supernatural powers, various new bodies, while the old body remained intact all the while. And all of them are known to have completely mastered the contents of the Vedas.
On the ground of all this the purvapakshin maintains that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the cause of final release.
This we deny, for the reason that the continuance of the bodily existence of Aparantamas and others—who are entrusted with offices conducive to the subsistence of the worlds, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and the like—depends on those their offices. As Savitar (the sun), who after having for thousands of yugas performed the office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises nor sets, according to Kh. Up. Ill, 11, 1, ‘ When from thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He is alone, standing in the centre;’ and as the present knowers of Brahman reach the state of isolation after the enjoyment of those results of action, which have begun to operate, has come to an end, according to Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2, ‘For him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered from the body;’ so Aparantamas and other Lords to whom the highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, last—although they possess complete knowledge, the cause of release—as long as their office lasts, their works not yet being ex¬ hausted, and obtain release only when their office comes to an end. For gradually exhausting the aggregate of works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to enable them to discharge their offices; passing according to their free will from one body into another, as if from one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties of their offices; preserving all the time the memory of their identity; they create for themselves through their power over the material of the body and the sense organs new bodies, and occupy them either all at once or in succession.
Nor can it be said that when passing into new bodies they remember only the fact of their former existence (not their individuality); for it is known that they preserve the sense of their individuality 1. Smrzti tells us, e.g. that Sulabha, a woman conversant with Brahman, wishing to dispute with Ganaka, left her own body, entered into that of Uanaka, carried on a discussion with him, and again returned into her own body. If in addition to the works the consequences of which are already in operation, other works manifested them¬ selves, constituting the cause of further embodiments, the result would be that in the same way further works also, whose potentiality would in that case not be destroyed, would take place, and then it might be suspected that the know¬ ledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the cause of final release. But such a suspicion is inadmissible since it is known from.Sruti and Smrzti that knowledge completely destroys the potentiality of action. For />ruti says, ‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); and, £ When the memory remains firm, then all the ties are loosened 5 ( Kh.
Up. VII, 26, 2). And Smrz'ti similarly says, 'As a fire well kindled, O Ar^una, reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes and, 'As seeds burned by fire do not sprout again, so the Self is not again touched by the afflictions which knowledge has burned/ Nor is it possible that when the afflictions such as ignor¬ ance and the like are burned, the aggregate of works which is the seed of affliction should be partly burned, but partly keep the power of again springing up; not any more than the seed of the Aali, when burned, preserves the power of sprouting again with some part. The aggregate of works, however, whose fruits have once begun to develop themselves comes to rest through effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the body, just as an arrow discharged stops in the end owing to the gradual cessation of its impetus; this in agreement with Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2, ‘For him there is only delay/ &c. We have thus shown that persons to whom an office is 1 Utpadyamananam aparimushitasmaratve*pi ^atismaratvam eva na vasish/Mdinanatvam ity cranky aha na ^eti. An. Gi.
VEDANTA-S$TRAS.
entrusted last as long as their office lasts, and that never¬ theless there is absolutely only one result of true know¬ ledge.—In accordance with this, scripture declares that the result of knowledge on the part of all beings is equally final release, cp. ‘ So whatever Deva was awakened he indeed became that, and the same with Ri shis and men 5 (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover 1 it may be the case that (some) great ri shis had attached their minds to other cognitions whose result is lordly power and the like, and that later on only when they became aware of the tran¬ sitory nature of those results they turned from them and fixed their minds on the highest Self, whereby they obtained final release. As Smrzti says, ‘When the mahapralaya has arrived and the highest (i. e. Hira/zyagarbha) himself comes to an end, then they all, with well-prepared minds, reach together with Brahman the highest place.’— Another reason precluding the suspicion that true know¬ ledge may be destitute of its result is that that result is the object of immediate intuition. In the case of such results of action as the heavenly world and the like which are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a doubt; but not so in the case of the fruit of true know¬ ledge, with regard to which scripture says, ‘ The Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 1), and which in the passage, ‘ That art thou,’ is referred to as something already accomplished. This latter passage cannot be interpreted to mean, ‘ Thou wilt be that after thou hast died for another Vedic passage declares that the fruit of complete knowledge, viz. union with the universal Self, springs up at the moment when complete knowledge is attained, ‘The Rishi Vamadeva saw and understood it, singing, “ I was Manu, I was the sun.” ’ For all these reasons we maintain that those who possess true knowledge reach in all cases final release.
33. But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the 1 Api ka nadhikaravataw sarvesham nshhzam atmatativa^anaw tenavyapako*py ayam purvapaksha ity aha^Tzanantareshu £eti. Bha.
akshara are to be comprehended (in all meditations on the akshara), on account of the equality and of the object being the same, as in the case of the upasad; this has been explained (in the Purva Mima^sa).
We read in the Va^asaneyaka, ‘O G&rgi, the Brahma//as call this the Akshara. It is neither coarse, nor fine, nor short, nor long/ &c. ( Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Similarly the Atharva;/a says, c The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste/ &c. (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6). In other places also the highest Brahman, under the name of Akshara, is described as that of which all qualities are to be denied. Now in some places qualities are denied of Brahman which are not denied in other places, and hence a doubt arises whether the mental conception of these particular denials is to form part of all those passages or not.
To the assertion of the purvapakshin that each denial is valid only for that passage in which the text actually exhibits it, we make the following reply.—The concep¬ tions of the akshara, i.e. the conceptions of the particular denials concerning the akshara, are to be included in all those passages, 4 on account of the equality and on account of the same object being referred to/ The equality con¬ sists therein that all the texts alluded to convey an idea of Brahman in the same way, viz. by denying of it all attributes; and we recognise in all of them the same ob¬ ject of instruction, viz. the one undivided Brahman. Why then should the conceptions stated in one passage not be valid for all others also? To the present case the same argumentation applies which had been made use of under III, 3, 11. There positive attributes were discussed; here we are concerned with negative ones. The division of the discussion into two (instead of disposing of positive and negative attributes in one adhikara//a) is due to the wish of explaining the differences in detail—The clause, 4 as in the case of the upasads/ introduces a parallel case. For vedanta-sCtras.
vedanta-sCtras.
the Gamadagnya-ahina-sacrifice 1 the text enjoins that the upasad offerings are to consist of puroa^Uas. Now although the mantras accompanying the offering of the puro^aj-as are originally enjoined in the Veda of the Udgatrzs (Ta;^ya Bra. XXI, 10. n, 6 Agni, promote the hotra,’ &c.), yet they are to be enounced by the adhvaryu; for the offering of the puro<fa^as is the work of the adhvaryu, and subordinate matters (i.e. here, the mantras) are governed by the prin¬ cipal matter (i.e. the offering of the puro^cUa). Similarly, in the case under discussion, the attributes of the akshara have, because they are subordinate to the akshara itself, to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever places the text may originally state them.—The principle of decision employed is explained in the Purva Mima//zsasutras III, 3, 9.
34. On account of (the same) number being re¬ corded. The Atharvamkas exhibit, with reference to the Self, the following mantra, ‘Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). The same mantra is found in the text of the SVetajvataras (IV, 6). The Ka//zas again read, c There are the two drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, like¬ wise those householders who perform the Trb/a£iketa-sacrifice.’—The doubt here arises whether the two sections in¬ troduced by these mantras constitute one vidya or two vidyas. Here the purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate vidyas, because the texts exhibit certain differences. For the mantra of the Mu^aka and Xvetajvatara Upanishads represents one bird as enjoying and the other as not enjoying; while in the mantra of the Ka//zas 1 I.e. a sacrifice lasting four days, called Gamadagnya, because first offered by Gamadagni. Cp. Taitt. Sa^h. VII, 1, 9.
24I both are said to enjoy.—As thus the objects of knowledge differ in character, the vidyas themselves must be looked upon as separate.
To this we make the following reply. The vidy& is one only because both mantras exhibit the character of the objects of knowledge as one and the same, viz. as defined by the number two.—But has not the purvapakshin shown that there exists a certain difference of character?—By no means, we reply. Both texts intimate one and the same matter, viz. the Lord together with the individual soul. In the Mu;^aka-text the clause, ‘ The other looks on without eating, 5 intimates the highest Self which is raised above all desire; the same highest Self forms also the subject of the complementary passage, 4 But when he sees the other Lord contented. 5 And the Ka//za-text intimates the same highest Self which is raised above all desire; only, as it is mentioned together with the enjoying individual soul, it is itself meta¬ phorically spoken of as enjoying; just as we speak of the ‘ men with the umbrella, 5 although only one out of several carries an umbrella. For that in the Ka//za-text also the highest Self forms the general subject-matter we have to conclude from the preceding passage, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that 5 (I, 2, 14), and from the com¬ plementary passage referring to the same Self, ‘Which is a bridge for sacrificers, which is the highest imperishable Brahman 5 (I, 3, 2). All this has been explained at length under I, 2, 11. As therefore there is one object of know¬ ledge only, the vidya also is one.—Moreover, if we carefully examine the context of the three mantras quoted, we observe that they are concerned merely with the knowledge of the highest Self, and that they mention the individual soul not as a new object of instruction but merely to show its identity with the highest Self. And that, as far as the knowledge of the highest Self is concerned, the question as to the oneness or separateness of vidyas cannot be even raised, we have already shown above. The present Sutra therefore merely aims at a fuller discussion of the matter, the practical out¬ come of which is that any particulars stated in one of the texts only have to be supplied in the others also.
35. As the Self is within all, as in the case of the aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of vidyd).
The Va£*asaneyins record, in the questions asked by Ushastaandby Kahola, the same passage twice in succession, ‘Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden; the Self who is within all ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 4,1; 5,1). —The question here presents itself whether the two sections introduced by the questions constitute one vidya only or two separate vidyas.
Two separate vidyas, the purvapakshin maintains; owing to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added nothing to—or took nothing away from—the contents of the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless. We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the separateness of the two vidy&s, just as in the Purva Mima/^sa repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be separate.
To this we make the following reply. As both texts equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be taken as constituting one vidya only. In both passages question and answer equally refer to a Self which is within everything. For in one body there cannot be two Seifs, each of which is inside everything else. One Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything, but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any more than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the element of fire within the element of water; but each of these elements is ‘ within all ’ in a relative sense only, not in the literal sense of the phrase.—Or else the ‘ like the aggregate of the elements (or beings) 5 of the Sutra has to be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. 5 ve. Up.VI, 11, ‘He is the one god, hidden in all beings, allpervading, the Self within all beings.’ As this mantra re¬ cords that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings, the same holds good with regard to the two Brahma;/apassages. And the object of knowledge being one, the vidya also is one only.
36. If it be said that otherwise the separation (of the statements) cannot be accounted for; we reply that it is (here) as in the case of other instructions.
We yet have to refute the remark made by the purvapakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyas be admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases. In the sixth prapa/^aka of the upanishad of the Ta^ins the instruction conveyed in the words, c That is the Self, thou art that, O vSVetaketu/ is repeated nine times, and yet the one vidya is not thereby split into many. Simi¬ larly in our case.—But how do you know that the vidya remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repeti¬ tion?—Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding clauses show that all those passages have the same sense.
For the repeated request on the part of vSVetaketu, c Please, Sir, inform me still more/ shows that one and the same matter is again and again proposed for further discussion, and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two introductory questions and the equality of the concluding clauses, ‘ Everything else is of evil/ show that both sections refer to one and the same matter.—Moreover, in the second question the text adds the word 6 just’ (eva). ‘ Tell me just that Brahman/ &c., which shows that the second question refers to the same matter as the first one. That the matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish by pointing out that the former section declares the existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends all the attributes of the Sa^sara state, such as hunger, thirst, and so on.—The two sections, therefore, form one vidya only.
I< 2 37. There is exchange (of meditation), for the texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other cases.
The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in the sun, ‘ What I am, that is he; what he is, that am 1 5 (Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6). And the G &balas say, 4 1 am thou indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.’—The doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this text is to be a double one ‘ by means of exchange ’ (i. e. whether the soul is to be meditated upon as &ditya and ctditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being meditated upon as aditya).
The purvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says, the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul’s being the Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord’s being the Self of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness of the Self.
To this we make the following reply. ‘Exchange’ is expressly recorded in the text for the purposes of medita¬ tion, just as other qualities (of the Self), such as its being the Self of all, &c., are recorded for the same purpose. For both texts make the distinctive double enunciation, ‘ I am thou,’ and ‘ Thou art 1 / Now this double enunci¬ ation has a sense only if a twofold meditation is to be based upon it; otherwise it would be devoid of meaning, since one statement would be all that is required.—But has not the purvapakshin urged above that this your ex¬ planation involves a lowering of the Lord, who is thereby represented as having the transmigrating soul for his Self? —Never mind, we reply; even in that way only the unity of the Self is meditated upon.—But does your explanation then not come to that of the purvapakshin, viz. that the double statement is merely meant to confirm the oneness of the Self?—We do not, our reply is, deny that the text confirms the oneness of the Self; we only want to prove that, on the ground of the text as it stands, a twofold me¬ ditation has to be admitted, not a simple one. That this virtually confirms the unity of the Self we admit; just as the instruction about (the Lord’s) possessing such qualities as having only true wishes, and so on—which instruction is given for the purpose of meditation—at the same time proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities. —Hence the double relation enounced in the text has to be meditated upon, and is to be transferred to other vidyas also which treat of the same subject.
38. For the True and so on are one and the same (vidya).
The text of the Va^asaneyaka, after having enjoined the knowledge of the True, together with a meditation on the syllables of its name (‘ Whosoever knows this great glorious first-born as the true Brahman/ &c., Bri. Up. V, 4, 1), con¬ tinues, f Now what is the True, that is the Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye ’ (V, 5, 2).—The doubt here arises whether the text enjoins two vidyas of the True or one only.
Two, the purvapakshin maintains. For the text declares two different results, one in the earlier passage, ‘ He con¬ quers these worlds’ (V, 4, 1); the other one later on, ‘He destroys evil and leaves it? (V, 5, 3). And what our oppo¬ nent may call a reference to the subject-matter under dis¬ cussion 1, is merely due to the circumstance of the object of meditation being the same (in the two vidyas).
To this we make the following reply.—There is only one vidya of the True, because the clause, ‘That which is the True,’ &c., refers back to that True which is treated 1 Viz. the clause in V, 5, 2, ‘That which is the true/ which apparently—or really—connects the vidyd of V, 5 with that of V, 4.
V, 4.
of in V, 4.—But has not the purvapakshin shown that the clause alluded to can be accounted for even on the sup¬ position of there being two vidyas?—The reasoning of the purvapakshin, we reply, would be admissible only if the separateness of the two vidyas were established by some other clear and undoubted reason; in our case, how¬ ever, there is a general possibility of both (viz. of the vidyas being separate or not), and the very circumstance that the mentioned clause contains a back reference to the True spoken of in V, 4, determines us to conclude that there is only one vidya of the True.—To the remark that there must be two vidyas because the text states two different results, we reply that the statement of a second result merely has the purpose of glorifying the new in¬ struction given about the True, viz. that its secret names are ahar and aham. Moreover, as in the case under dis¬ cussion, the fruit of the vidya has really to be supplied from its arthavada part 1, and as there is unity of vidya, all those fruits which the text states in connexion with the single parts of the vidya are to be combined and put in connexion with the vidya taken as a whole.—The con¬ clusion therefore is that the text records only one vidya of the True, distinguished by such and such details, and that hence all the qualities mentioned, such as Truth and so on, are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.
Some commentators are of opinion that the above Sutra refers (not to the question whether Bn. Up. V, 4 and V, 5 constitute one vidya but) to the question whether the Va^asaneyaka-passage about the persons in the sun and in the eye, and the similar iTMndogya-passage (I, 6, 6,‘ Now that golden person who is seen within the sun/ &c.) form one vidya or not. They conclude that they do so, and that hence truth and the other qualities mentioned in 1 For the vidya contains no explicit statement that a man desirous of such and such a fruit is to meditate on the True in such and such a way.—That in cases where the fruit is not stated in a vidhi-passage it must be supplied from the arthavada-passages, is taught in the Ph. Mi. Su. IV, 3, eighth adhikara;/a.
the Vd^asaneyaka are to be combined with the Kh andogya-text also.—But this interpretation of the Sutra appears objectionable. For the jOandogya-vidyd refers to the udgitha and is thus connected with sacrificial acts, marks of which connexion are exhibited in the beginning, the middle, and the end of the vidya. Thus we read at the beginning, ‘The Rik is the earth, the Saman is fire in the middle, ‘Rik and Saman are his joints and there¬ fore he is udgitha;’ and in the end, ‘He who knowing this sings a S&man ’ ( Kh. Up. I, 6, 1; 8; I, 7, 7). In the Va^asaneyaka, on the other hand, there is nothing to connect the vidya with sacrificial acts. As therefore the subject-matter is different, the vidyas are separate and the details of the two are to be held apart.
39. (Having true) wishes and other (qualities) (have to be combined) there and here, on account of the abode and so on.
In the chapter of the iTMndogya which begins with the passage, ‘ There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether’ (VIII, 1, 1), we read, ‘ That is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose imaginations are true.’ A similar passage is found in the text of the Va^asaneyins, ‘ He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the Praz/as, the ether within the heart. In it there reposes the ruler of all’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22).
A doubt here arises whether these two passages con¬ stitute one vidya, and whether the particulars stated in one text are to be comprehended within the other text also.
There is oneness of vidya 1.—Here (the Sutrakara) says, ‘ Wishes and so on,’ i. e. ‘ The quality of having true wishes and so on’(the word kama standing for satyakama, just 1 This clause must apparently be taken as stating the siddhantaview, although later on it is said that the two vidyas are distinct (that, however, in spite of their distinctness, their details have to be com¬ bined). as people occasionally say Datta for Devadatta and Bhama for Satyabhama). This quality and the other qualities, which the jOandogya attributes to the ether within the heart, have to be combined with the Va^asaneyaka-passage, and vice versa the qualities stated in the Va^asaneyaka, such as being the ruler of all, have also to be ascribed to the Self free from sin, proclaimed in the AV/andogya. The reason for this is that the two passages display a number of common features. Common to both is the heart viewed as abode, common again is the Lord as object of know¬ ledge, common also is the Lord being viewed as a bank preventing these worlds from being confounded; and several other points.—But, an objection is raised, there are also differences. In the /TMndogya the qualities are attributed to the ether within the heart, while in the Va^asaneyaka they are ascribed to Brahman abiding in that ether.—This objection, we reply, is unfounded, for we have shown under I, 3, 14 that the term ‘ether’ in the iL^andogya designates Brahman.