It is, therefore, to no purpose to inquire whether Vital Principle and the body are one, any more than whether wax and the impress upon it are one, or whether the matter formative of any object and the object formed are one; for one and being have many significations, but they are correctly designated as reality.
It has thus been explained generally what the Vital Principle is, and shewn that it is an essence, in its abstract signification, which implies the particular mode of being in any particular body, as if any instrument, an axe, for instance, were a natural body, the mode of being in the axe would be, at once, both its essence and its Vital Principle; for, were it once to be withdrawn, then, save in name, it could be an axe no longer. All this, however, relates to an axe, but Vital Principle is the mode and the cause of being, not in any thing like an axe but, in a natural body, having within it a principle of motion and of rest.
But what has been said may be better understood by reference to the parts of a body. Thus, if the eye were an animal, vision would be its Vital Principle, as vision, abstractedly considered, is the essence of the eye; but the eye is the matter of vision, and if vision be wanting, then, save in name, it is an eye no longer, any more than is that an eye which is represented in sculpture or painting. All that has here been assumed of a part may be made applicable to the whole living body; for, as there is an analogy between part and part, so is there between the whole sensibility and the whole sentient body, in the ratio of its sensibility; but this must be understood of a body which yet retains its Vital Principle, and is, in potentiality, alive. The seed and the fruit are the representatives of such a body in potentiality; and as cutting is the reality of an axe, vision that of an eye, so watching is the reality of Vital Principle; which is to the body what vision is to an eye, and its own property to any instrument; but this is to be understood of a body in potentiality. Thus, as an eye is a pupil and vision, so an animal is a body and Vital Principle.
It is then obvious that neither Vital Principle nor any of its parts, even granting that it may be divisible, can be separate from the body; for of some of its parts it is the reality; and yet there is nothing to preclude the possibility of some others being separate, as there are some which do not contribute to the reality of any body. It is doubtful, however, whether the Vital Principle is the reality of a body in the sense that a mariner is of his vessel.
Thus far, then, have we proceeded in our attempt to define and delineate Vital Principle.
Notes Layout 2 Note 1, p. 58. Now matter is potentiality, species reality.] A few words may suffice for a further attempt to elucidate these terms. Matter, then, per se, has no definite existence, but with essence it becomes a something in potentiality, and then capable, under genial conditions, of becoming a reality, the specific and individual character of which depends upon form. Matter is said to be comprised in essence, and therefore the distinction between them is hardly discernible, but Aristotle, under the term essence, comprises elements (earth, fire, water and air) as well as derivatives from the elements, and that because, while all other bodies are to be considered as dependent upon them, they pre-existed to, and were the origin of all others. In another passage he assumes one universal, primordial, material essence, as the source whence all things which are have proceeded; yet still he admits of a peculiar essence for each genus, as the primal matter of pituita is whatever is sweet or oily, and as whatever is bitter is the primal matter of bile. Although essence may be an abstraction, yet a generic character is clearly assigned to it in the text, and even in recent times recourse has been had to such an assumption in order to explain the difference between the secretions of organs supplied with the same fluids and animated by the same nerves. Thus, it was assumed that there must be for each organ a peculiar essence, a substantia propria (ὑλιχὴ οὐσία), for the fulfilment of its functions as well as the maintenance of its relations and sympathies with the other parts of the system. The text seems to admit of only one essence and one matter to be as the matrix for all things, which is, of course, opposed to the doctrine of elements and the formation of bodies by them; but the hypothesis could treat of them only as primordial entities, however diversified by form their manifestations may be. Aristotle was the first, however, who made form to be the realising principle, to be that which confers upon matter specific character, and constitutes the series of being; and this has been adopted by modern physiologists, as Reil makes form together with variety in the combination of the elements "to be the cause of existing differences in organic bodies and their faculties."
Note 2, p. 58. But bodies, and above all natural bodies.] Living bodies, that is, are broadly distinguished from all others by the innate power of reproducing similar bodies, (similar in a specific sense, that is,) and which are the material for most of the works of man's hand; as the human intellect can confer upon its creations nothing save newness of form. Without asserting that all which is has emanated from living bodies, modern science has shewn that vast masses of matter, now inorganic, were the product of what once had life.
Note 3, p. 59. Thus every natural body partaking of life, &c.] The text seems to be in accordance with what had preceded, but it has been objected to by some on account of its supposed obscurity; it seems, however, to imply that the three primordial conditions, matter, essence and form, are necessary to, and concur in the formation of every specific body.
Note 4, p. 59. And since the body is such a combination, &c.] This passage is obscure both in wording and purport, but it seems to imply that the living body, being what it has been said to be, is independent and self-existent, and, as such, cannot be Vital Principle, because it cannot be among the subordinates of a subject, which is the part seemingly ascribed to Vital Principle, as merely realising what already had existence in potentiality.
Note 5, p. 59. Now reality is, in the twofold signification, &c.] These two terms, which, as has been said, pervade and illustrate Aristotle's philosophical writings, are, themselves illustrated, as it were, here, under the forms of sleep and watching—the one, being the analogue of potentiality, and the latter, of reality—and thus knowledge, although possessed, yet, if not exercised, is only in potentiality; but when actually exercised, it is raised up and converted into reality. It is not easy, without periphrasis, to fix upon an apposite term for the ἐγρήγορσις, which signifies, of course, a state the opposite to sleep—watching, adopted here, and the French réveil seem to imply a forced condition; and "being awake" is hardly definite enough.
Note 6, p. 59. Only this is to be understood of a body which may be organised, &c.] Organs are instruments subservient to the purposes of the living body, as the living body is subservient to the Vital Principle, and Vital Principle, in its turn, subservient to nature's design in creation. So that even plants, although insentient, have organs, but organs which, in contradistinction to those of animals, are homogeneous; as the leaf is said to be formative of all the parts of the fruit. Aristotle distinguished the parts of animals, as is known, as homogeneous (ἀσύνθετα), that is simple or of one nature, as flesh, bone and sinew, and compound (σύνθετα), as hand, foot, &c., which are made up of different or unlike parts. Thus, all the parts which are heterogeneous or unlike, are made up of parts which are homogeneous or like, as a hand, for example, is made up of flesh, tendons and bones; while the parts of plants, on the contrary, are but developments of one simple part, that is the leaf. It is manifest that Aristotle here points, suggestively, to the development of organs by their own innate powers, and thus he may be said to have originated a doctrine which has been adopted, and, perhaps, realised as homologous physiology, by modern science. Goëthe, before the present century, had observed that "whoever looks even casually at the growth of plants, cannot but perceive that certain outward parts often change, and sometimes assume wholly, at other times, partially, the form of parts lying next to them. The secret affinity between the different outward parts of plants, as leaves, calix, corolla, stamen, which are naturally developed out of one another, has been long known; and this process, whereby one and the same organ is seen to undergo manifold changes, has been designated Metamorphosis of Plants." The pericarp is, of course, the seed-vessel, the covering, that is, of the seed, (as the pod of leguminosa, the hairy covering of the chestnut, or the pulpy coat of fruit,) and the germinal part of seeds is by Aristotle compared to the prolific end of the egg which is attached to the oviduct, (τῇ ὕστερᾳ,) as the seed is to pods, husks, or other forms. The seed and fruit are well said to be analogous to an animal body in its state of potentiality, (which may be likened to a state of hybernation,) as ages may pass away without extinguishing that latent existence which, under favourable conditions, being resuscitated, can resume the actions of life. Note 7, p. 59. And the roots are analogous to the mouth, &c.] This is one of those suggestive allusions which characterise Aristotle's writings, and seem to have anticipated knowledge that was yet to be realised; for had it been worked out, science might long since have been in possession of the doctrine of homology. The passage shews that Aristotle had perceived that parts might be designated after their functions rather than their forms, for it is the same process in plants, he observes, only they take in food by their roots, out of the earth, already concocted, and hence they have no excrementitious matter; as for them, the soil and its warmth are as a stomach, while animals have within them a soil, that is a stomach, from which they draw nutrition, as plants do from the earth, until digestion have been completed."
Note 8, p. 60. It is, therefore, to no purpose.] An exemplification of matter and form, as body and Vital Principle, by the analogy of wax and the impress or form given to it by the seal; for these may typify a reality, as a statue may typify a reality in the form given to the marble.
Note 9, p. 60. It has thus then been explained.] This is a wider and closer exemplification than had been given, both of the nature and influence of Vital Principle as the essence in living bodies—for it is to the living body, according to this analogy, what the special property is to the instrument. Thus, vision is the essence of an eye, as cutting is that of an axe, for, could the organ or instrument be deprived of those faculties, they would no longer, save in name, be eye or axe; and this holds good of the living body, which, if deprived of its essence, its Vital Principle that is, being no longer able to fulfil its purposes in creation, is not to be regarded, save in name, as an organised body.
Note 10, p 61. It is then obvious that neither Vital Principle, &c.] There is an apparent contradiction in this passage, owing to the want of completeness in the argument—the Vital Principle, as the essence, cannot be distinct from the organs of the body, since they depend upon it for their functions; but the mind, being impassive, (ἀπαθὴς ὁ νοῦς) and the cause of all the higher faculties, may exist apart from all which is corporeal and even sentient, and thus survive the body's death and decay. Thus, Aristotle has elsewhere observed that it is scarcely possible for anything to be of higher value or more influential than the Vital Principle, and quite impossible that anything should be more so than the mind.
Note 11, p. 61. It is doubtful, however, whether, &c.] Whether, that is, the Vital Principle is separable from the body, as the mariner is from his vessel—whether, as he is not necessarily involved in its wreck, so it may survive the death of the body. But the question evidently pertains to psychology, and can scarcely be entertained amid inquiries into corporeal functions and sympathies; and the chief object of this treatise, is to ascertain what that principle is which, for a stated time, animates and presides over the functions of reproduction, nutrition, growth and decay. It is evident, besides, that Aristotle has annexed, so to say, this high privilege to the mind, as the seat and source of all moral and intellectual qualities and faculties.
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER II.
As the purport of this chapter is to determine the essential or characteristic properties of the Vital Principle in order to attain to a solid definition, it commences, very appropriately, with a short disquisition upon that form, and a protest against any deviation from its real purport; and thus the argument of the foregoing chapter is continued. The opening paragraph is necessarily obscure, from the nature of its topic, but it may be practically at least elucidated, by reference to similar topics in the other works. It is observed by Aristotle, that the antecedent is, absolutely speaking, more apprehensible than the sequence, as a point e.g. is than a line, a line than a surface, and a surface than a solid; so too an unit is more apprehensible than a number (for the unit is the origin of all number), as a single letter is than a syllable. But sometimes, on the other hand, the reverse of this happens—for as it is the solid, especially, which falls under the senses, so the surface is more apprehensible than the line, and the line than the point; as the multitude (οἱ πολλοὶ) are already conversant with them, while the sequences are to be acquired only by attention, or some peculiar mental faculty. Thus, to speak generally, it is best to gather knowledge concerning sequences through their antecedents; for this is by far the most scientific mode of conducting an inquiry. In fine, whatever falls under the senses seems, from being familiar to us, to be more apprehensible than principles or causes, which are more or less abstractions; as, the falling of a stone seems to be more apprehensible than the principle of Gravitation. But as the knowledge of any subject may be also acquired through the study of its accidents, that is, its essential properties, so it is suggested that the knowledge of Vital Principle may be arrived at through the study of its faculties.
CHAPTER II.
Since that which is evident and, when abstractedly considered, more apprehensible may be derived from particulars which are by their nature obscure, although to us more apparent, let us again attempt, bearing this in mind, to attain to a comprehensive view of Vital Principle. It is not only correct that the wording of a definition should shew, as do most definitions, what a thing is, but it ought also to embody and make apparent the cause of its being what it is. But the terms usually employed make definitions to be kinds of conclusions; as if, for instance, to the question "what is a quadrature?" it be answered, that it is to find an equilateral rectangular figure equal to another figure with unequal sides, such a definition is the statement of the conclusion; if it be said that the quadrature is "the discovery of a mean proportional," this conveys the cause of the thing.
We say, then, resuming our inquiry at its outset, that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate by having life. Now the term life has many acceptations but if one only of the following properties, viz. mind, sensibility, locomotion, and rest, as well as the motion concerned in nutrition, growth, and decay be manifested in any object, we say that that object is alive. And, therefore, all plants seem to be alive, for they all appear to have within them a faculty and a principle by which they acquire growth and undergo decay in opposite directions; for they do not grow upwards exclusively, but they grow equally in both these and all other directions, and are alive throughout so long as they are able to imbibe nourishment. It is possible for nutrition to subsist independently of the other functions, but the others cannot possibly, in mortal beings, subsist without it; and this is manifest in plants, since no other than it has been allotted to them. Thus, it is by this faculty of nutrition that life is manifested in living beings, but an animal is characterized above all by sensibility; for we say that creatures endowed with sensibility are not merely living beings but animals, although they may neither be motive nor change their locality. Touch is the sense first manifested in all creatures, and, as the nutritive faculty can be manifested independently of Touch and other senses, so the sense of Touch can be manifested independently of any other. We call nutritive function that part of Vital Principle of which plants partake; but all animals appear besides it to have the sense of Touch; and we shall, hereafter, explain why each of those functions has been allotted. Let it suffice, for the present, to say that Vital Principle is the source of the nutritive, the sentient, cogitative and motive faculties; and that by them it has been defined.
It is easy, with respect to some of those faculties, to perceive, whether any one of them is the Vital Principle, or a part of Vital Principle, and if a part whether it is distinct from other parts substantively, or in an abstract sense only; but there are others which seem to elude investigation. Thus, as some plants appear, after having been divided, and after the parts have been separated, still to be alive, as if the living principle, in each plant, were in reality one, in potentiality more than one, so we see the same occurrence in other distinctions of the Vital Principle, as in insects which have been divided; for each of the parts manifests sensibility and locomotion, and if sensibility, then imagination and desire, as wherever there is feeling, there must be sense of pain and pleasure, and wherever these, there must, of necessity, be desire. We have nothing very certain to offer upon the subject of the mind and the reflective faculties; but the mind seems to be another kind of Vital Principle, and alone to be capable of existing apart from the body, as the everlasting exists apart from the perishable. Thus, it is manifest, from what has been adduced, that the other parts of the Vital Principle are not, as some say, distinct from the body, although it is clear that, when considered absolutely, they are different from it; for the mode of being in a sentient must differ from that in a cogitative being, since feeling differs from thinking, and this applies equally to other functions and faculties. All those faculties besides belong to some animals, particular ones only to others, and there are others to which one only has been allotted, and this constitutes distinctions among animals, the cause of which shall hereafter be considered. But something very like this has taken place with respect to the senses, for some animals have them all; others have particular ones only, and there are others again which have but one; but that one is Touch, which of all is the most necessary.
As that by which we live and feel, like that by which we understand, has a twofold signification, since we speak of that by which we understand sometimes as Knowledge, and sometimes as the Vital Principle, for we say that we understand by either of them; so equally does this apply to that by which we are in health, and which sometimes refers to a particular part of the body, and sometimes to the whole body. Now, the two faculties alluded to, knowledge and health, are a form, a " specific something", a " relation," and an action, as it were, of a recipient, capable in the one case of knowing, and in the other of maintaining health (for the action of creative energies seems to be innate in the impressionable and suitably constituted subject), but the Vital Principle is that by which we live, feel and think, from life's outset; so that, although it may be the cause and form, it cannot be matter and subject. Thus, the essence has a threefold signification, as we have said, in the sense of form, of matter, and the compound of the two; and of these matter is potentiality, and form reality; and since the living being is a compound of the two, the body is not the reality of the Vital Principle, but it, on the contrary, is the reality of a particular kind of body. On which account it is happily assumed by some that the Vital Principle can neither be without the body, nor be itself a body of any kind; for a body it is not, but yet it is something of the body, and, therefore, present innately in the body, and that peculiarly constituted. It is not, that is, in any kind of body, as the earlier writers have maintained, when they attached it to a body without in the least defining either the nature or quality of the body; although it must be against all probability that any kind of recipient should receive any thing taken by chance. But here all takes place as might reasonably be expected—for the realising influence exists congenitally in its own subject, while yet potential, and constituted of matter fitted for its agency. It is then manifest, from what has been adduced, that the realising influence and cause can act only upon that which is potentially capable of becoming such or such a reality.
Notes Layout 2 Note 1, p. 64. It is not only correct that the wording, &c.] Aristotle makes a definition to be a term significant of what a thing essentially is, and, thus a definition may be employed in place of nouns, or one defini for another; but a noun cannot be accepted as an adequate definition, since every definition ought to involve some kind of cause. It is an expression, in fact, which so explains any term as to distinguish it from all else, as a boundary line separates fields. Aristotle, again, makes it to be something laid down (θέσις μὲν ἐστι) as the arithmetician lays down the unit as indivisible, quantitatively considered; and yet this is no hypothesis, since the unit, in itself, is not the same as the unit in relation—that is in combination. The conclusion is the close of a syllogism, and to be distinguished from description which proceeds from particulars, and from definition which is a summary derived from universals. The distinction between these terms is exemplified in the text by a geometrical figure— if we say that the "quadrature is that by which a rectangle with unequal sides is reduced to a square, this is a definition but a definition bordering on description, as it gives no account of how the operation is to be performed, or whether it can be performed at all;" and if we say that "the quadrature is the finding of a mean proportional, the definition partakes of the character of an explanation rather than a description;" for if there be found "a mean proportional between any two lines which make a rectangular figure, that proportional is the side of the required square."
Note 2, p. 64. We say...that the animate, &c.] Nutrition, or the faculty by which matter can identify other matter with itself and thereby develop and grow is the rudimental principle of life, and the distinction between living and inert matter; for inert unlike living matter, increases in bulk, not through its own agency but, only by the casual agglomeration of external particles. This was assumed to be the sole faculty of plants, as Touch was supposed to be the first and the only sense necessary to animal existence; but it may be questioned whether nutrition and Touch are ever thus found as isolated and independent faculties. Cuvier also looked upon nutrition as the characteristic property of living matter; for life consists, he observes, in the faculty possessed by certain corporeal combinations of enduring for a time under some determinate form, of drawing incessantly into their composition portions of surrounding substances, and of giving back to the elements portions of their own substance."
Note 3, p. 66. With respect to some of those faculties, &c.] It is the purport of this passage to shew that, by experiment and observation, we may obtain an insight into the organs and functions of the body; but that, as the mental faculties do not admit of being so scrutinized, the investigation of them is, necessarily, obscure and complicated. The distinction between sentient properties and mental faculties is further exemplified by the lower forms of animal existence, which continue to live, after having been divided, in each of the parts; and as each part has locomotion and manifests feeling, it is assumed that it must also have imagination (instinct?) and desire. But nothing at all resembling this can be predicated of the mind, since, being indiscerptible, it is without parts, and, so constituted, it cannot be subject to the change or dissolution of the body.
Note 4, p. 67. But something very like this has taken place, &c.] Aristotle is everywhere consistent with what is advanced here—for an animal is defined by him as a being furnished with senses, and, above all, with that which first is manifested—the Touch; and, elsewhere, he says, that every animal, as such, must have some one sense, since it is by sensibility that we distinguish what is from what is not an animal. "It is further suggested that animals may be distinguished, grouped that is, after sentient and reasoning faculties, and that Zoology may thus be founded on universal and demonstrable principles.
Note 5, p. 67. As that by which we live and feel.] As life, that is, implies a body and living principle, so knowledge implies faculties and mind; and health the liability to sickness; but as Vital Principle is said to be the cause of life and feeling, it is, as such, a creative energy, and cannot, therefore, be matter and subject. It cannot, that is, be a mere faculty or function, or be subject to what is termed sickness.
Note 6, p. 68. On which account it is happily assumed, &c.] This is a summary of what had been said concerning that something, whatever it be, which constitutes a living body and distinguishes it from inert or inanimate matter; and, although very indefinite, it still is all which can be said concerning it. Aristotle guards against the assumption, as Vital Principle requires for its manifestation peculiar matter and exact relation, that it may animate any kind of body, and thus the argument reverts to living matter and its capability of organism, as the germ, so to say, of animal existence. This necessary relation between the matter and principle is then advanced to refute the doctrine of metempsychosis maintained by the followers of Pythagoras; as the active and passive, the agent and subject, cannot possibly be mere casual associations. The subject is further exemplified, in the closing paragraphs, by those two conditions which pervade all Aristotle's writings—the body while yet in potentiality is, by the Vital Principle, realised, converted, that is into reality; for Vital Principle can act only upon what is in potentiality, and capable, under its influence, with form, of becoming a specific creature.
PRELUDE TO CHAPTER III.