heavenly world.
discussion; and (the text) enounces something more than that.
We read, Bri. Up. II, 3, 4 Two forms of Brahman there are indeed, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and the immortal, the solid and the fluid, sat and tya/ The text thereupon divides the five elements into two classes, predicates of the essence of that which is immaterial—which it calls purusha—saffron-colour, and so on, and then goes on to say, ‘ Now then the teaching by Not so, not so! For there is nothing else higher than this (if one says): It is not so/ Here we have to enquire what the object of the negative statement is. We do not observe any definite thing indicated by words such as 4 this ’ or 4 that; ’ we merely have the word f so ’ in 4 Not so, not so! ’ to which the word ‘ not * refers, and which on that account indicates something meant to be denied. Now we know that the word 4 so’ (iti) is used with reference to approximate things, in the same way as the particle 4 evam ’ is used; compare, e.g. the sentence 4 so (iti) indeed the teacher said ’ (where the { so ’ refers to his immediately preceding speech). And, in our passage, the context points out what has to be con¬ sidered as proximate, viz. the two cosmic forms of Brah¬ man, and that Brahman itself to which the two forms belong. Hence there arises a doubt whether the phrase, 4 Not so, not so! 5 negatives both Brahman and its two forms, or only either; and if the latter, whether it negatives Brahman and leaves its two forms, or if it negatives the two forms and leaves Brahman.—We suppose, the pfirvapakshin says, that the negative statement negatives Brahman as well as its two forms; both being suggested by the context. As the word 4 not ’ is repeated twice, there are really two nega¬ tive statements, of which the one negatives the cosmic form of Brahman, the other that which has form, i.e. Brahman itself. Or else we may suppose that Brahman alone is negatived. For as Brahman transcends all speech and thought, its existence is doubtful, and admits of being nega¬ tived; the plurality of cosmic forms on the other hand falls within the sphere of perception and the other means of right