Here now some come forward with the following con¬ tention. Works of permanent obligation and works to be performed on special occasions are undertaken to the end that harm may not spring up; such works as are due to special desires, and such as are forbidden, are eschewed, in order that neither the heavenly world nor hell may be obtained, and those works whose fruits are to be enjoyed in the current bodily existence are exhausted by just that fruition. Hence, as after the death of the present body, there is no cause for the origination of a new body, that blessed isolation which consists in the soul’s abiding within its own nature will accomplish itself for a man acting in the way described above, even without the cognition of his Self being identical with Brahman’s Self.—All this is inadmissible, we reply, because there is no proof of it. For scripture nowhere teaches that he who desires release should conduct himself in the way described. To say that because the Sa^sara state depends on works, it will cease when works are absent, is an altogether arbitrary style of reasoning. And (whether arbitrary or not) this reasoning falls to the ground, because the absence of the cause is something that cannot be ascertained. It may be supposed that each living being has, in its former states of existence, accumulated many works which have part of them pleasant, part of them unpleasant results. As these works are such as to lead to contrary results, which cannot be enjoyed all of them at the same time, some works whose opportunity has come, build up the present state of existence; others sit inactive waiting for a place, a time, and operative causes (favourable to them). As these latter works cannot thus be exhausted in the present state of existence, we cannot definitely assert, even in the case of a man who conducts himself as described above, that at the end of his present bodily existence all cause for a new bodily existence will be absent. The existence of a remainder of works is, moreover, established by scriptural and Smrz’ti passages, such as, ‘Those whose conduct has been good’ ( Kh. Up. V, io, 7); ‘Then with the remainder.’—But may not, an objection is raised, those remaining works be wiped out (even in the present existence) by the performance of works of permanent obligation and such works as are due to special occasions?—This may not be, we reply, because the two sets of works are not of contrary nature. Where there is contrariety of nature, one thing may be wiped out by another; but good deeds performed in previous states of existence, and works of permanent obligation and so on (performed in the present life), are both of them equally pure and therefore not of opposite nature. Bad works indeed, as being of impure nature, are opposed to works of permanent obligation, &c., and therefore may be extin¬ guished by the latter. But even from this admission it does not follow that the causes for a new embodied existence are altogether absent; for those causes may be supplied by good deeds, and we do not know that the evil works have been extinguished without a remainder. Nor is there anything to prove that the performance of works of per¬ manent obligation, &c., leads only to the non-origination of harm, and not at the same time to the origination of new results (to be extinguished in future states of existence); for it may happen that such new results spring up collater¬ ally. Thus Apastamba says, c When a mango tree is planted for the sake of its fruits, it in addition gives shade and fragrance; thus additional advantages spring from the performance of religious duty.’—Nor can anybody who has not reached perfect knowledge promise to refrain altogether, from birth to death, from all actions either forbidden or aiming at the fulfilment of special wishes; for we observe that even the most perfect men commit faults, however minute. This may be a matter of doubt; all the same it remains true that the absence of causes for a new existence cannot be known with certainty.—If, further, the soul’s unity with Brahman’s Self—which is to be realised through knowledge—is not acknowledged, the soul whose essential nature it is to be an agent and enjoyer cannot even desire the state of blissful isolation; for a being cannot divorce itself from its true essence, not any more than fire can cease to be hot.—But, an objection is raised, what is of disad¬ vantage to the soul is the state of agentship and fruition in so far as actually produced, not its mere potentiality. Release of the soul may, therefore, take place if only that actual condition is avoided while its potentiality remains. —This also, we reply, is not true; for as long as the potentiality exists it will inevitably produce the actuality. —But, our opponent resumes, potentiality alone, without other co-operative causes, does not produce its effect; as long therefore as it is alone it cannot, though continuing to exist, do any harm!—This also, we reply, is not valid; for the co-operative causes also are, potentially, permanently connected (with the acting and enjoying soul). If, therefore, the soul whose essence is acting and enjoying is not considered to possess fundamental identity with Brahman —an identity to be realised by knowledge—there is not any chance of its obtaining final release. Scripture, more¬ over (in the passage, 4 There is no other way to go/ SVet. Up.
III, 8), denies that there is any other way to release but knowledge.—But if the soul is non-different from the highest Brahman, all practical existence comes to an end, because then perception and the other means of right knowledge no longer act!—Not so, we reply. Practical life will hold its place even then, just as dreamlife holds its place up to the moment of waking. Scripture, after having said that perception and the rest are operative in the sphere of those who have not reached true knowledge (‘ For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the other/ &c.; B ri. Up.
IV, 5, 15), goes on to show that those means of knowledge do not exist for those who possess that knowledge (‘ But when the whole of him has become the Self, whereby should he see another/ &c.). As thus for him who knows the highest Brahman all cognition of something to be gone to, &c. is sublated, his going cannot in any way be shown to be possible.
To what sphere then belong the scriptural texts about the soul’s going?—To the sphere of qualified knowledge, we reply. Accordingly the soul’s going is mentioned in the chapter treating of the knowledge of the five fires, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman’s couch, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Agni VaLsvanara (Kh. Up. V, 3-10; Kau. Up. I; Kh. Up. V, 11-24). And where the soul’s going is spoken of in a chapter treating of Brahman—(as e.g. in the passages, ‘He leads them to Brahman/ &c., Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6, in a chapter treating of Brahman, as shown by ‘ Breath is Brahman/ &c., IV, 10, 5; and ‘ He departs upward/ &c., Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5, in the chapter beginning ‘There is this city of Brahman/ VIII, 1, 1)—such attributes as ‘vamani/ i.e. Leader of blessings (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 3), and ‘satyakama/ i. e. having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman has to be meditated upon, and to that Brahman the soul can go. No passage, on the other hand, speaks of the soul’s going to the highest Brahman; while such going is specially IV ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 4.
denied in the passage, ‘ Of him the pra//as do not depart.’
In passages, again, such as 4 He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1), we indeed meet with the verb ‘to reach,’ which has the sense of going; but because, as explained before, the reaching of another place is out of question, ‘reaching’ there denotes only the obtainment (realisation) of one’s own nature, in so far as (through true knowledge) the expanse of names and forms which Nescience superimposes (on Brahman) is dissolved. Such passages are to be understood analogously to the text, * Being Brahman he enters into Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 6).— Besides, if the going were understood as connected with the highest Brahman, it could only subserve the purpose either of satisfying (the mind of him who knows) or of reflection. Now, a statement of the soul’s going cannot produce any satisfaction in him who knows Brahman, since satisfaction is already fully accomplished through his perfect condition, bestowed on him by knowledge, of which he is immediately conscious. Nor, on the other hand, can it be shown that reflection on the soul’s going in any way subserves knowledge, which is conscious of eternally perfect blessedness, and has not for its fruit something to be accomplished.—For all these reasons the soul’s going falls within the sphere of the lower knowledge. And only in consequence of the distinction of the higher and lower Brahman not being ascertained, statements about the soul’s going which apply to the lower Brahman are wrongly put in connexion with the higher Brahman.
But are there really two Brahmans, a higher one and a lower one?—Certainly there are two! For scripture declares this, as e.g. in the passage, c O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the higher and also the lower Brahman ’ (Pr. Up. V, 2).—What then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower?—Listen! Where the texts, negativing all distinctions founded on name, form, and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as that which is not coarse and so on, the higher Brahman is spoken of. Where, again, for the purpose of pious meditation, the texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction depending on name, form, and so on, using terms such as [38] D d 4 He who consists of mind, whose body is pra/za, whose shape is light’ ( Kh. Up. III. 14, 2), that is the lower Brah¬ man.—But is there not room here for the objection that this distinction of a higher and a lower Brahman stultifies the scriptural texts asserting aduality?—Not so, we reply. That objection is removed by the consideration that name and form, the adjuncts (of the one real Brahman), are due to Nescience. Passages such as ‘If he desires the world of the fathers ’ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 2, 1), which the text exhibits in proximity to a meditation on the lower Brahman, show that the fruit of such meditation is lordship over the worlds; a fruit falling within the sphere of the Sa/z/sara, Nescience having not as yet been discarded. And as that fruit is bound to a special locality, there is nothing contradictory in the soul’s going there in order to reach it. That the soul, although all-pervading, is viewed as going because it enters into connexion with the buddhi and the rest of its adjuncts, just as general space enters into connexion with jars and the like, we have explained under II, 3, 29.
For all these reasons the view of Badari as set forth in Sutra 7 is the final one; while Sutra 12, which states Uaimini’s opinion, merely sets forth another view, to the end of the illumination of the learner’s understanding. j 15. Those who do not take their stand on symbols he leads, thus Badaraya^a (opines); there being no fault in the twofold relation (resulting from this opinion); and the meditation on that (i. e. Brahman) (is the reason of this twofold relation).
It is a settled conclusion that all going has reference to the effected Brahman, not to the highest Brahman. Another doubt now arises here. Does that person who is not a man lead to the world of Brahman all those who take their stand on the effected Brahman, without any difference; or only some of them?
The purvapakshin maintains that all those who possess knowledge—provided that knowledge be not of the highest Brahman—go to the world of Brahman. For in Sutra III, 3, 31 that going was put in connexion with all the dif¬ ferent vidyas (of the qualified Brahmans), without any distinction.
To this the Sutrakara replies, ‘Those who do not take their stand on symbols.’ That means: Excepting those who take their stand on symbols (i. e. who meditate on certain things as symbolically representing Brahman), that person who is not a man leads all others who take their stand (i. e. who meditate) on the effected Brahman, to the world of Brahman; this is the opinion of the teacher Badaraya/za. For in acknowledging in this way a twofold relation there is no fault; since the argumentation as to the non-restriction of going (Sutra III, 3, 31) may be under¬ stood as referring to all meditations with the exception of those on symbols. The words, ‘and the meditation on that, 5 state the reason for this twofold relation. For he whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, * In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves.’ In the case of symbols, on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation.—But scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge of the five fires, ‘He leads them to Brahman 5 ( Kh. Up. V, 10, 2).—This may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. We only mean to say that where there is no such declar¬ ation the general rule is that those only whose purpose is Brahman go to it, not any others.
16. And scripture declares a difference (in the case of meditations on symbols).
With reference to the meditations on symbols, such as name and so on, scripture declares that each following meditation has a different result from the preceding one, ‘ As far as name reaches he is lord and master;—speech is greater than name;—as far as speech reaches he is lord and master;—mind is greater than speech ’ (Kh. Up. VII, 1, ff.).
D d 2 Now this distinction of rewards is possible because the meditations depend on symbols, while there could be no such distinction if they depended on the one non-dififerent Brahman.—Hence those who take their stand on symbols cannot have the same reward as others.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 405 Reverence to the highest Self!
1. (On the souls) having entered (into die highest light), there is manifestation (of its own nature); (as we infer) from the word ‘ own/ ‘ Thus does that serene being, having risen out of this body and entered into the highest light, manifest itself by its own nature 5 (Kh. Up. VII, 12, 3). Regarding this text a doubt arises whether the Self 1 manifests itself through some adventitious distinction—as the Self (of him who possesses the lower knowledge only) does in the world of the gods and other abodes of enjoyment—or only through its own Self.—The purvapakshin maintains that, as in other places, here also the manifestation takes place through some adventitious characteristic; because release also is a fruit (like other fruits, e. g. svarga), and because •manifestation’ means as much as origination. If the manifestation took place only through the Self’s own nature, it would already appear in the Self’s former states; for a thing’s own nature is never absent from it. The Self therefore manifests itself by means of some adventitious distinction.
To this we make the following reply. It manifests itself through its Self only, not through any other attribute.— Why so?—On account of the word ‘ own ’ in the clause ‘ by its own nature/ For on the other view the qualification conveyed by ‘ own ’ would be unmeaning.—But may not the term ‘own’ merely indicate that that form belongs to that which manifests itself?—Not so, we reply. This is a point which would not require to be stated. For as in 1 Sazzzprati /£aturthe pade paravidyaphalaikade^o brahmabhavavirbhava^, saguzzavidyaphalazzz >£a sarvesvaratulyabhogatvam avadharayishyate, tatraparavidyaprapyam uktva paravidyaprapyam aha sa/zzpadyeti. An. Gi.
whatever form a thing manifests itself that form necessarily belongs to it, the qualification ‘ own 5 would be devoid of purport. It has a meaning, on the other hand, if it denotes the Self, the sense conveyed then being that the manifesta¬ tion takes place only through the nature of the Self, not through any other, adventitious, nature.—But, as a thing cannot be without its own nature, what difference is there between the Selfs former states and its present state (after the manifestation)?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
2. (The Self whose true nature has manifested itself is) released; according to the promise (made by scripture).
That soul, of which the text says that it manifests itself, is released from its former bondage and abides in its own pure Self; while previously its Self was stained by the three states (i. e the state of waking, dreaming, and dream¬ less sleep), according to Kh. Up. VIII, 9-11, ‘ It is blind —‘it weeps as it were; 5 —‘it goes to utter annihilation. 5 This is the difference.—But how is it known that in its present condition the soul is released?—‘On account of the promise, 5 the Sutra says. For after the teacher has promised to give further instruction about the Self as free from the imperfections of the three states (‘ I shall explain him further to you’ Kh. Up. VIII, 11, 3), he introduces the topic (of the released Self) in the words, ‘ Him being free from the body neither pleasure nor pain touches, 5 and concludes, ‘ By his own nature he manifests himself; that is the highest Person. 5 The words at the beginning of the tale also, ‘The Self which is free from sin 5 (VIII, 7, 1), make a promise regarding the released Self. And release is a fruit in so far only as it is a cessation of all bondage, not as implying the accession of something new. And with reference to the assertion that manifestation is the origi¬ nation of something new we remark that it is so only with regard to a former condition (which ceases to be), as when we say of a convalescent person that he now manifests himself free from sickness. Hence there is no room for objections. 3. (The light into which the soul enters is) the Self; owing to the subject-matter of the chapter.
But how can the soul be called ‘released/ considering that the clause 4 having entered into the highest light ’ speaks of it as within the sphere of what is a mere effect? For the word 4 light/ according to general usage, denotes physical light. And none who has not passed beyond the sphere of what is effected can be released, it being known that whatever is an effect is tainted with evil.—This objection is without force, we reply; because in the passage referred to the word ‘light’ denotes the Self, in accordance with the subject-matter of the chapter. For as such the highest Self is introduced in the words, ‘The Self which is free from sin, old age, death/ &c., and we therefore may not all at once pass over to physical light; incurring thereby the fault of abandoning the topic under discussion and introducing a new one. Besides, the word 4 light ’ sometimes denotes the Self, as e. g. in the passage, 4 That the gods meditate on as the light of lights' (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 16). We have discussed this at length under I, 3, 40.
4. (The released soul abides) in non-division (from the highest Self); because that is seen from scripture. A doubt here arises whether that soul of which the text says, 4 Having entered the highest light it manifests itself by its true nature/ remains separate from the highest Self, or abides in the state of non-division from it.—Somebody might be inclined to think that—because in the passage, 4 He moves about there,’ a distinction is made between the abode and him who abides; and because the clause, 4 Having entered the highest light/ mentions an agent and an object (of the agent's activity)—the soul remains distinct from the highest Self.—This view the Sutra sets aside. The released soul is non-separate from the highest Self.—Why so?—Because that is seen from scripture. For passages such as ‘ Thou art that 5 (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); ‘I am Brahman’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10); ‘Where he sees nothing else’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); ‘ But there is then nothing second, nothing else different that he could see ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 23), show that the highest Self abides in the state of non-division. And the fruit must be assumed to correspond to the cognition, according to what was explained under IV, 3, 15. And also such passages as ‘Just as pure water poured into pure water remains the same, thus, O Gautama, is the Self of a thinker who knows ’ (Ka. Up. II, 4,15), whose object it is to describe the nature of the released soul, declare that there is non¬ separation only. The same follows from the comparisons (of the soul entering Brahman) to rivers falling into the sea. Passages where separation (of abode and abiding thing, &c.) is expressed, may be explained as, in a secondary sense, expressing non-separation; so e. g. Kh. Up. VII. 24, 1, ‘ In what does the Infinite rest?—In its own great¬ ness;’ and Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2, ‘Loving the Self, playing with the Self.’
5. By (a nature) like that of Brahman (the soul manifests itself); (thus) Craimini (opines); on account of reference and the rest. It has been concluded that the clause, ‘ by its own nature,’ means that the soul manifests itself by its own Self only, not by some other adventitious character. What has now to be inquired into is the specific qualities of that nature. Here the Sutra at first states the opinion of the teacher Uaimini. According to him the soul’s own nature is ‘ like that of Brahman,’ i.e. it comprises all the qualities beginning with freeness from sin and concluding with truthfulness of conception (i.e. the qualities enumerated in Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and also omniscience and omnipotence; and in this nature the soul manifests itself.—Why so?—Because this is known from reference 1 and the rest. For the reference 1 The commentators say that the ‘and the rest’ of the Sutra comprises vidhi and vyapade^a, and give the following definitions.
to certain qualities made in VIII, 7, i, teaches that the Selfhood of the Self is such (i.e. such as made up of those qualities).—Again, the passage, £ He there moves about eating, playing, rejoicing, 5 shows that the Self possesses lordly power; so also the passage, £ For him there is free movement in all worlds 5 ( Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6).—And thus also there is justification for such designations as ‘All¬ knowing; all-powerful.’
6. By the sole nature of intelligence (the soul manifests itself), as that is its Self; thus Au^ulomi (opines).
Although the text enumerates different qualities, such as freeness from sin, &c., these qualities rest only on fanciful conceptions due to difference of words; for what the text intimates is only absence in general of all qualities such as sin and the rest. Intelligence alone constitutes the nature of the Self, and hence it is proper to conclude that it mani¬ fests itself in a nature consisting of that only. This con¬ clusion will also agree with other scriptural texts, such as B ri. Up. IV, 5, 13, ‘Thus this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.’—Qualities, on the other hand, such as having true wishes, are indeed mentioned by the text as real (positive) attributes, the meaning being that his wishes are true, i.e. truly existent; but all the same they, as depending on the connexion with limiting adjuncts, cannot constitute the true nature of the Upanyasa is the reference to something known (established else¬ where), which reference is made with a view to a vidhi, i. e. the establishing of something not yet known (upanyaso namodde^a^ sa X’a^nyatra ^atasya^nyavidhanayanuvada^). Thus here the qualities —freeness from sin—are referred to as known, for the purpose of establishing the vidhi, ‘ That it is which we must search out.’—The passage, ‘ He there wanders about,’ &c., is a vidhi; for it teaches what is not already known from elsewhere.—The mentioning of such qualities as omniscience and omnipotence is vyapade^a, i.e. simple expression of something known without reference to a vidhi.
4io Self, as intelligence does. For all manifoldness of character has to be denied of Brahman, as we have shown under III, 2, ii. For the same reason the mention made of eating and so on, means only the absence of all pain in general, and aims at glorification, just as the passage about ‘loving the Self’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2). For love, play, and the like cannot in their literal sense be ascribed to the action of the Self, because they presuppose something second (beyond the Self). Hence the soul manifests itself in the nature of pure intelligence, free from all manifoldness, calm, not capable of being expressed by any terms. This is the view of the teacher Au^ulomi.
7. Thus also, on account of the existence of the former (qualities), (admitted) owing to reference and so on, there is absence of contradiction, (as) Badarayazza (thinks).
Thus also, i. e. although it be admitted that intelligence only constitutes the true nature of the Self, also the former nature, i.e. lordly power like that of Brahman, which is intimated by reference and the rest, is—with a view to the world of appearances—not rejected; and hence there is no contradiction. This is the opinion of the teacher Badar&-ya/za.
8. But by mere will (the released effect their purposes); because scripture states that.
In the meditation on Brahman within the heart we read as follows: ‘ If he desires the world of the fathers, by his mere will the fathers rise,’ &c. (Kk. Up. VIII, 2,1).—A doubt here presents itself whether the will alone is the cause of the rising of the fathers, or the will joined with some other operative cause.—The purvapakshin maintains that although scripture says ‘ by his mere will,’ some other cause must be supposed to co-operate, as in ordinary life. For as in our ordinary experience the meeting with one’s father is caused by one’s will, and, in addition, by the act of going and so on, so it will be in the case of the released soul also; and IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, IO. 4 1 I thus we do not assume something contrary to observation. When the text says ‘ by his mere will, 5 it implies, as in the case of a king, the whole apparatus of other easily pro¬ curable instrumental causes by which the desired object is obtained. Besides, if the fathers and so on rose owing to a mere wish, they would be of unstable nature, like the imaginary representation of some desired object, and thus not be able to procure any solid enjoyment.—To this we reply that the rising of the fathers and so on is due to the will only.—Why so?—Because scripture declares this. If any other cause were required, the direct scriptural state¬ ment c by his will only’ would thereby be contradicted. And even if we admit some other cause accompanying the act of will, it cannot be a cause to be realised by an effort; for therefrom it would follow that before the realisation of that cause the will would be barren. Nor can the analogies of ordinary experience be applied to something to be learned from scripture. For as the will of the released differs in nature from the will of ordinary men, it may have the power of effecting something that possesses as much stability as the special purpose requires.
9. And for this very same reason (the released soul is) without another lord. For this very same reason, i. e. owing to the fact of the will of the released person not being barren, he who knows has no other lord over himself. For not even an ordinary person when forming wishes will, if he can help it, wish himself to be subject to another master. And scripture also declares this when saying, ‘Those who depart from hence, after having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds ’ (. Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6).
10. The absence (of a body and sense-organs, on the part of the released) Badari (asserts); for thus scripture says.
The passage, ‘ By his mere wish the fathers rise, 5 shows that the released possesses a mind (internal organ, manas) whereby he wills. A question however arises whether he who knows, after having reached lordly power, possesses a body and senses, or not. Here the teacher Badari is of opinion that the glorified possessor of knowledge is without body and sense-organs.—Why so?—Because scripture de¬ clares this, ‘ With the mind seeing those wishes he rejoices ’ (Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 5). If he rejoiced with the mind, the body, and the senses, scripture would not specially say 4 with the mind.’ Hence there are neither body nor senseorgans in the state of release.
11. The presence (of a body and senses) (Taimini (asserts); because the text records option (of the released person multiplying himself). The teacher Uaimini is of opinion that the released person possesses a body and sense-organs as well as a mind. For passages like '* He is onefold, he is threefold 5 ( Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2) declare that the Self has the option of manifold existence which cannot be brought about without manifold¬ ness of body.—The capability of optionally multiplying one’s self is, indeed, mentioned in the knowledge of plenitude (bhuman) which refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities, but this lordly power which is valid only for the qualified state is there mentioned only in order to glorify the know¬ ledge of the (unqualified) plenitude; and it therefore presents itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge 1.
12. For this reason Badaraya;/a (opines that the released person is) of both kinds; as in the case of the twelve days’ sacrifice.
The teacher Badaraya;^a, again, thinks that for this reason, i.e. because scripture contains indications of both kinds, the proper conclusion is that the released person exists in both 1 Manifoldness of the Self is mentioned in a vidya referring to the highest Brahman; but its introduction there is not due to the wish of teaching something about that state, but merely of, rhe¬ torically, glorifying it. We, therefore, are entitled to view that passage as teaching something about him who possesses the lower knowledge.
conditions. When he wishes to have a body, he appears with one; when he wishes to be disembodied, he is without one. For he has various wishes, and all his wishes are realised.—‘As in the case of the twelve days 5 sacrifice. 5 As the soma sacrifice extending over twelve days may be viewed either as a sattra or as an ahina sacrifice, because both alternatives are indicated by scriptural passages 1; so it is here also.
13. When there is no body, (the process) may take place as in the dreaming state.
When there is no body and no sense-organs, the process in the state of release may be viewed as analogous to that in the state of dream, when objects wished, such as a father and so on, have a perceptional existence only while body, senses, and objects do not really exist.
14. When there is (a body), (it may be) as in the waking state.