of France, between the two parties, addressing to both of them the language which I thought most likely to convince them. I observed to Austria how urgent it was that the general peace of Europe should be assured by this particular peace, and I exerted myself to point out to her what was excessive in her demands. To Piedmont I indicated the points on which it seemed to me that honour and interest would permit her to give way. I applied myself especially to giving her Government in advance clear and precise ideas as to what it might expect from us, so that it should have no excuse to enter- tain, or to pretend to have entertained, any dangerous illusions^ I will not go into details of the conditions under discussion, which are without interest to-day; I will content myself with saying that at the end they seemed prepared to come to an understanding, 1 Despatch of the 4th of July 1849 to M. de Boislecomte: " The conditions laid down for Piedmont by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria are no doubt severe; but, nevertheless, they do not affect the integrity of the territory of the Kingdom nor her honour. They neither take away the strength which she should pre- serve, nor the just influence which she is called upon to exercise over the general policy of Europe and in particular over the affairs of Italy. The treaty which she is asked to sign is a vexatious one, no doubt; but it is not a disastrous one; and, after the fate of arms has been decided, it does not exceed what was naturally to be feared.
"France has not neglected, and will not neglect, any effort to obtain a mitigation of this proposal; she will persist in her endeavours to obtain from the Austrian Government the modifications which she considers in keeping not only with the interests of Piedmont but with the easy and lasting maintenance of the general peace; and to attain this result, she will employ all the means supphed to diplomacy: but she will not go beyond this. She does not think that, within the limits of the question and the degree to which the interests of Piedmont are in- ALEXIS DE TfJChUEVIl.LE.- and that any further delay was.hi.- ir..-:-:■, • quesdon of money. This was ili.- c.M^ii:';. affairs, and Austria assured us dir.)u-ii ii.-r.\:.-.'.. sador in Paris of her c.nciliai. ir\.!!-[..,.;[;,,:.■ already looked upon peace as e. tuIm.Ic.'. \\\:< w unexpectedly learned thai th.- Au-.iriaii I'i-'ii:. tentiary had suddenl\- chan-i-d lu^ ainii:.!--..■: i:■ language, had delivered on the ic^b. "t [..'ix,, ^,.. serious ultimatum, c. duelled in cxcc.-.i;:! jl-,; ^.-; terms, and had onh" L^iven four (la\s in wiii.!■; v reply to it. At the end of die^e f)ur.la\> i:, armistice was to he raised and die war r.-uav i Already Marshal Radetzky was c. m.-.-mraiin,, ia army and preparinc^ to enter upon a iVc^li cain.jM:^;;. This news, so contrary to the parifir,i^Ma\i:K' which we had received, was lo me a;^i' a: ^-ia. of surprise and indignation. Dnnan.ls m) >-\^n-\'\\.\\.\ volved, it would be oppnnune to.1.) lUMre. li.iM;:. •. deliberate opinion, she docs not hcMiate t.i;_;ivi- uti' i,11, allow, even by her silence, a belief to;^Min l;iiui:u1:n exaei. that have not been taken; to su.L;;^re'>t hope- lii.ii w r.•.: of wishing to realize; lo uri^e inciiiertly 1)\ um;,;, f.1 ' which we should not think ourselves ju-tMied;:i -.;i;> acts; in a word, to enj^ri'^e others witliMi;'. in4.i:;in_: '.1- consciously to en<(age ourselves in.nc d...ply than we:!.: mean: that would be,.)n tiie jxut.if eiilici ti:e o.-..-; private individuals, a line of < on.iu. t wlu^h -eeii;! prudent nor honourable.
"You can rely,.Sir, that so Ion, a^ I o^ m:;.;. -M^ y the President's confidence ha^ jila^ e.l m.-. th.- in-.c:- Republic shall incur no su. h repi.iai h; il will a-nur, that it will not be prepareil t.. c.iii v.lat: it \m11 1:1 ■.'<.<• that it is not resolved t.) keep: ami it will...iis:.l.; ^ point of honour to declare beforehand wh.a it i^ n t:< a.; execute promptly and with vii;our that win. h it h.i-> -^ ■:: 356 RECOLLECTIONS OF delivered in such arrogant and violent terms, seemed to announce that peace was not Austria's only object, but that she aimed rather at the independence of Piedmont and perhaps at her representative institu- tions; for so long as liberty shows itself in the smallest fraction of Italy, Austria feels ill at ease in all the rest.
I at once came to the conclusion that we must at no price allow so near a neighbour to be oppressed, deliver a territory which touched our frontiers to the Austrian armies, or permit political liberty to be abolished in the only country in which, since 1848, it had showed itself moderate. I thought, moreover, that Austria's mode of procedure towards us showed either an intention to deceive us or else a desire to try how far our toleration would go, or, as is com- monly said, to sound us.
I saw that this was one of those extreme circum- stances, which I had faced beforehand, where it became my duty to risk not only my portfolio (which, to tell the truth, was not risking much) but the fortunes of France. I proceeded to the Council and explained the state of affairs.
The President and all my colleagues were unani- mous in thinking that I ought to act. Orders were immediately telegraphed to concentrate the Army of Lyons at the foot of the Alps, and so soon as I returned home, I myself wrote (for the flaccid style of diplomacy was not suited to the circumstances) the following letter: ^ ^ Letter to M. de Boislecomte, 25 July 1849.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 357 *' Should the Austrian Government persist in the unreasonable demands mentioned in your telegram of yesterday, and, abandoning the limits of diplomatic discussion, throw up the armistice and undertake, as it says it will, to go and dictate peace at Turin, Pied- mont can be assured that we should not desert her. The situation would no longer be the same as that in which she placed itself before the battle of Novara, when she spontaneously resumed her arms and re- newed the war against our advice. This time it would be Austria which would herself take the initiative unprovoked; the nature of her demands and the violence of her proceedings would give us reason to believe that she is not acting solely with a view to peace, but that she is threatening the integrity of Piedmontese territory or, at the very least, the independence of the Sardinian Govern- ment.
" We will not allow such designs as these to be accomplished at our gates. If, under these condi- tions, Piedmont is attacked, we will defend her."
I moreover thought it my duty to send for the Austrian representative (a litde diplomatist very like a fox in appearance as well as in nature), and, convinced that, in the attitude we were taking up, hastiness was identical with prudence, I took advan- tage of the fact that I could not as yet be expected to have become familiar with habits of diplomatic reserve, to express to him our surprise and our dis- 358 RECOLLECTIONS OF satisfaction in terms so rude that he since admitted to me that he had never been so received in his Hfe.
Before the despatch of which I have quoted a few lines had reached Turin, the two Powers had come to an agreement. They had come to terms on the question of money, which was arranged practically on the conditions that had been pre- viously suggested by ourselves. The Austrian Government had only desired to precipitate the negociations by frightening the other side; it made very little difficulty about the conditions.
Prince Schwarzenberg sent me all sorts of ex- planations and excuses, and peace was definitely signed on the 6th of August, a peace hardly hoped for by Piedmont after so many mistakes and mis- fortunes, since it assured her more advantages than she had at first ventured to demand.
This affair threw into great relief the habits of English, and particularly of Palmerstonian, diplo- macy: the feature is worth quoting. Since the commencement of the negociation, the British Government had never ceased to show great animosity against Austria, and loudly to encourage the Piedmontese not to submit to the conditions which she sought to force upon them. My first care, after taking the resolutions I have described, was to communicate them to England, and to endeavour to persuade her to take up the same line of conduct I therefore sent a copy of my despatch to Drouyn ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 359 de Lhuys, who was then Ambassador in London, and instructed him to show it to Lord Palmerston, and to discover that minister's intentions. Drouyn de Lhuys repHed: ^ "While I was informing Lord Palmerston of your resolutions and of the instructions you had sent M. de Boislecomte, he listened with every sign of eager assent; but when I said, ' You see, my lord, how far we wish to go; can you tell me how far you will go yourself?' Lord Palmerston at once replied, ' The British Government, whose interest in this business is not equal to yours, will not lend the Piedmontese Government more than a diplomatic assistance and a moral support."
Is not this characteristic? England, protected against the revolutionary sickness of nations by the wisdom of her laws and the strength of her ancient customs, and against the anger of princes by her power and her isolation in the midst of us, is always pleased to play the part of the advocate of liberty and justice in the internal affairs of the Continent. She likes to censure and even to insult the strong, to justify and encourage the weak; but it seems that she does not care to go further than to assume virtuous airs and discuss honourable theories. Should her proUg^s come to need her, she offers her moral support.
1 Despatches of the 25th and 26th of June 1849- 360 RECOLLECTIONS OF I add, in order to finish the subject, that these tactics succeeded remarkably well. The Piedmon- tese remained convinced that England alone had de- fended them, and that we had very nearly abandoned them. She remained very popular in Turin, and France very much suspected. For nations are like men, they love still more that which flatters their passions than that which serves their interests.
Hardly had we emerged from this bad pass, before we fell into a worse one. We had witnessed with fear and regret what was happening in Hungary. The misfortunes of this unlucky people excited our sympathies. The intervention of the Russians, which for a time subordinated Austria to the Tsar, and caused the hand of the latter to be more and more active in the management of the general affairs of Europe, was not calculated to please us. But all these events happened beyond our reach, and we were helpless.
" I need not tell you," I wrote in the instructions I sent Lamoriciere, "with what keen and melancholy interest we follow events in Hungary. Unfortunately, for the present, we can only take a passive part in this question. The letter and spirit of the treaties open out to us no right of intervention. Besides, our distance from the seat of war must impose upon us, in the present state of our affairs and of those of Europe, a certain reserve. Since we are not able to speak or act to good purpose, it is due to our ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 361 dignity not to display, in respect to this question, any sterile excitement or impotent good-feeling. Our duty with regard to Hungarian events is to limit ourselves to carefully observing what happens and seeking to discover what is likely to take place," Overwhelmed by numbers, the Hungarians were either conquered or surrendering, and their principal leaders, as well as a certain number of Polish generals who had joined their cause, crossed the Danube at the end of August, and threw themselves into the arms of the Turks at Widdin. From there, the two principal ones, Dembinski and Kos- suth, wrote to our Ambassador in Constantinople.^ The habits and peculiarities of mind of these two men were betrayed in their letters. The soldier's was short and simple; the lawyer-orator's long and ornate. I remember one of his phrases, among others, in which he said, "As a good Christian, I have chosen the unspeakable sorrow of exile rather than the peacefulness of death." Both ended by asking for the protection of France.
While the oudaws were imploring our aid, the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors appeared before the Divan and asked that they might be given up. Austria based her demand upon the treaty of Bel- grade, which in no way established her right; and Russia hers upon the treaty of Kainardji (10 July 1774), of which the meaning, to say the least of it, 1 Letters of the 22nd and 24th of August 1849.
362 RECOLLECTIONS OF was very obscure. But at bottom they neither of them appealed to an international right, but to a better known and more practical right, that of the strongest. This was made clear by their acts and their language. The two embassies declared from the commencement that it was a question of peace or war. Without consenting to discuss the matter, they insisted upon a reply of yes or no, and declared that if this reply was in the negative, they would at once cease all diplomatic relations with Turkey.
To this exhibition of violence, the Turkish minis- ters replied, with gentleness, that Turkey was a neutral country; that the law of nations forbade them to hand over outlaws who had taken refuge on their territory; and that the Austrians and Russians had often quoted the same law against them when Mussulman rebels had sought an asylum in Hungary, Transylvania or Bessarabia. They modestly submitted that what was permitted on the left bank of the Danube seemed as though it should also be permitted on the right bank. They ended by protesting that what they were asked to do was opposed to their honour and their religion, that they would gladly undertake to keep the refugees under restraint and place them where they could do no mischief, but that they could never consent to deliver them to the executioner.
"The young Sultan," our ambassador wrote to me, *' replied yesterday to the Austrian Envoy that, while ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 363 denouncing what the Hungarian rebels had done, he could now only regard them as unhappy men seeking to escape death, and that humanity forbade him to surrender them. Rechid Pasha, on his part, the Grand Vizier," added our Minister, "said to me, * I shall be proud if I am driven from power for this;' and he added, with an air of deep con- cern, * In our religion, every man who asks for mercy is bound to obtain it.' " This was talking like civilized people and Chris- tians. The Ambassadors were content to reply like real Turks, saying that they must give up the fugi- tives or undergo the consequences of a rupture which would probably lead to war. The Mussulman population itself took fire; it approved of and sup- ported its Government; and the Mufti came to thank our Ambassador for the support he had given to the cause of humanity and good law.
From the commencement of the discussion, the Divan had addressed itself to the Ambassadors of France and England. It appealed to public opinion in the two great countries which they represented, asked their advice, and besought their help in the event of the Northern Powers executing their threats. The Ambassadors at once replied that in their opinion Austria and Russia were exceeding their rights; and they encouraged the Turkish Government in its resistance.
In the meanwhile, arrived at Constantinople an 364 RECOLLECTIONS OF aide-de-camp of the Tsar. He brought a letter which that Prince had taken the pains to write to the Sultan with his own hand, asking for the ex- tradition of the Poles who had served six months before in the Hungarian war against the Russian army. This step seems a very strange one when one does not see through the particular reasons which influenced the Tsar under the circumstance. The following extract from a letter of Lamoriciere's describes them with great sagacity, and shows to what extent public opinion is dreaded at that end of Europe, where one would think that it was neither an organ nor a power: " The Hungarian war, as you know," he wrote,^ " was embarked upon to sustain Austria, who is hated as a people and not respected as a govern- ment; and it was very unpopular. It brought in nothing, and cost eighty-four millions of francs. The Russians hoped to bring back Bem, Dembinski, j and the other Poles to Poland, as the price of the | sacrifices of the campaign. Especially in the army, there reigned a veritable fury against these men. The people and soldiers were mad with longing for this satisfaction of their somewhat barbaric national pride. The Emperor, in spite of his omnipotence, is obliged to attach great value to the spirit of the masses upon whom he leans, and who constitute his real force. It is not simply a ^ Despatches of the nth and 2Sth of October 1849.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 365 question of individual self-love: the national senti- ment of the country and the army is at stake."
These were, no doubt, the considerations which prompted the Tsar to take the dangerous step I have mentioned. Prince Radziwill presented his letter, but obtained nothing. He left forthwith, haughtily refusing a second audience, which was offered him to take his leave; and the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors officially declared that all diplomatic relations had ceased between their masters and the Divan.
The latter acted, in these critical circumstances, with a firmness and propriety of bearing which would have done honour to the most experienced cabinets of Europe. At the same time that the Sultan refused to comply with the demands, or rather the orders, of the two Emperors, he wrote to the Tsar to tell him that he would not discuss with him the question of right raised by the inter- pretation of the treaties, but that he appealed to his friendship and to his honour, begging him to take it in good part that the Turkish Govern- ment refused to take a measure which would ruin it in the eyes of the world. He offered, moreover, once more, himself to place the refugees in a position in which they should be harmless. Abdul Medjid sent one of the wisest and cleverest men in his Empire, Fuad Effendi, to take this letter to St Petersburg. A similar letter was written to 366 RECOLLECTIONS OF Vienna, but this was to be handed to the Emperor of Austria by the Turkish Envoy at that Court, thus very visibly marking the difference in the value attached to the consent of the two Sovereigns. This news reached me at the end of September. My first care was to communicate it to England. At the same time^ I wrote a private letter to our Ambassador, in which I said: " The conduct of England, who is more in- terested in this affair than we are, and less exposed in the conflict that may arise from it, must needs have a great influence upon our own. The English Cabinet must be asked clearly and categorically to state how far it is prepared to go. I have not forgotten the Piedmont affair. If they want us to assist them, they must dot their i's. It is possible that, in that case, we shall be found to be very deter- mined; otherwise, not. It is also very important that you should ascertain the opinions produced by these events upon the Tories of all shades; for with a government conducted on the parliamentary system, and consequently variable, the support of the party in power is not always a sufficient guarantee."
In spite of the gravity of the circumstances, the English ministers, who were at that moment dis- persed on account of the parliamentary holidays, took a long time before meeting; for in that ^ Private letter, i October 1849.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 367 country, the only country in the world where the aristocracy still carries on the government, the majority of the ministers are both great landed proprietors and, as a rule, great noblemen. They were at that time on their estates, recruiting from the fatigue and ennui of business; and they showed no undue hurry to return to Town. During this interval, all the English press, without distinction of party, took fire. It raged against the two Emperors, and inflamed public opinion in favour of Turkey. The British Government, thus stimu- lated, at once took up its position. This time it did not hesitate, for it was a question, as it said itself, not only of the Sultan, but of England's influence in the world. ^ It therefore decided, first, that representations should be made to Russia and Austrian; secondly, that the British Mediterranean Squadron should proceed to the Dardanelles, to give confidence to the Sultan and, if necessary, defend Constantinople. We were invited to do the same, and to act in common. The same evening, the order was despatched to the British Fleet to sail.
The news of these decisive resolutions threw me into great perplexity. I did not hesitate to think that we should approve the generous conduct of our Ambassador, and come to the aid of the Sultan; 2 but as to a warlike attitude, I did not 1 Private letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 2 October 1849.
2 Private letters to Lamorici^re and Beaumont, 5 and 9 October 368 RECOLLECTIONS OF believe that it would as yet be wise to adopt it. The English invited us to do as they did; but our position was very different from theirs. In defending Turkey, sword in hand, England risked her fleet; we, our very existence. The English Ministers could rely that, in that ex- tremity. Parliament and the nation would support them; whereas we were almost certain to be aban- doned by the Assembly, and even by the country, if things came so far as war. For our wretchedness and danger at home made people's minds at that moment insensible to all beside. I was convinced, moreover, that in this case threats, instead of serving to forward our designs, were calculated to frustrate them. If Russia, for it was really with her alone that we had to do, should chance to be disposed to open the question of the partition of the East by invading Turkey — a contingency that I found it difficult to believe in — the sending of our fleets would not prevent the crisis; and if it was really only a question (as was probably the case) of taking revenge upon the Poles, it would aggravate it, by making it difficult for the Tsar to retract, and causing his vanity to join forces with his resentment.
I went to the meeting of the Council with these reflections. I at once saw that the President was already decided and even pledged, as he himself declared to us. This resolve on his part had been in- spired by Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador, ALEXIS DE TOCqUEVILLE 369 an eighteenth-century diplomatist, who had worked himself into a strong position in Louis Napoleon's good graces...The majority of my colleagues thought as he did, that we should without hesitation adopt the line of joint action to which the English invited us, and like them send our fleet to the Dardanelles.
Failing in my endeavour to have a measure which I considered premature postponed, I asked that at least, before it was carried out, they should consult Falloux, whose state of health had compelled him to leave Paris for a time and go to the country. Lanjuinais went down to him for this purpose, re- ported the affair to him, and came back and reported to us that Falloux had without hesitation given his opinion in favour of the despatch of the fleet. The order was sent off at once. However, Falloux had acted without consulting the leaders of the majority or his friends, and even without due reflection as to the consequences of his action; he had yielded to a movement of impulse, as sometimes happened to him, for nature had made him frivolous and light-headed before education and habit had rendered him calculating to the pitch of duplicity. It is prob- able that, after his conversation with Lanjuinais, he received advice, or himself made certain reflec- tions, opposed to the opinion he had given. He therefore wrote me a very long and very involved letter, 1 in which he pretended to have misunder- 1 Letter from Falloux, 11 October 1849.
370 RECOLLECTIONS OF stood Lanjuinais (this was impossible, for Lanjuinais was the clearest and most lucid of men both in speech and action). He revoked his opinion and sought to evade his responsibility; and I replied at once with this note: ** My dear Colleague, " The Council has taken its resolution, and at this late hour there is nothing to be done but await events; moreover, in this matter the responsibility of the whole Council is the same. There is no individual responsibility. I was not in favour of the measure; but now that the measure is taken, I am prepared to defend it against all comers." ^ While giving a lesson to Falloux, I was none the less anxious and embarrassed as to the part I was called upon to play. I cared little for what would happen at Vienna; for in this business I credited Austria merely with the position of a satellite. But what would the Tsar do, who had involved himself so rashly and, apparently, so irrevocably in his relations towards the Sultan, and whose pride had been put to so severe a test by our threats? Fortunately I had two able agents at St. Peters- burg and Vienna, to whom I could explain myself without reserve.
" Take up the business very gently," I recom- ^ Letter to Falloux, 12 October 1849.
ALEXIS DE TOCqUEVILLE 37, mended them,^ " be careful not to set our adversaries' self-esteem against us, avoid too great and too osten- sible an intimacy with the English Ambassadors, verbose Government is detested by the Court at which you are, although nevertheless maintaining good relations with those ambassadors. In order to attain success, adopt a friendly tone, and do not try to frighten people. Show our position as it is; we do not want war; we detest it; we dread it; but we cannot act dishonourably. We cannot advise the Porte, when it comes to us for our opinion, to commit an act of cowardice; and should the courage which it has displayed, and which we have approved of, bring it into danger, we cannot, either, refuse it the assistance it asks of us. A way must therefore be found out of the difficulty. Is Kossuth's skin worth a general war? Is it to the interest of the Powers that the Eastern Question should be opened at this moment and in this fashion? Cannot a way be found by which everybody's honour will be saved? What do they want, after all? Do they only want to have a few poor devils handed over to them.? That is assuredly not worth so great a quarrel; but if it were a pretext, if at the bottom of this business lurked the desire, as a matter of fact, to lay hands upon the Ottoman Empire, then it would certainly be a general war that they wanted; for ultra-pacific though we are, we should 1 Private letters to Lamoriciere and Beaumont, 5 and 9 October 372 RECOLLECTIONS OF never allow Constantinople to fall without striking a blow."
The affair was happily over by the time these instructions reached St. Petersburg. Lamoriciere had conformed to them before he received them. He had acted in this circumstance with an amount of prudence and discretion which surprised those who did not know him, but which did not astonish me in the least. I knew that he was impetuous by temperament, but that his mind, formed in the school of Arabian diplomacy, the wisest of all diplomacies, was circumspect and acute to the pitch of artifice.
Lamoriciere, so soon as he had heard rumours of the quarrel direct from Russia, hastened to express, very vividly, though in an amicable tone, that he disapproved of what had happened at Con- stantinople; but he took care to make no official, and, above all, no threatening, representations. Although acting in concert with the British Minister, he carefully avoided compromising him- self with him in any joint steps; and when Fuad Effendi, bearing Abdul Medjid's letter, arrived, he let him know secretly that he would not go to see him, in order not to imperil the success of the negociation, but that Turkey could rely upon France.