ing up his life as an act of obedience, but on account of his obedience in maintaining holiness; for he held out so firmly in this obedience that he met death on account of it. It may, indeed be said, that the Fa- ther commanded him to die, when he enjoined that upon him on account of which he met death. It was in this sense, then, that "as the Father gave him the commandment, so he did, and the cup which He gave to him, he drank; and he was made obedient to the Father, even unto death; " and thus "he learned obe- dience from the things which he suffered," that is, how far obedience should be maintained. Now the word "didicit," which is used, can be understood in two ways. For either "didicit" is written for this: he caused others to learn; or it is used, because he did learn by experience what he had an understanding of before. Again, when the Apostle had said: "he humbled himself, being made obedient even unto death, and that the death of the cross," he added: "wherefore God also hath exalted him and given him a name, which is above every name." And this is similar to what David said: "he drank of the brook in the way, therefore did he lift up the head." For it is not meant that he could not have attained his ex- altation in any other way but by obedience unto death; nor is it meant that his exaltation was con- ferred on him, only as a reward of his obedience (for he himself said before he suffered, that all things had been committed to him by the Father, and that all things belonging to the Father were his); but the ex- pression is used because he had agreed with the Fa- ther and the Holy Spirit, that there was no other way to reveal to the world the height of his omnipotence, than by his death. For if a thing do not take place, CUR DEUS HOMO. 195 except on condition of something else, it is not im- properly said to occur by reason of that thing. For if we intend to do a thing, but mean to do something else first by means of which it may be done; when the first thing which we wish to do is done, if the re- sult is such as we intended, it is properly said to be on account of the other; since that is now done which caused the delay; for it had been determined that the first thing should not be done without the other. If, for instance, I propose to cross a river only in a boat, though I can cross it in a boat or on horseback, and suppose that I delay crossing because the boat is gone; but if afterwards I cross, when the boat has re- turned, it may be properly said of me: the boat was ready, and therefore he crossed. And we not only use this form of expression, when it is by means of a thing which we desire should take place first, but also when we intend to do something else, not by means of that thing, but only after it. For if one de- lays taking food because he has not to-day attended the celebration of mass; when that has been done which he wished to do first, it is not improper to say to him: now take food, for you have now done that for which you delayed taking food, f Far less, there- fore, is the language strange, when Christ is said to be exalted on this account, because he endured death; for it was through this, and after this, that he deter- mined to accomplish his exaltation.) This may be understood also in the same way as that passage in which it is said that our Lord increased in wisdom, and in favor with God; not that this was really the case, but that he deported himself as if it were so. / For he was exalted after his death, as if it were really on account of that. Moreover, that saying of his: "I I96 ANSELM.
came not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me," is precisely like that other saying: "My doctrine is not mine;" for what one does not have of himself, but of God, he ought not to call his own, but God's. Now no one has the truth which he teaches, or a holy will, of himself, but of God. Christ, therefore, came not to do his own will, but that of the; Father; for his holy will was not derived from his hu- manity, but from his divinity. f For that sentence: — "God spared not his own Son, but gave him up for rw us all," means nothing more than that he did not z** rescue him. } For there are found in the Bible many -\^n things like this. Again, when he says: "Father, if ^-£ it be passible, let this cup pass from me; neverthe- — ^ less not as I will, but as thou wilt; " and "If this cup cy p may not pass from me, except I drink it, thy will be ^^ «e done; " he signifies by his own will the natural desire ^^~re of safety, in accordance with which human nature^^~e shrank from the anguish of death. But he speaks o3 ^=rf the will of the Father, not because the Father pre — ^- ferred the death of the Son to his life;j but because^^ e the Father was not willing to rescue the human race,«_ ->f unless man were to do even as great a thing as was signified in the death of Christ. \ Since reason did not demand of another what he could not do, therefore^— ^ the Son says that he desires his own death. For he^ preferred to suffer, rather than that the human race^ should be lost; as if he were to say to the Father =^ "Since thou dost not desire the reconciliation of the^ world to take place in any other way, in this respect^ I see that thou desirest my death; let thy will, there- fore, be done, that is, let my death take place, so that the world may be reconciled to thee." For we often say that one desires a thing, because he does not CUR DEUS HOMO. 197 choose something else, the choice of which would pre- clude the existence of that which he is said to desire; for instance, when we say that he who does not choose to close the window through which the draft is ad- mitted which puts out the light, wishes the light to be extinguished. £ So the Father desired the death of the Son, because he was not willing that the world should be saved in any other way, except by man's doing so great a thing as that which I have men- tioned/] And this, since none other could accomplish it, availed as much with the Son, who so earnestly desired the salvation of man, as if the Father had commanded him to die; and, therefore, "as the Fa- ther gave him commandment, so he did, and the cup which the Father gave to him he drank, being obedi- ent even unto death."
CHAPTER X.
Likewise on the same topics; and how otherwise they can be cor- rectly explained.
It is also a fair interpretation that it was by that same holy will by which the son wished to die for the salvation of the world, that the Father gave him com- mandment (yet not by compulsion), and the cup of suffering, and spared him not, but gave him up for us and desired his death; and that the Son himself was obedient even unto death, and learned obedience from the things which he suffered. For as with re- gard to that will which led him to a holy life, he did not have it as a human being of himself, but of the Father; so also that will by which he desired to die for the accomplishment of so great good, he could not have had but from the Father of lights, from I98 ANSELM.
whom is every good and perfect gift. And as the Father is said to draw by imparting an inclination, so there is nothing improper in asserting that he moves man. For as the Son says of the Father: " No man cometh to me except the Father draw him," he might as well have said, except he move him. In like manner, also, could he have declared: l ' No man lay- eth down his life for my sake, except the Father move or draw him." fjFor since a man is drawn or moved by his will to that which he invariably chooses, it is not improper to say that God draws or moves him when he gives him this will3 And in this drawing or impelling it is not to be understood that there is any constraint, but a free and grateful clinging to the holy will which has been given. If then it cannot be de- nied that the Father drew or moved the Son to death by giving him that will; who does not see that, in the same manner, he gave him commandment to endure death of his own accord and to take the cup, which he freely drank. And if it is right to say that the Son spared not himself, but gave himself for us of his own will, who will deny that it is right to say that the Father, of whom he had this will, did not spare him but gave him up for us, and desired his death? In this way, also, by following the will received from the Father invariably, and of his own accord, the Son be- came obedient to Him, even unto death; and learned obedience from the things which he suffered; that is, he learned how great was the work to be accomplished by obedience. For this is real and sincere obedience when a rational being, not of compulsion, but freely, follows the will received from God. \ In other ways, also, we can properly explain the Father's desire that the Son should die, though these would appear suffi- CUR DEUS HOMO. 199 cient. For as we say that he desires a thing who causes another to desire it; so, also, we say that he desires a thing who approves of the desire of another, though he does not cause that desire. Thus when we see a man who desires to endure pain with forti- tude for the accomplishment of. some good design; though we acknowledge that we wish to have him en- dure that pain, yet we do not choose, nor take pleas- / ure in, his suffering, but in his choice. We are, also, accustomed to say that he who can prevent a thing but does not, desires the thing which he does not pre- / vent. ^Since, therefore, the will of the Son pleased the Father, and he did not prevent him from choos- ing, or from fulfilling his choice, it is proper to say that he wished the Son to endure death so piously and for so great an object, though he was not pleased with his suffering/"} Moreover, he said that the cup must not pass from him, except he drank it, not be- cause he could not have escaped death had he chosen to; but because, as has been said, the world could not otherwise be saved; and it was his fixed choice to suffer death, rather than that the world should not be saved. It was for this reason, also, that he used those words, viz., to teach the human race that there was no other salvation for them but by his death; and not to show that he had no power at all to avoid death. For whatsoever things are said of him, similar to these which have been mentioned, they are all to be explained in accordance with the belief that he died, not by compulsion, but of free choice. For he was omnipotent, and it is said of him, when he was offered up, that he desired it. And he says himself: "I lay down my life that I may take it again; no man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself; I have power * 200 ANSELM.
to lay it down, and I have power to take it again.' 9 A man cannot, therefore, be properly said to have been driven to a thing which he does of his own power and will..
Boso. But this simple fact, that God allows him to be so treated, even if he were willing, does not seem becoming for such a Father in respect to such a Son.
Anselm. Yes, it is of all things most proper that such a Father should acquiesce with such a Son in his desire, if it be praiseworthy as relates to the honor of God, and useful for man's salvation, which would not otherwise be effected.
Boso. The question which still troubles us is, how the death of the Son can be proved reasonable and necessary. For otherwise, it does not seem that the Son ought to desire it, or the Father compel or permit it./ For the question is, why God could not save man in some other way, and if so, why he wished to do it in this way?j For it both seems unbecoming for God to have saved man in this way; and it is not clear how the death of the Son avails for the salvation of man. For it is a strange thing if God so delights in, or requires, the blood of the innocent, that he neither chooses, nor is able, to spare the guilty without the sacrifice of the innocent.
Anselm. Since, in this inquiry, you take the place of those who are unwilling to believe anything not previously proved by reason, I wish to have it under- stood between us that we do not admit anything in_ the least unbecoming to be ascribed to the Deity, ancM! that we do not reject the smallest reason if it be no ^ opposed by a greater. For as it is impossible to afc» tribute anything in the least unbecoming to God; s^s CUR DEUS HOMO. 201 any reason, however small, if not overbalanced by a greater, has the force of necessity.
Boso. In this matter, I accept nothing more will- ingly than that this agreement should be preserved between us in common.
Anselm. The question concerns only the incarna- tion of God, and those things which we believe with regard to his taking human nature.
Boso. It is so.
Anselm. Let us suppose, then, that the incarnation of God, and the things that we affirm of him as man, had never taken place; and be it agreed between us that man was made for happiness, which cannot be attained in this life, and that no being can ever arrive at happiness, save by freedom from sin, and that no man passes this life without sin. Let us take for granted, also, the other things, the belief of which is necessary for eternal salvation.
Boso. I grant it; for in these there is nothing which seems unbecoming or impossible for God.
Anselm. Therefore, in order that man may attain happiness, remission of sin is necessary.
Boso. We all hold this.
CHAPTER XI. What it is to sin, and to make satisfaction for sin.
Anselm. We must needs inquire, therefore, in what manner God puts away men's sins; and, in order to do this more plainly, let us first consider what it is to sin, and what it is to make satisfaction for sin. Boso. It is yours to explain and mine to listen. Anselm. If man or angel always rendered to God A is due, he would never sin.
* 202 ANSELM.
Boso. \ cannot deny that.
Anselm. Therefore to sin is nothing else than not to render to God his due.
Boso. What is the debt which we owe to God?
Anselm. Every wish of a rational creature should be subject to the will of God.
Boso. Nothing is more true.
Anselm. This is the debt which man and angel owe to God, and no one who pays this debt commits sin; but every one who does not pay it sins. This is jus- tice, or uprightness of will, which makes a being just or upright in heart, that is, in wiftj; and this is the sole and complete debt of honor which we owe to God, and which God requires of us. For it is such a will only, when it can be exercised, that does works pleasing to God; and when this will cannot be exer- cised, it is pleasing of itself alone, since without it no work is acceptable. He who does not render this honor which is due to God, robs God of his own and dishonors him; and this is sin. Moreover, so long as he does not restore what he has taken away, he re- mains in fault; and it will not suffice merely to re- store what has been taken away, but, considering the contempt offered, he ought to restore more than he took away. For as one who imperils another's safety does not enough by merely restoring his safety, with- out making some compensation for the anguish in- curred ' 9i so he who violates another's honor does not enough by merely rendering honor again, but must, according to the extent of the injury done, make res- toration in some way satisfactory to the person whom he has dishonored. We must also observe that when any one pays what he has unjustly taken away, he ought to give something which could not have been t CUR DEUS HOMO. 203 demanded of him, had he not stolen what belonged to another. f So then, every one who sins ought to pay back the honor of which he has robbed God; and this is the satisfaction which every sinner owes to God. ■ Boso. Since we have determined to follow reason in all these things, I am unable to bring any objection against them, although you somewhat startle me.
CHAPTER XII.
Whether it were proper for God to put away sins by compassion alone, without any payment of debt.
Anselm. Let us return and consider whether it were proper for God to put away sins by compassion alone, without any payment of the honor taken from, him.
Boso, I do not see why it is not proper.
Anselm. To remit sin in this manner is nothing else than not to punish; and since it is not right to cancel sin without compensation or punishment; if it be not punished, then is it passed by undischarged.
Boso. What you say is reasonable.
Anselm. It is not fitting for God to pass over any- thing in his kingdom undischarged.
Boso. If I wish to oppose this, I fear to sin.
Anselm. It is, therefore, not proper for God thus to pass over sin unpunished.
Boso. Thus it follows.
Anselm. There is also another thing which follows if sin be passed by unpunished, viz., that with God there will be no difference between the guilty and the not guilty; and this is unbecoming to God.
Boso. I cannot deny it.
204 ANSELM.
Anselm. Observe this also. Every one knows that justice to man is regulated by law, so that, according to the requirements of law, the measure of award is bestowed by God.
Boso. This is our belief.
Anselm. But if sin is neither paid for nor punished, it is subject to no law.
Boso. I cannot conceive it to be otherwise.
Anselm. Injustice, therefore, if it is cancelled by compassion alone, is more free than justice, which seems very inconsistent. And to these is also added a further incongruity, viz., that it makes injustice like God. For as God is subject to no law, so neither is injustice.
Boso. I cannot withstand your reasoning. But when God commands us in every case to forgive those who trespass against us, it seems inconsistent to en- join a thing upon us which it is not proper for him to do himself. *» Anselm. There is no inconsistency in God's com- manding us not to take upon ourselves what belongs to Him alone. For to execute vengeance belongs to none but Him who is Lord of all; for when the powers of the world rightly accomplish this end, God himself does it who appointed them for the purpose.
Boso. You have obviated the difficulty which I thought to exist; but there is another to which I would like to have your answer. For since God is so free as to be subject to no law, and to the judgment of no one, and is so merciful as that nothing more merciful can be conceived; and nothing is right or fit save as he wills; it seems a strange thing for us to say that he is wholly unwilling or unable to put away an injury done to himself, when we are wont to apply V CUR DEUS HOMO. 205 to him for indulgence with regard to those offences which we commit against others.
Anselm. What you say of God's liberty and choice and compassion is true; but we ought so to interpret / these things as that they may not seem to interfere with His dignity. For there is no liberty except as regards what is best or fitting; nor should that be called mercy which does anything improper for the Divine character.rMoreover, when it is said that what God wishes is just, and that what He does not wish is unjust, we must not understand that if God wished x anything improper it would be just, simply because \ he wished it. 7 For if God wishes to lie, we must not conclude that it is right to lie, but rather that he is not God. For no will can ever wish to lie, unless truth in it is impaired, nay, unless the will itself be impaired by forsaking truth. When, then, it is said: "If God wishes to lie," the meaning is simply this: ''If the nature of God is such as that he wishes to lie; " and, therefore, it does not follow that falsehood is right, except it be understood in the same manner as when we speak of two impossible things: "If this be true, then that follows; because neither this nor that is true;" as if a man should say: "Supposing water to be dry, and fire to be moist; " for neither is the case. Therefore, with regard to these things, to speak the whole truth: If God desires a thing, it is right that he should desire that which involves no unfitness. For if God chooses that it should rain, it is right that it should rain; and if he desires that any man should die, then is it right that he should die. 1 Wherefore, if it be not fitting for God to do anything unjustly, or out of course, it does not belong to his liberty or compassion or will to let the sinner go un- 206 ANSELM.
punished, who makes no return to God of what the sinner has defrauded him.^ Boso. You remove from me every possible objec- tion which I had thought of bringing against you.
Anselm. Yet observe why it is not fitting for God to do this.
Boso. I listen readily to whatever you say.
CHAPTER XIII.
How nothing less was to be endured, in the order of things, than that the creature should take away the honor due the Creator and not restore what he takes away.
Anselm. In the order of things, there is nothing less to be endured than that the creature should take away the honor due the Creator, and not restore what he has taken away.
Boso. Nothing is more plain than this.
Anselm. But there is no greater injustice suffered than that by which so great an evil must be endured.
Boso. This, also, is plain.
Anselm. I think, therefore, that you will not say that God ought to endure a thing than which no greater injustice is suffered, viz., that the creature should not restore to God what he has taken away.
Boso. No; I think it should be wholly denied.
Anselm. Again, if there is nothing greater or better than God, there is nothing more just than supreme justice, which maintains God's honor in the arrange- ment of things, and which is nothing else but God himself.
Boso. There is nothing clearer than this.
Anselm. Therefore God maintains nothing with more justice than the honor of his own dignity.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 207 Boso. I must agree with you.
Anselm. Does it seem to you that he wholly pre- serves it, if he allows himself to be so defrauded of it as that he should neither receive satisfaction nor punish the one defrauding him.
Boso. I dare not say so.
Anselm. Therefore the honor taken away must be repaid, or punishment must follow; otherwise, either God will not be just to himself, or he will be weak in respect to both parties; and this it is impious even to think of.
Boso. I think that nothing more reasonable can be said.
CHAPTER XIV.
How the honor of God exists in the punishment of the wicked.
Boso. But I wish to hear from you whether the punishment of the sinner is an honor to God, or how it is an honor. For if the punishment of the sinner is not for God's honor when the sinner does not pay what he took away, but is punished, God loses his honor so that he cannot recover it. And this seems in contradiction to the things which have been said.
Anselm. It is impossible for God to lose his honor; J for either the sinner pays his debt of his own accord, 1 or, if he refuse, God takes it from him. For either » man renders due submission to God of his own will, by avoiding sin or making payment, or else God sub- jects him to himself by torments, even against man's will, and thus shows that he is the Lord of man, though man refuses to acknowledge it of his own ac- cord. And here we must observe that as man in sin- ning takes away what belongs to God, so God in pun- ishing gets in return what pertains to man. For not 208 ANSELM.
only does that belong to a man which he has in pres- ent possession, but also that which it is in his power to have. Therefore, since man was so made as to be able to attain happiness by avoiding sin; if, on ac- count of his sin, he is deprived of happiness and every good, he repays from his own inheritance what he has stolen, though he repay it against his will. For although God does not apply what he takes away to any object of his own, as man transfers the money which he has taken from another to his own use; yet what he takes away serves the purpose of his own honor, for this very reason, that it is taken away. For by this act he shows that the sinner and all that per- tains to him are under his subjection.
CHAPTER XV.
Whether God suffers his honor to be violated even in the least de- gree.
Boso. What you say satisfies me. But there is still another point which I should like to have you answer. For if, as you make out, God ought to sustain his own honor, why does he allow it to be violated even in the least degree? For what is in any way made liable to injury is not entirely and perfectly preserved.
Anselm. Nothing can be added to or taken from the honor of God. For this honor which belongs to him is in no way subject to injury or change. But as the individual creature preserves, naturally or by reason, the condition belonging, and, as it were, allotted to him, he is said to obey and honor God; and to this, rational nature, which possesses intelli- gence, is especially bound. And when the being chooses what he ought, he honors God; not by be- CUR DEUS HOMO. 20g stowing anything upon him, but because he brings himself freely under God's will and disposal, and maintains his own condition in the universe, and the beauty of the universe itself, as far as in him lies. But when he does not choose what he ought, he dis- honors God, as far as the being himself is concerned, because he does not submit himself freely to God's disposal. And he disturbs the order and beauty of the universe, as relates to himself, although he can- not injure nor tarnish the power and majesty of God. For if those things which are held together in the cir- cuit of the heavens desire to be elsewhere than under the heavens, or to be further removed from the heav- ens, there is no place where they can be but under the heavens, nor can they fly from the heavens with- out also approaching them. For both whence and whither and in what way they go, they are still under the heavens; and if they are at a greater distance from one part of them, they are only so much nearer^ to the opposite part. /And so, though man or evil angel refuse to submit to the Divine will and appoint- ment, yet he cannot escape it; for if he wishes to fly from a will that commands, he falls into the power of a will that punishes. And if you ask whither he goes, it is only under the permission of that will; and even this wayward choice or action of his becomes subser- vient, under infinite wisdom, to the order and beauty of the universe before spoken of. For when it is understood that God brings good out of many forms of evil, then the satisfaction for sin freely given, or if this be not given, the exaction of punishment, hold their own place and orderly beauty in the same uni- verse. For if Divine wisdom were not to insist upon these things, when wickedness tries to disturb the i 2IO ANSELM.
right appointment, there would be, in the very uni- verse which God ought to control, an unseemliness springing from the violation of the beauty of arrange- ment, and God would appear to be deficient in his management. And these two things are not only un- fitting, but consequently impossible;/so that satisfac- tion or punishment must needs follow every sin! ^ Boso. You have relieved my objection.
Anselm. It is then plain that no one can honor or dishonor God, as he is in himself; but the creature, as far as he is concerned, appears to do this when he submits or opposes his will to the will of God.
Boso. I know of nothing which can be said against this.
Anselm. Let me add something to it.
Boso. Go on, until I am weary of listening.
CHAPTER XVI.
The reason why the number of angels who fell must be made up from men.
Anselm. It was proper that God should design to make up for the number of angels that fell, from hu- man nature which he created without sin.
Boso. This is a part of our belief, but still I should like to have some reason for it.
Anselm. You mistake me, for we intended to dis- cuss only the incarnation of the Deity, and here you are bringing in other questions.
Boso. Be not angry with me; "for the Lord loveth a cheerful giver; " and no one shows better how cheer- fully he gives what he promises, than he who gives more than he promises; therefore, tell me freely what I ask.
Anselm. There is no question that intelligent na-