Anseltn. This is in the case of man, who often does not know what is useful for him, or cannot make up his loss; but God is in want of nothing, and, should all things perish, can restore them as easily as he created them.
Boso. I must confess that I ought not to oppose the will of God even to preserve the whole creation.
Anseltn. What if there were more worlds as full of beings as this?
Boso. Were they increased to an infinite extent, and held before me in like manner, my reply would be the same.
Anseltn. You cannot answer more correctly, but consider, also, should it happen that you gave the look contrary to God's will, what payment you can make for this sin?
Boso. I can only repeat what I said before.
Anseltn. So heinous is our sin whenever we know- ingly oppose the will of God even in the slightest 23O ANSELM.
Ij thing; since we are always in his sight, and he always enjoins it upon us not to sin.
Boso. I cannot deny it.
Anselm. Therefore you make no satisfaction unless you restore something greater than the amount of that obligation, which should restrain you from com- mitting the sin.
Boso. Reason seems to demand this, and to make the contrary wholly impossible.
Anselm. Even God cannot raise to happiness any being bound at all by the debt of sin, because He ought not to.
Boso. This decision is most weighty.
Anselm. Listen to an additional reason which makes it no less difficult for man to be reconciled to God.
Boso. This alone would drive me to despair, were it not for the consolation of faith.
Anselm. But listen.
Boso. Say on.
CHAPTER XXII.
What contempt man brought upon God, when he allowed himself to be conquered by the devil; for which he can make no satis- faction.
Anselm. Man being made holy was placed in para- dise, as it were in the place of God, between God and the devil, to conquer the devil by not yielding to his temptation, and so to vindicate the honor of God and put the devil to shame, because that man, though weaker and dwelling upon earth, should not sin though tempted by the devil, while the devil, though stronger and in heaven, sinned without any to tempt him. And when man could have easily effected this, he, without CUR DEUS HOMO. 231 compulsion and of his own accord, allowed himself to be brought over to the will of the devil, contrary to the will and honor of God.
Boso. To what would you bring me?.
Anselm. Decide for yourself if it be not contrary to the honor of God for man to be reconciled to Him, with this calumnibus reproach still heaped upon God; unless man first shall have honored God by overcom- ing the devil, as he dishonored him in yielding to the devil. Now the victory ought to be of this kind, that, as in strength and immortal vigor, he freely yielded to the devil to sin, and on this account justly incurred the penalty of death; so, in his weakness and mor- tality, which he had brought upon himself, he should conquer the devil by the pain of death, while wholly avoiding sin. But this cannot be done, so long as from the deadly effect of the first transgression, man is conceived and born in sin.
Boso. Again I say that the thing is impossible, and reason approves what you say.
Anselm. Let me mention one thing more, without which man's reconciliation cannot be justly effected, and the impossibility is the same.
Boso. You have already presented so many obliga- tions which we ought to fulfil, that nothing which you can add will alarm me more.
Anselm. Yet listen.
Boso. I will.
CHAPTER XXIII.
What man took from God by his sin, which he has no power to repay.
Anselm. What did man take from God, when he allowed himself to be overcome by the devil?
232 ANSELM.
Boso. Go on to mention, as you have begun, the evil things which can be added to those already shown for I am ignorant of them.
Anselm. Did not man take from God whatever He had purposed to do for human nature?
Boso. There is no denying that.
Anselm. Listen to the voice of strict justice; and judge according to that whether man makes to God a real satisfaction for his sin, unless, by overcoming the devil, man restore to God what he took from God in allowing himself to be conquered by the devil/ so that, as by this conquest over man the devil took what belonged to God, and God was the loser, so in man's victory the devil may be despoiled, and God recover his right. ) Boso. Surely nothing can be more exactly or justly conceived.
Anselm. Think you that supreme justice can vio- late this justice?
Boso. I dare not think it.
Anselm. Therefore man cannot and ought not by any means to receive from God what God designed to give him, unless he return to God everything which he took from him; so that, as by man G6d suffered loss, by man, also, He might recover His loss. But this cannot be effected except in this way: that, as in the fall of man all human nature was corrupted, and, as it were, tainted with sin, and God will not choose one of such a race to fill up the number in his heav- enly kingdom; so, by man's victory, as many men may be justified from sin as are needed to complete the number which man was made to fill. But a sinful man can by no means do this, for a sinner cannot jus- tify a sinner.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 233 Boso. There is nothing more just or necessary; but, from all these things, the compassion of God and the hope of man seems to fail, as far as regards that happiness for which man was made.
Anselm. Yet wait a little.
Boso. Have you anything further?
CHAPTER XXIV.
How, as long as man does not restore what he owes God, he can- not be happy, nor is he excused by want of power.
Anselm. If a man is called unjust who does not pay his fellow-man a debt, much more is he unjust -who does not restore what he owes God.
Boso, If he can pay and yet does not, he is cer- tainly unjust. But if he be not able, wherein is he unjust?
Anselm. Indeed, if the origin of his inability were not in himself, there might be some excuse for him. But if in this very impotence lies the fault, as it does not lessen the sin, neither does it excuse him from paying what is due. Suppose one should assign his slave a certain piece of work, and should command him not to throw himself into a ditch, which he points out to him and from which he could not extricate himself; and suppose that the slave, despising his master's command and warning, throws himself into the ditch before pointed out, so as to be utterly un- able to accomplish the work assigned; think you that his inability will at all excuse him for not doing his appointed work?
Boso. By no means, but will rather increase his crime, since he brought his inability upon himself. For doubly hath he sinned, in not doing what he was 234 ANSELM.
commanded to do and in doing what he was fore- warned not to do.
Anselm. Just so inexcusable is man, who has vol- untarily brought upon himself a debt Which he cannot pay, and by his own fault disabled himself, so that he can neither escape his previous obligation not to sin, nor pay the debt which he has incurred by sin. For his very inability is guilt, because he ought not to have it; nay, he ought to be free from it; for as it is a crime not to have what he ought, it is also a crime to have what he ought not. Therefore, as it is a crime in man not to have that power which he received to avoid sin, it is also a crime to have that inability by which he can neither do right and avoid sin, nor re- store the debt which he owes on account of his sin. For it is by his own free action that he loses that power, and falls into this inability. For not to have the power which one ought to have, is the same thing as to have the inability which one ought not to have. Therefore man's inability to restore what he owes to God, an inability brought upon himself for that very purpose, does not excuse man from paying; for the result of sin cannot excuse the sin itself.
Boso. This argument is exceedingly weighty, and must be true.
Anselm, Man, then, is unjust in not paying what he owes to God.
Boso. This is very true; for he is unjust, both in not paying, and in not being able to pay.
Anselm. But no unjust person shall be admitted to happiness; for as that happiness is complete in which there is nothing wanting, so it can belong to no one who is not so pure as to have no injustice found in him.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 235 Boso. I dare not think otherwise.
C Anselm. He, then, who does not pay God what he\ owes can never be happy.
Boso. I cannot deny that this is so.
Anselm. But if you choose to say that a merciful God remits to the suppliant his debt, because he can- not pay; God must be said to dispense with one of two things, viz., either this which man ought volun- tarily to render but cannot, that is, an equivalent for his sin, a thing which ought not to be given up even to save the whole universe besides God; or else this, which, as I have before said, God was about to take away from man by punishment, even against man's will, viz., happiness. But if God gives up what man ought freely to render, for the reason that man cannot; repay it, what is this but saying that God gives up what he is unable to obtain? But it is mockery to ascribe such compassion to God. But if God gives up what he was about to take from unwilling man, because man is unable to restore what he ought to restore freely, He abates the punishment and makes man happy on account of his sin, because he has what he ought not to have. For he ought not to have this inability, and therefore as long as he has it without • atonement it is his sin. ( And truly such compassion on the part of God is wholly contrary to the Divine justice, which allows nothing but punishment as the recompense of sin. * Therefore, as God cannot be in- consistent with himself, his compassion cannot be of this nature.
Boso. I think, then, we must look for another mercy than this.
Anselm. But suppose it were true that God par- 236 ANSELM.
dons the man who does not pay his debt because he cannot.
Boso. I could wish it were so.
Anselm. But while man does not make payment, he either wishes to restore, or else he does not wish to- Now, if he wishes to do what he cannot, he will be needy, and if he does not wish to, he will be un- just.
Boso. Nothing can be plainer.
Arts elm. But whether needy or unjust, he will not be happy.
Boso. This also is plain.
Anselm. So long, then, as he does not restore, he will not be happy.
Boso. If God follows the method of justice, there is no escape for the miserable wretch, and God's com- passion seems to fail.
Anselm. You have demanded an explanation; now hear it. 1 1 do not deny that God is merciful, who pre- serveth man and beast, according to the multitude of his mercies. But we are speaking of that exceeding pity by which he makes man happy after this life. And I think that I have amply proved, by the reasons given above, that happiness ought not to be bestowed upon any one whose sins have not been wholly put away; and that this remission ought not to take place, save by the payment of the debt incurred by sin, ac- cording to the extent of sin. And if you think that any objections can be brought against these proofs, you ought to mention them.
Boso. I see not how your reasons can be at all in- validated.
Anselm. Nor do I, if rightly understood. But even if one of the whole number be confirmed by impreg- CUR DEUS HOMO. 237 nable truth, that should be sufficient. For truth is equally secured against all doubt, if it be demonstrably proved by one argument as by many.
Boso. Surely this is so. But how, then, shall man be saved, if he neither pays what he owes, and ought not to be saved without paying? Or, with what face shall we declare that God, who is rich in mercy above human conception, cannot exercise this compassion?
Anselm. This is the question which you ought to ask of those in whose behalf you are speaking, who have no faith in the need of Christ for man's salva- tion, and you should also request them to tell how man can be saved without Christ. But, if they are utterly unable to do it, let them cease from mocking us, and let them hasten to unite themselves with us, who do not doubt that man can be saved through Christ; else let them despair of being saved at all. And if this terrifies them, let them believe in Christ as we do, that they may be saved.
Boso. Let me ask you, as I have begun, to show me how a man is saved by Christ.
CHAPTER XXV.
How man's salvation by Christ is necessarily possible.
Anselm. Is it not sufficiently proved that man can be saved by Christ, when even infidels do not deny that man can be happy somehow, and it has been sufficiently shown that, leaving Christ out of view, no salvation can be found for man? For, either by Christ or by some one else can man be saved, or else not at all. If, then, it is false that man cannot be saved at all, or that he can be saved in any other way, his sal- vation must necessarily be by Christ.
238 ANSELM.
Boso. But what reply will you make to a person who perceives that man cannot be saved in any other way, and yet, not understanding how he can be saved by Christ, sees fit to declare that there cannot be any salvation either by Christ or in any other way?
Anselm. What reply ought to be made to one who ascribes impossibility to a necessary truth, because he does not understand how it can be?
Boso. That he is a fool.
Anselm. Then what he says must be despised.
Boso. Very true; but we ought to show him in what way the thing is true which he holds to be im- possible.
Anselm. Do you not perceive, from what we have said above, that it is necessary for some men to attain to felicity? For, if it is unfitting for God to elevate man with any stain upon him, to that for which he made him free from all stain, lest it should seem that God had repented of his good intent, or was unable to accomplish his designs; far more is it impossible, on account of the same unfitness, that no man should be exalted to that state for which he was made. Therefore, a satisfaction such as we have above proved necessary for sin, must be found apart from the Christian faith, which no reason can show; or else we must accept the Christian doctrine. For what is clearly made out by absolute reasoning ought by no means to be questioned, even though the method of it be not understood.
Boso. What you say is true.
Anselm. Why, then, do you question further?• Boso. I come not for this purpose, to have you re- move doubts from my faith, but to have you show me the reason for my confidence..' Therefore, as you have CUR DEUS HOMO. 239 brought me thus far by your reasoning, so that I per- ceive that man as a sinner owes God for his sin what \ he is unable to pay, and cannot be saved without pay- i ing; I wish you would go further with me, and enable! me to understand, by force of reasoning, the fitness of j all those things which the Catholic faith enjoins upon I us with regard to Christ, if we hope to be saved; and how they avail for the salvation of man, and how God saves man by compassion; when he never remits his sin, unless man shall have rendered what was due on account of his sin. And, to make your reasoning the clearer, begin at the beginning, so as to rest it upon a strong foundation.
Anselm. Now God help me, for you do not spare me in the least, nor consider the weakness of my skill, when you enjoin so great a work upon me. Yet I will attempt it, as I have begun, not trusting in myself but in God, and will do what I can with his help. But let us separate the things which remain to be said from those which have been said, by a new introduc- tion, lest by their unbroken length, these things be- come tedious to one who wishes to read them.
BOOK SECOND.
CHAPTER I.
How man was made holy by God, so as to be happy in the enjoy- ment of God.
Anselm. It ought not to be disputed that rational nature was made holy by God, in order to be happy in enjoying Him. For to this end is it rational, in order to discern justice and injustice, good and evil, and between the greater and the lesser good. Other- 240 ANSELM.
wise it was made rational in vain. But God made it not rational in vain. Wherefore, doubtless, it was made rational for this end. In like manner is it proved that the intelligent creature received the power of discernment for this purpose, that he might hate and shun evil, and love and choose good, and especially the greater good. For else in vain would God have given him that power of discernment, since man's dis- cretion would be useless unless he loved and avoided according to it. But it does not befit God to give such power in vain. It is, therefore, established that rational nature was created for this end, viz., to love and choose the highest good supremely, for its own sake and nothing else; for if the highest good were chosen for any other reason, then something else and not itself would be the thing loved. But intelligent nature cannot fulfil this purpose without being holy. Therefore that it might not in vain be made rational, it was made, in order to fulfil this purpose, both ra- tional and holy. Now, if it was made holy in order to choose and love the highest good, then it was made such in order to follow sometimes what it loved and chose, or else it was not. But if it were not made holy for this end, that it might follow what it loves and chooses, then in vain was it made to love and choose holiness; and there can be no reason why it should be ever bound to follow holiness. Therefore, as long as it will be holy in loving and choosing the supreme good, for which it was made, it will be miser- able; because it will be impotent despite of its will, inasmuch as it does not have what it desires. But this is utterly absurd. Wherefore rational nature was made holy, in order to be happy in enjoying the su- preme good, which is God. Therefore CUR DEUS HOMO. 241 nature is rational, was made holy for this end, that he might be happy in enjoying God.
CHAPTER II.
How man would never have died, unless he had sinned.
Ansdm. Moreover, it is easily proved that man "was so made as not to be necessarily subject to death; for, as we have already said^it is inconsistent with God's wisdom and justice to compel man to suffer death without fault, when he made him holy to enjoy eternal blessedness. It therefore follows that had man never sinned he never would have died.
CHAPTER III. How man will rise with the same body which he has in this world.
Ansdm. From this the future resurrection of the dead is clearly proved. For if man is to be perfectly restored, the restoration should make him such as he would have been had he never sinned.
Boso. It must be so.
Ansdm. Therefore, as man, had he not sinned, was to have been transferred with the same body to an immortal state, so when he shall be restored, it must properly be with his own body as he lived in this world.
Boso. But what shall we say to one who tells us that this is right enough with regard to those in whom humanity shall be perfectly restored, but is not neces- sary as respects the reprobate?
Ansdm. We know of nothing more just or proper than this, that as man, had he continued in holiness, would have been perfectly happy for eternity, both in K 242 ANSELM.
body and in soul; so, if he persevere in wickedness, he shall be likewise completely miserable forever.
Boso. You have promptly satisfied me in these matters.
CHAPTER IV.
How God will complete, in respect to human nature, what he has begun.
Anseltn. From these things, we can easily see that God will either complete what he has begun with re- gard to human nature, or else he has made to no end so lofty a nature, capable of so great good. Now if it be understood that God has made nothing more val- uable than rational existence capable of enjoying him;^it is altogether foreign from his character to suppose that he will suffer that rational existence utterly to perish.3 Boso. No reasonable being can think otherwise.
Anscltn. Therefore is it necessary for him to per- fect in human nature what he has begun. But this, as we have already said, cannot be accomplished save by a complete expiation of sin, which no sinner can effect for himself.
Boso. I now understand it to be necessary for God to complete what he has begun, lest there be an un- seemly falling off from his design.
CHAPTER V.
How, although the thing may be necessary, God may not do it by a compulsory necessity; and what is the nature of that neces- sity which removes or lessens gratitude, and what necessity increases it.
Boso. But if it be so, then God seems as it were compelled, for the sake of avoiding what is unbecom- CUR DEUS HOMO. 243 ing, to secure the salvation of man. How, then, can it be denied that he does it more on his own account than on ours? But if it be so, what thanks do we owe him for what he does for himself? How shall we at- tribute our salvation to his grace, if he saves us from J* necegsiiy?.
Anselm. There is a necessity which takes away or lessens our gratitude to a benefactor, and there is also a necessity by which the favor deserves still greater thanks. For when one does a benefit from a neces- sity to which he is unwillingly subjected, less thanks are due him, or none at all. But when he freely places himself under the necessity of benefiting another, and sustains that necessity without reluctance, then he certainly deserves greater thanks for the favor. ' For this should not be called necessity but grace, inas- much as he undertook or maintains it, not with any constraint, but freely.! For if that which to-day youN promise of your own accord you will give to-morrow, / you do give to-morrow with the same willingness;/ though it be necessary for you, if possible, to redeem/ -\r * your promise, or make yourself a liar; notwithstand-j ing, the recipient of your favor is as much indebted for your precious gift as if you had not promised itj for you were not obliged to make yourself his debton before the time of giving it: just so is it when one] undertakes, by a vow, a design of holy living) For though after his vow he ought necessarily to perform, lest he suffer the judgment of an apostate, and, although he may be compelled to keep it even unwill- ingly, yet, if he keep his vow cheerfully, he is not less but more pleasing to God than if he had not vowed. For he has not only given up the life of the world, but also his personal liberty, for the sake of God; and 244 ANSELM.
he cannot be said to live a holy life of necessity, but with the same freedom with which he took the vow. Much more, therefore, do we owe all thanks to God for completing his intended favor to man; though, indeed, it would not be proper for him to fail in his good design, because wanting nothing in himself he begfin it for our sake and not his own. For what man • was about to do was not hidden from God at his crea- 1 tion; and yet by freely creating man, God as it were' bound himself to complete the good which he had be- }; gun. • In fine, God does nothing by necessity, since he is not compelled or restrained in anything. ) And when we say that God does anything to avoid dis- honor, which he certainly does not fear, we must mean that God does this from the necessity of maintaining his honor; which necessity is after all no more than\ this, viz., the immutability of his honor, which be-J longs to him in himself, and is not derived from an- other; and therefore it is not properly called neces- sity.- Yet we may say, although the whole work which God does for man is o f grac e, that i t is necessar y for God, on acco unt of his unchangeable goodness, to complete the work which he has begun Boso. I grant it.
f CHAPTER VI.
How no being, except the God-man, can make the atonement by which man is saved.
Anselm. But this cannot be effected, except the price paid to God for the sin of man be something greater than all the universe besides God.
Boso. So it appears. $ Anselm. Moreover, it is necessary that he who can CUR DEUS HOMO. 245 give God anything of his own which is more valuable than all things in the possession of God, must be greater than all else but God himself.
Boso. I cannot deny it.
Anseltn. Therefore none but God can make this t satisfaction.
Boso. So it appears.,, Anseltn. But none but a man ought to do this, p\7\f otherwise man does not make the satisfaction. — Boso. Nothing seems more just.
Anseltn. If it be necessary, therefore, as it appears, that the heavenly kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless the aforesaid satisfac- tion be made, which none but God can make and none but man ought to make, it is necessary for the God- man to make it.
Boso. Now blessed be God! we have made a great discovery with regard to our question. Go on, there- fore, as you have begun. For I hope that God will assist you.
Anseltn. Now must we inquire hoy God can be- come man.
CHAPTER VII.
How necessary it is for the same being to be perfect God and per- fect man.
Anseltn. The Divine and human natures cannot al tern ate, so that the Divine should become human or the human Divine; nor can they be so co mmi ngled as that a third should be produced from the two which is neither wholly Divine nor wholly human. For, granting that it were possible for either to be changed into the other, it would in that case be only God and not man, or man only and not God. Or, if they were J 246 ' ANSELM.
so commingled that a third nature sprung from the combination of the two (as from two animals, a male and a female of different species, a third is produced, which does not preserve entire the species of either parent, but has a mixed nature derived from both), it would neither be God nor man. Therefore the God- | man, whom we require to be of a nature both human ' and Divine, cannot be produced by a change from one into the other, nor by an imperfect commingling of both in a third; since these things cannot be, or, if they couM be, would avail nothing to our purpose. * Moreover, if these two complete natures are said to be joined somehow, in such a way that one may be Di- vine while the other is human, and yet that which is God not be the same with that which is man, it is im- possible for both to do the work necessary to be ac- complished. ( For God will not do it, because fee has no debt to pay; and man will not do it, because he cannot^ Therefore, in order that the God-man may perform this, it is necessary that the same be$ng should be perfect God and perfect man, in oTder to tnake this atonement. For he cannot and ought not to do p* it, unless he be very God aad very man. I Since, then, it is necessary that the God-man preserve the com- pleteness of each nature, it is no less necessary that, these two natures be united entire in one person, just! as a body and a reasonable soul exist together in every human being; for otherwise it is impossible that the.
same being should be very God and very man. / Boso. All that you say is satisfactory to me.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 247 CHAPTER VIII.
How it behoved God to take a man of the race of Adam, and born of a woman.
Anselm. It now remains to inquire whence and how God shall assume human nature. For he will either take it from Adam, or else he will make a new man, as he made Adam originally. But, if he makes a new man, not of Adam's race, then thds man will not belong to the human family, which descended from Adam, and therefore ought not to make atone- ment for it, because he never belonged to it.i For, as it is right for man to make atonement for the sin of man, it is also necessary that he who makes the atone- ment should be the very being who has sinned, or else one of the same race. Otherwise, neither Adam nor his race would make satisfaction for themselves. Therefore, as through Adam and Eve sin was propa- gated among all men, so none but themselves, or one born of them, ought to make atonement for the sin of men. And, since they cannot, one born of them must fulfil this work. Moreover, as Adam and his whole race, had he not sinned, would have stood firm with- out the support of any other being, so, after the fall, the same race must rise and be exalted by means of itself. For, whoever restores the race to its place, it will certainly stand by that being who has made this restoration. Also, when God created human nature in Adam alone, and would only make woman out of man, that by the union of both sexes there might be increase, in this he showed plainly that he wished to produce all that he intended with regard to human X 248 ANSELM.
X 248 ANSELM.
nature from man alone. Wherefore, if the race of Adam be reinstated by any being not of the same race, it will not be restored to that dignity which it would have had, had not Adam sinned, and so will not be completely restored; and, besides, God will seem to have failed of his purpose, both which sup- positions are incongruous. It is, therefore, necessary that the man by whom Adam's race shall be restored be taken from Adam.
Boso. If we follow reason, as we proposed to do, this is the necessary result.
Anseltn. Let us now examine the question, whether the human nature taken by God must be produced from a father and mother, as other men are, or from man alone, or from woman alone. For, in whichever of these three modes it be, it will be produced from Adam and Eve, for from these two is every person of either sex descended. And of these three modes, no one is easier for God than another, that it should be selected on this account.
Boso. So far, it is well.
Anseltn. It is no great toil to show that that maim will be brought into existence in a nobler and purer manner, if produced from man alone, or woman alone, than if springing from the union of both, as do all other men.
Boso. I agree with you.
Anseltn, Therefore must he be taken either from man alone, or woman alone.
Boso. There is no other source.