CONTENTS Front page Preface Introduction Book the first Prelude to Chapter 1 Chapter 1 Prelude to Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Prelude to Chapter 3 Chapter 3 Prelude to Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Prelude to Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Book the second Prelude to Chapter 1 Chapter 1 Prelude to Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Prelude to Chapter 3 Chapter 3 Prelude to Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Prelude to Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Prelude to Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Prelude to Chapter 7 Chapter 7 Prelude to Chapter 8 Chapter 8 Prelude to Chapter 9 Chapter 9 Prelude to Chapter 10 Chapter 10 Prelude to Chapter 11 Chapter 11 Prelude to Chapter 12 Chapter 12 Book the third Prelude to Chapter 1 Chapter 1 Prelude to Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Prelude to Chapter 3 Chapter 3 Prelude to Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Prelude to Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Prelude to Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Prelude to Chapter 7 Chapter 7 Prelude to Chapter 8 Chapter 8 Prelude to Chapter 9 Chapter 9 Prelude to Chapter 10 Chapter 10 Prelude to Chapter 11 Chapter 11 Prelude to Chapter 12 Chapter 12 Prelude to Chapter 13 Chapter 13 Cambridge: Printed at the University Press.
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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ.
ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE.
Translated from the original Text; WITH NOTES BY CHARLES COLLIER, M.D., F.R.S.
FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, AND HONORARY FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS.
Cambridge: MACMILLAN & CO.
LONDON: D. NUTT.
1855.
PREFACE.
Having, after careful study of this Treatise, been led to the conclusion that Aristotle's object, in its composition, was to put before the world his own opinions as well as those of former and contemporaneous writers upon the Vital Principle, I have been induced to undertake a translation of it, in order to give the general reader the theories, hypotheses, and opinions which prevailed, at that early period of natural and physiological knowledge, upon life and its manifestations. The Treatise, indeed, records all the prevailing opinions upon living beings and sentient properties, which lie scattered through Aristotle's other physiological writings; and it displays, perhaps more than any other of his works, the extent of his knowledge, and the perspicacity of his intellect. Should it, however, be questioned whether a work, composed at a time when the special sciences pertaining to its subject were yet in their infancy, can be now of any value, it might be answered that, irrespective of any positive result, an interest must ever be taken in the investigation, truthfully conducted, of nature's operations; and that this, brief as it is, comprises many of the dogmata, of an otherwise enlightened age, upon the more abstruse topics of natural philosophy and physiology.
It is scarcely necessary to observe, that several versions of this Treatise are extant, but as they have been written under an impression that its design is rather psychological than physiological, this misapprehension has tended to vitiate, or render unintelligible what otherwise, as literary productions, might have done justice to the original. Some of the translators, besides, seem to have been but imperfectly acquainted with physiology, and this want of preliminary knowledge has sometimes led to a misapprehension of the text, and sometimes to an inadequate appreciation of what could be only suggestive. Thus, the causes which have contributed to make the text abstruse, and even in places unintelligible, have concurred in making the translations obscure, and occasionally incomprehensible; for besides indications of imperfect anatomical knowledge, the arguments in the Treatise can be regarded but as suggestions, and be elucidated only by reference to the more matured science of modern times. It cannot derogate from what is due to Aristotle, to admit that physiology, in his age, was not only encumbered with the hypotheses of earlier schools, but also dwarfed and distorted by imperfect acquaintance with those systems and organs of the living body, which he perceived, intuitively, to be necessary to a full comprehension of his subject. But although the opinions and conjectures of this Treatise may, from the advanced state of anatomy and physiology, have but little intrinsic value, the method adopted by Aristotle may not be undeserving the attention of those who, with a wider range of special knowledge, are better prepared for the undertaking; unless, indeed, the Vital Principle is to be set down among those final causes, which, lying beyond the human comprehension, are to be admitted as ultimate facts. Although this may be the case, however, some interest must be taken in a Treatise which is, not only indicative of Aristotle's style and mode of argument, but pregnant also, by allusion, with collateral information.
This version has been made with the intention of rendering it, in so far as the analogies of language would allow, a faithful transcript of the opinions and manner of Aristotle; and notes are added for the elucidation of passages which by no periphrasis could be made intelligible to the general reader. It may be observed that the mind, (ὁ νοῦς), although nowhere defined, appears, in this Treatise, to represent the abstract immaterial principle usually attributed to the ψυχή; for it alone is excluded from all direct participation in corporeal functions or changes.
Although the title given to this version embodies, as I believe, Aristotle's idea, yet it is not pretended that the writers cited by him always employed the term ψυχή in his sense; or even that he, himself, was always consistent in the use of it. Plato was certainly not engaged upon material agencies or properties in his Phædo, and in the Timæus, which partakes of a physiological character, and as such has been criticised in this Treatise, the animating motor principle is treated of rather as an abstraction than as the originating and natural cause of life, through all its manifestations. The term Vital Principle, however, has been retained throughout, even where it may seem to be less apposite, as well to avoid the misapprehension which might be occasioned by the substitution of another term, (that of soul I mean,) which might then to some appear to be its synonym, as on account of the extreme difficulty of determining the point where the metonymy might, without question, be adopted.
This Translation is from the Oxford edition, collated with that of Trendelenburg; and this allusion to that eminent scholar affords me the opportunity of acknowledging the assistance which has been derived from his comments upon passages, which require, for elucidation, all the light that can be thrown upon them by tradition and learning.
INTRODUCTION.
INTRODUCTION.
As this treatise may interest some who have never considered the subject for the elucidation of which it was composed, it will be well to offer a summary of that which Aristotle had undertaken to delineate, and to give, at the same time, an epitome of the opinions which, in modern times, have been entertained concerning it.
It is then that principle, which, inherent in genial matter, establishes functions distinctive of animated beings; and those functions are nutrition, and, through nutrition, growth or development, within a certain prescribed range, and absorption or rather change wrought by absorption, that is, decay. These two functions constitute, in fact, animated beings, and distinguish them broadly from whatever is inanimate; and as those functions are inherent in the simplest forms of being, it is in such that we might expect to find a clue to the nature of that something which, whether entity or mere quality, confers upon living matter its distinctive properties. But whether we examine a seed before development, or watch the rudimental forms of life, that something lies shrouded in matter which, although to appearance inanimate, is yet, through its influence, under genial conditions, capable of developing into a perfect being; and of resisting, for a stated time, the agency of surrounding elements. Thus, growth and development with their antagonisms absorption and decay, effected through the actions of the material framework of living beings, constitute, essentially, life; and the subject of this essay is that something which gives to matter those attributes. The processes, then, of reproduction, growth, and decay, that is, generation, life, and death, are the essential characteristics of living beings, and conferred upon them, as has been said, by that something which is designated Vital Principle.
Now, to homogeneous forms and solitary functions others of more complex nature are superadded, and these give rise to that long chain of being of which man may be regarded as the head; but yet, amid all the simplicity of organs, of action, and of reaction, those two functions still prevail, and constitute life, whatever the type of being, in its strictest signification. This is the teaching of Aristotle, as it is the doctrine of modern physiologists; and those functions are always here referred to as the essential conditions of whatever is animated, although, for higher forms of being, other organs and functions are required. The nature, however, of the essence or principle which originates and orders those living functions is hitherto for us, as it was for Aristotle, inscrutable; and it may be that the wide survey which he took of life, by complicating simple functions with sentient and even intellectual faculties, tended only to disturb and pervert the course of his inquiry. But whether Aristotle's mode of inquiry was or not faulty, and whether the principle which animates the world (it may be the universe) is or not among those causes which are inscrutable, it will be ever a topic of deep interest to the learned and the thoughtful of every age.
In an opening chapter, Aristotle has in so clear and succinct a manner reviewed the prevailing doctrines and opinions as well of his own as of a preceding age, that that summary may be regarded as the exposition of all that was then most authoritative; and as, from that time, physiology may be said to have declined, it would be almost supererogatory to allude to any other writer before the rise of modern science. It may be mentioned, however, in deference to the name, that Cicero has alluded, with a just appreciation of Aristotle's superiority, to this treatise; but as the topic was foreign to his pursuits and little in accordance with his talents, we cannot be surprised if he mistook the scope of the design, and perverted thereby the tendency of the argument.
This treatise is, it may be added, both an introduction and a sequel to the other physiological treatises of Aristotle; and, as it treats of all the characteristics of living beings, it may contribute to a clearer understanding of them, as they, in their turn, may serve to elucidate it; for they all proceed from the same hand, maintain the same doctrines, and emanate from the same laborious and original intellect.
This topic engaged the attention of eminent anatomists and physiologists towards the opening of the present century, and their writings will shew the opinions entertained by the moderns concerning it; but it has, generally, been made an incidental rather than a special subject of inquiry, a prelude, as it were, to the teaching of anatomy and physiology. The opinions entertained concerning vital principle Italic textby the eminent men here alluded to (Hunter and Barclay, Bichât and Cuvier) may well be collated with those of Aristotle, who wrote at a time when science was in its infancy, and when, for profitable investigation, he had to depend almost exclusively, amid so much hypothesis, upon his own laborious and perspicacious intellect.
In quoting those writers, there is hardly occasion for observing any order of precedence, as they flourished about the same time, and contributed equally to the present development of physiological science.
According to Hunter, "Animal matter is endowed with a principle called, in common language, life. This principle is perhaps conceived of with more difficulty than any other in nature, which arises from its being more complex in its effects than any other; and it is, therefore, no wonder that it is the least understood. But, although life may appear compounded in its effects in a complicated animal like man, it is as simple in him as in the most simple animal, and is reducible to one simple property in every animal." In another paragraph, he adds, "the first and most simple idea of life is its being the principle of self-preservation, by its preventing matter from falling into dissolution—for dissolution immediately takes place when matter is deprived of it; the second is its being the principle of action. These are two very different properties, though they arise from the same principle."
Barclay observes that, "in every living organized structure there is plainly a power that preserves, regulates, and controls the whole; directing, at first, the different processes in forming one part of the organs, afterwards employing the assistance of the organs which it has formed to produce more, till at last it completes the whole of the system in such a manner as to suit its future conveniences and wants. This power, or rather this agent, physiologists have named Vital Principle; though not a few are inclined to suppose it to be the effect, rather than the cause, of the organization. But in all operations that are performed without either volition or consciousness, it appears subordinate to a much higher power—to that Almighty and Omniscient Being, who dispenses his laws to the boundless Universe, and whose laws, except by himself, can never be improved, altered, or abrogated."
Bichât makes Vital Principle to be "the assemblage of the functions which resist death;" and this definition was adopted substantively by Cuvier, who, in his introductory lecture to the "Comparative Anatomy," has illustrated the influences of this assumed principle, by a description, alike graphic and beautiful, of what takes place when it has been withdrawn or extinguished. "If," he observes, "in order to have a correct idea of life, we consider it in simple forms of being, we shall soon perceive that it consists in the faculty possessed by particular corporeal combinations of lasting for a given time and under a determined form; of attracting, incessantly, into their composition a portion of the surrounding substances, and in giving back to the elements portions of their own substance. So long as this series of movements is maintained, the body, in which it is manifested, is a living body; and when it is irrecoverably arrested it is dead."
But although the definition of Bichât involves a great truth, and is a summary of all that has been ever said upon the subject, it is open to the criticism of M. Magendie, that, by its admitting the idea of death, it presupposes life, and thus establishes a vicious circle of reasoning. It is criticised also by M. Comte, as a fancied antagonism between animate and inanimate matter, a chimerical struggle between living beings and surrounding influences; for "the idea of life," he observes, "presupposes something able to live, and it requires no less a certain assemblage of external influences for its fulfilment."
The nature of Vital Principle, then, is still for us, as it was for Aristotle, a great mystery; and as opinions upon it are at best but speculations, we may proceed, without further comment, to the text, which, besides miscellaneous matter, will be found to contain suggestions for reflexion and inquiry.
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER I.
This chapter is an elaborate statement of the subject as well as the object of the inquiry. The term ψυχή, here rendered "Vital Principle," has several significations, as was observed in the preface, in the course of this and the other physiological treatises: in one passage, it implies the life of an animal; in another, the nutritive function; in another, a vital part; in another, a motor force; and in another, the visual power (τοῦ ὄμματος ἡ ψυχή); some writers, besides, derived the term ψυχή from ψυχρὸς or ψυχός, coolness or cold, because respiration was held to be a cooling process, and as such essential to life. The object of Aristotle, then, in this treatise, was to learn the nature of that essence or principle which, under whatever denomination, is the innate source of motion, and, consequently, of vital actions in all bodies capable of being animated; for although, in the more complicated forms of being, it is involved in the manifestation of perceptions and passions, its great office still is to originate, to maintain, and to perpetuate life, through all its gradations. It may be that, from some such conclusion, Aristotle was led to regard the vital principle as inferior in destiny and office to the faculty which he has designated mind (ὁ νοῦς), and made to be impassive, homogeneous, apart from, and independent of, the body. These opinions have much in common with those adopted by Plato in the Timæus; as, while, in that most beautiful and intellectual disquisition, the senses, appetites, and passions, the mortal framework, that is, of the sentient being, are located about the heart and liver,—the intellectual faculty, that which is divine, and intended to direct and control the animal powers, is placed in the head. The life is represented, in fact, by ψυχή, which is bound up with corporeal functions and appetites; and reason by νοῦς, which, if any where, is, "as the divine seed of wisdom," in the brain; and, being homogeneous, does not depend, for existence, upon the life of the body. These few words will suffice to shew that there is an analogy between the two systems of physiology and psychology.
BOOK THE FIRST.
CHAPTER I.
It may be assumed that all knowledge is beautiful and estimable; but as one branch may be more so than another, either because of the exactness which is requisite for its examination, or from its treating of objects more exalted and wonderful than any others, so, on both these accounts, we may reasonably assign the first place to an inquiry into Vital Principle. For the knowledge of it promises to contribute largely to all truth, and most especially to truth in relation to nature, since it is the origin, as it were, of living beings. The object of our inquiry, then, is to study and ascertain its nature and its essence, as well as its accidents, of which some seem to be its own peculiar affections, and some to belong to living beings, as original properties, through it.
Let us premise, however, that the attempt to attain to any certainty with respect to it is beset with almost insuperable difficulties; for as this has much in common with many other inquiries, with every inquiry, I mean, instituted for ascertaining the essence and the thing itself, it might hastily be supposed that, as demonstration is the method for studying particular bodies in their accidents, there may be some one special method of investigation when our object is to learn what is the essence of a thing, and that that method ought to be sought for on this occasion. If, however, there is no one common method for ascertaining what any thing in itself is, the systematic treatment of our subject is rendered still more difficult; for, in that case, it will be necessary to adopt, for each particular subject, some one particular method. Although it may be manifest, besides, that the inquiry should be by some kind of demonstration, or division, or other method, there will still remain many difficulties and many liabilities to error in fixing upon the principles from which the inquiry should set out; for the principles of different subjects differ, as those of number are not those of plane surfaces.
It may be well, perhaps, before proceeding further, to distinguish the “genus” to which Vital Principle belongs, and determine what it is—determine, I mean, whether it is a something and essence, or quantity, or quality, or any other of the classified categories; as also, a distinction of no small importance, whether it is among entities in potentiality, or whether rather it is a reality. We have to consider too whether Vital Principle is divisible or without parts, and whether every Vital Principle is or is not the same in kind, and, if not the same, whether the difference is generic or specific; but they who now are engaged in discussing and exploring Vital Principle seem to give exclusive attention to that of man. We must be on our guard against this, however, so that it may not escape us whether there is but one definition for Vital Principle as for animal, or whether it must be different for each creature, as for a horse, a dog, or a man. The term animal, besides, taken in an universal sense, is either without meaning, or of very secondary value; and so equally is every other common term which might be predicated of this subject. If, on the other hand, there are not several Vital Principles, but parts only of a single Principle, we have to settle whether we should commence the inquiry with the Principle as a whole, or, contrariwise, with its parts; and, with respect to the parts, it is difficult to determine which of them have been constituted differently from others; it is difficult also to say whether we should study the parts before their functions, as the mind before thought, or sensibility before sensation; and so for other faculties and functions. If it be expedient to commence the inquiry with functions, it may be a question whether it would not be better here also to study first their opposites; as the object of perception before that which perceives, and thought before that which thinks. Now, the knowledge of any thing in itself seems to be useful towards a right conception of the causes of the accidents in substances; as, in mathematics, the knowledge of straight and curve, line and surface, is requisite for perceiving to how many right angles the angles of the triangle are equal. But the knowledge of the accidents contributes, largely, in its turn, towards knowing what the thing, essentially, is; for whenever we may be able, from the appearance of any substance, to recount the whole or the greater number of its accidents, we are then best prepared to say what its essence is. Thus, the essence is the proper beginning for every demonstration, so that all the definitions, which do not make known, or make it easy to conjecture what may be the accidents of any substance, are to be regarded as dialectic and unprofitable subtleties.
It is difficult to determine whether all the emotions of Vital Principle are common to it and its recipient, or whether some one emotion belongs to it exclusively; and this is a question, which, although not easily settled, it is necessary to entertain. There is scarcely one of the many emotions which are derived from the Vital Principle, (as anger, or courage, desire, or feeling,) in the manifestation of which the Vital Principle can be said to be affected, actively or passively, without the body; the faculty of thought seems to be the peculiar property of the Vital Principle but whether thought be imagination of some kind, or never unaccompanied by imagination, still we must admit that it cannot be exercised without the body. If, then, there is any one function or emotion which is peculiar to the Vital Principle, we should admit that it might be isolated from the body; but, if no one belongs to it, exclusively, then we say that it cannot be separate from one. But, just as many accidents concur in the quality straightness, in so far as straightness (as, for instance, among others, to touch a brazen sphere at a point, which, were it apart from some kind of body, it could not do), so straightness is inseparable from a body, since it is ever found together with one. In the same way all the emotions of the Vital Principle (such as courage, gentleness, fear, pity, daring, joy, love and hatred,) seem to be manifested together with the body; for the body is affected, simultaneously, by them. As evidence of which, there are times when we are neither excited nor alarmed, although misfortunes may be trying and palpable, while, at other times, when the body is plethoric, or in a state akin to that of anger, we are moved by incidents which are trivial and unimportant. And what makes this yet more apparent is, that, at times, without the occurrence of aught to occasion alarm, we are thrown into the state of persons under terror; and if this be true, it is clear that all such emotions are material conditions. So that the definition of any one of them, as that of anger for example, may be said to be the motion of a body of particular nature, or part or function of a body, by such a cause, and for such an end.
Thus, for these reasons, it is for the physiologist to study the Vital Principle, either as a whole, or under some particular manifestation. But the physiologist and the metaphysician would differ widely in their definition of any one of those emotions, as that of anger, for example; which, while the latter would hold to be desire for retaliation, or some such motive, the former would maintain to be ebullition of blood, or excess of heat about the heart. The one of these, in fact, accounts for the passion by the matter, and the other by the form and cause; for the form is the cause of the thing, which, if it is to be, must, of necessity, be in a special matter. Thus, the cause of a house, for instance, is such as this—"to be a shelter to avert injury from rain, wind, and heat;" and here the physiologist will speak of stones, bricks, and rafters, while the metaphysician will, in these materials, only behold the form to be adopted for those purposes. Which, then, of these is the physiologist? Is it he who studies only the matter without reference to the cause, or he who is occupied with the cause only? Or is it rather he who judges both from cause and matter; and which of the two is he? May we not however rather say that there is one who is engaged upon the properties which are inseparable and only in so far as they are inseparable from matter, while to the physiologist it belongs to judge of such emotions and functions as emanate from particular bodies and peculiar matter? Properties different from these belong to another; and some of them to an artisan, a physician or builder, as the case may be, while the mathematician has to do with properties which are not inseparable from matter, but which, as they do not belong to any particular body, admit of being treated as abstractions; and abstract qualities, as abstractions, belong to the transcendental philosopher.
Let us, however, return to the point where our discussion broke off, and repeat that the emotions of Vital Principle, such as anger and fear, for instance, in so far as they are innate, are inseparable from the material frame-work of animals; and that they are not to be regarded as a line or a surface.
Notes Layout 2 Note 1, p. 11. Truth in relation to nature, &c.] Aristotle says that some beings exist by nature, and some by other causes; those by nature include animals and their parts, plants and elementary bodies, as fire and air, earth and water, for all such, evidently, exist, and exist by nature. The objects, in fact, of nature's constitution are broadly distinguished from whatever does not emanate from her—"for all her productions appear to have within them a principle of motion, and of rest; some for locomotion, and some for the motions of growth, decay, and change. But neither a bed, a garment, nor any other similar object, whether formed of stone, earth, or composition, has any such innate tendency to change; and thus nature is to be regarded as the source and first cause of motion and rest in something which has, not casually but, innately, in itself, from its origin, the capability of being so acted upon." The term nature, besides, is applied to any substance which, however rude and unchangeable, admits, by its own properties, of being converted into something, as bronze is said to be the nature of a statue or of bronze utensils, wood of wooden articles, and so of other materials and products. There were some who spoke of the essence of natural bodies as nature, and as they made the primal