Chapter IX.
Since the Vital Principle of animals has been defined by the two faculties of judgment (which is the office of thought with sentient perception), and of locomotion, let us now, having dwelt sufficiently upon sensation and mind, proceed to consider, with respect to the motor power, what part of the Vital Principle it may be. Let us consider, that is, whether it is a part of Vital Principle and separate from it, substantively or abstractedly, or whether it is Vital Principle as a whole; and if it be a part, whether it is something peculiar and exclusive of those usually attributed to Vital Principle, and which have been alluded to, or whether it is to be considered as one of them.
But a difficulty at once presents itself, both in Chapter IX.
Since the Vital Principle of animals has been defined by the two faculties of judgment (which is the office of thought with sentient perception), and of locomotion, let us now, having dwelt sufficiently upon sensation and mind, proceed to consider, with respect to the motor power, what part of the Vital Principle it may be. Let us consider, that is, whether it is a part of Vital Principle and separate from it, substantively or abstractedly, or whether it is Vital Principle as a whole; and if it be a part, whether it is something peculiar and exclusive of those usually attributed to Vital Principle, and which have been alluded to, or whether it is to be considered as one of them.
But a difficulty at once presents itself, both in determining the sense in which we are to speak of the parts of Vital Principle, and in settling how many of them there may be. In one point of view, in fact, the parts appear to be infinite in number and to comprise, not only those which some speak of as the reasoning, passionate and appetitive, and others as the rational and the irrational, but other parts also, which by the distinctions employed in those classifications, are brought into notice, and are more broadly distinguished from one another than are any of those to which we have alluded. Those other parts are the nutritive, which belongs to all plants and animals, and the sentient, which cannot readily be placed among either rational or irrational parts; there is the imaginative, besides, which differs in mode of being from all the others, and yet it would be difficult to determine, amid the several parts of Vital Principle, with which of them it is identical, or from which it differs. Besides these, there is the appetitive part, which, whether considered abstractedly or functionally, would seem to differ from all others, and yet it would be absurd to separate it from them; for volition is present in the rational, as decire and passion are in the irrational part, and if the Vital Principle be made up of these three, appetite must be present in each of them.
But, to resume the more especial topic of this chapter, what is that, let us ask, which confers upon an animal locomotive power? Now, it may be supposed that the generative and the nutritive functions, which are innate in all living beings, originate the motion concerned in the processes of growth and decay, which equally belong to them all; and with respect to breathing and expiration, sleep and watching, which are subjects of much difficulty, we shall enter upon the consideration of them hereafter. Let us, however, consider what confers upon an animal the power of progression.
Now, it clearly is not the nutritive faculty—for the movement of progression is ever for some end, and is associated either with imagination or appetite; and then no being moves unless urged to it by desire or fear, excepting, indeed, there be impulse from without; plants, besides, were nutrition the cause, should be locomotive, and possess some organ to fit them for that kind of movement.
Neither can it be the sentient faculty—for there are many creatures which are sentient, and yet stationary throughout their existence; and if nature do nothing in vain, and never, except in the case of beings dwarfed or deformed, omits anything necessary to existence, the creatures alluded to are perfect creatures; and as proof of this they are reproductive, are capable of development and subject to decay, so that they also ought to have organs to fit them for progression.
Neither can the rational faculty or the so-called mind be the motor power, for the speculative intellect never thinks upon what is to be done, or suggests aught concerning what should be fled from or pursued after; but this motion is the act of one fleeing from or pursuing after something. Nor does that faculty, even when reflecting upon any such object, at once bid to flee from or to follow after it, as it often dwells upon something terrible, or agreeable, without suggesting alarm, although the heart may be set in motion or some other part of the impression be agreeable. Add to this, that although the mind may bid, and the reason suggest that something should be fled from or pursued after, the individual does not necessarily move, but acts as does an intemperate person, according to the dictates of passion. It is thus, occasionally, we see that a physician, although versed in medical science, does not cure, as if there were something other than the science which had the power of acting according to the precepts of the science.
It may be affirmed that the appetite cannot be the positive cause of this motion; for the temperate, even while desiring and yearning after something, do not act in order to secure that for which they feel appetite, but follow their understanding.
Notes Layout 2 Note 1, p. 173. But a difficulty at once presents itself, &c.] There is an apparent want of discrimination here between the faculties which are the privilege and distinction of higher creatures and the functions which are essential to life, and without which there can be neither animal nor living being. In a subsequent paragraph the rational faculty or mind (καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς) is excluded from all participation in corporeal movements, and held to have no part in sentient perception. It is supposed, in fact, never to be engaged upon what is practical as its office is contemplation, so that, "when dwelling upon what may be fearful, or otherwise, it does not, at once, suggest, flight or pursuit;" although, independently of its influence, "the heart or some other organ of the body may be accelerated or depressed." But in all this, as no allusion is made to a moving force, whether the motive be imagination or the stimulus of appetite, the inquiry may be said to be defective.
Note 2, p. 173. But to resume the more especial, &c.] Although these passages, which allude both to physical and moral causes of motion, are sufficiently obvious, yet, as they do not explain how locomotion is effected, they fail in the object of the inquiry; and then the motion concerned in nutrition, growth and decay, is almost in the same category, so to say, with that of progression. It may be mentioned that the "motion and progression of animals," "breathing and expiration," "sleep and watching," "youth and age," are special treatises, and probably composed for the elucidation of this particular work upon "life." The comparison between the intemperate man who, although rational, acts against his reason, and the physician who, although versed in medical science, does not cure, seems to exemplify the adage, that to advise is one thing, to do, another; or to confirm the solemn words of Johnson, "that teachers of morality discourse like angels, but they live like men."
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER X.
The subject of locomotion is continued, and the motor principles are said to be appetite and mind; but mind in the sense rather of a perceptive or sentient than a purely intellectual faculty; and yet it is neither the centre of sensibility nor imagination, although it partakes of the nature of each of them. The imagination, which many are said to follow against judgment, is evidently the voluntary species of which man alone partakes; and the other, which is allotted to the lower animals, may be regarded as instinct. The mind, as a practical faculty, is to be distinguished from the theoretical or speculative intellect, which has for its object the discovery of truth, as the other has the preservation of the body. The argument is complicated, and made less apprehensible by the technicality and great precision of its wording: thus, τὸ ὀρεχτόν, or object desired, is food, and appetite is the stimulus or feeling of hunger which compels to move; the practical mind (διάνοια πρακτική) is the sentient faculty, and the beginning of the action, which is the satisfaction of the appetite, completes or is the last of the series. Thus, these two, the appetite and practical thought (which is sentient perception) are motors, as being both stimulus and desire, and the object desired (food, that is), acting upon the sentient perception, urges to locomotion for the attainment of it; the imagination, as an instinctive power, is said never to impel to move, save for the satisfaction of necessary wants.
Chapter X.
Those two faculties, the appetite and the mind, appear to be the motor principles in animals—the mind, if the imagination might be set down as being a kind of thought; for many against knowledge follow their imaginings, and other animals are moved neither by thought nor calculation, but by imagination. Thus, those two faculties, mind and appetite, are locomotive powers; but, then, it is mind in the sense of a calculating and a practical faculty, and which differs from the speculative mind by the object to which it tends.
Chapter X.
Those two faculties, the appetite and the mind, appear to be the motor principles in animals—the mind, if the imagination might be set down as being a kind of thought; for many against knowledge follow their imaginings, and other animals are moved neither by thought nor calculation, but by imagination. Thus, those two faculties, mind and appetite, are locomotive powers; but, then, it is mind in the sense of a calculating and a practical faculty, and which differs from the speculative mind by the object to which it tends. Now, every appetite tends to some object, for the appetite, which is the beginning of the practical mind, has ever some object in view, and that object is the beginning of the action. So that these two, appetite and practical thought, may reasonably be regarded as motor powers—for the object longed for impels to move, and then, through it, the practical intelligence impels, because its origin is the object longed for; and when imagination may incite to move, it never does set in motion without appetite. Thus, it is the object longed for alone which produces motion; for if there were two motives, mind and appetite, they would produce motion according to some common formula. But as the case is, the mind does not appear to produce motion without appetite, for volition is appetite; and even when a creature may move by calculation, it still moves by volition; the appetite, on the contrary, impels to move against calculation, for desire is a kind of appetite.
The mind then is always right; but appetite as well as imagination may be right and may be wrong. It is, therefore, the object desired which always excites to move, but then that object is a good or an apparent good; not however, a good in every sense, but a practical good, and a practical good admits of being otherwise than good.
It is manifest then, that it is that faculty of Vital Principle, the so-called appetite which excites to move. But when Vital Principle is divided into parts, and parts are distinguished by their faculties, very many are made apparent, as the nutritive, the sentient, the cogitative, the deliberative, and the appetitive, and these differ from one another more than do the desiring and the passionate.
The appetites admit of being opposed to one another, and this occurs when reason may be opposed to desire, but the opposition can be manifested only in beings with a sense of time; for the mind commands to resist on account of the future, while desire urges to immediate compliance, as that which is good appears, as the future is unseen, to be absolutely good and absolutely grateful. Thus, the appetitive faculty, in so far as appetitive, may, in a specific sense, be the motor, but it is the object desired by appetite which is the first to set in motion; for without having been itself moved, it incites to move from having been thought upon or imagined; and there are several such motors. There are three terms here: the motor; then that by which it moves; and thirdly, that which is moved. But the motor is in the two-fold sense of unmoved, and both motor, and moved—the unmoved is the practical good; the motor and moved is the appetitive stimulus or appetition (for that which is moved moves only in so far as it desires, and appetite is a motion or an act of some kind); and the moved is the animal. As the organism by which appetite effects motion is obviously corporeal, its nature must be studied together with those functions which are common to the body and the Vital Principle. But to speak summarily, the organism whereby motion is effected, is as a hinge in which coexist the beginning and the end of motion—for herein are the convex and the concave, of which that is the beginning, and this the end of motion; and therefore the one is at rest while the other is in motion, as although, rationally considered, the two pieces are distinct, yet, substantively, they are inseperable.
In fine, then, as has been said, an animal is endowed with self-motion to the extent of its appetition; but it cannot be susceptible of appetite without imagination, and all imagination is either rational or sentient, and of this latter kind other animals partake also.
Notes Layout 2 Note 1, p. 178. Thus it is the object longed for alone, &c.] Food, that is, being necessary both for stilling the appetite and preserving the body, is the first motor; for, were there, as the text says, two motors, then, as the practical mind never impels to move without appetite, appetite could not impel to move without the mind, which is not the case. This is the argument; but it is less distinct than might be wished for owing to the nature of the practical mind not having been defined, and to insufficient knowledge concerning both muscular agency and the brain and nervous system.
Note 2, p. 178. The mind then is always right, &c.] The intellect, that is, when neither moved by appetite nor perverted by imagination, (for both may be wrong) is, when freed from those influences, always right; but food incites to move because it is either good or appears to be a good, in the sense, not of a moral but, of a practical good, and, as such, it may, by abuse, be the opposite of good.
Note 3, p. 179. The appetites admit of being opposed, &c.] "Appetite and reason are not always in accordance," Aristotle observes, and as, when any one desire is subdued another may arise and strive for the mastery, so appetite may well be opposed to appetite. But resistance to desire can be manifested only in such beings as have a sense of time, have, that is, powers of abstraction, by which, withdrawing themselves from what is present, and foreseeing consequences in the future, they are enabled to resist the immediate compliance which desire or passion is urging upon them. For "the portion of time now present, is a portion of that which is future and indivisible."
Note 4, p. 179. For without having been itself moved, &c.] Owing to the wording there is obscurity about this passage, but yet it may be elucidated—the object desired, food, that is, although at rest, may, acting upon the appetitive sense, incite to move, and so be regarded as a motor; and there are, of course, as many such motors as there are kinds of food. These then are the three terms—first, the motor or food; then the muscular agency by which locomotion is effected; and lastly, that which is moved, or the animal.
Note 5, p. 180. But to speak summarily, &c.] The passage has, in this version, been rendered with a bias that the analogy was drawn from the structure of the knee-joint, which, in all times, has been likened to a hinge, and hence termed " ginglymoid;" and conchologists, following Aristotle, have so termed the hinge of the bivalves. The Latin is, "nunc ut in summa dicamus, id quod movet ut instrumentum, ibi est collocandum ubi idem principii rationem finisve subit ut in cardine fit—hinc enim convexum et concavum est; quorum alterum finis, alterum principium est; quapropter alienum quiescit alterum movetur." The closing paragraph seems to confirm what has been assumed, that sentient imagination is analogous to "animal instinct."
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER XI.
It is by no means obvious what may have been meant by "imperfect creatures," or in what sense desire, unless it be as instinct, can be assigned to them; for there is no trace throughout the zoology of Aristotle, extensive as it is, of any such species of being. One commentator has suggested polypi and mollusca; but the former, in their present acceptation, (improperly termed zoophytes), had not then been observed, and the latter could not, from the description, have been regarded as "imperfect animals." The "polypus" was the generic term for the highest forms of the Cephalopoda, or "cuttle fish."
} Chapter XI.
} Chapter XI.
Let us now consider the motor power in such imperfect creatures as have only the sense of Touch; and learn whether or not it is admissible that imagination and desire can be present with them. Now, they do appear to be sensible of pain and pleasure, and if so far sensible, they must of necessity have desire. But how can imagination be present in them? It may, perhaps, be answered that, as their movements are indeterminate, so those sensations are present, but present in some indeterminate manner.
The sentient imagination belongs, as has been said, to other animals, but that which is voluntary is found only in such as are rational; for it is matter of calculation whether this or that shall be done, and as the individual is to pursue what is larger and better, he must be guided by a rule of some kind, and thereby be enabled to individualize several different images. The reason why these creatures do not seem to be capable of forming opinions is, that they are without the faculty for drawing inferences, and this includes opinion. But the appetite has no deliberative will, as appetite sometimes overcomes and impels the will, and sometimes the will overcomes and impels the appetite, as a ball is bandied to and fro; or appetite rules and impels appetite, when intemperance has the ascendancy. But that which is superior is ever naturally more dominant, and productive of motion in three different directions; but the intelligent faculty has no motion—it remains at rest. Although the conception of the universal is to be distinguished from the conception of the particular, (for while the former says that such an one ought to perform such an act, the latter says that such an one, and that I am he, ought now to perform this particular act,) yet it is this latter opinion rather than the former which impels to move; and although both may be motive, the one, at least, is rather at rest, and the other is rather in motion.
Notes Layout 2 Notes Layout 2 Note 1, p. 182. The sentient imagination belongs, &c.] Instinct is the fixed but unerring guide of the lower animals; the voluntary imagination, on the other hand, the faculty, that is, which can, at will, be called up and supply images for selection and combination by the judgment, can belong only to beings endowed with reason—that is, to man. The faculties associated with this imagination, enable the individual, by idealising a measure, to select what may be, relatively, larger and better, and out of several impressions or sensations, to form general notions. It is unnecessary to follow the argument which explains why these creatures, so low in the scale, cannot form opinions.
Note 2, p. 182. But appetite has no deliberative will, &c.] The meaning of this passage is, seemingly, too obvious to require comment; but some commentators have in the term σφαῖρα seen an allusion to the celestial spheres, rather than a ball, because, as the upper controls in its movements the lower sphere, so reason, being superior to appetite, is to control inordinate desires. "Quibus collatis, non temerarium erit, σφαίρας similitudinem ita interpretari: consilium tanquam superius (ἡ ἄυω) ita appetitum in suum motum convertere, sicut superior sphæra eas, quœ inferiores volvuntur." The words which follow "that which is superior is ever naturally more dominant," may require some such interpretation, for they seem to imply that motion, by translation, may be derived from the motions of the spheres above, which were said to be in three directions; but the knowing faculty, the mind, that is, like the first motor, is, for ever, at rest.
Note 3, p. 183. Although the conception of the universal, &c.] This abstruse passage can only be understood by reference to the special treatise upon "the motion of animals, wherein this topic is considered;" it is asked, "whence comes it, that an individual, after thinking, sometimes acts and sometimes does not act, sometimes moves and sometimes does not move?" and the answer is, that "action or motion is the conclusion of a syllogism," of which "the conception of the universal is the major, that of the particular, the middle, and the action following it the minor."
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER XII.
As the treatise is drawing to a close, this chapter again alludes to the distinction between the life in plants and animals from the presence or absence of sensibility—thus, animals are distinguished from plants by being sentient, as plants are from inanimate bodies by nutrition and growth. Aristotle placed plants immediately after inanimate substances, and says that they are distinguished, generically, by degrees of vitality; that compared with other bodies they appear to be almost alive (σχεδὸν ὥσπερ εὔψυχον); compared with animals, to be inanimate; and that the transition from the one to the other is in an unbroken series. Thus, there are "marine creatures," he says, "which cannot with certainty be ranged among either animals or plants; and sponge has altogether the appearance of a plant." Lamarck has substantively adopted this, as he, too, commences with inanimate things (which, whatever their character, he distinguishes broadly from whatever has life) and then passes to plants, which he distinguishes from animal bodies, by being non-irritable—incapable, that is, of contracting any of their solids, suddenly and repeatedly, while animal bodies are, on the contrary, endowed with contractile power. Cuvier observes, that "living and organised beings have, from the earliest times, been subdivided into animated beings—beings, that is, which are sentient and moveable, and beings which are inanimate; and as these are neither sentient nor moveable, they are reduced to the common faculty of vegetation or nutrition." It is not necessary, then, as Aristotle remarks, that all living beings should be sentient.
Chapter XII.
It is necessary to every living creature that it should have a nutritive principle in order that it may live and continue to live, from birth to death; for it is necessary to every thing generated that it should be capable of growth, development and decay, and as these cannot be carried on without nourishment, it is necessary to all reproductive and perishing beings that they should have a congenital nutritive function. But it is not necessary to all living beings that they should be sentient, nor can it be admitted that such as have simple or homogeneous bodies can have Touch, or that there can be an animal without Touch; neither can any beings be sentient but such as are receptive of form without the matter. It is necessary to an animal, however, that it should be sentient, if nature do nothing in vain—for all things in nature are for some end, or else they are accidents of things for some end; so that if there were any animal body fitted for progression without being sentient, it would perish, and could not attain to the end which is nature's design. How, in fact, is such a body to be nourished? As to creatures which are fixed, they obtain their nourishment on the spot where they have been produced. It is not possible then, that a body which is not fixed to one spot and which has been generated, should have living principle and judging faculties without being sentient. Nor can a creature spontaneously generated be sentient; Why, let us ask, should it be so? The sensibility is for the greater good either of the Vital Principle or the body; but neither of these can, in the case supposed, be effected by it, as the one will not through it think the better, nor the other be better fitted for its offices. Thus, there is no living body free to move which is not sentient. But if a body be sentient, it must necessarily be either homogeneous or compound—Now, homogeneous it cannot be, as in that case it would be without Touch, and Touch it must of necessity have. All which is proved thus—Since an animal is a living body, and all bodies are tangible, and tangible implies whatever is perceptible to Touch, it follows that the body of an animal must be sensible to Touch, if the animal is to preserve its existence. The other senses, as the sight, smell, hearing, perceive through other media; but if an animal when touching were without sensation, it could have no guide for avoiding some things or seizing others, and so circumstanced, it would not be possible for it to preserve its existence. The taste, therefore, is a kind of Touch, for taste is the sense for food and food is a tangible body; but sound, colour and odour neither nourish nor contribute to growth or decay. Thus, taste must of necessity be a kind of Touch from its being the sense which is perceptive both of what is tangible and nutritive; and, as these two senses are necessary to animals, it is manifest that there can be no animal without Touch.
The other senses, being for the higher good of animals, are allotted, not to all but, only to particular genera, as they are necessary to none but such as have the power of progression. If, indeed, such a creature is to preserve its existence, it must not only be sensible of objects when touching them, but be able also to perceive them when at a distance; and this can be effected if it be sensible through a medium, which, having been impressed and set in motion by the objects of perception reacts upon the percipient. And it is thus that the locomotive impulse acts until it cease in rest—that which impels something else communicates along with impulsion impelling power, and the motion is in a midspace; and as the first motor impels without having been impelled, so the last is impelled without impelling, and the intermediate links, of which there are several, both impel and are impelled. So is it too with respect to changes wrought in bodies, excepting that they are effected without change of locality—as if any one were to tinge a portion of wax, it would be in motion until it should be saturated; nothing like this, however, can happen to a stone, but it can to water, and that to a distance. The air is mobile in the highest degree, and, provided it be still and in one mass, it both acts and is acted upon. It is better, therefore, in the case of refraction, to assume that the air, in so far as it is one mass, (and it is so over every smooth surface,) is impressed by form and colour, rather than that visual rays issuing from the eye are refracted. Thus, the air, in the case of vision, gives motion to the sense, as if the impress upon wax had been transmitted to its extremity.
Notes Layout 2 Note 1, p. 186. Simple or homogeneous bodies, &c.] There is no clue in Aristotle's writings to the meaning of "simple (or homogeneous) bodies" (τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν), unless it be the Acalepha, "the body of which, like that of the oyster, is said to be altogether fleshy, but, unlike the oyster, to be without a shell; and it is further said to belong rather to plants than animals." But as in the following chapter it is shewn that an animal body, if homogeneous, cannot exist, so the tenor of the whole argument may be, to shew that no animal body can be homogeneous.
Note 2, p. 187. As to creatures which are fixed, &c.] These include such species of the Testacea as are fixed to one habitat, and derive nutriment from the water with which they are surrounded; but it is not easy to determine what is meant by the term ἀγεννήτον, (spontaneously generated,) as this mode of reproduction was attributed, by Aristotle, to some fishes and eels, which are certainly neither homogeneous nor insentient.