truer sense than body or the solid. Again, some The pre-Socratics. believe that there is nothing of this kind besides sensible things, while others believe in eternal entities more numerous and more real than sensible things. Thus Plato posited the Forms and the objects of mathematics as two kinds of substance, and as a third the substance of sensible bodies; and Speusippus Plato's nephew and successor as the head of the Academy. assumed still more kinds of substances, starting with "the One," and positing principles for each kind: one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and then another for the soul. In this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. Some The followers of Xenocrates, successor to Speusippus. again hold that the Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that other things—lines and planes—are dependent upon them; and soon back to the substance of the visible universe and sensible things. We must consider, then, with regard to these matters, which of the views expressed is right and which wrong; and what things are substances; and whether there are any substances besides the sensible substances, or not; and how sensible substances exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and if so, why and how) or no substance besides the sensible ones. We must first give a rough sketch of what substance is. The term "substance" is used, if not in more, at least in four principal cases; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are held to be the substance of the particular, and fourthly the substrate. The substrate is that of which the rest are predicated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else. Hence we must first determine its nature, for the primary substrate is considered to be in the truest sense substance. Now in one sense we call the matter the substrate; in another, the shape; and in a third, the combination of the two.
By matter I mean, for instance, bronze; by shape, the arrangement of the form; and by the combination of the two, the concrete thing: the statue. Thus if the form is prior to the matter and more truly existent, by the same argument it will also be prior to the combination. We have now stated in outline the nature of substance—that it is not that which is predicated of a subject, but that of which the other things are predicated. But we must not merely define it so, for it is not enough. Not only is the statement itself obscure, but also it makes matter substance; for if matter is not substance, it is beyond our power to say what else is. For when everything else is removed, clearly nothing but matter remains; because all the other things are affections, products and potencies of bodies, and length, breadth and depth are kinds of quantity, and not substances. For quantity is not a substance; rather the substance is that to which these affections primarily belong. But when we take away length and breadth and depth we can see no thing remaining, unless it be the something bounded by them; so that on this view matter must appear to be the only substance. By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor designated by any of the categories which define Being. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each one of the categories; because all other things are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter.
Thus the ultimate substrate is in itself neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor anything else. Nor indeed is it the negations of these; for the negations too will only apply to it accidentally. If we hold this view, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for it is accepted that separability and individuality belong especially to substance. Hence it would seem that the form and the combination of form and matter are more truly substance than matter is. The substance, then, which consists of both—I mean of matter and form—may be dismissed, since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense evident.
We must consider the third type, for this is the most perplexing. Now it is agreed that some sensible things are substances, and so we should begin our inquiry in connection with these. It is convenient to advance to the more intelligible sc. by nature. All learning proceeds by induction from that which is intelligible to us (i.e., the complex facts and objects of our experience, which are bound up with sensation and therefore less intelligible in themselves), to that which is intelligible in itself (i.e., the simple universal principles of scientific knowledge).; for learning is always acquired in this way, by advancing through what is less intelligible by nature to what is more so. And just as in actions it is our task to start from the good of the individual and make absolute good good for the individual, Cf. Aristot. Ethics 1129b 5. so it is our task to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is by nature intelligible intelligible to oneself. Now that which is intelligible and primary to individuals is often but slightly intelligible, and contains but little reality; but nevertheless, starting from that which is imperfectly intelligible but intelligible to oneself, we must try to understand the absolutely intelligible; advancing, as we have said, by means of these very things which are intelligible to us. Since we distinguished at the beginning Aristot. Met. 7.3.1. the number of ways in which substance is defined, and since one of these appeared to be essence, we must investigate this. First, let us make certain linguistic statements about it. The essence of each thing is that which it is said to be per se. "To be you" is not "to be cultured," because you are not of your own nature cultured. Your essence, then, is that which you are said to be of your own nature. But not even all of this is the essence; for the essence is not that which is said to be per se in the sense that whiteness is said to belong to a surface, Cf. Aristot. Met.
5.18.3, 4. because "being a surface" is not "being white." Nor is the essence the combination of both, "being a white surface." Why? Because the word itself is repeated. Hence the formula of the essence of each thing is that which defines the term but does not contain it. Thus if "being a white surface" is the same as "being a smooth surface," "white" and "smooth" are one and the same. The statement that "to be a white surface" is the same as "to be a smooth surface" tells us nothing fresh about surface; it simply identifies "white" with "smooth." Aristotle has in mind Democritus's theory of color (that it is an impression conveyed to our eyes from the superficial texture of the object; Theophrastus, De Sensu 73-75 ); cf. Aristot. De Sensu 442b 11, Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 316a 1. But since in the other categories too there are compounds with substance (because there is a substrate for each category, e.g. quality, quantity, time, place and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of each one of them; whether these compounds, e.g. "white man," also have an essence. Let the compound be denoted by X. Literally "cloak," but the word is chosen quite arbitrarily. Cf. Aristot. Met. 8.6.4.
What is the essence of X? "But this is not even a per se expression." We reply that there are two ways in which a definition can be not per se true of its subject: (a) by an addition, and (b) by an omission. In one case the definition is not per se true because the term which is being defined is combined with something else; as if, e.g., in defining whiteness one were to state the definition of a white man. In the other, because something else (which is not in the definition) is combined with the subject; as if, e.g., X were to denote "white man," and X were defined as "white." "White man" is white, but its essence is not "to be white."
But is "to be X" an essence at all? Surely not. The essence is an individual type; but when a subject has something distinct from it predicated of it, it is not an individual type. E.g., "white man" is not an individual type; that is, assuming that individuality belongs only to substances.
Hence essence belongs to all things the account of which is a definition. We have a definition, not if the name and the account signify the same (for then all accounts would be definitions; because any account can have a name, so that even "the Iliad " will be a definition), but if the account is of something primary. Such are all statements which do not involve the predication of one thing of another. Hence essence will belong to nothing except species of a genus, but to these only; for in these the predicate is not considered to be related to the subject by participation or affection, nor as an accident. But of everything else as well, if it has a name, there will be a formula of what it means —that X belongs to Y; or instead of a simple formula one more exact—but no definition, nor essence. Or perhaps "definition," like the "what," has more than one sense. For the "what" in one sense means the substance and the individual, and in another each one of the categories: quantity, quality, etc. Just as "is" applies to everything, although not in the same way, but primarily to one thing and secondarily to others; so "what it is" applies in an unqualified sense to substance, and to other things in a qualified sense. For we might ask also what quality "is," so that quality also is a "what it is"; not however without qualification, but just as in the case of not-being some say by a verbal quibble that not-being "is"—not in an unqualified sense, but "is" not-being—so too with quality. Now although we must also consider how we should express ourselves in each particular case, it is still more important to consider what the facts are. Hence now, since the language which we are using is clear, similarly essence also will belong primarily and simply to substance, and secondarily to other things as well; just as the "what it is" is not essence simply, but the essence of a quality or quantity. For it must be either by equivocation that we say that these things are, or by adding and subtracting qualifications, as we say that the unknowable is known sc. to be unknowable.; since the truth is that we use the terms neither equivocally nor in the same sense, but just as we use the term "medical" in relation to one and the same thing; but not of one and the same thing, nor yet equivocally. The term "medical" is applied to a body and a function and an instrument, neither equivocally nor in one sense, hut in relation to one thing. Cf.
Aristot. Met. 4.2.2. However, in whichever way one chooses to speak of these things, it matters nothing; but this point is clear: that the primary and unqualified definition, and the essence, belong to substances. It is true that they belong equally to other things too, but not primarily. For if we assume this, it does not necessarily follow that there is a definition of anything which means the same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of formula, i.e. the formula of one thing— one not by continuity like the Iliad, or things which are arbitrarily combined, but in one of the proper senses of "one." And "one" has the same variety of senses as "being." "Being" means sometimes the individual thing, sometimes the quantity, sometimes the quality. Hence even "white man" will have a formula and definition; but in a different sense from the definition of "whiteness" and "substance." The question arises: If one denies that a formula involving an added determinant is a definition, how can there be a definition of terms which are not simple but coupled? Because they can only be explained by adding a determinant. I mean, e.g., there is "nose" and "concavity" and "snubness," the term compounded of the two, because the one is present in the other.
Neither "concavity" nor "snubness" is an accidental, but a per se affection of the nose. Snubness is a per se affection of the nose, because it applies only to the nose and cannot be explained apart from it, but the same can hardly be said of concavity. Aristotle himself uses the word other connections. Nor are they attributes in the sense that "white" is of Callias or a man, because Callias is white and is by accident a man; but in the sense that "male" is an attribute of animal, and equality of quantity, and all other attributes which we say belong per se. That is, all things which involve the formula or name of the subject of the affection, and cannot be explained apart from it. Thus "white" can be explained apart from "man," but not "female" apart from "animal." Thus either these terms have no essence or definition, or else they have it in a different sense, as we have said. But there is also another difficulty about them. If "snub nose" is the same as "concave nose," "snub" will be the same as "concave." But if not, since it is impossible to speak of "snub" apart from the thing of which it is a per se affection (because "snub" means a concavity in the nose), either it is impossible to call the nose snub, or it will be a tautology, "concave-nose nose" because "snub nose" will equal "concave-nose nose." Hence it is absurd that such terms as these should have an essence.
Otherwise there will be an infinite regression; for in "snub-nose nose" there will be yet another nose. Clearly, then, there is definition of substance alone. If there were definition of the other categories also, it would have to involve an added determinant, as in the case of the qualitative; and of the odd, for this cannot be defined apart from number; nor can "female" apart from "animal." By "involving an added determinant" I mean descriptions which involve a tautology, as in the above examples. Now if this is true, there will be no definition of compound expressions either; e.g., "odd number."
We fail to realize this because our terms are not used accurately. If on the other hand there are definitions of these too, either they are defined in a different way, or, as we have said, "definition" and "essence" must be used in more than one sense; thus in one sense there will be no definition of anything, and nothing will have an essence, except substances; and in another those other things will have a definition and essence. It is obvious, then, that the definition is the formula of the essence, and that the essence belongs either only to substances, or especially and primarily and simply. We must inquire whether the essence is the same as the particular thing, or different. This is useful for our inquiry about substance; because a particular thing is considered to be nothing other than its own substance, and the essence is called the substance of the thing. In accidental predications, indeed, the thing itself would seem to be different from its essence; e.g., "white man" is different from "essence of white man." If it were the same, "essence of man" and "essence of white man" would be the same. For "man" and "white man" are the same, they say, and therefore "essence of white man" is the same as "essence of man." But perhaps it is not necessarily true that the essence of accidental combinations is the same as that of the simple terms; because the extremes of the syllogism are not identical with the middle term in the same way. The argument consists of two syllogisms: White=essence of white man. Man=white man. Therefore man=essence of white man. But essence of man=man. Therefore essence of man=essence of white man. The conclusion is faulty because whereas the first identity is assumed to be absolute, the second is accidental. Perhaps it might be thought to follow that the accidental extremes are identical; e.g. "essence of white" and "essence of cultured"; but this is not admitted. Aristotle seems to mean that both "essence of white man and "essence of cultured man" might be proved by the former syllogism to be identical in the same way with the middle term "man," in which case it would seem that "essence of white" and "essence of cultured" are the same. There is, however, the same fallacy as before. But in per se expressions, is the thing necessarily the same as its essence, e.g., if there are substances which have no other substances or entities prior to them, such as some hold the Ideas to be? For if the Ideal Good is to be different from the essence of good, and the Ideal Animal and Being from the essence of animal and being, there will be other substances and entities and Ideas besides the ones which they describe; and prior to them, if essence is substance. And if they are separate from each other, there will be no knowledge of the Ideas, and the essences will not exist (by "being separate" I mean if neither the essence of good is present in the Ideal Good, nor "being good" in the essence of good); for it is when we know the essence of it that we have knowledge of a thing. And it is the same with other essences as with the essence of good; so that if the essence of good is not good, neither will the essence of being "be," nor the essence of one be one. Either all essences exist alike, or none of them; and so if not even the essence of being "is," neither will any other essence exist. Again that to which "essentially good" does not apply cannot be good. Hence "the good" must be one with the essence of good, "the beautiful" with the essence of beauty, and so with all terms which are not dependent upon something else, but self-subsistent and primary. The example of the Ideas as per se terms is used by Aristotle to show incidentally the fallacy of the Ideal theory: there can be no self-subsistent entity apart from the essence. For it is enough if this is so, even if they are not Forms; or perhaps rather even if they are. (At the same time it is clear also that if the Ideas are such as some hold, the substrate will not be substance; for the Ideas must be substances, but not involving a substrate, because if they did involve one they would exist in virtue of its participation in them.) This criticism is irrelevant to the point under discussion. It simply points out that the Ideal theory conflicts with received opinion (cf. Aristot. Met.
7.3.1 ). That each individual thing is one and the same with its essence, and not merely accidentally so, is apparent, not only from the foregoing considerations, but because to have knowledge of the individual is to have knowledge of its essence; so that by setting out examples it is evident that both must be identical. But as for the accidental term, e.g. "cultured" or "white," since it has two meanings, it is not true to say that the term itself is the same as its essence; for both the accidental term and that of which it is an accident are "white," so that in one sense the essence and the term itself are the same, and in another they are not, because the essence is not the same as "the man" or "the white man," but it is the same as the affection. The absurdity <of separating a thing from its essence> will be apparent also if one supplies a name for each essence; for then there will be another essence besides the original one, e.g. the essence of "horse" will have a further essence. Yet why should not some things be identified with their essence from the outset, i.e. to avoid the infinite series implied in the last sentence.
if essence is substance? Indeed not only are the thing and its essence one, but their formula is the same, as is clear from what we have just stated; for it is not by accident that the essence of "one," and "the one," are one. Moreover, if they are different, there will be an infinite series; for the essence of "one" and "the one" will both exist; so that in that case too the same principle will apply. i.e. since there is a distinct term "essence of one" besides "one," there will be a third distinct term "essence of essence of one"; and so on as in the case of "horse" above. Clearly, then, in the case of primary and self-subsistent terms, the individual thing and its essence are one and the same. It is obvious that the sophistical objections to this thesis are met in the same way as the question whether Socrates is the same as the essence of Socrates; for there is no difference either in the grounds for asking the question or in the means of meeting it successfully. We have now explained in what sense the essence is, and in what sense it is not, the same as the individual thing. Of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, others artificially, and others spontaneously; but everything which is generated is generated by something and from something and becomes something. When I say "becomes something" I mean in any of the categories; it may come to be either a particular thing or of some quantity or quality or in some place. Natural generation is the generation of things whose generation is by nature. That from which they are generated is what we call matter; that by which, is something which exists naturally; and that which they become is a man or a plant or something else of this kind, which we call substance in the highest degree. All things which are generated naturally or artificially have matter; for it is possible for each one of them both to be and not to be, and this possibility is the matter in each individual thing. And in general both that from which and that in accordance with which they are generated, is nature; for the thing generated, e.g. plant or animal, has a nature. And that by which they are generated is the so-called "formal" nature, which has the same form as the thing generated (although it is in something else); for man begets man. Such is the generation of things which are naturally generated; the other kinds of generation are called productions. All productions proceed from either art or potency or thought. Some of them are also generated spontaneously and by chance in much the same way as things which are naturally generated; for sometimes even in the sphere of nature the same things are generated both from seed and without it. e.g. fish ( Aristot. Hist. An. 569a 11 ) and insects ( Aristot. Hist. An. 539a 24 ).
We shall consider cases of this kind later. In Aristot. Met.
7.9.
Things are generated artificially whose form is contained in the soul (by "form" I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance); for even contraries have in a sense the same form. The logical connection is: It is sufficient to say that the form of objects which are artificially produced is contained in the soul; for although artificial production can produce contrary effects, the form of the positive effect is the absence of the form of the negative effect, so that in a sense they have the same form. For the substance of the privation is the opposite substance; e.g., health is the substance of disease; for disease is the absence of health, and health is the formula and knowledge in the soul. Now the healthy subject is produced as the result of this reasoning: since health is so-and-so, if the subject is to be healthy, it must have such-and-such a quality, e.g.
homogeneity; and if so, it must have heat. And the physician continues reasoning until he arrives at what he himself finally can do; then the process from this point onwards, i.e. the process towards health, is called "production." Therefore it follows in a sense that health comes from health and a house from a house; that which has matter from that which has not (for the art of medicine or of building is the form of health or the house). By substance without matter I mean the essence. In generations and motions part of the process is called cogitation, and part production—that which proceeds from the starting-point and the form is cogitation, and that which proceeds from the conclusion of the cogitation is production.
Each of the other intermediate measures is carried out in the same way. I mean, e.g., that if A is to be healthy, his physical condition will have to be made uniform. What, then, does being made uniform entail? So-and-so; and this will be achieved if he is made hot. What does this entail? So-and-so; now this is potentially present, and the thing is now in his power. The thing which produces, and from which the process of recovering health begins, is the form in the soul, if the process is artificial; if spontaneous, it is whatever is the starting-point of the production for the artificial producer; as in medical treatment the starting-point is, perhaps, the heating of the patient; and this the doctor produces by friction. Heat in the body, then, is either a part of health, or is followed (directly or through several intermediaries) by something similar which is a part of health. This is the ultimate thing, namely that produces, and in this sense is a part of, health—or of the house (in the form of stones) There is no real analogy between the casual relationship of heat to health and of stones to a house. The former is both material and efficient; the latter only material. Cf. Aristot. Met.
7.9.1. or of other things. Therefore, as we say, generation would be impossible if nothing were already existent. It is clear, then, that some part must necessarily pre-exist; because the matter is a part, since it is matter which pre-exists in the product and becomes something. But then is matter part of the formula? Well, we define bronze circles in both ways; we describe the matter as bronze, and the form as such-and-such a shape; and this shape is the proximate genus in which the circle is placed. The bronze circle, then, has its matter in its formula. Now as for that from which, as matter, things are generated, some things when they are generated are called not "so-and-so," but "made of so-and-so"; e.g., a statue is not called stone, but made of stone. But the man who becomes healthy is not called after that from which he becomes healthy. This is because the generation proceeds from the privation and the substrate, which we call matter (e.g., both "the man" and "the invalid" become healthy), but it is more properly said to proceed from the privation; e.g., a man becomes healthy from being an invalid rather than from being a man. Hence a healthy person is not called an invalid, but a man, and a healthy man.
But where the privation is obscure and has no name—e.g. in bronze the privation of any given shape, or in bricks and wood the privation of the shape of a house—the generation is considered to proceed from these materials, as in the former case from the invalid. Hence just as in the former case the subject is not called that from which it is generated, so in this case the statue is not called wood, but is called by a verbal change not wood, but wooden; not bronze, but made of bronze; not stone, but made of stone; and the house is called not bricks, but made of bricks. For if we consider the matter carefully, we should not even say without qualification that a statue is generated from wood, or a house from bricks; because that from which a thing is generated should not persist, but be changed. This, then, is why we speak in this way. Now since that which is generated is generated by something (by which I mean the starting-point of the process of generation), and from something (by which let us understand not the privation but the matter; for we have already distinguished the meanings of these), and becomes something (i.e. a sphere or circle or whatever else it may be); just as the craftsman does not produce the substrate, i.e. the bronze, so neither does he produce the sphere; except accidentally, inasmuch as the bronze sphere is a sphere, and he makes the former. For to make an individual thing is to make it out of the substrate in the fullest sense. I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make the round or the sphere, but something else; i.e. to produce this form in another medium. For if we make the form, we must make it out of something else; for this has been assumed. E.g., we make a bronze sphere; we do this in the sense that from A, i.e. bronze, we make B, i.e. a sphere. If, then, we make the spherical form itself, clearly we shall have to make it in the same way; and the processes of generation will continue to infinity. It is therefore obvious that the form (or whatever we should call the shape in the sensible thing) is not generated—generation does not apply to it— nor is the essence generated; for this is that which is induced in something else either by art or by nature or by potency. But we do cause a bronze sphere to be, for we produce it from bronze and a sphere; we induce the form into this particular matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general is generated, something must be generated from something; for that which is generated will always have to be divisible, and be partly one thing and partly another; I mean partly matter and partly form. If then a sphere is the figure whose circumference is everywhere equidistant from the center, part of this will be the medium in which that which we produce will be contained, and part will be in that medium; and the whole will be the thing generated, as in the case of the bronze sphere. It is obvious, then, from what we have said, that the thing in the sense of form or essence is not generated, whereas the concrete whole which is called after it is generated; and that in everything that is generated matter is present, and one part is matter and the other form. Is there then some sphere besides the particular spheres, or some house besides the bricks? Surely no individual thing would ever have been generated if form had existed thus independently. If forms are self-subsistent substances, individual substances cannot be generated from them; for the individual contains the form, but one substance cannot contain another actually existing substance ( Aristot. Met.
7.8.8 ). Form, however, is not a substance but a characteristic. Form means "of such a kind"; it is not a definite individual, but we produce or generate from the individual something "of such a kind"; and when it is generated it is an individual "of such a kind." The whole individual, Callias or Socrates, corresponds to "this bronze sphere," but "man" and "animal" correspond to bronze sphere in general. Obviously therefore the cause which consists of the Forms (in the sense in which some speak of them, assuming that there are certain entities besides particulars), in respect at least of generation and destruction, is useless; nor, for this reason at any rate, should they be regarded as self-subsistent substances. Indeed in some cases it is even obvious that that which generates is of the same kind as that which is generated—not however identical with it, nor numerically one with it, but formally one—e.g. in natural productions (for man begets man), unless something happens contrary to nature, as when a horse sires a mule. And even these cases are similar; for that which would be common to both horse and ass, the genus immediately above them, has no name; but it would probably be both, just as the mule is both. Normally the sire communicates his form to the offspring. In the case of a mule, the material element contributed by the dam, which is an ass, limits the effect of the formal element contributed bu the sire, which is a horse; but even so the form of the sire is generically the same as that of the offspring.
Thus obviously there is no need to set up a form as a pattern (for we should have looked for Forms in these cases especially, since living things are in a special sense substances); the thing which generates is sufficient to produce, and to be the cause of the form in the matter. The completed whole, such-and-such a form induced in this flesh and these bones, is Callias or Socrates. And it is different from that which generated it, because the matter is different but identical in form, because the form is indivisible. The question might be raised why some things are generated both artificially and house. The reason is that in some cases the matter—which is the starting-point of the process in the production and generation of artificial things, and in which some part of the result is already existent—is such that it can initiate its own motion, and in other cases it is not; and of the former kind some can initiate motion in a particular way, and some cannot. For many things can move themselves, but not in a particular way, e.g. so as to dance. It is impossible, then, for any things whose matter is of this kind (e.g.
stones) to be moved in this particular way except by something else; but in that particular way it is possible. And it is so with fire. Stones can fall by themselves, but cannot by themselves build a house; fire can rise by itself, but cannot boil a kettle. For this reason some things cannot exist apart from the possessor of the art, and others can; because the motion can be initiated by those things which do not indeed possess the art, but can themselves be moved either by other things which do not possess the art, or by the motion from the part of the product which pre-exists in them. e.g., health can be produced as the result of the activity set up by heat in the body. It is clear also from what we have said that in a sense all artificial things are generated either from something which bears the same name (as is the case with natural objects) or from a part of themselves which bears the same name as themselves (e.g. a house from a house, inasmuch as it is generated by mind; for the art is the form), or from something which contains some part; that is if the generation is not accidental; for the direct and independent cause of the production is a part of the product. Heat in the motion produces heat in the body; and either this is health or a part of health, or a part of health or health accompanies it. And this is why heat is said to produce health, because it produces that of which health is a concomitant and consequence. Therefore as essence is the starting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms start from the "what" of a thing), so too generation proceeds from it. And it is the same with natural formations as it is with the products of art. For the seed produces just as do those things which function by art. It contains the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes has in some sense the same name as the product (for we must not expect that all should have the same name in the sense that "man" is produced by "man"—since woman is also produced by man); unless the product is a freak. This is why a mule is not produced by a