That means: there are, in the first place, restrictive rules declaring that a descent may not take place. Compare ‘ for life mortifying the body in the house of a tutor 5 (Kk. Up. II, 23, 2); ‘ He is to go into the forest, that is he is not to return thence, that is the Upanishad; ’ ‘ Having been dismissed by the teacher he is to follow one of the four asramas, according to rule, up to release from the body.’—In the second place there are texts teaching the ascent to higher arramas ( 4 Having completed the Brahma-£arya state he is to become a householder; he may wander forth from the Brahma^arya state ’); but there are none teaching the descent to lower asramas.—And in the third place there exists no good custom of that kind.—The descent to a lower asrama can in no way be based on the wish of well performing the duties of that cLsrama; for Snmti says,‘One’s own duty, however badly performed, is better than another duty well carried out ’ (Bha. Gita III, 35). And the principle is that whatever is enjoined on a certain person constitutes his duty, not what a person is able to perform well; for all duty is characterised by injunction. Nor is a descent allowed owing to the influence of passion, &c.; for restrictive rules are weightier than passion.—By the word ‘ also ’ the Sutrakara indicates the consensus of Gaimini and Badarayazza on this point, in order to confirm thereby the view adopted.
41. And not also (can the expiation take place) prescribed in the chapter treating of qualification, because on account of the inference of his lapse from Smrfti he (the Naish^ika) is not capable of it. If a Brahma&mn for life breaks from inattention the vow of chastity, is he to perform the expiatory sacrifice enjoined by the text, ‘ A student who has broken the vow of chastity shall sacrifice an ass to Nhrzti 1 ’ or not?—He is not, the purvapakshin says. For although in the chapter which treats of qualification (Pu. Mim. Su. VI, 8, 22) that expiatory ceremony has been settled (for Brahma^arins in general), it does not yet hold good for the professed Brahma/£arin. For Smrzti declares that such sins can¬ not be expiated by him any more than a head once cut off can again be healed on to the body, 4 He who having once entered on the duties of a Naish/^ika again lapses from them, for him—a slayer of the Self—I see no expiation which might make him clean again.’ The Upakurvazza (i. e. he who is a BrahmaMrin for a certain time only, not for life) on the other hand, about whose sin Smrzti makes no similar declaration, may purify himself by the ceremony mentioned.
42. But some (consider the sin) a minor one, (and 1 Cp. e. g. Apastamba Dharma-sutra I, 9, 26, 8. The passage quoted in the text is, however, a scriptural one. hence claim) the existence (of expiation for the Naish/^ika also); as in the case of the eating (of unlawful food). This has been explained (in the Pfirva Mima;^sa).
Some teachers, however, are of opinion that the trans¬ gression of the vow of chastity, even on the part of a professed Brahma^arin, is a minor sin, not a mortal one, excepting cases where the wife of the teacher and so on are concerned. For they plead that that sin is not anywhere enumerated among the deadly ones such as violating a teacher’s bed and so on. Accordingly they claim the expiatory ceremony to be valid for the Naish/Zzika as well as the Upakurva/za; both being alike Brahma^arins and having committed the same offence. The case is analogous to that of eating. Just as BrahmaHrins (in general) who have broken their vow by eating honey, flesh, and the like may again purify themselves by a ceremony, so here also.— The reason for this decision is that for those who assume the absence of all expiation on the part of the Naish/^ikas no scriptural passage supporting their view is met with; while those who admit expiation can base their view on the passage quoted above (‘ A student who has broken the vow’ &c.), which makes no distinction between Upakurva^as and Naish^ikas. It therefore is more appropriate to assume the validity of the ceremony for Naish/Zdkas also. The principle guiding the decision has been explained in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge (Pu. Mi. Su. I, 3, 8).—On this view the Smrzti-passage which declares that there is no expiation for the Naish/^ika must be explained as aiming at the origination of weighty effort on the Naish/^ika’s part.—Similarly in the case of the mendicant and the hermit. The hermit, when he has broken his vows, undergoes the Krikk/ira. penance for twelve nights and then cultivates a place rich in plants. The mendicant proceeds like the hermit, with the exception of cultivating the Soma-plant, and undergoes the purifications prescribed for his state. The rules given by Smrzti for those cases have to be followed.
3 20 43. But (they are to be kept outside) in either case, on account of Smrzti and custom.
But whether lapses from the duties of one’s order, com¬ mitted by those who are bound to chastity, be mortal sins or minor sins, in either case such persons are to be excluded by honourable men frish/as). For Smrzti refers to them in terms of the highest reproach; cp. passages such as the one quoted under Sutra 41; and the following one, 4 He who touches a Brahmazza that has broken his vow and fallen from his order, or a hanged man or one gnawed by worms must undergo the iTandraya/za penance. 5 And good custom also condemns them; for good men do not sacrifice, study, or attend weddings with such persons.
44. To the lord (of the sacrifice) only (the agentship in meditations belongs), because scripture de¬ clares a fruit; this is the view of Atreya. With regard to meditations on subordinate members of sacrificial actions there arises a doubt whether they are to be carried out by the sacrificer (i.e. him for whom the sacri¬ fice is performed) or by the officiating priests.—By the sacrificer, the purvapakshin maintains, because scripture declares fruits. For a fruit is declared in such texts as the following one, ‘ There is rain for him, and he brings rain for others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold Saman as rain’ ( Kh. Up. II, 3, 2); and we must conclude that that fruit goes to the Lord of the sacrifice, because it is he who is entitled to the sacrificial performance together with its subordinate members, and because such meditations fall within the sphere of that to which he is entitled. And that the fruit belongs to him who carries out the medita¬ tions scripture states when saying, ‘ There is rain for him who meditates. 5 —But scripture declares a fruit for the priest also, viz. in the passage, c Whatever desire he may desire either for himself or for the sacrificer he obtains by his singing.’—That passage, we reply, is of no force because it expressly declares the fruit (as belonging to the priest in a special case only). Hence the lord of the sacrifice only is the agent in those meditations which have a fruit; this is the opinion of the teacher Atreya. 45. (They are) the work of the priest, this is the view of Aru/ulomi; since for that (i.e. the entire sacrificial work) he is feed.
The assertion that the meditations on subordinate members of the sacrifice are the work of the sacrificer is unfounded. They rather are the work of the priest, as the teacher Au<Ailomi thinks. For the priest is rewarded for the work together with its subordinate members; and the meditations on the udgitha and so on fall within the per¬ formance of the work since they belong to the sphere of that to which the person entitled (viz. the lord of the sacrifice) is entitled. Hence they are to be carried out by the priests only, the case being analogous to that of the restrictive rule as to the work to be performed by means of the godohana vessel. In agreement herewith scripture declares the udgatrz to be the agent in knowledge, in the following passage, ‘Him Vaka Dalbhya knew. He was the udgatrz of the Naimishiya-sacrificers * (Kh. Up. I, 2, 13). With reference to the circumstance noted by the purvapakshin that scripture states the fruit to belong to the agent, we remark that this makes no difference; for with the exception of cases expressly stated the priest can¬ not be connected with the sacrifice since he subserves the purposes (acts for) another (viz. the lord of the sacrifice).
46. And on account of scriptural statement. ‘ Whatever blessing the priests pray for at the sacrifice, they pray for the good of the sacrificer; thus he said ’ (Sat. Bra. I, 3, 1, 26); ‘Therefore an udgatrz who knows this may say: what wish shall I obtain for you by my singing? 5 (Kh. Up. I, 7, 8). These scriptural passages also declare that the fruit of meditations in which the priest is the agent goes to the sacrificer.—All this establishes the conclusion that the meditations on subordinate parts of the sacrifice are the work of the priest.
[38] Y 47. There is the injunction of something else co¬ operating (towards knowledge) (which is) a third thing (with regard to balya and pa^itya), (which injunction is given) for the case (of perfect know¬ ledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such (i. e. the Sazzznyasin possessing knowledge); as in the case of injunctions and the like.
c Therefore let a Brahmazza after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state; and after he has done with the childlike state and learning (he is, or, may be) a Muni; and after he has done with what constitutes Muniship and non-Muniship (he is, or, may be) a Brahmazza ’ (Brz. Up. Ill, 5). With reference to this passage a doubt arises whether it enjoins the state of a Muni or not.—The purvapakshin maintains that it does not enjoin it, since the injunction is completed with the clause, ' Let him wish to stand by a childlike state.’ The following clause £ then a Muni’ contains no verbal form of injunctive force and there¬ fore must be viewed as a mere anuvada (making a remark concerning the state of a Muni which is already established).
Should it be asked how this conclusion is reached, we reply that Muniship is established by the clause 'having done with learning’ (which forms part of the injunctive portion of the passage), as ' Muni ’ and * learned man ’ both denote know¬ ledge b It is, moreover, clear also that the last clause, fi and after he has done with what constitutes Muniship and non-Muniship (he is) a Brahmazza,’ does not enjoin the condition of a Brahmazza, as that state is previously established (independently of that clause); but the words 'then a Brahmazza’ are a mere glorificatory anuvada. Now as the words 'then a Muni’ show an analogous form of enunciation (to the clause ' then a Brahmazza ’), they also can embody a glorificatory anuvada only.
1 The state of a Muni is already enjoined by the clause ‘ pazzafityazzz nirvidya;’ the clause ‘atha muni/b’ therefore, may be viewed as an anuvada (as which it could not be viewed, if there were no previous injunction of mauna).
To all this we reply as follows. ‘ There is an injunction of something else which co-operates. 5 The passage must be understood as enjoining the state of a Muni—which co-operates towards knowledge—in the same way as it enjoins learning and a childlike state, because that state is something new (not enjoined before).—But it has been said above that the word ‘learning 5 already intimates Muniship!—This, we reply, does not invalidate our case since the word ‘ muni 5 denotes (not only knowledge as the term ‘ learned man 5 does, but) pre-eminence of knowledge, on the ground as well of its etymology from ‘ manana, 5 i.e.
thinking, as of common use, shown in such phrases as ‘ I am the Vyasa of Munis also. 5 —But the term ‘ Muni 5 is also seen to denote the last order of life; cp. passages such as ‘ Householdership, studentship, the order of Munis, the order of hermits in the woods. 5 —Yes, but it has not that meaning exclusively, as we see that it does not apply to phrases such as ‘ Valmiki is the foremost among Munis. 5 In the passage quoted (about the four orders) the last order is referred to, by the term ‘ Muni, 5 because there it stands in proximity to the other orders of life, and, as the state of the Ascetic is the only one which remains (after we have assigned the three other terms to the stages of life clearly denoted by them), the last order may be denoted 4 mauna 5 because knowledge is its principal requirement.—We there¬ fore conclude that in the passage under discussion the state of the Muni—whose characteristic mark is pre-eminence of knowledge—is enjoined as something third—with regard to the childlike state and learning.—Against the objection that the injunction terminates with the childlike state, we remark that all the same we must view the Muniship also as something enjoined, as it is something new, so that we have to supplement the clause as follows: ‘ then he is to be a Muni. 5 That the state of a Muni is something to be enjoined, in the same way as the childlike state and learning, also follows from its being referred to as something to be done with (like balya and paWitya). It is enjoined ‘ on him who is such, 5 i. e. on the Sawnyasin possessing knowledge.—How do we know this latter point?—Because Y 2 the Sawnyasin who possesses knowledge forms the topic, as we see from the preceding passage, ‘ Having cognized the Self and risen above the desire for sons, &c., they wander about as mendicants.’—But if the Sawnyasin possesses knowledge, pre-eminence of knowledge is already established thereby; what then is the use of the injunction of Muniship?—To this the Sutra replies ‘in the case of.’ That means: in the case of pre-eminence of knowledge not being established owing to the prevailing force of the (erroneous) idea of multiplicity; for that case the injunction (of Muniship, i.e. of pre-eminence of knowledge) is given. ‘As in the case of injunctions and the like.’ With reference to sacrifices such as are enjoined in the passage, ‘ He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to offer the daryapur/zamasa-sacrifice,’ the aggregate of subordinate members, such as the establishment of the sacred fires, is enjoined as something helpful; similarly in this text whose topic is knowledge and which therefore does not chiefly aim at injunction, Muniship is enjoined as something helpful to knowledge.
As thus the order of the ascetic, as distinguished by a childlike state and so on, is actually established by scripture, for what reason does the iT^andogya Upanishad wind up with the householder, viz. in the passage, c After having received his discharge from his teacher he settles in his own house,’ &c.? For by concluding with the householder, scripture manifests special regard for him.— To this doubt the next Sutra replies.
48. On account of his being all, however, there is winding up with the householder.
The word ‘however’ is meant to lay stress on the house¬ holder’s being everything. For the performance of many works belonging to his own a^rama, such as sacrifices and the like, which involve not a little trouble, is enjoined on him by scripture; and at the same time the duties of the other ajramas—such as tenderness for all living creatures, restraint of the senses and so on—are incumbent on him also as far as circumstances allow. There is therefore nothing contradictory in the jOandogya winding up with the house¬ holder.
49. On account of there being injunction of the others also, in the same way as of the state of a Muni. As the state of the Muni (Sa^nyasin) and the state of the householder are enjoined in scripture, so also the two other orders, viz. that of the hermit and that of the student. For we have already pointed above to passages such as ‘ Austerity is the second, and to dwell as a student in the house of a teacher is the third.’ As thus the four a^ramas are equally taught by scripture, they are to be gone through equally, either in the way of option (between them) or in the way of comprehension (of all of them).—That the Sutra uses a plural form (of ‘ the others ’) when speaking of two orders only, is due to its having regard either to the different sub-classes of those two, or to their different duties.
50. (The passage enjoining balya means that the ascetic is to live) not manifesting himself; on account of the connexion (thus gained for the passage). The passage, ‘ Therefore let a Brahmazza after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state,’ speaks of the childlike state as something to be under¬ taken. Now by the ‘ childlike state ’ we have to understand either the nature or the actions of a child. Childhood in so far as it means a period of life cannot be brought about at will, and we therefore must take the 6 childlike state ’ to mean either the behaviour of a child—such as attending to the calls of nature without any respect of place, &c.— or inward purity, i. e. absence of cunning, arrogance, force of the sensual passions, and so on\—With regard to the 1 I am doubtful as to the true reading in this place. The ‘ va ’ of the Calcutta edition (p. 1039, last line) has certainly to be struck vedanta-s'Otras. doubt thus arising the purvapakshin maintains that by ‘childlike being’ people more commonly understand be¬ having, talking, and eating according to one’s liking, freely attending to the calls of nature and so on, and that there¬ fore the word is to be understood here also in that sense.— But such free conduct is improper, because sinfulness and so on would follow from it!—Not so, the purvapakshin replies; for the Sa//myasin possessing knowledge is, through express scriptural statements, free from all sinfulness thus incurred; just as the sacrificer is declared to be free from the sin he might incur in slaying the sacrificial animal.
To this we reply that it is not so because the statement of the text may be understood in a different sense. For as long as another rational interpretation of the word ‘ balya ’ is possible we have no right to adopt an interpretation which involves the assumption of another injunction being rendered futile. Moreover subordinate matters are enjoined with a view to the furtherance of the principal matter, and what here is the principal matter is the endeavour after knowledge which ascetics have to take upon themselves. Now if we accepted the entire conduct of a child as what is enjoined here we could in no way show that the en¬ deavour of knowledge is furthered thereby. We therefore understand by ‘ balya ’ the special inward state of a child, i. e. absence of strong sensual passions and the like. This the Sutra expresses by saying ‘ Not manifesting.’ The meaning of the clause under discussion thus is: Let him be free from guile, pride, and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning, and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others. For thus the passage gains a connexion with the entire chapter on the ground of co-operating towards the principal matter. In agreement herewith Smrzti-writers have said, ‘ He whom nobody knows either out. Some good MSS. read:—bala^aritam antargata bhavavhuddhir aprarutf^endriyatvaffz dambhadirahitatvaw va.—The ‘ antar¬ gata ’ seems to mean the same as the ‘antara h,’ p. 1041, 11. 1-2.
as noble or ignoble, as ignorant or learned, as wellconducted or ill-conducted, he is a Brahma^a. Quietly devoted to his duty, let the wise man pass through life unknown; let him step on this earth as if he were blind, unconscious, deaf/ Another similar passage is, ‘ With hidden nature, hidden conduct/ and so on.
51. In this life also (the origination of know¬ ledge takes place) if there is no obstruction of what is ready at hand; on account of this being seen (in scripture). Beginning from Sutra 26 of the present pada we have discussed the various means of knowledge. We are now to consider whether knowledge—the fruit of those means— when accomplishing itself accomplishes itself only here in this life, or sometimes in the next life only.—The purvapakshin maintains that it accomplishes itself here in this life only. For, he argues, knowledge has for its antecedent the learning of scripture and so on, and nobody applies himself to learning, &c., with the intention that knowledge should result therefrom in the next life only; we rather observe that men begin to learn with a view to knowledge already springing up in this life. And also sacrifices and the like produce knowledge only mediately through learning and so on; for knowledge can be produced (directly) through the means of right knowledge only 1. Hence the origination of knowledge takes place in this life only.—To this we reply, ‘The origination of knowledge takes place in this life if there is no obstruction of that which is ready at hand/ That means: When the means of knowledge which is operative is not obstructed by some other work the results of which are just then reaching maturity, knowledge already reaches maturity in this life.
1 Of which study is one.—Sacrifices indeed may bear their special fruits in the next life only; but in so far as they co-operate towards knowledge they are effective in this life. For their only action in that line is to purify the mind and thus to render it fitter to receive knowledge.
But when such an obstruction takes place, then in the next life. And a work’s reaching maturity depends on place, time, and operative cause presenting themselves. Nor is there any binding rule according to which the same time, place, and operative cause which ripen one work should ripen another work also; for there are works the fruits of which are opposed to each other. And scripture also goes only so far as to teach what the fruit of each work is, without teaching the special conditions of place, time, and operative cause. And owing to the specific strength of the means employed the supersensuous power of one work manifests itself (i. e. the fruit of that work realizes itself), while that of another is obstructed thereby and comes to a standstill.
Nor is there any reason why a man should not form, with regard to knowledge, an unspecified intention 1; for we may freely form the intention that knowledge should spring up from us either in this life or in some subsequent life. And knowledge although springing up through the mediation of learning and so on, springs up only in so far as learning destroys the obstacles in the way of knowledge. Thus scripture also declares the difficulty of knowing the Self, c He of whom many are not even able to hear, whom many even when they hear of him do not comprehend; wonderful is a man when found who is able to teach him; wonderful is he who comprehends him when taught by an able teacher’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 7).—Moreover scripture relates that Vamadeva already became Brahman in his mother’s womb, and thus shows that knowledge may spring up in a later form of existence through means procured in a former one; for a child in the womb cannot possibly procure such means in its present state.
The same is shown by Smr/ti. Vasudeva being asked by Ar^una, c What will be the fate of him, O Krzshzza, who has not reached perfection?’ replies, ‘ None who performs good works undergoes an evil fate; ’ declares thereupon 1 I.e. there is no reason for the assertion made by the purvapakshin that men form a specified intention only, viz. that know¬ ledge should spring up in this life only. that such a man reaches the world of the blessed and is, later on, born again in a good family; and finally states just what we at present maintain in the passage beginning, 'There he obtains that knowledge which corresponds to his former bodily existence,’ and closing, 4 Perfected by many states of existence he then goes the highest way.’— It therefore is an established conclusion that knowledge originates, either in the present or in a future life, in dependence on the evanescence of obstacles.
52. No such definite rule (exists) as to the fruit which is release, on account of the assertions as to that condition, on account of the assertions as to that condition.
We have seen that in the case of persons desirous of release who rely upon the means of knowledge there exists a definite difference of result, in so far as the knowledge resulting springs up either in this life or a future life according to the degree of strength of the means employed. It might now be supposed that there exists a similar definite difference with regard to the fruit characterised as final release, owing to the superior or inferior qualification of the persons knowing.
With reference to this possible doubt the Sutra now says, 'No such definite rule as to that fruit which is release.’ That means: We must not suppose that in the case of that fruit which is release there exists an analogous definite rule of difference.—Why?—' On account of the assertions (by scripture) about that condition.’ For all Vedanta-texts assert the state of final release to be of one kind only. The state of final release is nothing but Brahman, and Brahman cannot be connected with different forms since many scriptural passages assert it to have one nature only. Compare e.g. ' It is neither coarse nor fine’ (B ri, Up. Ill, 8, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no’ (B ri, Up. Ill, 9, 26); 'Where one sees nothing else’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'That immortal Brahman is before’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self’ (B ri, Up. II, 4, 6 ); ‘This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman 5 (B ru Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘When the Self only is all this how should he see another?’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 15).—Moreover the means of knowledge might perhaps, according to their individual strength, impart a higher (or lower) degree to their result, viz. knowledge, but not to the result of knowledge, viz. release; for, as we have explained more than once, release is not something which is to be brought about, but something whose nature is permanently established, and is reached through know¬ ledge. Nor does, in reality, knowledge admit of lower or higher degree; for it is, in its own nature, high only, and would not be knowledge at all if it were low. Although therefore knowledge may differ in so far as it originates after a long or short time, it is impossible that release should be distinguished by a higher or lower degree. And from the absence of difference of knowledge also there follows absence of definite distinction on the part of the result of knowledge (viz. release). The whole case is analogous to that of the results of works. In that know¬ ledge which is the means of release there is no difference as there is between works. In those cognitions, on the other hand, which have the qualified Brahman for its object—such as ‘he who consists of mind, whose body is prazza 5 —a difference is possible according to the addition or omission of qualities, and hence there may be a definite distinction of results, just as there is between the results of actions. This is also indicated by the passage, ‘according as they meditate on him they become.’ But in meditations on Brahman devoid of qualities it is other¬ wise. Thus