(II, 4, 3, 4), entered into this body, ‘ Opening the suture of the skull he got in by that door’ (7). Then again the text relates how the Self after having considered the activities of all the organs (‘ if speech names/ &c.; 6) asked himself the question, ‘What am I?’ and thereupon ‘saw this person as the widely spread Brahman’ (10). The aim of all which is to declare that Brahman is the universal Self. The same truth is inculcated in a subsequent passage also, viz. II, 6, 1, 5; 6, where the text at first enumerates the whole aggre¬ gate of individual existences together with the elements, and then continues, ‘ All this is led by knowledge (i.e. the highest Self); it rests on knowledge. The world is led by knowledge, knowledge is its rest, knowledge is Brahman. 5 —For all these reasons the view that the highest Brahman is meant in the Aitareyaka is not open to any objections.
The two preceding Sutras may also be explained with reference to some other Vedic passages. We read in the Va£*asaneyaka (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7)5 ‘Who is that Self?— He who is within the heart, surrounded by the pra/zas, consisting of knowledge, the person of light.’ Of the Self here first mentioned the text goes on to show that it is free from all contact and thus proves it to have Brahman for its Self, the concluding statement being, 4 This great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman’ (IV, 4, 25).—In the AVzandogya again we have a chapter in which the introductory statement does not use the term 4 Self y (‘ Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second ’), while at the conclusion the term 'Self'’ is used in the declaration of identity (‘That is the Self. Thou art that’).—A doubt here arises whether these two scriptural texts treat of the same matter or not.
They do not, the purvapakshin maintains, since they are not equal. Since the determination of the sense depends on the letter of the text, we have no right to maintain equality of sense where the texts differ. In the Va^asaneyaka the initial statement about the Self shows that the whole passage conveys instruction about the true nature of the Self. In the TTMndogya, on the other hand, the initial clause is of a different kind, and we therefore must assume that the whole passage imparts instruction differing in nature from that of the Va^asaneyaka.—But has it not been said that the.Oandogya-passage also teaches in the end the doctrine of universal identity with the Self?—That has been said indeed (but wrongly); for as the concluding passage must be made to agree with the initial passage (which latter does not say anything about the identity of the Self and Brahman), we assume that the concluding passage merely enjoins an imaginative combination (sampatti) of the Self and Brahman.
To this we reply that also the passage, 4 Being only this was in the beginning,’ has to be understood as referring to the Self; ‘as other places,’ i. e. in the same way as the passage quoted from the Va^asaneyaka. For what reason?—‘On account of the subsequent (statement),’viz. the statement as to identity. And if it be said that ‘ on account of the connected meaning ’ of the initial passage in which no mention is made of the Self, the chapter cannot be understood to refer to the Self; we reply ‘ that it may be so understood on account of the assertion ’ made in the passage about that 4 by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not [38] P known. 5 For this passage asserts that through the know¬ ledge of one thing all things become known, and to make good this assertion the text later on declares that ‘ Being only this was/ &c. Now this knowledge of all things through one thing is possible only if we understand the pas¬ sage last quoted to refer to the Self; for if the principal Self were not known, how could all things be known?
Moreover the assertion that, before creation, there existed one thing only, and the reference to the individual soul by means of the word c Self/ and the statement that in deep sleep the soul becomes united with the True, and the repeated inquiries on the part of Nvetaketu, and the repeated assertions, ‘ Thou art that/—all this is appropriate only if the aim of the whole section is not to enjoin an imaginative meditation on all things as identical with the Self, but to teach that the Self really is everything.—Nor must it be said that, in the section under discussion, the concluding passage must be interpreted so as to agree with the introductory clause (and cannot on that account teach anything about the Self ); for the introductory passage declares neither that the Self is everything, nor that the Non-self is everything (but merely makes a statement regarding what is in general), and such an altogether general statement cannot be in conflict with any particular statement made in a supplementary passage, but rather is in want of some such particular statement whereby to define itself 1.—And moreover (to view the matter from a different point of view), the word 4 Being 5 if looked into closely can denote nothing else but the principal Self, since we have proved, under II, i, 14, the unreality of the whole aggregate of being different from the Self.—Nor, finally, does a difference of expression necessarily imply a difference of sense; not any more than in ordinary language the two phrases, c Bring that vessel 1 I.e. the definite statement about the Self in the concluding passage may be used for defining the sense of the indefinite initial statement about that which is. ‘That which is’ comprises the Self as well as the Not-Self.
21 I over there,’ and, 4 That vessel over there, bring it,’ have different meanings.—It therefore remains a settled con¬ clusion that in texts such as discussed above, the matter of instruction is the same, however much the mode may vary in which the instruction is conveyed.
18. As (scripture where speaking of the rinsing of the mouth with water) makes a reference to an act (established by Smrzti), (that act is not enjoined by •Sruti, but rather) the new (act of meditation on the water viewed as the dress of pra/za). The A 7 /andogas as well as the Va^asaneyins record, in the colloquy of the pranas, that the food of Breath com¬ prizes everything even unto dogs and birds, and that water is its dress. To this the A 7 zandogas add, ‘Therefore when going to eat food they surround it before and after with water’ ( Kh. Up. V, 2, 2). And the Va^*asaneyins add (Bn. Up. VI, 1, 14), ‘.Srotriyas who know this rinse the mouth with water when they are going to eat and rinse the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed. Therefore a man knowing this is to rinse the mouth with water when going to eat and after having eaten; he thereby makes that breath dressed.’—These texts intimate two things, rinsing of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed. The doubt then arises whether the texts enjoin both these matters, or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the meditation on breath as dressed.
The purvapakshin maintains that the text enjoins both, since the one as well as the other is intimated by the text, and since both matters not being settled by any other means of knowledge are worthy of being enjoined by the Veda.—Or else, he says, the rinsing of the mouth only is enjoined, since with reference to the latter only the text exhibits the particular injunctive verbal form (‘he is to rinse ’). In this latter case the mention made in the text of the meditation on breath as dressed has merely the purpose of glorifying the act of rinsing.
P 2 To this we make the following reply.—The rinsing of the mouth cannot possibly be enjoined by the quoted passages ‘ since they merely contain references to an act/ i.e. since they merely contain remarks concerning the purificatory act of rinsing the mouth which is known from and settled by Smrzti.—But are not the very 5 ruti-passages under discussion to be looked upon as the fundamental texts on which the Smrzti-injunctions regarding the rinsing of the mouth are based?—This is not possible, we reply, since the vSruti and Smrzti-passages refer to different matters.
All the Smrzti-passages enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth only in so far as it purifies man; while the quoted vSruti texts which occur in prazza-vidy&s, if enjoining the rinsing of the mouth at all, enjoin it with reference to the knowledge of pra/za. And a 6ruti-passage cannot constitute the basis of a Smr/ti-passage referring to an altogether different matter. Nor can it be maintained that the vSruti-passage enjoins some altogether new rinsing of the mouth connected with the prazza-vidya, as we recognise the rinsing mentioned in vSruti as the ordinary rinsing performed by men for the sake of purification.—The preceding argumentation already precludes the alternative of two matters being enjoined, which would moreover lead to a so-called split of the sen¬ tence.—We therefore conclude that the text—with reference to the rinsing of the mouth before and after eating which is enjoined by Smrzti— enjoins (by means of the passage, ‘thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed’) a new mental resolve with regard to the water used for rinsing purposes, viz. that that water should act as a means for clothing the pra/za. The statement about the clothing of the pra/za cannot (as suggested by the purvapakshin) be taken as a glorification of the act of rinsing the mouth; for in the first place the act of rinsing is not enjoined in the Vedic passage \ and in the second place we apprehend that the passage itself conveys an injunction, viz. of the mental 1 A glorifying arthavada-passage would be in its place only if it were preceded by some injunction; for the glorification of certain acts is meant to induce men to comply with the injunctions concerning those acts.
resolve to provide clothing for the pra;za. Nor must the objection be raised that in that case two purposes are admitted for the one act of rinsing the mouth, viz. the purpose of purification and the purpose of providing the pra/za with clothing. For we have actually to do not with one action, but with two separate actions. For one action is the rinsing of the mouth which serves the purpose of purifying man, and another action is the mental resolve that that water should serve the purpose of clothing the pra/za. Similarly the preceding passage, ‘ Whatever there is, even unto dogs, &c., that is thy food/ does not enjoin the promiscuous use of food of all kinds—for that would be contrary to scripture and impossible in itself—but merely enjoins the meditation on all food as food of the pra/za. We therefore conclude that also the passage, ‘ Water is thy dress/ which forms the immediate continuation of the passage last quoted does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth but merely the act of meditating on the rinsing-water as con¬ stituting the dress of the pra/za.
Moreover the mere present-form, ‘ they rinse the mouth with water/ has no enjoining force.—But also in the passage, ‘They think that thereby they make the breath dressed/we have a mere present-form without injunctive power (and yet you maintain that that passage conveys an injunction)!— True; but as necessarily one of the two must be enjoined 1, we assume, on the ground of what the text says about the making of a dress, that what is enjoined is the meditation on water being the dress of pra/za; for this is something ‘new/ i.e. not established by other means of knowledge 2. The rinsing of the mouth with water, on the other hand, is already established by other means (i.e. Smrzti), and there¬ fore need not be enjoined again.—The argument founded 1 Because otherwise we should have only arthavadas. But arthavadas have a meaning only in so far as connected with an injunction.
2 The above argumentation avails itself of the Sutra, putting a new construction on it.—Tarhi dvayor avidheyatvam ity ayankyanuvadamatrasya*ki#/£itkaratvad anyataravidher ava.syakatve samkalpanam eva vidheyam iti vidhantare/za sutrazzz yqgayati. An. Gi.
by the purvapakshin on the circumstance that, in the B ri. Up., the verb ‘to rinse’ is found in the injunctive form (‘therefore a man, &c., is to rinse'’), is already refuted by our showing that the act of rinsing the mouth is not a new one (and therefore requires no Vedic injunction). For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoin¬ ing the rinsing of the mouth, the Ka^vas (in their recension of the B ri. Up.) conclude the chapter with the clause, ‘ They think,’ &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the Madhyandinas, ‘Therefore a man,’ &c. From this we have to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Madhy¬ andinas also is ‘ the knowledge of that,’ i. e. the knowledge of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned pra//a.—Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place (i.e. the M 4 dhyandina-^akha) the rinsing of the mouth is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water as the dress of pra^a; for the introductory passage, ‘ Water is the dress,’ is the same everywhere.—We are therefore entitled to conclude that what is enjoined in all 5 akhas is the cognition of water being the dress of the pra;za.
19. In the same (.Sakha also) it is thus (i.e. there is unity of vidya), on account of the non-difference (of the object of meditation). In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Va^asaneyksakha there is a vidya called the Sa^ilya-vidya, in which we meet with the following statement of particulars, ‘ Let him meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the pra/^a for its body and light for its form,’ &c.—In the Brihad-araz/yaka again, which belongs to the same Sakha, we read (V, 10, 6), ‘ That person consisting of mind, whose being is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all—he rules all this whatsoever exists.’—A doubt here presents itself whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidya in which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be combined or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate vidyas whose particulars cannot be combined. For otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do with texts belonging to different Nakhas we can rebut the charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the texts are read and known by separate classes of men; we can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned in the others; so e.g. in the colloquy of the pra/zas. On the other hand, texts belonging to one and the same 5akha cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same persons study and know them, and passages occurring in different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidya. Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one text to enjoin the vidya and that of the other to enjoin the particulars of the vidya. For in that case each of the two passages would mention only such particulars as are not mentioned in the other one; while as a matter of fact particulars common to both as well as not common to both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the one passage are not to be combined with those of the other.
To this we make the following reply. Just as passages met with in different 5akhas form one vidya in which the different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages under discussion also, although belonging to one and the same Nakha, constitute one vidya only, since the object of meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes the character of a meditation; as long as there is no differ¬ ence of character we cannot determine difference of vidya; and if there is no difference of vidya the particulars men¬ tioned in different places cannot be held apart.—But has it not been demonstrated above that the vidyas have to be held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise?—Tautology does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them enjoining the vidy£, and the other the particulars of the vidya.—But in that case the Brzhad-arazzyaka ought to mention only those points which are not mentioned in the Agnirahasya, as e.g. c he is the Lord of all; ’ while it ought not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agni¬ rahasya, as e.g. the Selfs consisting of mind!—Not so, we reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is already mentioned in the other passage enables us to recognise the vidya. The Brzhad-ara/^yaka-passage, by mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to recognise the vSa/^ilya-vidya, and then teaches certain particulars with reference to the latter; how otherwise should we know that the Brz.-passage is meant to enjoin particulars for the Sa;^ilya-vidya? Moreover, as in a passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it teaches something not yet established, a reference to some¬ thing already established is justified on the ground of its being a (so-called) nityanuvada, we cannot overlook the recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one) which is rendered possible through that anuvada. Hence, although the two passages belong to one and the same Sakha, they yet constitute one vidya only, and their particu¬ lars have to be combined into one whole.
20. Thus in other cases also, on account of the con¬ nexion (of particulars with one and the same vidya). We read in the Brzhad-ara//yaka (V, 5), £ The true is Brahman/ and, further on, ‘Now what is the true, that is the Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye/ Having thus declared the different abodes of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified its body with the sacred syllables (bhu/*, &c.), the text teaches its two secret names (upanishad), ‘ Its secret name is ahar 5 with reference to the gods; and ‘ its secret name is aham ’ with reference to the body.—A doubt here arises whether these two secret names are both to be applied to the deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode, or only one name to each.
The above Sutra maintains the purvapaksha view. Just as certain particulars though recorded elsewhere are yet Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PA DA, 21. to be combined with the Sandilya-vidya, so we have to proceed in other cases also, as e. g. the one under discus¬ sion, because the particulars mentioned are all connected with one vidya. The vidya of the True with its double reference to the Devas and to the body is one only, as we infer from the fact of its having one exordium only (‘ The true is Brahman 5 ), and from the way in which the text interconnects Aditya and the person in the eye. Why then should an attribute belonging to one of the latter not belong to the other also? For, to quote an analogous case, certain rules of life which are prescribed for a teacher —as e. g. having a following of pupils—remain equally valid whether the teacher be in a village or in a wood. For these reasons both secret names equally belong to the Aditya as well as to the person within the eye. This view the next Sutra refutes.
21. Or this is not so, on account of the difference (of place). The two secret names do not apply quite equally to the two persons mentioned, because they are connected with different places in the vidya. For the clause, 4 Its secret name is ahar, 5 the text exhibits in connexion with the person in the solar orb, while the clause, ‘ Its secret name is aham, 5 occurs in connexion with the person in the eye. Now the pronoun ‘its 5 always refers to something mentioned close by; we therefore conclude that the text teaches each secret name as belonging to one special abode of Brahman only. How then can both names be valid for both?—But, an objection is raised, the person within the orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only; for the text teaches them both to be abodes of the one true Brahman!—True, we reply; but as each secret name is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as con¬ ditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman only in so far as it is in that state. We on our part also illustrate the case by a comparison. The teacher always remains the teacher; yet those kinds of services which the pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be 2 18 2 18 done when he stands; and vice versa.—The comparison, on the other hand, instituted by the purvapakshin is ill chosen, since the duties of the disciple towards his teacher depend on the latter’s character as teacher, and that is not changed by his being either in the village or the forest.— Hence the two secret names have to be held apart.
22. (Scripture) also declares that.
Scripture moreover contains a distinct intimation that the attributes under discussion are to be held apart. We read, Kh. Up. I, 8, 5, ‘ The form of that person is the same as the form of the other person, the joints of the one are the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of the other.’—But how does this passage convey the desired intimation?—By expressly transferring the attributes of the person within the sun to the person within the eye; for this express transfer shows that the text looks upon the attributes of the two as separated by the difference of abode and therefore not to be combined (unless specially enjoined to be so combined).—The conclusion therefore is that the two secret names are to be held apart.
23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the sky (attributed to Brahman in the Ra^ayamya-khila) (are not to be inserted in other vidyas). In the khilas (supplementary writings) of the Ra^ayaniyas we meet with a passage, ‘ Held together are the powers among which Brahman is the best; the best Brahman in the beginning stretched out the sky V which mentions certain energies of Brahman, such as holding together its powers, entering into the sky, &c. And in the 1 Virya virya/zi parakramabheda^, anye hi purusha^ sahayan apekshya vikraman bibhrati tena tatparakrama^am na ta eva niyatapurvatvarupakara^atvena ^yesh/M bhavanti ki m tu tatsahakarmo *pi, brahmavirya^aw tu brahmaiva gykshth&m brahma gyesh/Mm yesha m tani tatha brahma khalv ananyapekshaz# ^aga^anmadi karoti. Kim Mnyeshazra parakrama^am balavadbhir madhye bhanga^ sambhavati tena te svaviryam na bibhrati, brahmaviryam tu brahma^a sambhrftani avighnena sambhrftany ity artha^. An. Gi.
Upanishad of the same (i. e. the Ra/zayaniyas) we meet with vidyas of Brahman among which the wSaz/^/ilya-vidya is the first.—The question then arises whether the energies of Brahman just mentioned are to be inserted in those Brahma-vidyas or not. To the purvapaksha view that they are to be so inserted because they are connected with Brahman, the Sutrakara replies that the holding together and pervading the sky are not to be inserted in the vSa/z^ilya-vidya and other vidyas, for the same reason, i. e. on account of their being connected with different abodes. In the vSa/z^ilya-vidya, Brahman is said to have its abode in the heart, 4 He is the Self within the heart 5 (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 3); the same statement is made in the dahara-vidya, 4 There is the palace, the small lotus (of the heart), and in it that small ether’ (VIII, 1, 1). In the Upako^ala-vidya again, Brahman is said to reside within the eye, 'That person that is seen in the eye’ (IV, 15, 1).
In all these vidyds Brahman is described as residing within the body; it is therefore impossible to insert into them the energies of Brahman which the khila of the Ra^ayaniyas mentions, and which are connected with the Devas (i. e. external nature).—But the vidyas of the.Oandogya likewise mention such powers of Brahman as are connected with the Devas; cp. e. g. Ill, 14, 3, 4 He is greater than the heaven, greater than these worlds; 5 IV, 15, 4, 4 He is also Bhamani, for he shines in all worlds VIII, 1, 3, 4 As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.’ And again there are other vidyas of Brahman, such as the one which represents Brahman as comprising sixteen parts, in which not any special abode is mentioned.—True; but there is a special reason why the attributes stated in the Ra/zayaniyakhila cannot be introduced into the other vidyas. Par¬ ticulars mentioned in one place can indeed be inserted in vidyas met with in another place if the latter are suggested to the mind by containing some reference to agreeing par¬ ticulars; the qualities of holding together, however, on one side and those mentioned in the vSa/z^ilya-vidya, &c., on the other side are of such a nature as to exclude each other, and therefore do not mutually suggest each other. The mere circumstance of all the particulars being con¬ nected with Brahman does not suffice to suggest vidyas occurring in other places; for even in vidyas which are avowedly separate, all the particulars may be connected with Brahman. And it is an established fact that Brahman, although one only, is, owing to the plurality of its powers, meditated upon in more than one way, as shown under Sutra 7 -—The conclusion therefore is that the attributes of holding together its powers and so on are not to be inserted in the 5 a;^ilya and similar vidyas.
24. And as the record of others (viz. the Taittiriyaka) is not such as in the purusha-vidya (of the AT/zandogya), (the two purusha-vidyas are not to be combined). In the Rahasya-brahma/za of the Tazzafins and the Paingins (the jOandogya) there is a vidya treating of man, in which man is fancifully identified with the sacrifice, the three periods of his life with the three libations, his hunger and so on, with the diksha, &c. And other par¬ ticulars also are mentioned there, such as formulas of prayer, use of mantras and so on.—A similar fanciful assimilation of the sacrifice and man the Taittiriyakas exhibit, 4 For him who knows thus the Self of the sacrifice is the sacrificer, Faith is the wife of the sacrificer/ and so on (Taitt. Ar. X, 64).—The doubt here arises whether the particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the Khk ndogya are to be inserted in the Taittiriyaka or not.
Against the view of the purvapakshin that they are so to be inserted because in both places we have a purushaya^Tza, we maintain that they are not to be inserted because the characteristics of the purusha-ya^zza of the AVzandogas are not recognised in the Taittiriya-text. This the Sutrakara expresses by saying, 4 As (the record of the followers of some Sakhas, viz. the Tazzz/ins and Paingins, is) in the purusha-vidya, not such is the record of others, 5 viz. the Taittiriyakas. For the latter exhibit an identification of man with the sacrifice, in which the wife, the sacrificer, the Veda, the vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter, the sacrificial animal, the priest, &c., are mentioned in succession; none of which particulars are mentioned in the iTMndogya. The use also to which the Taittiriyaka turns the three libations is different from the K/tandogya. And the few points in which the two texts agree, such as the iden¬ tification of the Avabrztha-ceremony with death, lose their significance side by side with the greater number of dis¬ similarities, and are therefore not able to effect the recog¬ nition of the vidya.—Moreover the Taittiriyaka does not represent man as the sacrifice (as the Khandogya does); for the two genitives (‘ of him who thus knows 5 and ‘of the sacrifice ’) are not co-ordinate, and the passage there¬ fore cannot be construed to mean, ‘ The knowing one who is the sacrifice, of him the Self is/ &c. For it cannot be said that man is the sacrifice, in the literal sense of the word k The two genitives are rather to be taken in that way, that one qualifies the other, ‘ The sacrifice of him who thus knows, of that sacrifice/ &c. For the connexion of the sacrifice with man (which is expressed by the geni¬ tive, ‘ the sacrifice of him ’) is really and literally true; and to take a passage in its literal meaning, if possible at all, is always preferable to having recourse to a secondary metaphorical meaningk Moreover the words next follow¬ ing in the Taittiriyaka-passage, ‘the Self is the sacrificer/ declare that man (man’s Self) is the sacrificer, and this again shows that man’s relation to the sacrifice is not that of co-ordination 1 2 3. Moreover as the section beginning with ‘ Of him who thus knows ’ forms an anuvada of something previously established (and as such forms one vakya to which one sense only must be ascribed), we must not bring about ‘ a split of the sentence 5 by interpreting it as