In this third edition, the translation of Aristotle’s Rhe- toric has bee=. again carefully compared with the Greek, and revised and corrected throughout. Numerous ex~ planatory and illustrative notes have also been added; as well as a marginal analysis, which it is presumed will be found of much service to the reader.
The famous Thomas Hobbes’ Brief of the Art of Rhetoric’, “containing in substance all that Aristotle hath written in his three books on that subject,” and forming the best summary of this noble science, has been again reprinted from the scarce edition published at London in 1681. A body of Analytical Questions, for self-examination, has also been appended. | With these improvements, the Editor confidently opes that the present volume will be found to contain, not only the most faithful version of the Rhetoric of Aristotle, but the best helps for the d: e understanding and retaining the sense thereof.
Ozford. November, 1846.
In the present new edition of the Oxford version of the Rhetoric, it has been thought advisable not to interfere either with the text, notes, or Questions, all being of acknowledged excellence. But, as Hobbes, by the IV TO THE READER.
quaintness of his Analysis, at times lost sight of the precise character of the original definitions, an Appen dix has been added, containing the very words of Aristotle, connected by such remarks as were necessary to preserve clearness, and furnishing such passages as should be almost learnt by heart.
The new translation of the Poetic is an attempt to unite the closeness of Taylor with the perspicuity of Twining, upon whose versions it has principally been based.. A copious selection from the notes of the last named scholar has been added, together with a few ne- cessary ones from recent.sources by the present Editor, THEOoNORE Atos Buck ey, Cerist CHURCH.
ARISTOTLES TREATISE ON RHETORIC, BOOK I.—CHAP. I.
That Rhetoric, like Logic, is conversant with no definite class of subjects; that it is useful; and that tts business as not absolutely to persuade, but to recognise topies fitted to persuade, Rueroric! is the counterpart of logic?; since both are conversant with subjects of such a nature as it is the business of all to have acertain knowledge of, and which belong to no distinct science. Wherefore all men in some way participate of both*; since all, to a 1 Aristotle appears to have contemplated a much greater va- riety of occasions for the exercise of his 'Ῥητορικὴ, than we consider proper to that ill-defined art, or habit, or faculty, vaguely called rhetoric. In fact, according to him, any man who attempts to persuade another, under whatever circum- stances, and with whatever object, may be said to exercise ῥητορικὴ.
2 Muretus explains the passage as conveying a censure on Plato, who extolled logic, but compared rhetoric to cookery— ὀψοποιητικῆ. He therefore would have it convey this mean- ing, ‘“‘ Rhetoric is the counterpart, not of cookery, as Plato asserts, but of his own favourite science, dialectics.” See also 8 Sir Ρ, Sidney, arguing that all arts are but attempts to methodise natural subjects, says, that “‘ the rhetorician and lo- gician, considering what in nature will soonest prove and per- snade, thereon give artificial rules, which are still compressed within the circle of a question, according to the proposed mat- tex.’ Defense of Poetry.
B 1. Rheto ric corre- sponds te Logic..
2.
That we ean re- duce them to a sys- tem, 3. Stric- tures on previous systems, ‘certain extent, attempt, as well to sift, as to maintain an argument; as well to defend themselves, as to im- peach*. Now, of the multitude®, some do this at ran- dom; others, by reason of practice, from habit; but as it is possible either way, it is plam that the case wilh admit of our reducing these things toa system. For we are at liberty to speculate on the causes of the success, as well of those who from practice, as of those who on the spur of the moment, [attempt either to convince or to persuade]. And every one will be antecedently prepared to acknowledge that an undertaking of this description is the business of art®.
Hitherto, however, such as have compiled systems of oratory have executed a very trifling part of it; for the means of making credible? alone come pro- 4’ E€eraCew καὶ ὑπέχειν, qua Loegicians; ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν, qua Rhetoricians: so that the faculties which form the basis of each of these arts appear to be natural to every man. Zeno elegantly illustrated the distinction between the two by a simile taken from the hand. The close power of Logic he compared to the jist, or hand compressed; the diffuse power of Rhetoric to the palm, or hand open. Cicero, Orator.
5 The vulgar ean give reasons to a certain degree, and can examine, after a manner, the reasons given them by others. And what is this but Narurau Logic? If therefore these efforts of theirs have an effect, and nothing happen without a cause, this effect must of necessity be derived from certain principles. The question then is, What these principles are; for if these can once be investigated, and then knowingly ap- plied, we shall be enabled to do by rude what others do by Aazard; and in what we do, as much to excel the uninstructed reasoner, as a disciplined boxer surpasses an untaught rustic. Harris’s Philosophical Arrang. ch. i.
6 An effect is produced; sometimes indeed accidentally, and sometimes from the person’s having been habituated to that which he attempts. Now if we can ascertain and methodise the causes of this his success, so as to insure the success of subsequent attempts, we shall have constructed something similar to an art: for, in some points, chance and art are not un.ike; whence the verse of Agatho;— Τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχην τέχνην. pee rsh Bee Eth. Nich. vi. 4.
7 Iliorts.—If the translation of this word shall appear fre- quently to be vague and indeterminate, the reader is requested to observe that we have no equivalent expression in English; for it is conceived that “‘ proof”? (the usual translation) always implies something qualified to convince the understanding; euar 1 RHETORIC 3 perly within the sphere of the art, but other points are merely adscititious. On the subject of enthymems, Neglect of however, which in point of fact is the very body of oe wees proof, these men say not a word; while on points ~ foreign to the subject they busy themselves most mightily. Now the feeling of ill-will’, pity, and anger, 4. Hence and the like emotions of themind, appertain not to the ἘΜῸΝ a case, but refer to the judge; so that if, in regard to all the pas- judicial processes, matters were regulated as they now sions. are in some states, (and more particularly in such as are well constituted, ) these spokesmen would not have a word tosay. And every one{ approves the regula- 5. tion |, whether they think that the law should hold this language, or whether they avail themselves of the rule, and positively forbid to speak irrelevantly to the case; just as they do in the Areopagus, observing this usage properly enough. For it is not right that an orator should bias the judge by winning him on to anger, or pity, or jealousy; since it is equally absurd as though one were to make a ruler crooked which he is about to use®. It is further evident that the 6. pleader’s business is nothing more than to prove the matter of fact, either that it is, or is not the case; that it has, or has not happened. But as to the question whether it be important or trifling, just or whereas Aristotle designates by the word πίστις, every thing which has a tendency to persuade the will. It is not, however, meant to be denied that proof (properly such) frequently has, and always ought to have, a tendency to persuade; but, at the same time, it would be too much to say that it is the only thing which is qualified todo so. Wide Mitchell’s Aristoph. vol. i.; Pal. Diss. p. 72; ibid. p. 75.
® For a similar use of the word διαβολὴ, cf. Thucyd. lib. i. ο. 127.—ob μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἤλπιζον παθεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τοῦτο, ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν.
9 Κριτὴς τοῦ νόμου κάνων. Aristotle employs the same me- taphor in his Ethics:---τοὺ γὰρ αὐὀρίστου, αὔριστος καὶ 6 κακών ἐστιν, ὥσπε; καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς, ὁ μολύβδινος κανών" πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμω τοῦ λίθον μετακινεῖται, καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ καώ Lib. y. c. 10. See Lucretius, iv. 516.— Denique ut in fabrica, si prava est regula prima, Normague si fallax rectis regionibus exit, Omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est, etc.
7. Rea sons why as little as possible should be left to the judge. Ist.
2nd.
3rd.
Sabi L etal Seay: ARISTOTLE’S ~y. unjust, whatever questions of this nature the legis- lator has not determined; on these the judge must somehow or other make up his mind of himself, and not take instructions on them from the parties at is- sue. It would then be most admirably adapted to the purposes of justice, if laws properly enacted were, as far as circumstances admitted, of themselves to mark out all cases, and to abandon as few as pos- sible to the discretion of the judge. And this be- cause, in the first place, it is easier to get one or a few of good sense, and of ability to legislate and ad- judge, than to get many 9: and next to this, legisla- tive enactments proceed from men carrying their views a long time back; [or, from men who have reflected on the subject for a long time;] while judi- cial decisions are made off hand; so that it is diffi- cult for persons deciding under these circumstances to assign what is just and expedient: and, what is most of all to the point, is this, that the award of the legislator is not particular nor about present cir- cumstances, but about what is future and general; whereas the member of a popular assembly and the judge decide on points actually present and definite; and under their circumstances, feelings of partiality, and dislike, and personal expediency, will, in many instances, RSA AB have been interwoven with the case; and to such a degree, that one is no longer able, adequately, to contemplate the truth, and that personal pleasure or pain throws a shade over the 10 As the young man can learn consequences (ὅτε) ere he discovers principles, (διότι, Eth. lib. i.,) so can most men bet- ter judge of individual cases by δικαστικὴ φρόνησις, than frame laws by νομοθετικὴ φρόνησις. (Eth. lib. vi.) And this is proved by the universal bias of orators to individual cases founded on law. To borrow an illustration from the arts, we may say, that as a person placed in the centre of a landscape has a fuller view of any individual object in it than the painter himself, but loses proportionately the general effect; so the judge can discern all the particulars of a given case, but cannot, as the. legislator who contemplates at a distance, view so well the general bearings and effects of any law when united or con- trasted with others. Cf. also the Ethics, lib. v. c. 1.—épOées μὲν νόμος ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς" χεῖρον δὲ ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένοτ.
CHAP. I.] RHETORIC -§ abandon to the discretion of the judges; since it is not possible that the legislator ever should foresee them.
If these things be so, it is plain that they embrace in their systems matters foreign to the subject, who give us explanations of the other points, as for in- stance—what the proem, and the narration, and the other divisions, ought severally to embrace: for in these treatises they busy themselves about nothing else, except how to render the judge of a certain dis- position; while on the subject of those means of persuasion, recognised by art, they discover nothing; and yet this is the source whence an orator may be- come a good reasoner. And it is for this reason that, notwithstanding the same system is conversant about deliberative and judicial cases, and although the business of the senate is more honourable, and embraces higher social interests, than that whose subject is merely the transactions of individuals; yet about the former they say not one word, while all undertake to frame systems of judicial pleading. And! they are not without a reason for this, since #2 Jt is not in the nature of things that any human legislator should determine on the infinite number of possible cases; or that he should not, with regard to some, be an unsafe guide to our decisions: for the last of these inconveniences we have a remedy in ἐπεεέκεια; since equity is, as he subsequently de- scribes it, τὸ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα, and τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον dixatov.—lib. i. c. xii. § 13. And again in the Ethics, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἡ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου, v. 10.
18. This error is a consequence on the ene mentioned before, § 3: from the disregard there noticed of the enthymem and πίστις, orators are naturally led to attach themselves to that branch of public speaking which requires enthymem least; and such is judicial pleading, inasmuch as the cause there rests mainly on evidence, properly so called, on the ἀτέχναι πίστειε. Aristotle himself gives as another reason for this preference, the greater ease of judicial oratory. (Vide lib. iii. c. xvii. § 10.)
so sons why men pre- fer judi- cial to de« liberative oratory.
in deliberative speeches it is less worth while to state matters foreign to the subject, and a deliberative speech admits less of malicious sophistry than judi- cial pleading, but is more widely interesting; for here the judge [i. 6. the senator | decides on questions which nearly interest himself, so that no more is ne- cessary than to prove that the question stands just as he, the adviser, asserts. In judicial questions, how- ever, this is not sufficient, but it is worth while τὸ engage the hearer; for the decision is about a ease which does not affect himself: so that the judges, looking to their own gratification, and listening with a view to amusement, surrender themselves up to the pleaders; and, strictly speaking, do not fulfil the character of judges!4. On which very account the law, in many places, as I before remarked, forbids And this he proves, first, because that which has been is plain to all, even to diviners; secondly, the orator having law for a premiss, the demonstration is easier. To these reasons may be added one which the master of Alexander weuld not willingly have allowed, namely, the loss of liberty to Greece, and the consequent loss of all interest in deliberative questions, to men whose future fates were totally out of their own power.
14 A writer in the Quarterly Review, No. 26, after contrasting the perplexity of English law with the simplicity of Athenian jurisprudence, says, “‘ This simplicity in the law made it the orator’s business less to hunt for cases and precedents than te discriminate character; less to seareh for errors in a bill than for flaws or errors in a witness’s life or testimony. And the prevalence of this practice may be inferred from a subsequent passage in this book, (c. ix. § 38,) where Isocrates is mentioned as an adept in the comparison of characters, ‘ which,” says Aristotle, “ he used to do to further his familiarity with judicial pleading.” To this we may subjoin the following remarks of Mitford on a speech by Alcibiades: ‘‘ The multitude ordinarily composing an Athenian court of justice was so great, that the pleaders always addressed it as under the impulse of the same interests, and subject to the same feelings as the general as- sembly, and equally without responsibility. Impartiality was never supposed; the passions were always applied to; and it never failed to he contended between the parties, which could most persuade the jurors that their interest was implicated with his, and that by deciding in his favour they would be gainers.” Hist. of Greece, vol. v. p. 94. So also Xenophon, in his Athe- nian Republic, c. 1. § 13.---οἶν τε τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ob τοῦ δικαίων αὐτοῖς μέλει μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῖς ξυμῴφέροντος.
CHAP. χ.ἢ RHETORIC. 7 the saying any thing irrelevant; but there [in deli- berative assemblies} the judges are, of themselves, careful enough of this.
But as it is plain that an artificial system is con- 11. Rea- versant about the means of making credible, and as ταν πέτα this isa sort of proof, (because we are then most per- cian will suaded when we conceive that the point has been probenly proved,) but the proof of rhetoric is enthymem, (and λυ τ he this, to speak generally, has the most sovereign effect torician. of all the means of persuasion;) and the enthymem is a sort of syllogism; since too it is the province of logic to consider equally every sort of syllogism, whether of that art as a whole, or of some particular branch of it; then, these points being admitted, it is evident that the man best able to consider the ques- tion, out of what sources and how the syllogism arises, ‘will moreover be in the highest degree capable of employing enthymems; provided he make himself acquainted, besides his logic, w:th the kind of sub- jects about which enthymems are conversant, and what differences they exhibit as compared with the syllogism of logic. Because it belongs to the same faculty of the mind to recognise both truth and the Ganblanee OF WANT ἐπὰ Tore Than Tis; mankind have a’? tolerable natural tendency toward that which is true; and, in general, hit the truth; wherefore an. aptness in conjecturing probabilities belongs to him who has a similar aptness in regard to truth. It is ‘ eee plain, then, that other rhetoricians embrace in their systems, points foreign to the subject, and what rea- sons they have for inclining to the subject of judi- cial pleading in preference to the other branches of rhetoric.
But rhetoric is wseful, because truth and justice 12, Util- are in their nature stronger than their opposites; so tyof | that if decisions be made, net in conformity to the eo ag rule of propriety, it must have been that they have Ist. been got the better of, through fault of the advocates themselves: and this is deserving reprehension. Fur- 2nd.
15 εφύκασιν ἱκανῶς, have naturally a considerable aptitude teward what, is true.
thermore, in the case of some people, not even if we had the most accurate scientific knowledge, would it be easy to persuade them were we to address them through the medium of that knowledge; for a scien- tific discourse, it is the privilege of education [to ap- preciate], and it is impossible that this [should ex- tend to the multitude!*]; but we must construct our means of persuasion, and our addresses, through the medium of ordinary language; as in fact I stated in my ‘Topics, “on the manner of communicating with 8rd. the multitude.” Again, too, we ought to be able to 4th .
persuade on opposite sides of a question; as also we ought in the case of arguing by syllogism: not that we should practise both, for it is not right to persuade to what is bad; but in order that the bearing of the case may not escape us, and that when another makes an unfair use of these reasonings, we may be able to solve them.!7 Now, of all the other arts, there is not one which embraces contraries in its conclu- sions; but logic and rhetoric alone do this; for they are both in an equal degree'® conversant about con- traries; not, however, that these contrary subjects present equal facilities: but the true and better side of the question is always naturally of a more easy inference, and has, generally speaking, a greater tend- ency to persuade. To illustrate further the utility of rhetoric, it were absurd, if, while it is disgraceful 16 The communication of ideas requires a similitude of thought and language: the discourse of a philosopher would vibrate without effect on the ear of a peasant. Gibbon’s De- cline and Fall, c. 1. note 90.
17 In the words of Falconbridge, let the orator resolve to ὧν smack of observation; Which, though I will not practise to deceive, Yet, to avoid deceit, I mean to learn.”
'8 Riccobon remarks, that a person may at first be inclined to doubt the truth of the assertion that Rhetoric and Logic alone recognise contraries; seeing that music, for instance, re- cognises harmony and discord; grammar, the improprieties and the proprieties of language, etc. This doubt is however removed, he says, by the word ὁμοίως, for these alone recoge nise with egwal propriety each of the two contraries; whereas other arts apply more strictly to one than to another.
CHAP. τ. RHETORIC. 9 for a man not to be able to assist himself by his per- son, it were not disgraceful to be unable to do this by his speech, which is more a peculiarity of man than the exercise of the body’. If, however, [any one should object”°] that a person, unfairly availing him- self of such powers of speaking, may be, in a very high degree, injurious; this is an objection which will lie in some degree against every good indis- criminately, except virtue; and with especial force against those which are most advantageous, as strength, health, wealth, and generalship. Because, employing these fairly, a person may be beneficial in points of the highest importance; and, by employing them unfairly, may be equally injurious.
That rhetoric, then, is conversant not with any one distinct class of subjects, but like logic [is of universal applicability ], and that it is useful, is evident; as also that its business is not absolute persuasion ”', but to consider on every subject what means of persuasion are inherent in it; just as is also the case in every 19 This is an ἃ minort argument, to understand the full force of which we ought to bear in mind the great importance at- tached to the δύναμις ἀγωνιστικὴ by the Greeks.
20 Non tamen idcirco crimen liber omnis habebit: Nil prodest quod non ledere possit idem. Igne quid utilius? Si quis tamen urere tecta Comparat, audaces instruit igne manus. Eripit interdum, modo dat medicina salutem, Queque juvans monstrat, queeque sit herba nocens. Et latro, et cautus precingitur ense viator: Ille sed insidias, hic sibi portat opem. Discitur innocuas ut agat facundia causas: Protegit hec sontes, immeritosque premit. Ovid. Trist. lib. ii. 1. 265.
21 Having told us what we may expect from Rhetoric, he now tells us what we are not to expect from it. Persuasion, though: the end, is not the duty of rhetoric: ‘‘ Officium ejus facultatis videtur esse, dicere apposite ad persuadendum: Finis, persuadere dictione.”’ (Cicero de Inv.) In the arts whose foundation is conjectural [στοχαστικαὶ τέχναι], among which we must class rhetoric, if the artist had done all that the case admitted, his duty was conceived to have been fulfilled, and he was entitled to commendation though he had entirely failed of success..
jection against the abuse of it an- swered, 14. End and duty of Rheto- ric.
Differ- ence in Logic and Rhetoric as regards 10 ARISTOTLE 8 ΓΒΟΟΚῚ other art: for neither is it the duty of medicine to render its patient healthy, but to bring him on as far as the case admits; for it is nevertheless very possi- ble to treat properly even such as may be incapable of again partaking of health: and besides this [it is evident that it belongs to the self-same art to ob- serve both the real and seeming means of persuasion; just as it is incumbent on logic to consider syllogisms and apparent syllogisms. And this is the case, be- cause the character of sophist does not consist in the faculty” | for the logician possesses this as well as he], but in his fixed design [of abusing 138], Here [in 33 That he is consistent in thus classifying characters accord- ing to their moral principles, will appear from his application of the appellation ᾿Αλαζὼν by the same rule in the Ethics: Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζὼν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν TH προαιρέσει. Ethics, iv. c. 7.
78 In order more fully to illustrate the nature of rhetoric, Aristotle has considered it throughout this chapter as analogous to logic. Each, he says, is founded on a faculty naturally pos- sessed by all men; each is useful, and applicable with equal propriety to any class of subjects whatever. Besides this, lo- gic and rhetoric alone, of all arts, are equally conversant with opposite inferences; and of course with sound and specious arguments (whether in the form of syllogism or enthymem). Now as logic and rhetoric are in their own nature indifferent to truth or falsehood, it must require an act of choice in either case to select the former or the latter, and the constant repeti- tion of that choice will ultimately form a corresponding habit. Hence the διαλεκτικὸς may be considered as δυνάμει σοφιστὴς, and the σοφιστὴς as δυνάμει διαλεκτικὸς. But when logic is prostituted to the support of false propositions, by the bad principles (the προαίρεσις) of its professors, it is branded with the name of sophistry, and the persons who so misapply it are called sophists: whereas, in the case of rhetoric, no such dis- tinction in reference to the principles of its professors ever ob- tained; but the name of orator is enjoyed equally by all who are masters of the art, whether they exercise it fairly or not, ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, Ῥήτωρ. A reason for this distinction may per- haps be furnished from the nature of the subject-matter respectively. The subject-matter of logic is ἀληθὲς, which is uniform, absolute, and admits not of degrees. Hence the so- phistical logician may fairly be supposed aware of the fallacy he uses, and is stigmatized accordingly. But the subject-mat- ter of rhetoric being τὸ ὅμοιον To ἀληθεῖ, (v. § 11,) or πεθανὸν, has many and various degrees, from the lowest presumption ] CHAP. 11. RHETORIC. " rhetoric |, however, the one who is considered in re- ference simply to his knowledge of the art, as well as he who is considered in reference to his moral prin- ciples, is indiscriminately designated an orator. But in logic, a sophist is called so in reference to his moral principles; a logician, however, without reference to his principles, simply as regards the faculty he is master of.
However, commencing from this point, let us at- tempt to treat of the system both from what sources and in what manner we shall be able to attain the proposed objects; having then once more, as at the outset, defined what this art is, let us treat of what remains, CHAP. II.
Definition of Rhetoric.—Eixi¢:—Xnpsiov:—Texpnooyv:-π’ their differences.— Example.
Let us define rhetoric to be, “ A faculty of consider- ing all the possible means of persuasion on every sub- ject;” for this is the business of no one of the other ~ arts, each of which is fit enough to inform or persuade respecting its own subject; medicine, for instance, on what conduces to health or sickness; and geome- try, on the subject of relations incidental to magni- tudes; and arithmetic, on the subject of numbers; and in the same way the remaining arts and sciences. But rhetoric, as I may say, seems able to consider the \ means of persuasion on any given subject whatso- ever. And hence I declare it to have for its province, as an art, no particular limited class of subjects. Now of the means of effecting persuasion, some originate in the art, others independently of it. By inartificial up to moral certainty. Here then a fallacy is not so easily discoverable, even by the orator himself; and candour re- quires us not to brand as moral what after all may be merely mental imperfection in the speaker.
the name of the profess- ors.
1, Defini- tion of Rhetoric.
2. Two classes of πίστεις —EVTEY= νοι, kev νοι.
I mean whatever are not furnished forth by our own means, but which are in existence already, as wit- nesses, torture, deeds, and all of this kind; by artifi- cial, such as may be got up by means of the system, and by our own talents. So that as regards these, we have to employ the one class, to discover the other.
8. Of means of persuading by speaking there are three species!: some consist in the character of the speaker; others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; others in the thing itself which is said, by rea- son of its proving, or appearing to prove the point.
4. i. Cha- [ Persuasion is effected | by means of the moral characaged of ter, when the speech shall have been spoken in such e speak-.
er. a way as to render the speaker worthy confidence: for we place confidence in the good to a wider extent, and with less hesitation, on all subjects generally; but on points where no real accuracy exists, but there is room for doubt, we even entirely confide in them. This feeling, however, should arise by means of the speech, and not by reason of its having been precon- ceived that the speaker is a certain kind of man. For it is not true, as some treatise-mongers lay down in their systems, of the probity of the speaker, that it contributes nothing to persuasion; but moral charac- ter nearly, I may say, carries with it the most soveδ. ii. Feel- reign efficacy in making credible?. [Persuasion is ings ofthe effected] through the medium of the hearers, when auditor. Η they shall have been brought to a state of excitement under the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced by pain or joy, or partiality or dis- * like, award our decisions in the same way; about which means of persuasion alone, I declare that the 1 Πίστεις διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ΟΥ̓ artificial, of three kinds, ἐν Te ἠθεῖ τοῦ λέγοντος--ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴς διαθεῖναί wios—év αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ.
2 ih so high estimation did Menander hold the manner of an address, that he attributed the whole effect to it;—rTpd7a, ἔσθ᾽ ὁ πείθων τοῦ λέγοντος, οὐ λόγος. And as Plutarch ob: serves upon this line, καὶ τρόπος μὲν οὔν Kai λόγος" ἢ TPO'TIOS ΔΙΑ AO'TUY. De Audiend. Poet. t. i. Op. Mor. p. 125. edit. Wyttenb.
CHAP. Ii.. RHETORIC. 13 system-mongers of the present day busy themselves. On the subject of these, however, some light will be afforded, when I speak on the subject of the passions.
Men give credit from the force of what is said, 6. iii. The when out of the means of persuasion which attach to SPcech it- each subject, we evince the truth, or that which ap- ~~ pears so. Now as persuasion is effected by these 7. Rhetomeans, it is plain that it will be the privilege of him "ean of who is able to draw inferences syllogistically, and to pjalectics take a full view of the subject of morals, and of the and Peli- virtues, and thirdly of the passions, both what each 4°: of the passions is, of what nature it is, and from what causes it is engendered, and how: so that the fact is, that rhetoric is, as it were, a kind of off-shoot of logic, and of that department of moral philosophy which it is fair to call the science of social life’. Whence rhe- toric is invested with the costume‘ of that science,