the Self of both. And that from that oneness (of symbol and meditating person) which depends on Brahman being the Self of all there results non-existence of the symbols (and hence impossibility of the meditations enjoined), we have explained above.—For these reasons the Self is not contemplated in symbols.
5. A contemplation of Brahman (is to be super¬ induced on symbols of Brahman), on account of the exaltation (thereby bestowed on the symbols).
With regard to the texts quoted above there arises another doubt, viz. whether the contemplation of Aditya and so on is to be superimposed on Brahman, or the contemplation of Brahman on Aditya and so on A—But whence does this doubt arise?—From the absence of a decisive reason, owing to the grammatical co-ordination. For we observe in the sentences quoted a co-ordination of the term ‘ Brahman 3 with the terms ‘Aditya,’ &c. ‘Aditya is Brahman,’ ‘Prcb/ais Brahman,’ ‘ Lightning is Brahman;’ the text exhibiting the two members of each clause in the same case. And here there is no obvious occasion for co-ordination because the words ‘ Brahman ’ on the one hand, and ‘Aditya’ and so on on the other hand, denote different things; not any more than there exists a relation of co-ordination which could be expressed by the sentence ‘ The ox is a horse/—But cannot Brahman and Aditya and so on be viewed as co-ordinated on the basis of the relation connecting a causal substance and its effects, analogously to the case of clay and earthen vessels?—By no means, we reply. For in that case dissolution of the effect would result from its co-ordination with the causal substance, and that—as we have already explained—would imply non-existence of the symbol. Moreover, the scrip¬ tural passages would then be statements about the highest Self, and thereby the qualification for meditations would be sublated 1 2; and further the mention of a limited effect would be purposeless 3. It follows herefrom that we have 1 I. e. whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as Aditya, or Aditya as Brahman.
2 While, as a matter of fact, scripture enjoins the meditations.
3 It would serve no purpose to refer to limited things, such as to do here with the superimposition of the contemplation of one thing on another thing—just as in the case of the text, ‘ The Brahma/za is Agni Vauvanara,’—and the doubt therefore arises the contemplation of which of the two things is to be superimposed on the other.
The purvapakshin maintains that there exists no fixed rule for this case, because we have no scriptural text establishing such a rule.—Or else, he says, contemplations on Aditya and so on are exclusively to be superimposed on Brahman. For in this way Brahman is meditated upon by means of contemplations on Aditya, and scripture decides that meditations on Brahman are what is pro¬ ductive of fruits. Hence contemplations on Brahman are not to be superimposed on Aditya and so on.
To this we make the following reply. The contemplation on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Aditya and so on.—Why?—‘ On account of exaltation/ For thus Aditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the con¬ templation of something higher than they being super¬ imposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular rule, viz. the one enjoining that the idea of something higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as when we view—and speak of—the king’s charioteer as a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters, because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous; for should we view a king as a charioteer, we should thereby lower him, and that would be no ways beneficial.—But, an objection is raised, as the whole matter rests on scriptural authority, the suspicion of any disadvantage cannot arise; and it is, further, not appropriate to define contemplations based on scripture by secular rules!—That might be so, we reply, if the sense of scripture were fully ascertained; but as it is liable to doubt, there is no objection to our having recourse to a secular rule whereby to ascertain it. And as by means of that rule we decide that what scripture means the sun and so on, as being resolved into their causal substance, i. e. Brahman. True knowledge is concerned only with the resolution of the entire world of effects into Brahman.
is the superimposition of a higher contemplation on some¬ thing lower, we should incur loss by superimposing a lower contemplation upon something higher.—As moreover in the passages under discussion the words ‘Aditya’ and so on stand first, they must, this being not contradictory, be taken in their primary sense. But, as our thought is thus defined by these words taken in their true literal sense, the word c Brahman,’ which supervenes later on, cannot be co-ordinated with them if it also be taken in its true literal sense, and from this it follows that the purport of the passages can only be to enjoin contemplations on Brahman (superinduced on Aditya and so on).—The same sense follows from the circumstance that the word c Brahman ’ is, in all the passages under discussion, followed by the word ‘iti,’ ‘thus 1.’ ‘He is to meditate (on Aditya, &c.) as Brahman.’ The words ‘Aditya’ and so on, on the other hand, the text exhibits without any such addition. The passages therefore are clearly analogous to such sentences as ‘He views the mother o’ pearl as silver,’ in which the word c mother o’ pearl 5 denotes mother o’ pearl pure and simple, while the word ‘ silver 5 denotes, by implication, the idea of silver; for the person in question merely thinks c this is silver ’ while there is no real silver. Thus our passages also mean, ‘ He is to view Aditya and so on as Brahman.’—The complementary clauses, moreover, which belong to the passages under discussion (‘He who knowing this meditates (upon) Aditya as Brahman ‘ Who meditates (on) speech as Brahman; ’ ‘ Who meditates (on) will as Brahman’), exhibit the words ‘ Aditya’ and so on in the accusative case, and thereby show them to be the direct objects of the action of meditation 2 *.—Against the remark that in all the mentioned cases Brahman only has to be meditated upon in order that a fruit may result from the meditation, we point out that from the mode of proof used 1 Which in the translations given above of the texts under dis¬ cussion is mostly rendered by ‘as’ before the words concerned.
2 While the word ‘ Brahman ’ does not stand in the accusative case.
IV ADIIYAYA, I PADA, 6.
above we infer that (not Brahman but) only Aditya and so on have to be meditated upon. But as in the case of hospitality shown to guests, Brahman, that is the supreme ruler of all, will give the fruit of meditations on Aditya and so on as well. This we have already shown under III, 2,28. And, after all, Brahman also is meditated upon (in the cases under discussion) in so far as a contemplation on Brahman is superinduced on its symbols, analogously as a contem¬ plation on Vishnu is superinduced on his images.
6. And the ideas of Aditya and so on (are to be superimposed) on the members (of the sacrificial action); owing to the effectuation (of the result of the sacrifice).
‘ He who burns up these, let a man meditate upon him as udgitha 5 ( Kh. Up. I, 3, 1); ‘Let a man meditate on the fivefold Saman in the worlds’ {Kh. Up. II, 2, 1); ‘Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Saman in speech 5 {Kh. Up. II, 8, 1); ‘This earth is the Rik, fire is Saman’ {Kh. Up. I, 6, 1).—With regard to these and similar meditations limited to members of sacrificial action, there arises a doubt whether the text enjoins contemplations on the udgitha and so on superinduced on Aditya and so on, or else contem¬ plations on Aditya, &c., superinduced on the udgitha and so on.
No definite rule can here be established, the purvapakshin maintains, since there is no basis for such a rule. For in the present case we are unable to ascertain any special pre-eminence, while we were able to do so in the case of Brahman. Of Brahman, which is the cause of the whole world and free from all evil and so on, we can assert definitively that it is superior to Aditya and so on; the udgitha and so on, on the other hand, are equally mere effects, and we cannot therefore with certainty ascribe to any of them any pre-eminence.—Or else we may decide that the ideas of the udgitha and so on are to be superin¬ duced exclusively on Aditya and so on. For the udgitha and so on are of the nature of sacrificial work, and as it is known that the fruit is attained through the work, Aditya and so on if meditated upon as udgitha and so on will themselves become of the nature of work and thereby be causes of fruit.—Moreover, the text,‘ This earth is the Rik, the fire is the Saman,’ is followed by the complementary passage, ‘ this Saman is placed upon this Rik, 9 where the word ‘Rik 9 denotes the earth and the word c Saman’ the fire. Now this (viz. this calling the earth ‘Rik 9 and calling the fire ‘ Saman’) is possible only if the meaning of the passage is that the earth and the fire have to be viewed as Rik and Saman; not if the Rik and the Saman were to be contemplated as earth and fire. For the term ‘king’ is metaphorically applied to the charioteer—and not the term ‘ charioteer’ to the king—the reason being that the charioteer may be viewed as a king.—Again in the text, £ Let a man meditate upon the fivefold Saman in the worlds,’ the use of the locative case ‘ in the worlds ’ intimates that the medi¬ tation on the Saman is to be superimposed on the worlds as its locus. This is also proved by the analogous passage, c This Gayatra Saman is woven on the vital airs’ ( Kh. Up. II, ii, 1).—Moreover (as proved before), in passages such as ‘ Aditya is Brahman, this is the instruction,’ Brahman, which is mentioned last, is superimposed on Aditya, which is mentioned first. In the same way the earth, 5 cc., are mentioned first, and the hink&ra, &c., mentioned last in passages such as ‘The earth is the hinkara’ ( Kh. Up. II, 2, i).
—For all these reasons the idea of members of sacrificial action has to be transferred to Aditya and so on, which are not such members.
To this we make the following reply. The ideas of Aditya and so on are exclusively to be transferred to mem¬ bers of sacrificial action, such as the udgitha and so on. For what reason?—‘ On account of effectuation ’—that means: Because thus, through their connexion with the supersensuous result (of the sacrificial work under dis¬ cussion), when the udgitha and so on are ceremonially qualified by being viewed as Aditya and so on, the sacri¬ ficial work is successful 1. A scriptural passage—viz. Kh.
Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action—such as Up. I, i, io, ‘ Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful’—moreover expressly declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial work.—Well then, an objection is raised, let this be admitted with regard to those meditations which have for their result the success of certain works; but how is it with meditations that have independent fruits of their own? Of this latter nature is e.g. the meditation referred to in KJi. Up. II, a, 3, £ He who knowing this meditates on the fivefold Saman in the worlds (to him belong the worlds in an ascending and a descending scale).’—In those cases also, we reply, the meditation falls within the sphere of a person entitled to the performance of a certain work, and therefore it is proper to assume that it has a fruit only through its connexion with the supersensuous result of the work under the heading of which it is mentioned; the case being analogous to that of the godohana-vessel 1.—And as Aditya and so on are of the nature of fruits of action, they may be viewed as superior to the udgitha and so on which are of the nature of action only. Scriptural texts expressly teach that the reaching of Aditya (the sun) and so on constitutes the fruit of certain works.—Moreover the initial passages, ‘ Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as the udgitha/ and ‘ Of this syllable the full account is this’ ( Kh. Up. I, 1, 1), represent the udgitha only as the object of meditation, and only after that the the udgitha—undergo a certain ceremonial purification (sa mskara) by being meditated upon as Aditya and so on. The meditations therefore contribute, through the mediation of the constituent members, towards the apurva, the supersensuous result of the entire sacrifice. 1 The sacred text promises a special fruit for the employment of the milking-pail (instead of the ordinary ^amasa), viz. the obtainment of cattle; nevertheless that fruit is obtained only in so far as the godohana subserves the accomplishment of the apfirva of the sacrifice. Analogously those meditations on mem¬ bers of sacrificial works for which the text promises a separate fruit obtain that fruit only in so far as they effect a mysterious sawskara in those members, and thereby subserve the apurva of the sacrifice.
text enjoins the contemplations on Aditya and so on.—Nor can we accept the remark that Aditya and so on being meditated upon as udgitha, &c., assume thereby the nature of work and thus will be productive of fruit. For pious meditation is in itself of the nature of work, and thus capable of producing a result. And if the udgitha and so on are meditated upon as Aditya, &c., they do not therefore cease to be of the nature of work.—In the passage, ‘ This Saman is placed upon this Rik] the words £ Rik' and ‘Saman’ are employed to denote the earth and Agni by means of impli¬ cation (laksha/za), and implication may be based, according to opportunity, either on a less or more remote connexion of sense. Although, therefore, the intention of the passage is to enjoin the contemplation of the Rik and the Saman as earth and Agni, yet—as the Rik and the Saman are mentioned separately and as the earth and Agni are men¬ tioned close by—we decide that, on the ground of their connexion with the Rik and Saman, the words ‘ Rik 5 and ‘ S&man 5 are employed to denote them (i. e. earth and Agni) only. For we also cannot altogether deny that the word ‘charioteer’ may, for some reason or other, meta¬ phorically denote a king.—Moreover the position of the words in the clause, ‘ Just this (earth) is Rik, declares that the Rik is of the nature of earth; while if the text wanted to declare that the earth is of the nature of Rik, the words would be arranged as follows, ‘this earth is just Riki — Moreover the concluding clause, ( He who knowing this sings the Saman, 5 refers only to a cognition based on a subordinate member (of sacrificial action), not to one based on the earth and so on.—Analogously in the passage, ‘ Let a man meditate (on) the fivefold Saman in the worlds, 5 the worlds—although enounced in the locative case—have to be superimposed on the Saman, as the circumstance of the ‘ Saman 5 being exhibited in the objective case indicates it to be the object of meditation. For if the worlds are superimposed on the Saman, the Sctman is meditated upon as the Self of the worlds; while in the opposite case the worlds would be meditated upon as the Self of the Saman.
—The same remark applies to the passage, ‘ This Gayatra Sclman is woven on the pranas’ ( Kh. Up. II, 11, 1).— Where again both members of the sentence are equally exhibited in the objective case, viz. in the passage, ‘ Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Saman (as) the sun’ ( Kh. Up. II, 9, 1), we observe that the introductory passages — viz.
‘ Meditation on the whole Saman is good; ’ 4 Thus for the fivefold Saman ‘Next for the sevenfold Saman’ (. Kh. Up. II, 1, 1; 7, 2; 8, 1) —represent the Saman only as the object of meditation, and therefrom conclude that Aditya has to be superinduced on it, and not the reverse.—From this very circumstance of the Saman being the object of meditation, it follows that even in cases where the two members of the sentence have a reverse position—such as c The earth (is) the hinkara,’ &c.—the hinkara, &c., have to be viewed as earth and so on; and not the reverse.—From all this it follows that reflections based on things not forming constituent members of the sacrifice, such as Aditya and so on, are to be superimposed on the udgitha and the like which are such constituent members.
7. Sitting (a man is to meditate), on account of the possibility. As meditations connected with members of sacrificial action depend on action, we need not raise the question whether they are to be carried on in a sitting, or any other posture. The same holds good in the case of perfect intuition, since knowledge depends on its object only. With regard to all other meditations, on the other hand, the author of the Sutras raises the question whether they may be undertaken indifferently by a person standing, sitting, or lying down; or only by a person sitting.
The purvapakshin here maintains that as meditation is something mental there can be no restriction as to the attitude of the body.—No, the author of the Sutras rejoins; ‘Sitting’ only a man is to meditate.—Why?—‘On account of the possibility.’ By meditation we understand the length¬ ened carrying on of an identical train of thought; and of this a man is capable neither when going nor when running, since the act of going and so on tends to distract the mind.
35° The mind of a standing man, again, is directed on main¬ taining the body in an erect position, and therefore incapable of reflection on any subtle matter. A man lying down, finally, is unawares overcome by slumber. A sitting person, on the other hand, may easily avoid these several untoward occurrences, and is therefore in a position to carry on meditations.
8. And on account of thoughtfulness. Moreover also the word ‘thoughtfulness’ denotes a lengthened carrying on of the same train of ideas. Now * thoughtfulness ’ we ascribe to those whose mind is concen¬ trated on one and the same object, while their look is fixed and their limbs move only very slightly. We say e.g. that the crane is thoughtful, or that a wife whose husband has gone on a journey is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness is easy for those who sit; and we therefore conclude here¬ from also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting person.
9. And with reference to immobility (scripture ascribes thought to the earth, &c.).
Moreover, in the passage ‘ The earth thinks as it were ’ scripture ascribes thought to the earth, with regard to its immobility. This also helps us to infer that meditation is the occupation of one who is sitting.
10. And Smrzti-passages say the same.
Authoritative authors also teach in their Smrztis that a sitting posture subserves the act of meditation: cp. e.g. Bha. Gitci VI, 11, 6 Having made a firm seat for one’s self on a pure spot.’ For the same reason the Yoga.rastra teaches different sitting postures, viz. the so-called lotus position and so on.
11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there (meditation may be carried on), on account of there being no difference.
A doubt here arises with regard to direction, place, and time, viz. whether any restrictive rules exist or not.—Against the view of those who maintain that such rules exist because we have analogous rules concerning the locality, &c., of Vedic works, the Sutrakara remarks that all rules concerning direction, place, and time depend on the aim merely; that is to say: Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever place and facing whatever region, he may with ease manage to concentrate his mind. For while scripture prescribes an easterly direction, the time of forenoon, and a spot sloping towards the east for certain sacrifices, no such specific rules are recorded for meditation, since the requisite concentra¬ tion may be managed indifferently anywhere.—But, an objection is raised, some passages record such specific rules, as e. g. the following one, ‘ Let a man apply himself (to meditation) in a level and clean place, free from pebbles, fire and dust, noises, standing water, and the like, favourable to the mind, not infested by what hurts the eyes, full of caves and shelters’ (Sve t. Up. II, io).—Such particular rules are met with indeed; but the teacher being friendlyminded says that there is no binding rule as to the particulars mentioned therein. The clause ‘favourable to the mind’ moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever concentration of the mind may be attained.
12. Up to death (meditations have to be repeated); for then also it is thus seen in scripture.
The first adhikara^a (of the present adhyaya) has estab¬ lished that repetition is to be observed with regard to all meditations. But now a distinction is made. Those meditations which aim at complete knowledge, terminate— in the same way as the beating of the rice grains is terminated by the husks becoming detached from the grains—with their effect being accomplished; for as soon as the effect, i. e. perfect knowledge, has been obtained, no further effort can be commanded, since scriptural instruction does not apply to him who knows that Brahman—which is not the object of injunction—constitutes his Self. On the other hand a doubt arises whether the devotee is to repeat those meditations which aim at certain forms of 35 2 exaltation for a certain time only and then may stop; or whether he is to repeat them again and again as long as he lives.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that such meditations are to be carried on for some time only and then to be given up, since this satisfies the demands of those scriptural passages which teach meditations distinguished by repetition.
To this we make the following reply. The devotee is to reiterate those meditations up to his death, since the supersensuous result (of such meditations) is reached by means of the extreme meditation. For such works also as originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future state of existence presuppose, at the time of death, a creative cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced; as appears from such passages as, ‘Endowed with knowledge (i.e. the conception of the fruit to be obtained) he (i.e. the individual soul) goes after that (viz. the fruit) which is connected with that knowledge’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2); £ Whatever his thought (at the time of death), with that he goes into Prazza, and the Pra/za united with light, together with the individual Self, leads on to the world as conceived (at the moment of death)’ (Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10). This also follows from the comparison to the caterpillar (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 3). But the meditations under discussion do not, at the time of death, require any other creative cognition but a repetition of themselves. Such meditations therefore as consist in the creative conception of a fruit to be obtained must be repeated up to the moment of death. Analogously the scriptural text, 5 at. Bra. X, 6, 3,1—‘With whatever thought he passes away from this world ’—declares that the medita¬ tion extends up to the time of death. Similarly Smrz*ti says, ‘ Remembering whatever form of being he in the end leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes, assimilated to its being’ (Bha. Gita VIII, 6); and ‘At the time of death with unmoved mind’ (Bha. Gita VIII, 10).
And that at the moment of death also there remains some¬ thing to be done, the scriptural passage ( Kh. Up. Ill, 17, 6) also proves, ‘ Let a man, at the time of death, take refuge with this triad.’
13. On the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there take place) the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earliersins; this being declared (by scripture).
The supplement to the third adhyaya is finished here¬ with. and an inquiry now begins concerning the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman.—The doubt here presents itself whether, on the attainment of Brahman, sins the results of which are opposed in nature to such attainment are extinguished or not. They cannot possibly be extin¬ guished, the purvapakshin maintains, before they have given their results, because the purpose of all works is their result. For we understand from scripture that work possesses the power of producing results; if, therefore, the work would perish without the enjoyment of its result, scripture would thereby be rendered nugatory. Smrzti also declares that ‘works do not perish., —But from this it would follow that all scriptural instruction regarding expiatory ceremonies is meaningless!—This objection is without force, we reply, because expiatory ceremonies may be viewed as merely due to certain special occurrences; as is the case with the offering enjoined on the occasion of the house (of one who has established the sacred fireplace)being burned 1.—Let us moreover admit that expiatory ceremonies, because enjoined on account of a person being afflicted by some mischief, may be meant to extinguish that mischief. But there is no analogous injunction of the knowledge of Brahman.—But if we do not admit that the works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished, it follows that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his works and thus cannot obtain release!—This follows by no means; but in the same way as the results of works, release will take place in due dependence on place, time, and special causes.—For these reasons the obtainment of Brahman does not imply the cessation of (the consequences of) mis¬ deeds.