at that time coming to be something. But in infinite series there is no first term, and therefore in this series the first term cannot exist, nor can any subsequent term. Therefore nothing can be either generated or moved or changed. Further, the same thing which admits of motion admits also of the contrary motion and of rest, and that which admits of generation admits also of destruction. Therefore that which comes to be, when it has come to be coming to be, is then in course of perishing sc. which is absurd.; for it does not perish as soon as it is coming to be coming to be, nor afterwards, because that which is perishing must exist. That which comes to be must cease to be, and it can cease to be only when it exists.
Therefore if that which comes to be comes to be coming to be, it must cease to be when it is coming to be; before this it does not exist, but is only coming to be coming to be, and after this it is not "that which comes to be" but "that which has come to be." Further, there must be some matter underlying that which is coming to be or changing. What then will it be? What is it that becomes motion or generation in the same way as it is body or soul that undergoes change? And moreover what is that which is the terminus of the motion? For that which we are considering must be a motion or generation of A from B into C. How then can these conditions be fulfilled? There can be no learning of learning, and therefore there can be no generation of generation. Since there is no motion of substance or of the relative or of activity and passivity, it remains that there is motion in respect of quality, quantity and place; for each of these admits of contrariety. By "quality" I mean not that which is in the substance (for indeed even the differentia is a quality), but the passive quality in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted upon or to be immune from being acted upon. Cf. Aristot. Met.
5.14. The immovable is either that which is wholly incapable of being moved, or that which is scarcely moved in the course of a long time or is slow in starting, or that which would naturally be moved but cannot be moved at the time when and from the place whence and in the way in which it would naturally be moved. This last is the only kind of immovable thing which I recognize as being at rest; for rest is contrary to motion, and so must be a privation of that which admits of motion. Things are "together in place" which are in the primary sense i.e., when they occupy one place to the exclusion of anything else.
Cf. Aristot. Phys. 209a 33-b 1. in one place, and "separate" which are in different places. "Contrary in place" is that which is at a maximum distance in a straight line. I have transferred this sentence from the end of the section, where it is placed in the text, on the ground that it fits more naturally here. I suspect that it, like the displaced portion of sect. 13, was originally a marginal note which was later inserted in the body of the text, but in the wrong position. Things are said to be "in contact" whose extremes are together in place. An "intermediate" is that at which a changing thing which changes continuously in accordance with its nature naturally arrives before it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing.
Since all change takes place between opposites, and these are either contraries or contradictories, and contradictories have no middle term, clearly it is to the sphere of contraries that the intermediate belongs. I have followed Prantl's suggestion in transferring this sentence from the end of sect. 13. "Successive" is that which comes after the beginning (the order being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has nothing of the same class between itself and that which it succeeds; e.g. lines in the case of a line, and units in that of a unit, and a house in the case of a house (but there is nothing to prevent something else from coming between). For that which is successive is a thing which is successive and posterior to some other thing.
1 is not successive to 2, nor is the new moon i.e., the first day of the month. to the second day of the month. "Contiguous" is that which is successive and in contact. The "continuous" is a species of the contiguous. I call two things continuous when their respective boundaries, by which they are kept together in contact, become one and the same; hence clearly the continuous belongs to the sphere of things whose nature it is to become one by contiguity. Clearly "successive" is the most ultimate term; for the successive need not be in contact, but contact implies succession; and if there is continuity there is contact, but if there is contact there is not necessarily continuity; and where there is no contact there is no coalescence. Therefore a point is not the same as a unit; for points admit of contact, whereas units do not, but only of succession; and between points there is something intermediate, but between units there is not.
Our inquiry is concerned with substance; for it is the principles and causes of substances that we are investigating. Indeed if the universe is to be regarded as a whole, substance is its first part; and if it is to be regarded as a succession, Cf. Aristot. Met.
12.10.14, Aristot. Met.
14.3.9. even so substance is first, then quality, then quantity. Moreover, the latter hardly exist at all in the full sense, but are merely qualifications and affections of Being. Otherwise "not-white" and "not-straight" would also exist; at any rate we say that they too "are," e.g., "it is not white." Further, none of the other categories is separately existent. Even the ancients in effect testify to this, for it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and causes. Present-day thinkers Platonists. tend to regard universals as substance, because genera are universal, and they hold that these are more truly principles and substances because they approach the question theoretically; but the ancients identified substance with particular things, e.g. fire and earth, and not with body in general.
Now there are three kinds of substance. One is sensible (and may be either eternal i.e., the celestial bodies. or perishable; the latter, e.g.
plants and animals, is universally recognized); of this we must apprehend the elements, whether they are one or many. Another is immutable, which certain thinkers hold to exist separately; some dividing it into two classes, others combining the Forms and the objects of mathematics into a single class, and others recognizing only the objects of mathematics as of this nature. These three views were held respectively by Plato, Xenocrates and Speusippus. Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.2.3, 4; Aristot.
Met. 13.1.4, and see Introduction. The first two kinds of substance come within the scope of physics, since they involve motion; the last belongs to some other science, if there is no principle common to all three.
Sensible substance is liable to change. Now if change proceeds from opposites or intermediates—not however from all opposites (for speech is not white), but only from the contrary Cf. Aristot. Met.
10.7. —then there must be something underlying which changes into the opposite contrary; for the contraries i.e., contrary qualities. Cf.
Aristot. Met. 8.5.1. do not change. Further, something persists, whereas the contrary does not persist. Therefore besides the contraries there is some third thing, the matter. Now if change is of four kinds, in respect either of substance or of quality or of quantity or of place, and if change of substance is generation or destruction in the simple sense, and change of quantity is increase or decrease, and change of affection is alteration, and change of place is locomotion, then changes must be in each case into the corresponding contrary state. It must be the matter, then, which admits of both contraries, that changes. And since "that which is" is twofold, everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually; e.g. from potentially white to actually white. The same applies to increase and decrease. Hence not only may there be generation accidentally from that which is not, but also everything is generated from that which is, but is potentially and is not actually. And this is the "one" of Anaxagoras; for his "all things were together," Anaxagoras Fr. 1 (Diels). and the "mixture" of Empedocles and Anaximander and the doctrine of Democritus would be better expressed as "all things were together potentially, but not actually." In this passage I follow Ross's punctuation and interpretation, which seem to me to be certainly right. Anaxagoras's undifferentiated infinity of homoeomerous particles (although contrasted with the unifying principle of Mind, cf. Aristot. Met. 1.8.14 ） can be regarded as in a sense a unity. Again, MI=GMA (as Ross points out) in its Aristotelian sense of "complete fusion" is a fair description of Anaximander's "indeterminate." The general meaning of the passage is that in each of the systems referred to the material principle in its elemental state should have been described as existing only potentially. Hence these thinkers must have had some conception of matter. All things which change have matter, but different things have different kinds; and of eternal things such as are not generable but are movable by locomotion have matter; matter, however, which admits not of generation, but of motion from one place to another. Cf. Aristot. Met. 12.1.3, Aristot. Met.
8.1.7, 8. One might raise the question from what sort of "not-being" generation takes place; for not-being has three senses. (1) the negation of a category, (2) falsity, (3) unrealized potentiality. Cf. Aristot. Met.
14.2.10. If a thing exists through a potentiality, nevertheless it is not through a potentiality for any chance thing; different things are derived from different things. Nor is it satisfactory to say that "all things were together," for they differ in their matter, since otherwise why did they become an infinity and not one? For Mind is one; so that if matter is also one, only that could have come to be in actuality whose matter existed potentially. The causes and principles, then, are three; two being the pair of contraries, of which one is the formula or form and the other the privation, and the third being the matter. This classification is found in Aristot. Physics 1.6, 7, but is foreign to the main treatise of the Metaphysics. See Introduction. We must next observe See Introduction. that neither matter nor form (I mean in the proximate sense) is generated.
All change is of some subject by some agent into some object.
The agent is the immediate mover; the subject is the matter; and the object is the form. Thus the process will go on to infinity if not only the bronze comes to be round, but also roundness or bronze comes to be; there must, then, be some stopping-point. We must next observe that every substance is generated from something which has the same name ("substances" including not only natural but all other products).
Things are generated either by art or by nature or by chance or spontaneously. Art is a generative principle in something else; nature is a generative principle in the subject itself In natural reproduction the generative principle is obviously in the parent. But the offspring is in a sense a part of the parent, and so Aristotle identifies the two. (for man begets man); the other causes are privations of these. Cf. Aristot. Met. 11.8.12 n. There are three kinds of substance: (1.) matter, which exists individually in virtue of being apparent Aristotle is contrasting proximate with primary matter. Fire, the primary matter of a man, is a simple undifferentiated element which cannot be perceived as such, and has no individuality. The head, and the other parts of the body, considered merely as in contact and not as forming an organic unity, are the proximate matter of a man; they are perceptible and individual. Flesh (in general) represents the matter in an intermediate stage. (for everything which is characterized by contact and so not by coalescence is matter and substrate; e.g.
fire, flesh and head; these are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in the strictest sense); (2.) the "nature" i.e., form. (existing individually)—i.e. a kind of positive state which is the terminus of motion; and (3.) the particular combination of these, e.g.
Socrates or Callias. In some cases the individuality does not exist apart from the composite substance (e.g., the form of a house does not exist separately, except as the art of building; nor are these forms liable to generation and destruction; there is a distinct sense in which "house" and "health" and every artificial product, considered in the abstract, do or do not exist i.e., in the mind of the architect or doctor. ); if it does so at all, it does so in the case of natural objects. Hence Plato was not far wrong in saying See Introduction. that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural objects; that is if there are Forms distinct from the things of our world. Moving causes are causes in the sense of pre-existent things, but formal causes coexist with their effects.
For it is when the man becomes healthy that health exists, and the shape of the bronze sphere comes into being simultaneously with the bronze sphere. Whether any form remains also afterwards is another question. In some cases there is nothing to prevent this, e.g. the soul may be of this nature (not all of it, but the intelligent part; for presumably all of it cannot be). Clearly then there is no need on these grounds for the Ideas to exist; for man begets man, the individual begetting the particular person. And the same is true of the arts, for the art of medicine is the formula of health. In one sense the causes and principles are different for different things; but in another, if one speaks generally and analogically, they are the same for all. For the question might be raised whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations are the same or different; and similarly with respect to each of the other categories. But it is absurd that they should be the same for all; for then relations and substance would have the same constituents. What then can their common constituent be? For there is nothing common to and yet distinct from substance and the other predicable categories, yet the element is prior to that of which it is an element. Moreover substance is not an element of relations, nor is any of the latter an element of substance. Further, how can all the categories have the same elements? For no element can be the same as that which is composed of elements; e.g., neither B nor A can be the same as BA (nor indeed can any of the "intelligibles," Unity and Being are called intelligibles as being the most universal predicates and as contrasted with particulars, which are sensible. e.g.
Unity or Being, be an element; for these apply in every case, even to composite things); hence no element can be either substance or relation. But it must be one or the other. Therefore the categories have not all the same elements. The truth is that, as we say, in one sense all things have the same elements and in another they have not. E.g., the elements of sensible bodies are, let us say, (1) as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which is the corresponding privation; as matter, that which directly and of its own nature is potentially hot or cold. And not only these are substances, but so are (2) the compounds This apparently refers to the elements; fire and air are hot matter, water and earth cold matter. of which they are principles, and (3) any unity which is generated from hot and cold, e.g. flesh or bone; for the product of hot and cold must be distinct from them. These things, then, have the same elements and principles, although specifically different things have specifically different elements; we cannot, however, say that all things have the same elements in this sense, but only by analogy: i.e., one might say that there are three principles, form, privation and matter. But each of these is different in respect of each class of things, e.g., in the case of color they are white, black, surface; or again there is light, darkness and air, of which day and night are composed. And since not only things which are inherent in an object are its causes, but also certain external things, e.g. the moving cause, clearly "principle" and "element" are not the same; but both are causes.
Principles are divided into these two kinds, and that which moves a thing or brings it to rest is a kind of principle and substance. Thus analogically there are three elements and four causes or principles; but they are different in different cases, and the proximate moving cause is different in different cases. Health, disease, body; and the moving cause is the art of medicine. Form, a particular kind of disorder, bricks; and the moving cause is the art of building. And since in the sphere of natural objects the moving cause of man is man, while in the sphere of objects of thought the moving cause is the form or its contrary, in one sense there are three causes and in another four.
For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of a house, and man begets man; but besides these there is that which as first of all things moves all things. For the first time the ultimate efficient cause is distinguished from the proximate. Aristotle is leading up to the description of the Prime Mover which occupies the latter half of the book. Now since some things can exist in separation and others cannot, it is the former that are substances. And therefore all things have the same causes, because without substance there can be no affections and motions. Next we shall see See Introduction. that these causes are probably soul and body, or mind, appetite and body. Aristotle is thinking of animals and human beings, which are substances in the truest sense. Again, there is another sense in which by analogy the principles are the same viz. actuality and potentiality; but these are different for different things, and apply to them in different ways. For in some cases the same thing exists now actually and now potentially; e.g.
wine or flesh or man (actuality and potentiality also fall under the causes as already described; for the form exists actually if it is separable, and so does the compound of form and matter, and the privation, e.g. darkness or disease; and the matter exists potentially, for it is this which has the potentiality of becoming both i.e., of acquiring either of the contrary qualities distinguished by the form and the privation; but the distinction in virtue of actuality and potentiality applies in a different sense to cases where the matter of cause and effect is not the same, in some of which the form is not the same but different.
E.g., the cause of a man is (i) his elements: fire and earth as matter, and the particular form; (2) some external formal cause, viz.
his father; and besides these (3) the sun and the ecliptic, The sun, moving in the ecliptic, approaches nearer to the earth in summer, causing generation, and recedes farther from the earth in winter, causing destruction. Cf. Aristot. Met. 12.6.10 n., Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 336a 32. which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor identical in form with him, but cause motion. Further, we must observe that some causes can be stated universally, but others cannot. The proximate principles of all things are the proximate actual individual and another individual which exists potentially. i.e., the proximate efficient cause and proximate matter. Therefore the proximate principles are not universal. For it is the particular that is the principle of particulars; "man" in general is the principle of "man" in general, but there is no such person as "man," whereas Peleus is the principle of Achilles and your father of you, and this particular B of this particular BA; but B in general is the principle of BA regarded absolutely. Again, even if the causes of substances are universal, still, as has been said, Aristot.
Met. 12.4.6. different things, i.e.
things which are not in the same genus, as colors, sounds, substances and quantity, have different causes and elements, except in an analogical sense; and the causes of things which are in the same species are different, not in species, but because the causes of individuals are different: your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, although in their universal formula they are the same. As for the question what are the principles or elements of substances and relations and qualities, whether they are the same or different, it is evident that when the terms "principle" and "element" are used with several meanings they are the same for everything; but when the meanings are distinguished, they are not the same but different; except that in a certain sense they are the same for all. In a certain sense they are the same or analogous, because (a) everything has matter, form, privation and a moving cause; (b) the causes of substances may be regarded as the causes of all things, since if substances are destroyed everything is destroyed; and further (c) that which is first in complete reality i.e., the prime mover.
is the cause of all things. In another sense, however, proximate causes are different; there are as many proximate causes as there are contraries which are predicated neither as genera nor with a variety of meanings i.e., individual forms and privations of individual things.; and further the particular material causes are different. Thus we have stated what the principles of sensible things are, and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different. Since we have seen Aristot. Met.
12.1.3, 4. that there are three kinds of substance, two of which are natural and one immutable, we must now discuss the last named and show that there must be some substance which is eternal and immutable. Substances are the primary reality, and if they are all perishable, everything is perishable. But motion cannot be either generated or destroyed, for it always existed Cf. Aristot.
Physics 8.1-3; nor can time, because there can be no priority or posteriority if there is no time. The argument seems to be: If we assume that time was generated, it follows that before that there was no time; but the very term "before" implies time. The same applies to the destruction of time. Hence as time is continuous, so too is motion; for time is either identical with motion or an affection of it. Cf. Aristot. Met. 11.12.1 n. But there is no continuous motion except that which is spatial, of spatial motion only that which is circular. These statements are proved in Aristot. Physics 8.8, 9. But even if we are to suppose that there is something which is kinetic and productive although it does not actually move or produce, there will not necessarily be motion; for that which has a potentiality may not actualize it. Thus it will not help matters if we posit eternal substances, as do the exponents of the Forms, unless there is in them some principle which can cause change. As there is not, according to Aristotle; cf. Aristot. Met.
1.7.4. And even this is not enough, nor is it enough if there is another substance besides the Forms; for unless it actually functions there will not be motion. And it will still not be enough even if it does function, if its essence is potentiality; for there will not be eternal motion, since that which exists potentially may not exist. Therefore there must be a principle of this kind whose essence is actuality.
Furthermore these substances Aristotle is now thinking not only of the prime mover (God or Mind) but also of the movers of the celestial spheres. Cf. Aristot. Met. 12.8.14. must be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything is. Therefore they are actuality. There is a difficulty, however; for it seems that everything which actually functions has a potentiality, whereas not everything which has a potentiality actually functions; so that potentiality is prior. But if this is so, there need be no reality; for everything may be capable of existing, but not yet existent. Yet if we accept the statements of the cosmologists who generate everything from Night, Cf. Hes. WD 17, Hes. Th.
116ff. or the doctrine of the physicists that "all things were together," Cf. Aristot. Met. 12.2.3. we have the same impossibility; for how can there be motion if there is no actual cause? Wood will not move itself—carpentry must act upon it; nor will the menses or the earth move themselves—the seeds must act upon the earth, and the semen on the menses. Hence some, e.g. Leucippus Cf. Aristot. Met.
1.4.12, Aristot. De Caelo 300b 8, and see Burnet, E.G.P. 178.
and Plato, Cf. Plat.
Tim. 30a, and sect. 8 below. posit an eternal actuality, for they say that there is always motion; but why there is, and what it is, they do not say; nor, if it moves in this or that particular way, what the cause is. For nothing is moved at haphazard, but in every case there must be some reason present; as in point of fact things are moved in one way by nature, and in another by force or mind or some other agent. And further, what kind of motion is primary? For this is an extremely important point. Again, Plato at least cannot even explain what it is that he sometimes thinks to be the source of motion, i.e., that which moves itself; for according to him the soul is posterior to motion and coeval with the sensible universe. Aristotle refers to Plato's rather inconsistent account in Plat. Tim. 30-34. Now to suppose that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another wrong; we have explained The reference is probably to 5 above, but cf. Aristot. Met. 9.8. the distinction. But that actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras (since mind is actuality), and by Empedocles with his theory of Love and Strife, and by those who hold that motion is eternal, e.g. Leucippus. Therefore Chaos or Night did not endure for an unlimited time, but the same things have always existed, either passing through a cycle or in accordance with some other principle—that is, if actuality is prior to potentiality. Now if there is a regular cycle, there must be something The sphere of the fixed stars, Aristot. Met. 12.8.9; cf. Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 336a 23ff. which remains always active in the same way; but if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else The sun, which has its own yearly orbit in the ecliptic, and a daily rotation round the earth, which is explained most economically with reference to the rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars. Cf.
Aristot. Met. 12.5.3 n., Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 336a 23ff. which is always active in two different ways. Therefore this must be active in one way independently, and in the other in virtue of something else, i.e.
either of some third active principle or of the first. It must, then, be in virtue of the first; for this is in turn the cause both of the third and of the second. Therefore the first is preferable, since it was the cause of perpetual regular motion, and something else was the cause of variety; and obviously both together make up the cause of perpetual variety.
Now this is just what actually characterizes motions; therefore why need we seek any further principles? Since (a) this is a possible explanation, and (b) if it is not true, we shall have to regard everything as coming from "Night" Aristot. Met. 12.6.6 and "all things together" and "not-being," Aristot. Met.
12.2.2, 3. these difficulties may be considered to be solved.
There is something which is eternally moved with an unceasing motion, and that circular motion. This is evident not merely in theory, but in fact. Therefore the "ultimate heaven" must be eternal. Then there is also something which moves it. And since that which is moved while it moves is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved; something eternal which is both substance and actuality. Now it moves in the following manner. The object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved.
The primary objects of desire and thought are the same. For it is the apparent good that is the object of appetite, and the real good that is the object of the rational will. This shows that desire in general (of which appetite and will are the irrational and rational aspects) has as its object the good. Desire is the result of opinion rather than opinion that of desire; it is the act of thinking that is the starting-point. Now thought is moved by the intelligible, and one of the series of contraries Aristotle himself recognizes two series, lists or columns of contraries, similar to those of the Pythagoreans ( Aristot. Met.
1.5.6 ). One, the positive, contains being, unity, substance, etc.; the other is negative and contains not-being, plurality, non-substance, etc. The negative terms are intelligible only in reference to the positive. Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.2.21. is essentially intelligible. In this series substance stands first, and of substance that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for one signifies a measure, Cf Aristot. Met.
5.6.17. whereas "simple" means that the subject itself is in a certain state.) But the Good, and that which is in itself desirable, are also in the same series; and that which is first in a class is always best or analogous to the best. That the final cause may apply to immovable things is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is not only "the good for something," but also "the good which is the end of some action." In the latter sense it applies to immovable things, although in the former it does not; and it causes motion as being an object of love, whereas all other things cause motion because they are themselves in motion. Now if a thing is moved, it can be otherwise than it is. Therefore if the actuality of "the heaven" is primary locomotion, then in so far as "the heaven" is moved, in this respect at least it is possible for it to be otherwise; i.e. in respect of place, even if not of substantiality. But since there is something—X—which moves while being itself unmoved, existing actually, X cannot be otherwise in any respect. For the primary kind of change is locomotion, Proved in Aristot.
Physics 8.7. and of locomotion circular locomotion Aristot. Physics 8.9 ; and this is the motion which X induces. Thus X is necessarily existent; and qua necessary it is good, and is in this sense a first principle. The argument is: X (the prime mover), since it imparts the primary motion, cannot be liable to motion (or change) of any kind. Therefore it exists of necessity, and must be good (cf.
Aristot. Met. 5.5.6 ); and it is qua good, i.e., the object of desire, that X is a first principle. For the necessary has all these meanings: that which is by constraint because it is contrary to impulse; and that without which excellence is impossible; and that which cannot be otherwise, but is absolutely necessary. Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.5 Such, then, is the first principle upon which depend the sensible universe and the world of nature. And its life is like the best which we temporarily enjoy. It must be in that state always (which for us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure. For the relation of pleasure to actuality or activity see Aristot. Nic. Eth.
10.4. (And for this reason waking, sensation and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them.) Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which is in the highest sense best. Since the prime mover is pure actuality, and has or rather is the highest form of life, Aristotle identifies it with the highest activity—pure thinking. And thought thinks itself through participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the object of thought, i.e. essence, is thought. And it actually functions when it possesses this object. In actualization the subject and object of thought (like those of perception, Aristot. De Anima 3.2.) are identical. Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is. Those who suppose, as do the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, The view is referred to again in Aristot. Met.
Aristot. Met. 14.5.1. that perfect beauty and goodness do not exist in the beginning (on the ground that whereas the first beginnings of plants and animals are causes, it is in the products of these that beauty and perfection are found) are mistaken in their views. For seed comes from prior creatures which are perfect, and that which is first is not the seed but the perfect creature. E.g., one might say that prior to the seed is the man—not he who is produced from the seed, but another man from whom the seed comes. Cf. Aristot. Met. 9.8.4, 5. Thus it is evident from the foregoing account that there is some substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things; and it has also been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but is impartible and indivisible (for it causes motion for infinite time, and nothing finite has an infinite potentiality Cf. Aristot.
Physics 266a24-b6.; and therefore since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it cannot have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no such thing at all); and moreover that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other kinds of motion are posterior to spatial motion. Thus it is clear why this substance has these attributes. We must not disregard the question whether we should hold that there is one substance of this kind or more than one, and if more than one, how