We now turn to another characteristic belonging to Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of his rule.—There arises the question whether the threefold fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 39.
l8l sawsara-state—viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the two—spring from the actions themselves or come from the Lord.—The Shtrakara embraces the latter alternative, on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsist¬ ence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of effecting all those modes of requital which are in accord¬ ance with the merit of the agents; actions, on the other hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of bringing about results at some future time, since nothing can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be overcome by the assumption that an action passes away only after having produced some result according to its nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such only through being enjoyed by the agent; only at the moment when some pleasure or some pain—the result of some deed—is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people understand it to be a ‘ fruit/—Nor, in the second place, have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous principle (apurva), which itself is supposed to be a direct result of the deed; for that so-called supersensuous principle is something of non-intelligent nature, compar¬ able to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an apurva.—But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are actually requited?—By no means, we reply; for the fact of requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.
39. And because it is declared by scripture.
We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions, not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but also because we have direct scriptural statement on our side. Cp. e.g. the passage, ‘ This indeed is the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4,24)- vedanta-s6tras.
40. Gaimini (thinks) for the same reasons that religious merit (is what brings about the fruits of actions).
Gaimini bases a contrary opinion on the reasons specified in the last two Sutras. Scripture, he argues, proclaims injunctions such as the following one, ‘ He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice/ Now as it is ad¬ mitted that such scriptural injunctions must have an object, we conclude that the sacrifice itself brings about the result, i. e. the obtainment of the heavenly world; for if this were not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless.— But has not this view of the matter already been aban¬ doned, on the ground that an action which passes away as soon as done can have no fruit?—We must, the reply is, follow the authority of scripture and assume such a con¬ nexion of action and fruit as agrees with scriptural state¬ ment. Now it is clear that a deed cannot effect a result at some future time, unless, before passing away, it gives birth to some unseen result; we therefore assume that there exists some result which we call apurva, and which may be viewed either as an imperceptible after-state of the deed or as an imperceptible antecedent state of the result. This hypothesis removes all difficulties, while on the other hand it is impossible that the Lord should effect the results of actions. For in the first place, one uniform cause cannot be made to account for a great variety of effects; in the second place, the Lord would have to be taxed with partiality and cruelty; and in the third place, if the deed itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless to perform it at all.—For all these reasons the result springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or nonmeritorious.
41. Badaraya^a, however, thinks the former (i. e. the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of action), since he is designated as the cause (of the actions themselves).
The teacher Badaraya^a thinks that the previouslymentioned Lord is the cause of the fruits of action. The word £ however 1 sets aside the view of the fruit being pro¬ duced either by the mere deed or the mere apurva.—The final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord acting with a view to the deeds done by the souls, or, if it be so preferred, with a view to the apurva springing from the deeds. This view is proved by the circumstance of scripture representing the Lord not only as the giver of fruits but also as the causal agent with reference to all actions whether good or evil. Compare the passage, Kau. Up. Ill, 8, ‘ He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed.’ The same is said in the Bhagavadgita (VII, 21), ‘ Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me. 5 All Vedanta-texts moreover declare that the Lord is the only cause of all creation. And his creating all creatures in forms and conditions corresponding to—and retributive of—their former deeds, is just what entitles us to call the Lord the cause of all fruits of actions. And as the Lord has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the objections raised above—as to one uniform cause being inadequate to the production of various effects, &c.—are without any foundation.
vedanta-sCtras.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. (The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedantatexts (are identical), on account of the non-difference of injunction and so on.
In the preceding part of this work we have explained the nature of the object of cognition, i. e. Brahman. We now enter on the discussion of the question whether the cognitions of Brahman, which form the subject of the different Vedanta-texts, are separate cognitions or not.
But, an objection may here be raised, so far we have determined that Brahman is free from all distinctions whatever, one, of absolutely uniform nature like a lump of salt; hence there appears to be no reason for even raising the question whether the cognitions of Brahman are separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition. For as Brahman is one and of uniform nature, it certainly cannot be maintained that the Vedanta-texts aim at establishing a plurality in Brahman comparable to the plurality of works (inculcated by the karmaka^a of the Veda). Nor can it be said that although Brahman is uniform, yet it may be the object of divers cognitions; for any difference in nature between the cognition and the object known points to a mistake committed. If, on the other hand, it should be assumed that the different Vedanta-texts aim at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it would follow that only one cognition can be the right one while all others are mistaken, and that would lead to a general distrust of all Vedanta.—Hence the question whether each individual Vedanta-text teaches a separate cognition of Brahman or not cannot even be raised.—Nor, supposing that question were raised after all, can the non-difference of the cognition of Brahman be demonstrated (as the Sutra attempts) on the ground that all Vedanta-texts are equally injunctions, since the cognition of Brahman is not of the nature of an injunction. For the teacher has proved at Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, I. 185 length (I, 1, 4) that the knowledge of Brahman is pro¬ duced by passages which treat of Brahman as an existing accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoining any¬ thing.—Why then begin at all this discussion about the difference or non-difference of the cognitions of Brahman?
To all this we reply that no objection can be raised against a discussion of that kind, since the latter has for its object only the qualified Brahman and pra^a and the like. For devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like acts, be either identical or different. Scripture moreover teaches that, like acts, they have various results; some of them have visible results, others unseen results, and others again—as conducive to the springing up of perfect know¬ ledge—have for their result release by successive steps. With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise the question whether the individual Vedanta-texts teach different cognitions of Brahman or not.
The arguments which may here be set forth by the purvapakshin are as follows. In the first place it is known that difference may be proved by names, as e. g. in the case of the sacrificial performance called ‘ light’ (^yotis) h And the cognitions of Brahman which are enjoined in the different Ved£nta-texts are connected with different names such as the Taittiriyaka, the Va^asaneyaka, the Kauthumaka, the Kaushitaka, the 5a/yayanaka, &c.—In the second place the separateness of actions is proved by the difference of form (characteristics; rupa). So e.g. with reference to the passage, ‘ the milk is for the VLsvedevas, the water for the va^ins 1 2 * * * *.’
1 See the saw^akrftakarmabhedadhikarawa, Pfi. Mi. Su. II, 2, 22, where the decision is that the word ^yotis (in ‘ athaisha ^yotir 7 &c.) denotes not the gyotish/oma but a separate sacrificial per¬ formance.
2 See Pu. Mi. Su. II, 2,23. The offering of water made to the divinities called vagin is separate from the offering of milk to the Vkvedevas; for the material offered as well as the divinity to which the offering is -made (i.e. the two rupa of the sacrifice) differs in the two cases.
i86 Now similar differences of form are met with in the Vedanta-texts; the followers of one 5 akha, e. g. mention, in the chapter called 4 the knowledge of the five fires/ a sixth fire, while other 6akhas mention five only; and in the colloquy of the pranas some texts mention a lesser, others a greater number of organs and powers of the body. —In the third place differences in qualifying particulars (dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts; only in the Muzzz/aka-Upanishad, e. g. it is said that the science of Brahman must be imparted to those only who have per¬ formed the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 10).—In the same way the other reasons which are admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repe¬ tition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to the different Vedanta-texts also.—We therefore maintain that each separate Vedanta-text teaches a different cogni¬ tion of Brahman.
To this argumentation of the purvapakshin we make the following reply.—The cognitions enjoined by all the Vedanta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference of injunction and so on. The 4 and so on * refers to the other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are enumerated in the Siddhanta-sutra of the adhikarazza treating of the different Vakhas (Pu. Mi. II, 4, 9, 4 (the act) is one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form, of injunction, and of name ’). Thus, as the agnihotra though described in different 5 akhas is yet one, the same kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of the words, 4 He is to offer; ’ so the injunction met with in the text of the Va^asaneyins (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 1), 4 He who knows the oldest and the best/ &c., is the same as that which occurs in the text of the.Oandogas, 4 He who knows the first and the best' (Kk. Up. V, 1, 1). The connexion of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the same in both texts, 4 He becomes the first and best among his people/ In both texts again the cognition enjoined has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge is the true nature of the prazza which is characterised by I8 7 I8 7 certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name, viz. the knowledge of the prazza.—For these reasons we declare that the different Vedanta-texts enjoin identical cognitions.—A similar line of reasoning applies to other cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedantatext, so e. g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the know¬ ledge of Vabvanara, the knowledge of Sandilya and so on. —Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the purvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the Purva Mimazzzsa-sutras II, 4, 10 ff.
The next Sfitra disposes of a doubt which may remain even after the preceding discussion.
2. (If it be said that the vidyas are separate) on account of the difference (of secondary matters), we deny that, since even in one and the same vidya (different secondary matters may find place). In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Vedanta-texts, because we meet with differences in secondary matters (guzza). Thus the Va-^•asaneyins mention in their text of the knowledge of the five fires a sixth fire (‘And then the fire is indeed fire,’ Bri. Up. VI, 2,14), while the A^andogas mention no sixth fire but conclude their text of the pazz^agnividya with the express mention of five fires (‘ But he who thus knows the five fires,’ Kh. Up. V, 10, 10).
Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those who admit that particular qualification (i.e. the sixth fire) and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vid yk of the A^andogas; for that would contradict the number ‘ five ’ expressly stated by them.—In the colloquy of the prazzas vedanta-sCtras.
vedanta-sCtras.
again the iV^andogas mention, in addition to the most important pra/za, four other pranas, viz. speech, the eye, the ear, and the mind; while the Va^asaneyins mention a fifth one also, ‘ Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that becomes rich in offspring and cattle ’ (B ri. Up. VI, i, 6).— Now a difference of procedure in the point of addition and omission effects a difference in the object known, and the latter again effects a difference in the vidya, just as a difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes one sacrifice from another.
To this we make the following reply.—Your objection is without force, since such differences of qualification as are met with in the above instances are possible even in one and the same vidya. In the ATMndogyatext a sixth fire is indeed not included; yet, as five fires, beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot effect a split of the vidya; not any more than the atiratra-sacrifice is differentiated by the sho^a.rin-rite being either used or not-used. Moreover, the iT/zandogyatext also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage, V, 9, 2, ‘ When he has departed, his friends carry him, as appointed, to the fire/—The Va^asaneyins, on the other hand, mention their sixth fire (‘ and then the fire is indeed fire, the fuel fuel, 5 &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which runs through the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified. Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but) is merely a remark about something already established (known) 1. And even if we assume that the statement about the sixth fire has the purpose of representing that fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be inserted in the vidya of the Af/£andogas without any fear of its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there; 1 Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which is known from perception.
for that number is not an essential part of the injunction 1, but merely makes an additional statement regarding some¬ thing known already from the text, viz. the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are identified 2. Simi¬ larly nothing stands in the way of some additional quali¬ fication being included in the vidyd concerning the colloquy of the prazzas and so on. The addition or omission of some particular qualification is unable to introduce differ¬ ence into the object of knowledge and thereby into the knowledge itself; for although the objects of knowledge may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same time the knowing person are understood to be the same. Hence the vidya also remains the same.
3. (The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute) of the study of the Veda (of the Atharva/zikas); because in the Sama^ara (it is mentioned) as being such. (This also follows) from the general subject-matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the Atharva/zikas) is analogous to that of the libations.
With reference to the purvapakshin’s averment that the rite of carrying fire on the head is connected with the vidya of the followers of the Atharva-veda only, not with any other vidya, and that thereby the vidya of the Atharvazzikas is separated from all other vidyas, the following remarks have to be made.—The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute not of the vidya, but merely of the study of the Veda on the part of the Atharvazzikas. This we infer from the circumstance that the Atharvazzikas, in the book called ‘SamaHra’ which treats ofVedic observances, record the above rite also as being of such a nature, i.e. as constituting an attribute of the study of the Veda. At the close of the Upanishad moreover we have the following sentence, ‘ A 1 I.e. the iTMndogya-text contains no injunction that five fires only are to be meditated upon.
2 So that there stands nothing in the way of our amplifying our meditation by the addition of a sixth fire.
man who has not performed the rites does not read this; ’ here we conclude from the word £ this ’ which refers to the subject previously treated, and from the fact of ‘ reading ’ being mentioned, that the rite is an attribute of the study of the Upanishad of the Atharva?zikas (but has nothing to do with theUpanishad itself).—But what about the immediately preceding passage,‘ Let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only by whom the rite of carrying fire on the head has been performed according to rule?’ Here the rite in question is connected with the science of Brahman, and as all science of Brahman is one only, it follows that the rite has to be connected with all science of Brahman!—Not so, we reply; for in the above passage also the word ‘ this ’ refers back to what forms the subject of the antecedent part of the Upanishad, and that subject is constituted by the science of Brahman only in so far as depending on a par¬ ticular book (viz. the Mu^aka-Upanishad); hence the rite also is connected with that particular book only.—The Sutra adds another illustrative instance in the words ‘ and as in the case of the libations there is limitation of that.’ As the seven libations—from the saurya libation up to the ^ataudana libation—since they are not connected with the triad of fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with the one fire which is taught in the Atharvan, are thereby en¬ joined exclusively on the followers of the Atharvan; so the rite of carrying fire on the head also is limited to the study of that particular Veda with which scriptural statements connect it.—The doctrine of the unity of the vidyas thus remains unshaken.
4. (Scripture) also declares this.
The Veda also declares the identity of the vidyas; for all Vedanta-texts represent the object of knowledge as one; cp. e.g. Ka. Up. I, 2, 15, ‘That word which all the Vedas record Ait. Ar. Ill, 2, 3,1 2, ‘ Him only the Bahvrz^as con¬ sider in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the iT^andogas in the Mahavrata ceremony/—To quote some other instances proving the unity of the vidyas: Ka. Up. I, 6, 2, mentions as one of the Lord’s qualities that he Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 5. I9I causes fear; now this very same quality is referred to in the Taitt. Up. II, 7, in order to intimate disapprobation of those who are opposed to the absolute unity of that which is, ‘ For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the Self), there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him who knows (a difference) and does not know (the oneness)/ —Similarly the Vabvanara, who in the Va^asaneyaka is imaginatively represented as a span long, is referred to in the ZTMndogya as something well known, ‘ But he who worships that VaLsvanara Self which is a span long,’ &c. {Kk. Up. V, 18, 1).
And as, on the ground of all Vedanta-texts intimating the same matters, hymns and the like which are enjoined in one place are employed in other places (where they are not expressly enjoined) for the purposes of devout meditation, it follows that all Vedanta-texts intimate also (identical) devout meditations.
5. In the case of (a devout meditation) common (to several.Vakhas) (the particulars mentioned in each.Sakha) have to be combined, since there is no difference of essential matter; just as in the case of what is complementary to injunctions.
[This Sutra states the practical outcome of the discussion carried on in the first four Sutras.] It having been deter¬ mined that the cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Vedanta-texts, it follows that as long as the cognition is one and the same its specific determinations mentioned in one text are to be introduced into other texts also where they are not mentioned. For if the matter of these deter¬ minations subserves some particular cognition in one place, it subserves it in another place also, since in both places we have to do with one and the same cognition. The case is analogous to that of the things subordinate to some sacrificial performance, as, e. g. the agnihotra. The agnihotra also is one performance, and therefore its subordinate members, although they may be mentioned in different texts, have to be combined into one whole.—If the cognitions were separate, the particulars mentioned in different texts could not be combined; for they would be confined each to its own cognition and would not stand to each other in that relation in which the typical form of a sacrifice stands to its modifications*. But as the cognitions are one, things lie differently.—The above Sutra will be explained and applied at length further on, in Sutra 10 ff.
6. If it be said that (the udgitha vidya of the Bri. Up. and that of the AfMnd. Up.) are separate on account (of the difference) of the texts; we deny this on the ground of their (essential) non-difference. We read in the Va^asaneyaka I, 3, 1, ‘The Devas said, well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgitha. They said to speech: Do thou sing out for us.—Yes, said speech,’ &c. The text thereupon relates how speech and the other pranas were pierced by the Asuras with evil, and therefore unable to effect what was expected from them, and how in the end recourse was had to the chief vital air, ‘ Then they said to the breath in the mouth: Do thou sing for us.—Yes, said the breath, and sang.’—A similar story is met with in the K/tandogya. 1,2. There we read at first that ‘ the devas took the udgitha, thinking they would vanquish the Asuras with it; ’ the text then relates how the other pra/zas were pierced with evil and thus foiled by the Asuras, and how the Devas in the end had recourse to the chief vital air, ‘ Then comes this chief vital air; on that they meditated as udgitha.’—As both these passages glorify the chief vital air, it follows that they both are in¬ junctions of a meditation on the vital air. A doubt, how¬ ever, arises whether the two vidyas are separate vidy&s or one vidya only.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that for the reasons specified in the first adhikarazza of the present pada the two 1 The Purva Mimaffzsa teaches that all subordinate things which the Veda prescribes for some typical sacrifice are eo ipso prescribed for the modified forms of the sacrifice also.
vidy&s have to be considered as one.—But, an objection is raised, there is a difference of procedure which contradicts the assumption of unity. The Va£*asaneyins represent the chief vital air as the producer of the udgitha (‘ Do thou sing out for us’), while the Af^andogas speak of it as itself being the udgitha (‘ on that they meditated as udgitha ’). How can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the unity of the vidy&s?—The difference pointed out, the purvapakshin replies, is not important enough to bring about a separation of the two vidyas, since we observe that the two both agree in a plurality of points. Both texts relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting; both at first glorify speech and the other pra/zas in their relation to the udgitha, and thereupon, finding fault with them, pass on to the chief vital air; both tell how through the strength of the latter the Asuras were scattered as a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone. And, moreover, the text of the Va^asaneyaka also co¬ ordinates the chief vital air and the udgitha in the clause, ‘He is udgitha’ (B ri. Up. I, 3, 23). We therefore have to assume that in the i^andogya also the chief prazza has secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the udgitha. —The two texts thus constitute one vidya only.
7. Or rather there is no (unity of the vidy&s), owing to the difference of subject-matter. Setting aside the view maintained by the purvapakshin, we have rather to say that, owing to the difference of sub¬ ject-matter, the two vidycls are separate.—In the iTMndogya the introductory sentence ( 1,1, 1), ‘ Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgitha,’ represents as the object of meditation the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha; thereupon proceeds to give an account of its qualities such as being the inmost essence of all (‘The full account, however, of Om is this,’ &c.); and later on tells, with reference to the same syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha, a story about the Gods and Asuras in which there occurs the statement, ‘ They meditated on the udgitha [38] o vedanta-sOtras.
as that breath V If now we should assume 1 2 * that the term 4 udgitha ’ denotes here the whole act of worship (not only the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha), and that (in the passage, 4 they meditated on the udgitha as that breath 5 ) the performer of that worship, i.e. the Udgatrzpriest, is said to be meditated upon as breath; our inter¬ pretation would be open to two objections: in the first place it would be opposed to the introductory sentence (which directly declares the syllable Om to be the object of devotion); and in the second place it would oblige us to take the word udgitha (in ‘ they meditated on the ud¬ githa ’), not in its direct sense, but as denoting by impli¬ cation the udgatrz. But the rule is that in one and the same connected passage the interpretation of later pas¬ sages has to adapt itself to the earlier passages. We therefore conclude the passage last quoted to teach that the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha is to be meditated upon as prazza.—In the Va£*asaneyaka on the other hand there is no reason for taking the word udgitha to denote a part of the udgitha only, and we therefore must interpret it to denote the whole; and in the passage, ‘Do thou sing out for us,’ the performer of the worship, i.e. the Udgatrz-priest, is described as prazza.
In reply to the purvapakshin’s remark that in the Va^*asaneyaka also the udgitha and the prazza occur in co-ordi¬ nation (in the passage, c He is udgitha 5 ), we point out that that statement merely aims at showing that the Self of all is that prazza which the text wishes to represent as udgatz'z. The statement, therefore, does not imply the unity of the two vidyas. Moreover, there also the term udgitha denotes the whole act of worship (while in the Kkandogya it denotes the omkara only). Nor must it be said that the pr&zza can