Another from relatives; for if to one party attach the idea of his having acted honourably or justly, to the other also will attach that of having suffered {honourably, etc.]. Also, if to command be just, so also is the having executed [the command]; for ex- ample, just as that farmer of the revenue, Diomedon ‘4 said of the revenues, “If it be not base for you t« put them up for sale, neither is it for us to purchase them.” And if the idea that he has suffered justly or honourably be on the side of the patient, so will it also be on that of the agent; and if on that of the agent, then also on that of the patient. There is, however, in this way of arguing, room for passing off some false reasoning®: for if the person has justly suffered any thing, he indeed has justly been a suf- ferer, but perhaps not so at your hands. On which ? See book i. 7, § 272. Hobbes calls this cognomination, or affinity of words.
4 Cicero illustrates this “ place”? by a similar example; ** Nam δὲ Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locare, nec Herma- ereontt quidem turpe est conducere.”? De Inven. lib. i.
5 Upon this fallacy the reasoning of Cleon was grounded in the debate about the Mityleneans; and Dioclotus, in his re- ply, uniformly strives at exposing it, while he urges, that how. ever they might merit death, the Athenians were not the peo- ple who should inflict it. Thucyd. lib. iii.
N ὁ 2. ii. Of conjugate inflee- tions, iv. From eompari- son in three ways. i. a for- tiori.
il. ἃ mi- nore.
ὅ. iii. By parity of . reasoning.
account we should view the question separately,— whether the patient deserve to suffer, and whether the agent have a right to inflict the suffering; that done, to employ the facets in whatever way may suit our purpose: for at times, considerations of this kind do not harmonize; just as in the Alemzon of Theodectus, “ Did no man hate thy mother?” In his reply he tells her, that it is fitting to consider the points taken separately; and when Alphesibeea asks how, taking her up, he says, “That she indeed de- served death, they did decree; but at the same time that I ought not to be the slayer.” And just so the trial respecting Demosthenes, and of the persons who slew Nicanor. For when they had been adjudged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he had also been justly put to death. Again, respecting the per- son who met his death at Thebes, respecting whom some one bade the question be decided, whether he were deserving death; as though it were not unjust to slay one who deserved to die.
Another element is derivable from the relations of greater and less®; for instance: “If not even the gods know every thing, hardly I should suppose do men;” for it is to say, that if the quality be not inherent in that which would more naturally possess it; then it is evident, that in that which would less naturally possess it, it is not inherent.
And the argument, that “he assaults his neigh- bours, who even does so to his father;” is derived from the element, if the less probability exist, so also does the greater; [which is available] in reference to whether of the two points it may be needful to prove, whether that it is or is not the fact.
And again, by parity of reasoning, when it is said, “« And is thy father to be pitied in that he has lost his children, and is not in truth CG{neus who has lost his noble offspring?” and the argument, “ If indeed The- seus committed no wrong, neither did Paris;” and, “Tf Tyndarus’ sons did not act unjustly, neither did 6 The argument ἃ fortiori.
CHAP. XXIII. ] RHETORIC. 18} Paris; and this, “Suppose Hector did slay Patro- clus, Paris slew Achilles;” and this, “If other artists are not to be held cheap, neither are philosophers;” and, “If generals are not held cheap because they are frequently vanquished, neither are sophists;” and that, “If it behoves an individual to have a care for your glory, it also behoves you to regard that of Greece.”
Another element arises from the consideration of time’, as Iphicrates urged in his oration against Har- modius, “that if before my doing it, I had claimed to have the honour of a statue, ye would have granted it; will ye not then grant it me now that I have achieved it?—Do not, therefore, engage yourselves under promises, when about to receive; and, when you have experienced the benefit, withdraw them.” And, on another occasion, in reference to the The- bans permitting Philip to pass through into Attica, the argument that, “if, before his aiding them against the Phocians, he had claimed a passage, they would have promised; it were then an absurd thing, if, be- cause he threw himself on them, and had confidence in them, they should not let him march through®.”
Another element is deduced from assertions made respecting yourself retorted upon your adversary; and the term is of exceeding service, as is exemplified 7 Under this head he considers both Time generally, and also Opportunity (καιρὸς, which, however, have been thus distin- guished—Xpovos ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ καιρὸς, καὶ Καιρὸς, ἐν ᾧ χρόνος οὐ πολύς. Hippocrates, in Precept. 61. Καιρὸς again has been described as ὁ προσφυὴς καὶ ἁρμόδιος ἑκάστῳ χρόνος.
8 A striking instance of appeal to this topic occurs in Mace beth, act i.
Lady Maebeth. then you were a man; Nor time, nor place, Did then adhere, and yet you would make both: They have made themselves, and that their fitness now Does unmake you.
See also Thucyd. book i. 140; ii. 6. Demosthenes frequently employs this topic, as in Olynth. iii. τένα χρόνον, ἢ τίνα κα poy, ὦ ἄνδρες AOnvaio:, τοῦ πάροντος βέλτω Cnteite. The force of the appeal thus made cannot be better illustrated than by the trequencey Οἱ iis employment, 6. v. From respect of time.
7. vi. From. retorting assertions on your adver Bary.
in the Teucer; one too it is of which Iphicrates availed himself against Aristophon, when he put the question home to him, whether he would betray the fleet for a bribe; and on his denying that he would, then said he, “ Would you, who are Aristophon, not betray them, and shall I, who am Iphicrates?” You ought, however, to be dealing with an opposite party, who appears in a greater degree to have been guilty of injustice; otherwise it would appear ridiculous, were any one laying an accusation against an Aris: tides, to allege this; but it ought always to tend di- rectly to the discredit of him who lays the impeach- ment; for, generally speaking, the plaintiff presumes himself better than the defendant; this notion, then, it behoves us to refute. And generally it is absurd when one chides in another what he does himself, or would feel inclined to do; or exhorts him to do what he does not himself, neither would be induced to do.
Another place is from definitions®; as, “that the genius is nothing else than either the deity, or his production. And yet whoever conceives the exist- ence of the production of a deity, must necessarily think at the same time that gods are in existence!°.” And, as Iphicrates said, “that that man was most noble who was the best; for that there did not at- tach any nobility to Harmodius and Aristogiton be- fore they had achieved some noble exploit.” And his proof that himself was more nearly akin to them, by saying, “ At any rate my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, than yours are!!.” And, as was said in that speech about Paris, 9 In addition to the instances of recourse to this topic quoted in the text, we may mention that of expediency in the speech of the Plateans (Thucydides, iii. 56); and one used by Alci- biades in his speech at Sparta, vi. 89, πᾶν τὸ ἐναντιούμενον TH δυναστεύοντι, δῆμος ὀνομασταὶ, K.T. Xr.
10 One of the arguments used by Socrates to prove his be- hef in the existence of gods; for if, as was granted, he held the existence of his attending spirit (τὸ δαιμόνιον), then neces- sarily must it either be itself a god, or at least a divine pro- duction. See Plato, Apolg. Soer.
δ See the concluding chapter of Tacitus’s Life of Agricola, CHAP. ΧΧΊΣΙ. RHETORIC. 183 “Α} will be free to acknowledge that the intemperate do not acquiesce in the enjoyment of a single person.” And the reason on account of which Socrates refused to go to Archelaus, “ because,” said he, “it is a dis- grace for one who has been treated well to be unable to make a retort on terms of equality, just as it would be for one who has been treated zl.” For all these deduce their inferences about the points respecting which they speak, after having defined and ascer- tained the question.
Another element is deducible from the number of 9 senses in which a word may be taken, as in the Topics respecting the acceptations of the word rightly. An- other from taking the different bearings of the case; as, “If all act unjustly for three objects, for the sake either of this, or this, or this, and from two of these motives it is impossible that he should have acted; but that he acted on the third, not even the accusers themselves allege.” Another from induction, as may be illustrated from the oration respecting Peparethus, to establish that “women every where discern truly respecting their children; because first at Athens the mother made the matter clear to Mantias, the orator, when under- taking a suit against his son; and again at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were at issue on the point, the Dodonian woman proved the child to be the son of Ismenias; and on this account they considered Thessaliscus to be the son of Ismenias. And again, from the law of Theodectes, “If people do not give their own horses in charge to those who manage those of others amiss, nor [their ships] to those who over- turn the ships of others; neither ought we, if in every case it happens in the same way, to employ those who but ill protect the safety of others, for our own protection.” And, as Alcidamas asserted, that “all pay honour to the wise, at least the Parians honoured Archilochus, what though he was a calum- niator of them; and the Chians, Homer, who was not their citizen; the Mitylenzans, Sappho, though she was a woman; and the Lacedwmonians, who of viii. From the num- ber of meanings of the term, ix. From the division.
x. From indue- tion.
xi. From former decisions.
all people are the least attached to learning, made Chilon one of their senators; the Greeks of Italy also honoured Pythagoras, and the people of Lam- psacus buried Anaxagoras, though a foreigner, and honour him even to this day; the Athenians again were prosperous while they abode by the laws of Solon, and the Lacedemonians, while by those of Lycurgus; also at Thebes, at the time that the magistrates were men of learning, the state enjoyed prosperity.”
Another element of enthymems is derivable from a former decision of the same, a similar, or opposite question; more especially indeed if all men so decide, and that uniformly; and otherwise, [if not all,] but the majority; or the wise, either all, or most of them; or the good; or if the very judges themselves, or those whom they approve, or those in opposition to whom they cannot decide (as for instance those on whom they depend); or those contrary to whom it is not becoming to decide; for instance, a god, or a fa- ther, or teacher, [happen so to have decided}. Just on the principle of the appeal of Autocles to Mixide- mides, “ whether it beseemed the awful goddesses to render an account to the Areopagus, and not Mixi- demides?” QOr,as Sappho insisted, ‘that to die was an evil, the gods having so decided; since [had it not been 807} they would themselves have died;” or as Aristippus told Plato when he asserted something, as he thought, rather dogmatically, “ Yet,” said he, ‘our companion at least held no such thing,” mean- ing Socrates. And Hegesippus, having first con- sulted the oracle at Olympia, put the question second- ly at Delphi,—whether he [ Apollo] was of the same opinion as his father; as though it were disgraceful to contradict a father. And of Helen, as Isocrates wrote’, that ““she was worthy, since indeed Theseus judged her so.” And of Paris, ‘“‘ whom the goddesses 12 "Eypawev, because demonstrative orations were seldom composed for delivery, but rather, as we should say, for the closet, book ili. c. 12, ὁ 6, ἡ μὲν ἐπιδεικτεκὴ λέξες γραφικω- TaTy, τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις. See note chap. xi. § 7.
CHAP. XXIII] RHETORIC. 185 preferred 15, and of Evagoras, as Isocrates says, that must needs be virtuous, “since Conon, when un- fortunately passing by every one else, came to Evagoras.”
Another element arises from an enumeration of 13.
parts; as in the Topica, “what kind of motion the soul is; it is either of this, or that description.” And an instance occurs in the Socrates of Theodectes: “Toward what temple hath he been guilty of im- piety? whom of the gods which the ritual of our state acknowledges, hath he not honoured?”
Another consists in, Since, in the generality of in- stances, it happens that on the same circumstances somewhat is consequent whether good or evil, the exhortation or dissuasion by means of these conse- quences, the accusation or defence, the praising or blaming; for instance, on education is consequent envy, which is an evil; and the being wise, which is a good: [on the one hand then you may assert that] men should not seek to be educated, because it is not good to be envied; [on the other that] it is fitting to be educated, for it is good to be wise. In this topic’, with the addition of that on possibility, and the other {universal means of proof }, as they have been stated, consists the system of Calippus.
Another occurs, when we want to exhort or dis- suade respecting two propositions, and those opposed to each other; and to avail ourselves of the foremen- tioned argument in the case of both. The difference [between this and the element last mentioned ] is, that in it the opposition is merely between any proposi- tions which may happen, it here holds between con- traries: for instance, a priestess was endeavouring to prevent her son from becoming a public speaker; 18. See book i. chap. vi. § 26; where, in stating that to be good which is an object of preference, he cites these two in- stances.
44 It is, however, a mode of argument sometimes so fallae cious, that we may say with Ovid, ————careat successibus opto Quisquis ad eventu facta notanda putat. Phyllis Demoph.
xii, From the enu- meration of parts.
xiii, From the conse- quents, xiv. From the di- lemma.
xv. From the differ- ent mo- tives of mankind.
xvi. From analogy.
xvii, From the simi- larity of conse- guents.
186 ARISTOTLE’S, BOOK II because, said she, “If on the one hand you speak what is *ust, men will hate you; if what is unjust, the gods.” [Here then it might be retorted], there- fore you ought to become a public speaker; for, “if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men’®.” And this is equivalent to the proverb “of buying dirt as well as salt.” And the retortion is this, when on each of two contraries good and evil is consequent, they being respectively opposed.
Another arises from the circumstance, that men do not approve the same things privately as before the world; but when in public, they praise beyond all things what is just and honourable; but within themselves they prefer what is expedient: the orator should endeavour to infer whichever suits his pur- pose, for this element is of sovereign use in exposing anomalies of opinion.
Another element is deducible from the analogy of results; as Iphicrates urged when they compelled his son to serve who was under the standard age, be- cause he was tall, that “if they esteem great children as men, they assuredly will vote small men to be children.” And Theodectes, in the oration respect- ing the law, asked, “Do ye make the mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens on account of their virtue, and will ye not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed these intolerable acts?”
Another arises out of the argument, that if the re- sult be the same, the principle from which it arises will be the same; just as Xenophanes used to argue, that “they are equally guilty of impiety who assert that the gods were produced, as those who assert that they die; for in both cases it happens that in some period or other the gods do not exist.” And generally 15 See an instance of this mode of arguing used by Tiresias, Euripides, Pheenisse, 968. Of this kind is also the argument of Gamaliel: ‘If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but, if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it.”
CHAP, XXIII.] RHETORIC. 187 assuming that the result of each act is in every case identified with it. [Take this argument as an illus- tration |: “ Ye are about to pronounce, not respect- ing Socrates, but respecting the pursuit in general, whether it be right to addict one’s self to philosophy.” And this, “that the giving earth and water is the being slaves.” And “that the participating in the common peace is the performing of what is enjoined.” Now we are to take whichever side may suit our pur- pose.
Another may be deduced from the circumstance, that the same persons do not choose the same things subsequently as before, but contrariwise; as, for in- stance, this appeal:—‘‘If, when in banishment, we fought that we might return; shall we, now that we have returned, take to flight, in order that we may not fight'®?” For one while they chose abiding in their country at the expense of fighting; at another, the possibility of avoiding fighting at the expense of non-continuance in their native land.
Another element which may be resorted to is, the assertion that a thing either exists or was produced, for the sake of that for which it might have existed or been produced; as if some one were to give a person any thing, in order that by taking it from him he may annoy him. Whence also it has been said, “" ΤῸ many, fortune, not bearing them good will, gives great good luck; but it is in order that they may _re- ceive the more conspicuous calamities!7.”. And this from the Meleager of Antiphon: ‘ Not in order that they might slay the beast, but that they may become witnesses, before Greece, of Meleager’s valour.” And that insinuation in the Ajax of Theodectes, “that Diomede chose Ulysses, not as any compliment, but in order that his attendant might at the same time be his inferior.” For it is very possible that he did so on this account.
Another, common both to the judicial and de- liberative orators, is the consideration of the motives 36 From an Uration by Lysias. % Evertére domos totas optaniibus ipsis Dii faciles.
XvViil. From the inconsist- ency of men, xix. From assuming a possible end as the real one.
ἢ; xx. From considering the motives.
xxi. From that which is incredible yet true.
which stimulate or retard men, and ‘the objects with a view to which they both act and avoid; for these are such as, if they be actually in existence, we needs must proceed to action; for instance, if the under- taking be possible, and easy, and beneficial, either to the person in question himself, or to his friends, or pernicious to his enemies, and entailing loss on them; or if the loss be less than the object proposed '*. And it is upon these considerations that orators ex- hort, and on their opposites that they dissuade; more- over they both defend and accuse upon the ground of these considerations; they rest their defences on those which are used to dissuade, and their accusations on those used to exhort!®. The whole system of Calippus, as well as that of Pamphilus, is nothing more than this element.
Another is deducible from circumstances which appear to have taken place, but which are improba- ble, on the ground that they would not seem to be facts, had they not well nigh occurred or actually done so; and that they have a yet stronger claim to belief; for men apprehend as truths either facts or probabilities; if then it be passing belief, and not probable, it will be true?°; for at all events, it is not on account of its likelihood and plausibility that it has this appearance of being the case. Just as An- drocles of the burgh Pithos, said in his impeachment 18 Ilpayua: by this word he designates the object of desire and pursuit. Victor.
19 That is to say, those very same faculties which the deli- berative orator would employ in exhorting a person to act, would, if existing in reference to one under accusation, be turned against him by the judicial speaker as circumstances confirmative of suspicion. And, vice versd, the circumstances of difficulty attending the undertaking, which would be em- ployed to dissuade from its attempt, might be alleged in de- Jence of an individual under suspicion, as points of the case which render his guilt improbable.
2 The argument may be formally stated thus: Men believe either what is actual fact, or probable; this is believed; this therefore is either fact, or probable; it is not probable, there- fore it is fact. It is needless to observe that the slight possibility, that it may be neither one nor the other, is completeiy siurred over.
_ CHAP ΧΧΙΠ.} RHETORIC. 1839 of the law, when the multitude were tumultuous as he spoke, “‘ The laws require some law to set them right, for the very fishes require salt;” and yet it is neither likely nor plausible that creatures bred in the brine of the sea should require salt. ‘‘ Nay, the olive lees require oil,” and yet it is a fact not to be credited, that the very things from which oil is produced should require oil.”
Another element, REFUTATIVE, is the consideration of contradictions; if there occur any contradiction under all the circumstances of time, conduct?!, say- ings, and the like. And this independently, respect- ing your adversary, as “‘ He tells you that he loves you, yet did he conspire with the thirty [tyrants |;” or independently respecting yourself, ‘‘ He tells you that I am litigious, but is not able to prove that I have brought any action into court;” or respecting both yourself and the adversary distinctly, ‘ This man never lent any thing, but I have ransomed many of you.”
Another, applicable to those who have been calum- niated, or who appear so, whether men or actions, is the explaining the cause of the mistaken notion; for there is some circumstance, on account of which it appears to be the case; for example, when a certain woman had come in contact with her son, she seemed from her embracing him to have had connexion with the youth; when, however, the circumstance which eaused it had been stated, the charge was quashed. And as in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses tells Ajax why, though he is braver than Ajax, he does not seem so.
Another is derived from the cause, if-that be in 25.
existence, arguing that the effect is also; and should it not exist, that neither does the effect. For cause, 21 Thus M. Livius Salinator having at one period narrowly escaped conviction for embezzlement, afterwards, when he was made Censor, disfranchised all the tribes except that by whose vote he had been acquitted, “quod aut prius se injuste con- demnassent; aut postea tantos honores non recte tribuissent.” Aur. Victor. de viris illus.
23. Refue tative ele ment.
i, From consider- ation of contradie- tions.
ii. From explana- tion.
eause to effect, and vice versa.
and that of which it is the cause, exist conjointly, and nothing exists without a cause. Just as Leoda mas in his defence, when Thrasybulus accused: him, because he had been inscribed with infamy on a pil- lar in the Acropolis, but erased it in the time of the thirty tyrants, urged, “‘that it was not possible, be- cause the thirty tyrants would put greater confidence _in him, while his hatred toward the democracy refv. From observing whether the fact could have been done bet- ter.
v. From the ano- maly of the pre- sent act to the past.
vi, From errors be- fore com- mi mained inscribed in public.”
Another is, the observing whether the thing re- specting which the party is deliberating, or acting, or has acted, did or does admit of being on another and better footing; since it will become evident that, if this be the case, he has not acted; since no one vo- luntarily, and of his own knowledge, deliberately chooses what is bad. ‘This, however, involves a fal- lacy; for in many cases it becomes clear [ only ] when too late, how it might have been managed better, whereas it was before unknown.
Another, which occurs when any thing anomalous to former acts is about to be done, is the considering the both in connexion; just as Xenophanes advised the people of Elea, when they asked him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leucothea 33 or not, “if they conceived her to be a deity, not to sing a dirge; but if a human being, not to sacrifice.”
Another element is, the accusing or defending on the ground of errors committed; for instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some persons accuse her because she slew her children, [alleging] that at all events they were not forthcoming; for, respecting the send- _ ing away her children, Medea was in fault: she, vii. From however, defends herself [alleging that, if any one}, she would have murdered Jason, not her children; which in truth had she done, she would have erred in not doing the other. And this element and spe- cies of enthymem constitutes the whole of that system of Theodorus, which is first.
Another is deducible from the name; as Sophocles 22 Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne Leucothea nominata ἃ Grecis, Matuta habetur a nostris? Cicero, Tusc. i. 12.
CHAF. XXIII.] ΚΗΒ, «ὍΞΙΟ. 131 says, “ Steel in truth you are, and bear the name.” And as they are wont to say ix their praises of the gods*3; and as Conon used to call Thrasybulus, “rash in counsel,” (Θρασύβουλος); and Herodicus told Thrasymachus, “ You are always rash in fight, ‘Opacipayoc); and Polus, “ You always are a colt,” ‘Tlédoc); and Draco the legislator, that “his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon™4; for they were harsh.” And as the Hecuba of Euripides says of Venus, “ The very name of the goddess rightly begins with folly®.” And as Charemon says, “ Pen- theus, rightly named from the calamities”® awaiting Refutative enthymems, however, are more in re- pute than the confirmative; by reason of the refutative enthymem being a setting contraries briefly together; and because things when put in contrast are more palpable to the auditor. Of all forms of reasoning, however, as well confirmative as refutative, those produce the greatest effect?’, which are of such a de- scription that, on the commencement of their enun- ciation, men anticipate the conclusion, yet without their being superficial; for the hearers on their own parts, feel a pleasure 33, in having of themselves anti- 23 Though he does not inform us what mode of praise this is to which he alludes, we may infer that it consisted in pun- ning on their respective appellations as often as the case ad- mitted it.
*4 Tn this solitary instance of all the tissue does our language admit of preserving the pun of the original; and this, while it will serve sufficiently to illustrate our author’s meaning, will not leave him any great cause to regret that he has lost the force of the others.
% Folly, in Greek ἀφροσύνη. The tragedian seems to have strained the etymology of ᾿Αφροδίτη to suit his purpose. However, there are no iiberties which punsters and theorists will not take. The words occur in the Troades, 990. Byron, speaking of love, says, “‘ Begun in Folly, closed in Tears.” Giaour.
% Tlivbea, εἶ rt: respecting this word, see a note, book i.
% For the principles on which this pleasure arises, see Ὁ. i.
el, § 21, on the ground that the apprehension of them is facili« the equivocation of the term, sons why refutative enthy- mems are more in repute than con firmative Ist. From the dic- tion of twokinds, i. Assert- ing a con- clusion not in- ferred.
ti. Am- biguous ter ms, e‘c.
cipated it; and [next to these may we class | all those, by which the hearers are left behind, just so much as that they apprehend them simultaneously with their having been enunciated, CHAP. XXIV. Elements of Apparent Enthymems.
JusT as it is possible that [one form of reasoning] may be a syllogism, and that another, without really being such, may appear to be so; even so it must needs be with respect to the enthymem also, that one description should really be enthymems, and another not, however they may appear to be; for the enthy- mem is a species of syllogism.
But the elements of these apparerit enthymems are, one derivable from the diction: and of this, the first kind is, as in logic, the asserting your last proposition with all the air of a conclusion, although you have deduced no [legitimate] inference at all: thus, “ So and so is assuredly not the case, necessarily, therefore, so and so is.” And the expressing yourself in the course of your reasonings concisely and pointedly; for this kind of style is the very province of the en- thymem, and this kind of fallacy is, it is probable, that which is [demonstrated ] “the result of the style of the diction;” but the stringing together the heads of many syllogisms, is a good expedient with a view to expressing yourself with all the air of syllogism in your style; thus, “that he preserved some, avenged others, emancipated the Greek people.” For each of these propositions has been demonstrated from others; and when they are put in conjunction, it appears that something results ever from them. Another kind arises from similarity of names, as the assertion, that tated, and our admiration excited; and § 27 on the principle that τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν ἡδύ. For our self-admiration is gratified by so easily perceiving the drift of the speaker.
CHAP. XXIV. RHETORIC. 193 ‘the mouse is an excellent animal, being that from which the most esteemed of all rites have derived their name;” for of all rites, the mysteries are held in most esteem. Or, if any one in praising a dog, were to embrace in his panegyric the dog in the heavens, or Pan; because Pindar thus addresses him, “Ὁ blessed being, whom the inhabitants of Olympus call the all-various dog of the mighty goddess.” Or the arguing, that “it is a most disgraceful thing, that there should be not even a dog inthe house; and therefore it is evident that a dog is honourable.” And the assertion, that Mercury is “communicative” above all the gods, because Mercury alone is called “common.” And the stating that λόγος, speech, is most excellent; because the good are worthy of λόγος, esteem, not of wealth: for the words (λόγου ἄξιον) are not used in a single sense.