I did not get off as cheaply with his friends. These were unspeakably eager in their rush for the spoil. They incessantly assailed me with their demands, with so much importunity, and often im- pertinence, that I frequently felt inclined to have them thrown out of the window. I strove, never- theless, to restrain myself. On one occasion, how- ever, when one of them, a real gallows-bird, haughtily insisted, and said that it was very strange that the Prince should not have the power of rewarding those who had suffered for his cause, I replied: " Sir, the best thing for the President to do is to forget that he was ever a pretender, and to remem- I A ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 321 ber that he is here to attend to the affairs of France and not to yours."
The Roman affair, in which, as I shall explain later, I firmly supported his policy, until the moment when it became extravagant and unreasonable, ended by putting me entirely into his good graces: of this he one day gave me a great proof. Beaumont, during his short embassy in England at the end of 1848, had spoken very strongly about Louis Napoleon, who was at that time a candidate for the Presidency. These remarks, when repeated to the latter, had caused him extreme irritation, I had several times endeavoured, since I had become a minister, to re- establish Beaumont in the President's mind; but I should never have ventured to propose to employ him, capable as he was, and anxious though I was to do so. The Vienna embassy was to be vacated in September 1849. It was at that time one of the most important posts in our diplomatic service, because of the affairs of Italy and Hungary. The President said to me of his own accord: " I suggest that you should give the Vienna embassy to M. de Beaumont. True, I have had great reason to complain of him; but I know that he is your best friend, and that is enough to decide me."
I was delighted. No one was better suited than Beaumont for the place which had to be filled, and nothing could be more agreeable to me than to offer it him.
All my colleagues did not imitate me in the care 322 RECOLLECTIONS OF which I took to gain the President's good-will with- out doing violence to my opinions and my wishes. Dufaure, however, against every expectation, was always just what he should be in his relations towards him. I believe the President's simplicity of manners had half won him over. But Passy seemed to take pleasure in being disagreeable to him. I believe that he considered that he had degraded himself by becoming the minister of a man whom he looked upon as an adventurer, and that he endeavoured to regain his level by impertinence. He annoyed him every day unnecessarily, rejecting all his candidates, ill-treating his friends, and contradicting his opinions with ill-concealed disdain. No wonder that the President cordially detested him.
Of all the ministers, the one who was most in his confidence was Falloux. I have always believed that the latter had gained him by means of some- thing more substantial than that which any of us were able or willing to offer him. Falloux, who was a Legitimist by birth, by training, by society, and by taste, if you like, belonged at bottom to none but the Church. He did not believe in the triumph of the Legitimism which he served, and he only sought, amid all our revolutions, to find a road by which he could bring back the Catholic religion to power. He had only remained in office so that he might watch over its interests, and, as he said to me on the first day with well-calculated frankness, by the advice of his confessor. I am convinced that from ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 323 the beginning Falloux had suspected the advantages to be gained from Louis Napoleon towards the accompHshment of this design, and that, famiHarizing himself at an early date with the idea of seeing the President become the heir of the Republic and the master of France, he had only thought of utilizing this inevitable event in the interest of the clergy. He had offered the support of his party without, however, compromising himself.
From the time of our entrance into affairs until the prorogation of the Assembly, which took place on the 13th of August, we did not cease to gain ground with the majority, in spite of their leaders. They saw us every day struggling with their enemies before their eyes; and the furious attacks which the latter at every moment directed against us advanced us gradually in their good graces. But, on the other hand, during all that time we made no progress in the mind of the President, who used to suffer our pres- ence in his counsels rather than to admit us to them.
Six weeks later it was just the opposite. The representatives had returned from the provinces incensed by the clamour of their friends, to whom we had refused to hand over the control of local affairs; and on the other hand, the President of the Republic had drawn closer to us; I shall show later why. One would have said that we had advanced on that side in the exact proportion to that in which we had gone back on the other.
Thus placed between two props badly jomed 324 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE together and always tottering, the Cabinet leant now upon one, now upon the other, and was I always liable to tumble between the two. It was I the Roman affair which brought about the fall. i Such was the state of things when the parliament- ary session was resumed on the ist of October 1849, and when the Roman affair was handled for the second and last time.
CHAPTER IV FOREIGN AFFAIRS I DID not wish to interrupt the story of our home misfortunes to speak of the difficuhies which we en- countered abroad, and of which I had to bear the brunt more than any other. I shall now retrace my steps and return to that part of my subject.
When I found myself installed at the Foreign Office, and when the state of affairs had been placed before my eyes, I was alarmed at the number and extent of the difficulties which I perceived. But what caused me more anxiety than anything else was myself.
I possess a great natural distrust of self. The nine years which I had spent rather wretchedly in the last Assemblies of the Monarchy had tended greatly to increase this natural infirmity, and although the manner in which I had just undergone the trial of the Revolution of February had helped to raise me a little in my own opinion, I nevertheless accepted this great task, at a time like the present, only after much hesitation, and I did not enter into it with- out great fear.
Before long, I was able to make a certain number of observations which tranquillized if they did not 326 RECOLLECTIONS OF entirely reassure me. I began by perceiving that affairs did not always increase in difficulty as they in- creased in size, as would naturally appear at a cursory glance: the contrary is rather the truth. Their complications do not grow with their importance; it even often happens that they assume a simpler aspect in the measure that their consequences become wider and more serious. Besides, a man whose will influences the destiny of a whole people always finds ready to hand more men willing to enlighten him, to assist him, to relieve him of details, more pre- pared to encourage, to defend him, than would be met with in second-rate affairs or inferior positions. And lastly, the size itself of the object pursued stimulates all the mental forces to such an extent, that though the task may be a little harder, the workman becomes much more expert.
I should have felt perplexed, full of care, dis- couragement and disordered excitement, in presence of petty responsibilities. I felt a peace of mind and a singular feeling of calm when brought face to face with larger ones. The sentiment of importance attached to the things I then did at once raised me to their level and kept me there. The idea of a rebuff had until then seemed insupportable to me; the prospect of a dazzling fall upon one of the greatest stages in the world, on which I was mounted, did not disconcert me; which showed that my weakness was not timidity but pride. I also was not long before perceiving that in politics, as in so many other ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 327 matters — perhaps in all — the vivacity of impressions received was not in a ratio with the importance of the fact which produced it, but with the more or less frequent repetition of the latter. One who grows troubled and excited about the handling of a trifling piece of business, the only one which he happens to have taken in hand, ends by recovering his self- possession among greater ones, if they are repeated every day. Their frequency renders their effect, as it were, insensible. I have related how many enemies I used formerly to make by holding aloof from people who did not attract my attention by any merit; and as people had often taken for haughtiness the boredom they caused me, I strongly dreaded this reef in the great journey I was about to undertake. But I soon observed that, although insolence increases with certain persons in the exact proportion of the progress of their fortunes, it was different with me, and that it was much easier for me to display affability and even cordiality when I felt myself above, than when I was one of, the common herd. This comes from the fact that, being a minister, I no longer had the trouble of running after people, nor to fear lest I should be coldly received by them, men making it a necessity themselves to approach those who occupy posts of that sort, and being simple enough to attach great importance to their most trivial words. It comes also from this that, as a minister, I no longer had to do only with the ideas of fools, but also with their interests, 328 RECOLLECTIONS OF which always supply a ready-made and easy subject of conversation.
I saw, therefore, that I was not so ill fitted. as I had feared for the part I had undertaken to play. This discovery encouraged me, not only for the present, but for the rest of my life; and should I be asked what I gained in this Ministry, so troubled, so thwarted, and so short that I was only able to commence affairs in it and to finish none, I would answer that I gained one great advantage, perhaps the greatest advantage in the world — confidence in myself.
At home and abroad, our greatest obstacles came less from the difficulty of business than from those who had to conduct it with us. I saw this from the first. Most of our agents were creatures of the Monarchy, who, at the bottom of their hearts, furiously detested the Government they served; and in the name of democratic and republican France, they extolled the restoration of the old aristocracies and secretly worked for the re-establishment of all the absolute monarchies of Europe. Others, on the contrary, whom the Revolution of February had dragged from an obscurity in which they should have al- ways remained, clandestinely supported the dema- gogic parties which the French Government was combating. But the chief fault of most of them was timidity. The greater number of our ambas- sadors were afraid to attach themselves to any particular policy in the countries in which they ALEXIS DE TOCOUEJ'ILLK;v^ represented us, and even feared lo disphiy m ilvir own Government opinions wliich ini^lu soonn- m- later have been counted as a crime ai^ainsi ih-in They therefore took care to keep ihcmsil\ -•-. covertly concealed beneath a heap of lirdi- f.u i> with which they crammed their corr<sp(jndi:a ■ (for in diplomacy you must always wriic, rww when you know nothint;- and wish to sa\- iioiliiuL^). and they were very careful not to ^how w'.iai iln } thought of the events they chronicled, and ^lih U-s-^ to g-ive us anv indication as to wliai wh' were lo conclude from them.
This condition of nullity to which our aL^cni-. voluntarily reduced themseK'es. and which, to I'il the truth, was in the case of most ol ihem no mor<- than an artificial perfectionin^' ot nature, indu' (^1 me, so soon as I had realized it, to employ mw men at the great Courts.
I should have liked in the same \va\- lo be able to get rid of the leaders of the majorii\-: bwi n^i beintr able to do this, I endeaxoured U) li\'- or. good terms with them, and I did noi e\cn d(sp,iir of pleasing them, while at the sani< time rcmainm.; independent of their inlluencn-: a diltuuli uiuln- taking in which I ne\-ertheless succcedeil; tor, ot;ill the Cabinet, I was the minister who mosi siron:.;l> opposed their policy and \-et the onl\ op.<- ulio retained their trood c^races. My sccrei, it I niu^i confess it, lay in tlattering their selt-c neglecting their advice.
unccii vdn 330 RECOLLECTIONS OF I had made an observation in small affairs which I deemed very applicable to greater ones: I had found that the most advantageous negociations are those conducted with human vanity; for one often obtains very substantial things from it, while giving very little substance in return. One never does so well when treating with ambition or cupidity. At the same time, it is a fact that in order to deal advantageously with the vanity of others, one must put his own entirely on one side and think of nothing but the success of his plans, an essential which will always prove a difficulty in the way of this sort of commerce. I practised it very happily at this time and to my great advantage. Three men thought themselves specially entitled to direct our foreign policy, owing to the position they had formerly occupied: these were M. de Broglie, M. Mole and M. Thiers. I overwhelmed all three of them with deference; I often sent for them to see me, and sometimes called upon them to consult them and to ask them, with a sort of modesty, for advice which I hardly ever followed. But this did not prevent these great men from displaying every satisfaction. I pleased them more by asking their opinion without following it than if I had followed it without asking it. Especially in the case of M. Thiers, this manoeuvre of mine succeeded admirably. R6musat, who, although with- out any personal pretentions, sincerely wished the Cabinet to last, and who had become familiarized ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 331 through an intercourse extending over twenty-five years with all M. Thiers' weaknesses, said to me one day: " The world does not know M. Thiers well; he has much more vanity than ambition; and he pre- fers consideration to obedience, and the appearance of power to power itself. Consult him constantly, and then do just as you please. He will take more notice of your deference to him than of your actions."
This is what I did, and with great success. In the two principal affairs that I had to conduct during my time of office, those of Piedmont and Turkey, I did precisely the opposite to what M. Thiers wished, and, nevertheless, we remained excellent friends till the end.
As to the President, it was especially in the con- duct of foreign affairs that he showed how badly prepared he still was for the great part to which blind fortune had called him. I was not slow in perceiving that this man, whose pride aimed at leading everything, had not yet taken the smallest steps to inform himself of anything. I proposed to have an analysis drawn up every day of all the despatches and to submit it to his inspection. Before this, he knew what happened in the world only by hearsay, and only knew what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had thought fit to tell him. The solid basis of facts was always lacking to the operations of his mind, and this was easily seen in all the dreams with which the latter was filled. I was sometimes 332 RECOLLECTIONS OF frightened at perceiving how much there was in his plans that was vast, chimerical, unscrupulous, and confused; although it is true that, when explaining the real state of things to him, I easily made him recognize the difficulties which they presented, for discussion was not his strong point. He was silent, but never yielded.
One of his myths was an alliance with one of the two great powers of Germany, of which he proposed to make use to alter the map of Europe and erase the limits which the treaties of 1 8 1 5 had traced for France. As he saw that I did not believe it possible to find either of these powers inclined for an alliance of this sort, and with such an object, he undertook himself to sound their ambassadors in Paris. One of them came to me one day in a state of great excitement to tell me that the President of the Republic had asked him if, in consideration of an equivalent, his Court would not consent to allow France to seize Savoy. On another occasion, he conceived the idea of sending a private agent, one of his own men,^ as he called them, to come to a direct understanding with the German Princes. He chose Persigny, and asked me to give him his creden- tials; and I consented, knowing well that nothing could come of a negociation of this sort. I believe i that Persigny had a two-fold mission: it was a question of facilitating the usurpation at home and an extension of territory abroad. He went first to ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 333 Berlin and then to Vienna; as I expected, he was very well received, handsomely entertained, and politely bowed out.
But I have spoken enough of individuals; let us come to politics.
At the time when I took up office, Europe was, as it were, on fire, although the conflagration was already extinguished in certain countries. Sicily was conquered and subdued; the Neapolitans had returned to their obedience and even to their servitude; the battle of Novara had been fought and lost; the victorious Austrians were negociating with the son of Charles Albert, who had become King of Piedmont by his father's abdication; their armies, issuing from the confines of Lombardy, occupied Parma, a portion of the Papal States, Placentia, and Tuscany, which they had entered unasked, and in spite of the fact that the Grand Duke had been restored by his subjects, who have been but ill rewarded since for their zeal and fidelity. But Venice still resisted, and Rome, after repelling our first attack, was calling all the demagogues of Italy to its assistance and exciting all Europe with its clamour. Never, perhaps, since February, had Germany seemed more divided or disturbed. Although the dream of German unity had been dispelled, the reality of the old Teutonic organiza- tion had not yet resumed its place. Reduced to a small number of members, the National Assembly, which had till then endeavoured to promote this 334 RECOLLECTIONS OF unity, fled from Frankfort and hawked round the spectacle of its impotence and its ridiculous fury. But its fall did not restore order; on the contrary, it left a freer field for anarchy.
The moderate, one may say the innocent, revolu- tionaries, who had cherished the belief that they would be able, peacefully, and by means of arguments and decrees, to persuade the peoples and princes of Germany to submit to a single government, made way for the violent revolutionaries, who had always maintained that Germany could only be brought to a state of unity by the complete ruin of its old systems of government, and the entire abolition of the existing social order. Riots therefore followed on every hand upon parliamentary discussion. Poli- tical rivalries turned into a war of classes; the natural hatred and jealousy entertained by the poor for the rich developed into socialistic theories in many quarters, but especially in the small states of Central Germany and in the great Rhine Valley. Wurtem- berg was in a state of agitation; Saxony had just experienced a terrible insurrection, which had only been crushed with the assistance of Prussia; in- surrections had also occurred in Westphalia; the Palatinate was in open revolt; and Baden had expelled its Grand Duke, and appointed a Pro- visional Government. And yet the final victory of the Princes, which I had foreseen when travelling through Germany, a month before, was no longer in doubt; the very violence of the insurrections ALEXIS DE rOCQUEriLLE.,- hastened It. The larger m(jnarchics had ncapiui-.d their capitals and their armies. Their hcack i.,ni still difficulties to conquer, hut nn more daii-cr^; and themselves masters, or on the point of hecDiniii:; so, at home, they could not fail soon to triumph in the second-rate States. B)- thus violently disturh^ ing public order, the insuri^ents ga\e them the ui-.h, the opportunit}' and the right to interx cne.
Prussia had already connnenced to do so. Th'- Prussians had just suppressed the Saxon insurreeiii >n by force of arms; they now entered tlie l\.hin<- Palatinate, offered their intervention to W'urtemherg. and prepared to invade the Grand-Duchy of Baden. thus occupying almost the whole of (ierman\- with their soldiers or their iniluence.
Austria had emerged from the terril)le crisis which, had threatened its existence, hut it was still in great travail. Its armies, after conquering in lial\-, were being defeated in Hungar)-. Desj)airing ot ma'-tci- ing Its subjects unaided, it had called Russia t'> ii-^ assistance, and the Tsar, in a manifesto dated 13 May, had announced to hi u rope that he w.i^ marching against the Hungarians. The laniMr..r Nicholas had till then remained at rest amid lii^ uncontested might. He had \iewc(l the agitaiiMn of the nations from afar in safet\-, but i^ )t widi indifference. Thenceforward, he alone aiiMn- iIk great powers of Europe represented the 1 il<l stat<- of society and the old traditional principle.i| authority. He was not (jnly its representati\ <■; he 336 RECOLLECTIONS OF considered himself its champion. His political theories, his religious belief, his ambition and his conscience, all urged him to adopt this part. He had, therefore, made for himself out of the cause of authority throughout the world a second empire yet vaster than the first. He encouraged with his letters and rewarded with his honours all those who, in whatever corner of Europe, gained victories over anarchy and even over liberty, as though they were his subjects and had contributed to strengthening his own power. He had thus sent, to the extreme South of Europe, one of his orders to Filangieri, the conqueror of the Sicilians, and had written that general an autograph letter to show to him that he was satisfied with his conduct. From the lofty position which he occupied, and whence he peace- fully watched the various incidents of the struggle which shook Europe, the Emperor judged freely, and followed with a certain tranquil disdain, not only the follies of the revolutionaries whom he pursued, but also the vices and the faults of the parties and princes whom he assisted. He expressed himself on this subject simply and as the occasion required, without showing any eagerness to disclose his thoughts or taking any pains to conceal them.
Lamoriciere wrote to me on the 1 1 th of August 1 849, in a secret despatch: " The Tsar said to me this morning, ' You believe, general, that your dynastic parties would be capable ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 337 of uniting with the Radicals to overthrow a dynasty which they disliked, in the hope of setting their own in its place; and I am certain of it. Your Legitimist Party especially would not hesitate to do so. I have long since thought that it is the Legitimists who make the Elder Branch of the Bourbons im- possible. This is one of the reasons why I recog- nized the Republic; and also because I perceive in your nation a certain common sense which is wanting in the Germans.'
"Later, the Emperor also said, 'The King of Prussia, my brother-in-law, with whom I was on very close terms of friendship, has not taken the slightest heed of my advice. The result is that our political relations have become remarkably cool, to such an extent that they have affected even our family relations. Look at the things he has done: did he not put himself at the head of those fools who dream of an United Germany, and now that he has broken with the Frankfort Parliament, has he not brought himself to the necessity of fighting the troops of the Schleswig-Holstein Duchies, which were levied under his patronage! Is it possible to imagine anything more disgraceful.^ And now, who knows how far he will go with his constitu- tional proposals? ' He added, ' Do not think that, because I intervene in Hungary, I wish to justify the conduct of Austria in this affair. She has heaped up, one on the other, the most serious faults and the greatest follies; but when all is said and done, it 338 RECOLLECTIONS OF had allowed the country to be Invaded by subversive doctrines, and the government had fallen into the hands of disorderly persons. This was not to be endured.'