Things therefore relatively opposed are said to be, what they are, with reference to opposites, or in whatever manner, they are referrible to each other, 2. Contrary opposition. but those which are opposed as contraries, are by no means, said to be what they are, with reference to each other, but are said to be contrary to each other, for neither is "good" said to be the "good" of "evil," but the contrary of evil, nor is "white," denominated the "white "of "black," but its contrary, so that these oppositions differ from each other. Such contraries however, as are of that kind, that one of them must necessarily be in those things, in which it can naturally be, or of which it is predicated, these have nothing intermediate; but in the case of those, in which it is not necessary, that one should be inherent, there is something intermediate. For instance, health and disease may naturally subsist in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that one, should be therein, either disease, or health; the odd and even are also predicated of number, and one of the two, either the odd or the even, must necessarily be in number, yet there is nothing intermediate between these, neither between disease and health, nor between the odd and the even. Those contraries, again, have something intermediate, in which one of them need not be inherent, as black and white are naturally in body, but it is not necessary, that one of these, should be inherent in body, for every body, is not white or black. Vileness, also and worth, are predicated of man, and of many others, yet one of these, need not be in those things of which it is predicated, for not all things are either vile or worthy; at least, there is something intermediate, as between white and black, there is dark brown, and pale, and many other colours, but between vileness and worth, that, is intermediate, which is neither vile, nor worthy. In some instances, the intermediates have names, thus, the dark brown, and the pale, and such colours are media between white and black, but in other cases, it is not easy to assign a name to the intermediate, but the latter is defined, by the negation of either extreme, as, for example, whatever is neither good nor bad, nor just nor unjust.
3. Opposition of habit and privation. Privation, however, and habit are predicated of something identical, as sight and blindness of the eye, and universally, in whatever the habit is naturally adapted to be produced, of such is either predicated. We say then, that each of the things capable of receiving habit is deprived of it, when it is not in that, wherein it might naturally be, and when it is adapted naturally to possess it; thus we say that a man is toothless, not because he has no teeth, and blind, not because he has no sight, but because he has them not, when he might naturally have them, for some persons from their birth, have neither sight nor teeth, yet they are neither called toothless nor blind. 1. Distinction in the meaning of habitual and privative opposition. To be deprived of, and to possess habit, then, are not privation and habit, for the sight is habit, but the privation is blindness, but to possess sight is not sight, nor to be blind, blindness, for blindness is a certain privation, but the being blind is to be deprived, and is not privation, for if blindness were the same as being blind, both might be predicated of the same person, but a man is said to be blind, yet he is never called blindness. To be deprived also, and to possess habit, appear to be similarly opposed, as privation and habit, since the mode of opposition is the same, for as blindness is opposed to sight, so likewise is the being blind, opposed to the possession of sight.
4. Opposition of affirmative and negative. Neither is that, which falls under affirmation and negation, affirmation and negation; for affirmation is an affirmative sentence, and negation a negative sentence, but nothing which falls under affirmation and negation is a sentence (but a thing). Still these are said to be mutually opposed, as affirmation and negation, since in them the mode of opposition is the same, for as affirmation is sometimes opposed to negation, for example, "he sits" to "he does not sit," so that thing which is under each is opposed, as "sitting" to "not sitting."
5. Privation and habit not relatively opposed. But that privation and habit, are not opposed as relatives, is evident, since what a thing is, is not asserted of its opposite, for sight is not the sight of blindness, nor in any other way spoken in reference to it, so also blindness, cannot be called the blindness of sight, but blindness indeed is said to be the privation of sight, not the blindness of sight. Moreover, all relatives are referred to reciprocals, so that if blindness were relative, it would reciprocate with that to which it is referred, but it does not reciprocate, for sight is not said to be the sight of blindness.
From these things, also, it is manifest that those which are predicated, (2). Nor contrarily. according to privation and habit, are not contrarily opposed, for of contraries which have no intermediate, one must always necessarily be inherent, wherein it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or of which it is predicated, but between these, there is no intermediate thing wherein it was necessary that the one should be in what was capable of receiving it, as in the case, of disease and health, in odd and the even number. Of those however between which there is an intermediate, it is never necessary that one should be inherent in every thing; for neither is it necessary that every thing capable of receiving it, should be white or black, or hot or cold, since there is no prevention to an intermediate being between them. Again, of these also there was a certain medium, of which it was not requisite that one should be in its recipient, unless where one is naturally inherent, as in fire to be hot, and in snow to be white: still in these, one, must of necessity be definitely inherent, and not in whatever way it may happen, for neither does it happen that fire is cold, nor that snow is black. Wherefore it is not necessary that one of them should be in every thing capable of receiving it, but only in those wherein the one is naturally inherent, and in these, that which is definitely and not casually, one. In privation however, and habit, neither of the above-mentioned particulars is true, since it is not always necessary that one should be inherent in what is capable of receiving it, as what is not yet naturally adapted to have sight, 6. Nature of intermediates in respect to opposition. is neither said to be blind nor to have sight; wherefore these things will not be of such contraries as have nothing intermediate. But neither, on the other hand, will they be amongst those which have something intermediate, since it is necessary that at some time, one of them, should be inherent in every thing capable of receiving it: thus when a man is naturally fitted to have sight, then he will be said to be blind, or to have sight, and one of these, not definitely, but whichever may happen, since he need not necessarily be blind, nor see, but either, as it may happen. In respect nevertheless of contraries, which have an intermediate, it is by no means necessary that one, should be inherent in every thing, but in some things, and in these, one of them definitely, and neither casually, so that things which are opposed according to privation and habit, are evidently not in either of these ways opposed, as contraries.
Again, in contraries, when the recipient exists, a change into each other may happen, unless one is naturally inherent in something, as for instance, in fire to be hot. It is possible also for the healthy to be sick, the white to become black, cold to become hot, (and the hot to become cold); from good it is possible to become bad, and from bad good, for he who is depraved, being led to better pursuits and discourses, advances, though but a little, to be better, and if he once makes an advancement ever so little, he will evidently become either altogether changed, or have made a very great proficiency, since he ever becomes more disposed to virtue, even if he has obtained the smallest, increase, from the beginning. Wherefore he will probably acquire greater increase, and this perpetually occurring, he will at last be transformed entirely to a contrary habit, unless he be prevented by time; but in privation and habit, it is impossible for a mutual change to occur, since it may take place from habit to privation, but from privation to habit is impossible, as neither can he who has become blind, again see, the bald again have hair, nor has the toothless ever yet again got teeth.
7. The peculiarity of affirmative, and negative opposition, that one should be true and the other false. Whatever things are opposed, as affirmation and negation, are evidently opposed according to none of the above-mentioned modes, since in these alone it is always necessary that one should be true, but the other false: as neither, is it always necessary in contraries that one should be true, but the other false, nor in relatives, nor in habit and privation. For instance, health and disease, are contrary, yet neither of them is either true or false; so also the double and the half are relatively opposed, and neither of them is either true or false; nor in things which are predicated as to privation and habit, as sight and blindness. In short, nothing predicated without any conjunction, is either true or false, and all the above-named are predicated without conjunction. Not but that a thing of this kind may appear, to happen in contraries, which are predicated conjunctively, for "Socrates is well" is opposed to "Socrates is sick," yet neither in these is it always necessary, that one should be true and the other false, for while Socrates lives, one will be true and the other false, but when he is not alive, both will be false, since neither is it true that Socrates is sick, nor that he is well, when he is not in existence at all. In privation and habit, then when the subject is non-existent, neither is true, but when the subject exists, the one is not always true, nor the other false. "Socrates sees" is opposed to "Socrates is blind," as privation and habit, and whilst he exists, one need not be true or false, for when he is not naturally fitted to possess them, both are false, but when Socrates does not exist at all, both will thus be false, that he sees, and that he is blind. In affirmation and negation always, if Socrates be or be not, one will always be false and the other true; for it is evident with respect to these two, "Socrates is sick," and "Socrates is not sick," that when he exists one of them is true and the other false; and in like manner when he does not exist, for in the latter case that he is ill is false, but that he is not ill is true; so that in those things alone which are affirmatively and negatively opposed will it be the peculiarity that one of them is either true or false.
Chap. XI.—Opposites continued, especially as to the contrariety between the Evil and the Good.
1. Opposition of good and evil. "Evil" is of necessity opposed to good, and this is evident from an induction of singulars, as disease to health, and cowardice to courage, and similarly of the rest. But to evil, at one time, good, is contrary, and at another, evil, for to indigence being an evil, excess is contrary, which is also an evil; Rhet. b. i. c. 7, and Eth. b. ii. c. 2. in like manner, mediocrity, which is a good, is opposed to each of them. A man may perceive this in respect of a few instances, but in the majority the contrary to evil is always good.
2. Where one contrary exists it is not necessary that the other should exist—but sometimes one destroys the other. Again, of contraries it is not required, if one is, that the remainder should be; for when every man is well, there will indeed be health, and not disease, and so also when all things are white, there will be whiteness, but not blackness. Besides, if "Socrates is well" be the contrary of "Socrates is ill," and both cannot possibly be inherent in the same subject, it follows, that when one of the contraries exists, the other cannot possibly exist, for "Socrates is well" existing, "Socrates is ill" cannot exist.
3. Contraries generally inherent in similar genera or species. Contraries, however, evidently are, by their nature, adapted to subsist about the same thing, either in species or genus, since disease and health naturally subsist in the body of an animal, but whiteness and blackness simply in body, and justice and injustice in the soul of man.
Notwithstanding, it is requisite that all contraries be either 4. They must be either in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or be genera themselves. in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or be genera themselves; for white and black are in the same genus, as "colour" is the genus of them; but justice and injustice in contrary genera, for "virtue" is the genus of one, but "vice" of the other; lastly, "good" and "bad" are not in a genus, but are themselves the genera of certain things.
Chap. XII.—Of Priority. A thing is said to be prior to another in four respects: 1. Priority fourfold. 1st, In respect of time. first and most properly, in respect of time, according to which, one is said to be older and more ancient than another, since it is called older and more ancient, because the time is longer. Next, 2nd, When there is no reciprocity as to the consequence of existence. when it does not reciprocate, according to the consequence of existence: thus one is prior to two, for two existing, it follows directly that one exists; but when one is, it is not necessary that two should be, hence the consequence of the remainder's existence does not reciprocate from the existence of the one; but such a thing appears to be prior, from which the consequence of existence does not reciprocate.
3rd, In respect of order. Thirdly, the prior is that predicated according to a certain order, as in the instance of sciences and discourses, for in demonstrative sciences, the prior and the posterior, subsist in order, since the elements are prior in order, to the diagrams, and in grammar, letters are before syllables; so also of discourses, as the proem is prior, in order, to the narration.
4th, In excellence. Moreover, besides what we have mentioned, the better and more excellent appear to be prior by nature. The common people are accustomed to say, that those whom they chiefly honour and especially regard, are prior in their esteem; In the text, but this is nearly the most foreign of all the modes, wherefore such are (nearly) the modes of priority which have been enumerated.
2. Another mode of priority may be added, where one thing is the cause of another's existing. Besides the above-mentioned, there may yet appear to be another mode of the prior; as of things reciprocating, according to the consequence of existence, that which in any respect is the cause of the existence of the one, may justly be said to be by nature prior, and that there are, certain things of this kind, is manifest. For that man exists, reciprocates, according to the consequence of existence, with the true sentence respecting him, since if man is, the sentence is true, by which we say, that man is, and it reciprocates, since if the sentence be true, by which we say that man is, then man is. Notwithstanding, a true sentence, is by no means the cause of a thing's existence, but in some way, the thing appears the cause of the sentence being true, for in consequence of a thing existing, or not existing, is a sentence said to be true or false. Wherefore one thing may be called prior to another, according to five modes.
Chap. XIII.—Of things simultaneous. 1. Those things are simultaneous which at the same time are produced, and which reciprocate, but do not either cause the other's existence. Things are called simultaneous simply and most properly, whose generation occurs at the same time, for neither is prior or posterior; these, therefore, are said to be simultaneous as to time. But by nature those are simultaneous, which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence, although one, is by no means the cause of the existence of the other, as in the double and the half, for these reciprocate; thus the double existing, the half also exists, and the half existing, the double exists, but neither is the cause of existence to the other.
2. Or which as species of the same genus, are opposed in the same relation of division. Those, also, which being derived from the same genus, are by division mutually opposed, are said to be naturally simultaneous; but they, are said to have a division opposite to each other, which subsist according to the same division; thus the winged is opposed to pedestrian and aquatic, as these being derived from the same genus, are by division mutually opposed, for animal is divided into these, viz. into the winged, the pedestrian, and aquatic, and none of these is prior or posterior, but things of this kind appear naturally simultaneous. Each of these again, may be divided into species, for instance, the winged, the pedestrian, and the aquatic; wherefore, those will be naturally simultaneous which, derived from the same genus, subsist according to the same division. But genera are always prior to species, since they do not reciprocate according to the consequence of existence; for the aquatic existing, animal exists, but though animal exists, it is not necessary that the aquatic should.
Hence those are called naturally simultaneous, which indeed reciprocate, according to the consequence of existence; but the one is by no means the cause of existence to the other, which is also the case with things that, derived from the same genus, have by division a mutual opposition; those, however, are simply simultaneous whose generation is at the same time.
Chap. XIV.—Of Motion. 1. Motion of six kinds. Of motion, there are six species, generation, corruption, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.
The other motions then evidently differ from each other, for neither is generation, corruption, nor increase, diminution, nor alteration, change of place, and so of the rest. 2. Alteration questionably relative to the rest, this disproved. In the case of alteration however, there is some doubt, whether it be not sometimes necessary that what is altered, be so, in respect to some one, of the other motions, but this is not true, for it happens that we are altered, as to nearly all the passions, or at least the greater part of them, without any participation of the other motions, for it is not necessary that what is passively moved should be either increased or diminished. Wherefore, alteration will differ from the other motions, since if it were the same, 1st. By no increase or diminution necessarily occurring in what is altered. 2nd, By no change taking place in quality. it would be necessary that what is altered, be forthwith increased or diminished, or follow some of the other motions, but this is not necessary. Similarly, also, what is increased or moved with any other motion, ought to be altered (in quality); but some things are increased which are not so altered, as a square is increased when a gnomon is placed about it, but it has not become altered (in quality); and in like manner with other things of this kind, so that these motions will differ from each other.
3. Generic and specific contrariety to motion. Nevertheless simply, rest is contrary to motion, the several rests to the several motions, corruption to generation, diminution to increase, rest in place to change in place; but change to a contrary place seems especially opposed, as ascent to descent, downwards to upwards. Still it is not easy, to define the contrary to the remainder of these specified motions, but it seems to have no contrary, unless some one should oppose to this, rest according to quality, or change of quality into its contrary, just as in change of place, rest according to place, or change to a contrary place. For alteration is the mutation of quality, so that to motion according to quality, will rest according to quality, or change to the contrary of the quality, be opposed; thus becoming white is opposed to becoming black, since a change in quality occurs, there being an alteration of quality into contraries.
Chap. XV.—Of the verb "to Have." 1. Having predicated in many ways. 1. Quality. To have, is predicated in many modes; either as habit and disposition or some other quality, for we are said to have knowledge and virtue; 2. Quantity. or as to quantity, as the size which any one has; thus he is said to have the size of three or four cubits; 3. Investiture. 4. In a part. 5. As to a part. 6. In measure.or as things about the body, as a garment or a tunic; or as in a part, as a ring in the hand; or as a part, as the hand or the foot; or as in a vessel, as a bushel has wheat, or a flagon, wine, for the flagon is said to have the wine, and the bushel the wheat; all these therefore are said to have, as in a vessel; 7. Possession. or as a possession, for we are said to have a house or land. A man is also said to have a wife, and the wife a husband, but the mode now mentioned, of "to have," seems the most foreign, 8. Also indirectly or by analogy. for we mean nothing else by having a wife, than that she cohabits with a man; there may perhaps appear to be some other modes of having, but those usually mentioned have nearly all been enumerated.