Another [element of fallacy] is the asserting con- jointly what is true separately; or separately, what is true conjointly; for as it appears to be the same thing, what though in many instances it be not the same, the orator should practise whatever method is more available to his purpose. The saying of Eu- thydemus is neither more nor less than an instance of this; the declaration, for instance, that “he knew there was a galley in the Pireus',” for he knew each [separate fact of his assertion]. And to declare of one who knows the constituent letters, “‘ that he knows the verse*;” for the verse isthe same thing. Again, the saying that “as twice so much is prejudicial, he denied that the one was wholesome; for it is absurd that two good things should constitute one that is noxious.” Thus enunciated, it is adapted to refuta- tion; but thus it is confirmative; “ for two evils do not constitute one good,” etc. But the whole topic ' An instance of the flagrant absurdity which may arise from taking conjointly what is true only separately: Euthyde- mus knew there were galleys in existence, and he was in the Pireus when he had this knowledge; he knew therefore that there were galleys in the Pireus, i. 6. he being in the Pireus.
3 Of this nature was the sneering recommendation uf a Dictionary as a book of generai information.
Oo 3. 2nd.From division and come position, 194 ARISTOTLE’S [soox τι.
is replete wih fallacy. Such again is the saying of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, that he had de- posed thirty tyrants*;” for he takes them conjointly. Or, as in the Orestes of Theodectes, from distinct cases, “‘It is just that she who has slain her husband should die; as also that a son at least should avenge his father, Now, are not these the very things that have been done?” for, taking the cases conjointly, perhaps it is no longer just. This may also come under the fallacy of omission, for it is not explained ‘by whom [she should be put to death |.”
Another element is the doing away or establishing a point by exaggeration’: and this occurs when without having shown that [the prisoner ] has really committed the crime, [the accuser] proceeds to ex- aggerate it; for this fallacy causes it to appear (when the accused employs the exaggeration) that he has not done the deed; or, (supposing it be the accuser who gets into a passion,) that he has done it. Thus then there is no enthymem; for the hearer is sophis- tically brought over to a belief either that [the ac- cused] has or has not done it, without any proof having been adduced.
Another is the argument drawn from a sign®, for this also is illogical; as if one were to say, “ Lovers are an advantage to states; for the love of Har- modius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hip- parchus.” And if one were to say, “ Dionysius is a robber, for he is a wicked man;” for this also is illogical, because not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man.
3 The fallacy consists in this, that it leads you to suppose that Thrasybulus had destroyed thirty distinct tyrannies, where- as he had in fact only suppressed one, the power of which hap- pened to be shared between thirty different individuals.
4 This is the first of the fallacies which are independent of the diction, and may be termed, for the sake of distinction, real or material fallacies.
5. Meaning of course the specific σημεῖον, for no fallacy can result from the τεκμήριον, vid. book i. chap. ii. § 16. This pce he has elsewhere denominated τὸ παρὰ τὴν dyvo:sp τοῦ thie κου.
CHAP. KXtV.{ RHETORIC. 195 Another is the arguing from an accidental cir- 6. cumstance; exemplified in that which Polycrates® acide said about mice, that “they lent their aid by gnaw- dents of a ing through the [enemy’s] bowstrings.” Or sup- thing. posing one to declare, “that the being bidden to supper is the most honourable; for Achilles was wroth, on account of his not being invited by the Greeks at Tenedos:” he however was enraged, as though he was treated with disrespect, and this occurred upon his not being invited.
Another arises from establishing the consequent; 7. as in the oration respecting Paris, [it is contended | iach that “he is of a noble spirit; because, despising that as a the society of many, he abode on Ida by himself;” logical for, because the noble-spirited are thus disposed, Py Ps" he, too, it should seem, is noble-spirited. Again, not. “Since he is both foppish in his dress, and strolls about by night, he is an adulterer;” because adul- terers are persons of such habits’. Similar to this is also the argument, that “the poor, because they dance and sing in the temples; and that exiles, because it is permitted them to dwell where they list, [are happy.]|” For as these advantages belong to those who appear to be happy; they too would appear to be happy, to whom they belong. Moreover, the case varies with the circumstances of the transaction; on which account, the argument falls under the charge of omission.
Another arises from stating as a cause that which 8. in fact is not; [arguing], for instance, on its having ata happened “simultaneously,” or “after;” for men do that as ἃ assume that what occurs “subsequently,” [occurs] Causé. “by means of” [that which preceded], and more ja: a especially those engaged in state affairs; just as cause. Demades [insinuated] “that the administration of 6 This Polycrates was one of the Sophists; he was men- tioned above (§3). The circumstance respecting the mice is recorded by Herodotus, ii. 141.
7 The fallacy in this instance arises from taking the simple cenverse of a universal affirmative proposition; as also in the instance cited ᾧ ὃ.
9. 8th. From the omis- sion of articu- ars.
9th. From arguing.
Demosthenes was the cause of all their misfortunes; because a war happened after it.”
Another, from the omission of the “when” and ‘manner how;” for instance, the argument “ that Paris carried off Helen justly; because free choice had been given her by her father*;” for very pos- sibly it was not [granted] for a continuance, but at first merely; because so far only was she at her father’s disposal. Or if any one were to say, “ that the striking free men was an insult:” because under all circumstances this is not the case, but when one begins the violence.
Again, as in the disputations of the Sophists, there arises an apparent syllogism from stating things ab- solutely or not absolutely, but conditionally; as [it is contended | in logic, that “what is a nonentity, does exist; because a nonentity exists as a nonentity;” and that “ what is unknown is known, for it is known to be unknown®;” just so in rhetoric also, we have an apparent enthymem from what is not absolutely probable, but conditionally probable. This, however, is not universally the case; as in truth Agatho re- marks, “‘ Perhaps some one will be inclined to assert this to be probable, that many improbabilities will befall men:” for that which is contrary to probability does occur; so that even what is contrary to proba- bility is probable!°; this, however, is not the case absolutely; but just as in sophistical disputations, it is the omission of the circumstances of extent, rela- tion, and place, which produces the imposition; so also here [in rhetoric], it results from the things being probable not absolutely, but conditionally pro- bable. The system of Corax is constructed upon this topic: for supposing your client, without being open to the charge, as for instance, being infirm, 8. See Euripides, Iphig. in Δ]. 66. 9 See the epigram, which, alluding to Socrates’s declara« tion, “‘ that he knew nothing,” concludes thus, Hoc aliquid nihil est, hoc nihil est aliquid. ** Compare the words of Sir Philip Sidney, that “ @ wonder ὁ no wonder in a wonderful subject.”
CuAP. XXIV. | RHETORIC. 197 should be under a charge for an assault, [you have grounds for your defence,] because the case is not probable: and if he be open to the charge, from his being, for example, a powerful man, [still you may defend him] on the ground that it is not likely. because it was sure to seem to be likely!'. And so also respecting all other cases, for he needs must be either open to the imputation or not. Both cases then appear to be likely; but the one is likely [absolutely |, the other not absolutely, but so as has been explained.
And this is [the secret] ‘‘of making the worse, the better side!?.”. And hence mankind were justly in- Sophistry dignant at the annunciation of Protagoras'*; for it is pris: an imposition, and not the real, but an apparent pro- bability, and has a place in no art except rhetoric, and the art of disputation. And now the subject of enthymems, as well real as apparent, has been discussed.
CHAP. XXV. The Solution of Arguments.
Ir follows that I speak of the modes of disengaging 1. Soluone’s self from arguments. They are either the meet- tion ire: ing them with contradictory arguments, or starting an two ways objection'. Now as tothe meeting them with counter aoe! ry. 11 Compare lib. i. cap. xii. § 5, τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ, x. 7. X. 12 There were some persons who charged Socrates with doe ing this, and thence concluded that he was a person dangerous to the state—Zor: τις Σωκράτης, ἀνὴρ σοφὸς, τά TE μετέωρα φροντιστὴς, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆν πάντα ἀναζητηκὼς, ΚΑῚ ΤῸΝ ἭΤΤΩ ΛΌΓΟΝ KPE'ITTQ ΠΟΊΩΝ. Plato Apol. Socr. § 2. Compare also the dialogue of the two λόγοι, in the Clouds of Aristophanes. 13 Protagoras Abderites, Prodicus Ceius, Hippias Eleus, aliique multi docere se profitebantur arrogantibus sane verbis, “ quemadmodum causa inferior, ita enim loquebantur, dicendo fieri superior posset.’” Cicero, Brut. c. vill. Τῶν ἄλλων τεχ- νῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, i. i. ὁ 12. 1 ᾿Αντισυλλογισμὸς is a syllogism, whose conclusion is con aru- ments. Objec tions.
2 3. Objec- tions are fourfold.
Ist. From the same source.
i, Gener- γ.
ii. Partieularly.
arguments, it is evident that we may do it on the ground of the same topics [as were given for refuta- tion]: for the arguments arise out of probabilities, and many things which appear likely are opposed to each other..
Objections, however, (as was stated in the Topics, ) are started in four ways: 1. for either it may be from the same subject: 2. from a similar: 3. or an op- posite [to that from which the adversary argues]: 4.
4, or from points already decided. By deriving your objection from the same source, I mean that, sup- posing the enthymem were respecting love, “ that it was a good feeling;” there would be a twofold ob- jection; for it [might be started] asserting generally that “every want is bad:” or particularly, that “ the proverbial expression Caunian loves”, would not have 5. arisen had there not been some wicked loves.” Again, an objection is alleged on the ground of a contrary fact; as, if the enthymem was this, “‘ The good man benefits all his friends;” [and the objection,] “ But 6. the bad man does not hurt all his.” And on the 3rd. From a similar case.
4th. he points de- cided, ground of similar cases*; if the argument be, “‘ Those who have been treated ill always hate;” [the objec- tion,] that “those who have been treated well do not always love*.” And again, the decisions of men of celebrity: thus, suppose one brought forward the ar- gument, that “we ought to have some feeling for those who are intoxicated, because they err ignorant- ly >” this objection [may be started], that “ Pittacus tradictory of that adduced by your opponent: ἔνστασις is the showing that his reasonings are fallacious either in matter or form.
2 Alluding to the loves of Byblis and her brother Caunus. See Ovid. Metaph. 1x. 453.
3 Or to use the English phrase, ‘‘ by parity of reasoning.”
4 Victorius remarks, that ‘‘ however at first sight this ins stance would seem to be one of ἔνστασις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εναντίου, it is not inapplicable to the present case, inasmuch as the in- jured stand to the injurers in a relation stmi/ar to that in which the benefited stand to their benefactors.
5 The question how far ἀγνόων may be considered a free agent, is discussed in the Nicomachwan Ethics lib. iii. cap. i 5; and Hook:r, book 1.
CHAP. Xxv.] RHETORIC. 199 is not therefore entitled to praise, otherwise he would not in his enactments have imposed higher fines, in case the party committed the error while intoxicated.”
But as all reasonings [of the orator] are derived 8. Rea from four sources, and these four are probability, ex- nee ample, proof positive (τεκμήριον), and signs; and as from four the reasonings drawn from what is usual, or appears Sources: i, Proba- to be so, are drawn from probabilities, while those bility. drawn by inference from similarity of circumstances, ii, Exam- whether in one or more instances, (when the speaker F: ple. oa embracing what is general, then infers particulars, ys μήριον. exist by virtue of example; while those again which ἵν. ση- are inferred from what is necessary and fact, are “*!- founded on proof positive; and lastly, as those drawn from what does or does not hold good, whether uni- versally or particularly, result from signs, [it being remembered] that probability is not what always, but what uswally occurs; it is plain that it is, i every case, possible to get rid of reasonings such as these by starting an objection. The solution is, how- 9. Solu- ever, [sometimes] apparent, and not always real; tion of for the objector does not do it away on the ground {one of its not being probable, but on that of its not being times fal- necessary®. Wherefore it always happens, that the lacious: defendant has the advantage of the accuser, by means ah ane a of this piece of sophistry. For as the accuser con- service to structs his proof by means of probabilities (the task ae of getting rid of the positive certainty being by no jjaintitt means the same [in point of difficulty], as that of getting rid of the probability of the charge); and as that which is merely probable, is invariably open to -an objection; (for it otherwise would not be a pro- bability, but invariable and necessary;) and if this method of solution have been adopted, the judge supposes either that it does not amount to a probability, or at least that he ought not to decide, having been imposed upon in the way mentioned above; ® The orator must therefore show on which side the greater probability lies. “There are objections,” said Dr. Johnson, “against a plenum, and objections against a vacuum; yet one of them must be right.” Whately.
because [in fact] he is not bound to pronounce on positive proofs alone, but also on probabilities, which is the spirit of the oath, “that he will decide to the. best of his judgment;” wherefore that will not be a satisfactory objection which rests merely on the ab- sence of proof positive, but it is further incumbent on the objector to get rid of the probability; this, however, will be the case, if the objection be proba- 11. ble in a higher degree; (and it may be se in two ways, either on the score of time, or of the nature of the case; and pre-eminently so, if in both these particulars;) for if in the majority of instances it be as you state, then it is a greater probability. 12. Speci- Signs also, and the reasonings deduced from them, eee may be got rid of, even if they be facts, as was stated ak. in the first Book; for it is clear to us from the Ana lytics that every sign is illogical. 13. Solu- The same method of solution applies to reasonings vinta! grounded on example as to those on probabilities; for ’ if we have a single instance in contravention, it has been answered’, [sufficiently to show 7 that it is not necessary; or that in the majority of instances, and those of more frequent occurrence, the case is other- wise. If, however, it be the case more frequently, and in the majority of instances, we must contend that the present is not the case in point, or that its application is not in point, or that it has some differ- ence at all events.
14. rex- But proofs positive (τεκμήρια), and the reasonings sok BSH grounded on them, we shall not be able to get rid of, except by at least not on the plea of inconclusiveness; this is assailing clear to us from the Analytics: it remains for us to oo show that what is asserted is not the case®; if, how- ever, it be clear both that it is true as a matter of fact, and that it is a proof positive of the point, from that moment it becomes irrefragable; for thenceforth it is plain from demonstration.
7 That is to say, by a λύσις φαινομένη. { * As we cannot object to the form of the reasoning, our only resource is to attack the matter: to deny the premises.
HAF. XXv1.| RHETORIC. 20) CHAP, XXVI. Of Amplification and Extenuation.
AMPLIFICATION and extenuation are not elements of 1. Ampli- enthymems, (by topic and element I mean the same pose ee thing,) since the element and the topic is that under posite not which many enthymems fall; whereas amplification pieces and extenuation are [themselves] enthymems for ten), showing that a thing is great or little, like those for showing that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or falls under either of the other denominations. And 2.
these are all the questions about which syllogisms and enthymems are conversant; so that unless each of these be a topic of an enthymem, amplification and extenuation are not.
Neither, again, are the topics which are available 3. Enthy- to solution of enthymems, at all different in species Pefutation from those employed in their construction: for it is and con- evident that he effects solution who either proves —— [something contrary |, or states an objection, and they game in establish a counter proof of the contrary; thus, “ If kind. one has argued that a fact has taken place, the other argues that it has not;” or “if one argues that it has not, the other insists that it has.” So that this will not amount toa difference; for both employ the same vehicles of proof, inasmuch as they each allege en- ‘hymems to show that it is, or is not the case.
But the objection is not an enthymem, but is, as 4. Objec-, was stated in the Topics, the stating some opinion pret from which it will appear that no legitimate inference mem. Ὄ». has been arrived at, or that [the opponent] has as- finition of sumed some false proposition. ang ns Thus much, then, on the subject of examples, and & maxims, and enthymems!, and, in a word, all the 1 In taking leave of a series of terms which have occurred hitherto so frequently, we may as well remark that examples, maxims, enthymems, etc. denote the particular modification of the proof, or the shape in which it is served up, without refer- » means of persuasion which address themselves to the understanding, both the sources whence we may furnish ourselves plentifully with them, and the means by which we may effect their solution’. It remains for us to go over the subject of style and ar- rangement?, ence to its degree of validity: while probability, signs, τεκμήρια, etc. refer to its degree of validity, without regard to the shape or manner in which the proof is conveyed.
2 Having now despatched the first and most important of the three grand divisions of his work, viz. the subject of πίστις, it only remains to discuss the remaining two, λέξις and τάξις. In fact, having told the speaker what he is to say, he has now only to tell how he is to say it.
3 The subjects of πίστις, λέξις, and τάξις, it will be recol- lected, constitute the widest and most general arrangement of his work. See book iii. chap. i. ᾧ 1.
BOOK ITI.
CHAP. I. Of the Parts of Rhetoric.
As there are three points which ought to be handled 1. Three respecting a speech; one, as to the sources out of poeit'y which will arise means of persuasion; a second, re- πίστις.
specting the style; a third, how we ought to arrange oy νὰ . τάξις, the parts of a speech. On the subject of the means 7° tivo of persuasion much has been said, as well as to how last to be many the sources are out of which [they arise], name- *teated.
ly, that they are three; also, what is the nature of these sources, and why they are no more: for all those who decide, are persuaded either by being themselves impressed in a certain way, or from conceiving the speakers to be men of a certain character, or from the matter of fact having been proved.
It has been stated also with respect to enthymems, whence we are to furnish ourselves with them; for [of those sources |, some are elementary propositions, peculiar | to the several branches of rhetoric]; others are places [οἵ universal applicability]. It follows that 2. we treat of the subject of style; for the mere being in possession of what one ought to say is not enough; but it is moreover necessary that we deliver it as we ought; [and the doing this] contributes much to your speech’s appearing to be of a certain character.
Now that by which its nature is first, was, con- 3, ὑπόκρι formably to nature, investigated the first; viz. whence σι Dot these things derive their persuasive efficacy: next to ie dled. this, was the disposition of them in the speaking: and thirdly, [arose an inquiry] of the greatest con- Δ See book i, chap. ii, } 3.
4. It con- sists in three things. μέγεθος. ἁρμονία. ῥυθμός.
5. No act yet com piled on it.
sequence, but which never yet has been handled, on the subject of delivery; for it was introduced into tragedy and the public recitations at a late period, since at first? the poets used themselves to sustain the dialogue’ in their tragedies. It is therefore plain that some such power exists in relation to rhetoric, as well as to poetry; which [as connected with the latter art | Glauco the Teian, and some others, have treated of. And it depends on the voice, as to how we ought to manage it in reference to each several passion; when, for instance, we should employ a loud, when a low, and when a moderate pitch of voice; and on the manner in which we should employ its tones, viz. the acute, the grave, and the intermediate; and on certain rhythms in reference to each; for the points, in reference to which they conduct their in- quiries, are three, viz. the loudness of the voice, the fitness of its tones, and its rhythm. Now these pro- ficients bear away nearly all the prizes in the disput- ations; and as in the other contests‘ the actors now produce a greater effect than the poets, so likewise do they in civil causes, owing to the depravity of states. There is not yet however any system com- piled respecting these points, (since even the subject of style was brought forward at a late period,) and, if rightly conceived of, it appears an ornament adapted to vulgar tastes®; but as the whole subject of rhetoric 2 That the two departments of author and actor were united in the same person, is asserted also by Horace, Art. Poet. 277, and by Plutarch, ἐθεάσαντο τὸν θέσπιν αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς.
3 That ὑποκριτὴς came to designate an actor from the cir- cumstance of his sustaining the dialogue with the chorus, may be evinced by reference to the etymology of the word. Its successive meanings have been clearly traced in the Quarterly Review: ““Ὑποκριτὴς, Qui respondet, ab ὑποκρίνεσθαι, ree spondere, Homer, Herodot. Histrio, quia primo tragedie statu histrio Choro respondebat. Suidas, ὁ ὑποκρινόμενος Tw χορῷ. Simulator, quia histriones fictas partes tuebantur.”’ No, xliv.
4 Those for the prize in the tragic games.
5 Φορτικόν. It appears from ‘lwining’s excellent illustrae tions of the meaning of this word, that it is used to imply any thing extravagant, violent, overcharged, outré:—as applied to cuar, 1.} RHETORIC. 205 has reference to opinion, we should pay attention to it, not as to a subject of absolute propriety, but as one of necessity; for as to mere matter of justice, we ought not to inquire further on the subject of speeches than so as to avoid giving pain, at the same time that we do not delight; for the rule of right is, that the contest be carried on by means of the facts themselves; so that, except the proof, all the rest is superfluous®; but it is notwithstanding, as has been stated, a point of great moment, in consequence of Its influ- ence is the weak judgment of the auditor. The subject of 8 ot style, however, has some necessary though trifling claim on our attention in every system; for the ex- pressing one’s self in this or that way makes some dif- ference with a view to exhibiting the subject clearly, not however to so great a degree [as is generally sup- posed]: all these points are however mere idea, and have a reference to the auditor; wherefore it is that no one teaches geometry in such a style.
This art then, be it introduced when it may’, will produce the same effect as that of acting. And some to a small extent have already made an effort to treat of it; Thrasymachus, for instance, on the excitement of compassion. Again, the being qualified for de- | livery is a gift of nature, and rather without the ὦ province of art; the subject of style, however, is clearly reducible to an art. Wherefore rewards are bestowed in turn on those who are proficients in this, just as there are on those rhetoricians [who claim] persons, it means troublesome, tiresome, etc., or insolent, over- bearing, etc., synonymously with ἀνελεύθερος, βάναυσος, popu- lar, low, vulgar, illiberal, ete. Atheneus, in speaking of the rejection of Hippoclides, one of the suitors of Agarista, daugh- ter of Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, attributes it to the disgust conceived by her father at him, POPTIKQS ὀρχησάμενον (see Herodot. vi. 129). Aristotle himself classes the φορτικοὶ with the βωμολόχοι, (Eth. Nich. iv. 8,) and with the οἱ πολλοὶ (ibid, i. 5). It is in fact, (to adopt an expression of Pope’s,) ; any thing levelled to please the populace.
B. i. c. 1. § 10. οὐδὲν ἄλλο der, πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχ δι; 1 Ὑπόκρισις: for he clearly foresees that from its obvious importance it must eventually become an adjunct of rhetoric, as it has already become of dramatic exhibitions.
8. Poets first used recitation and deli- very with success, 9. Hence early rhe- toricians adopted the florid poetical style.
But have gradually relin- quished it, as the tragedi- ans have also done.
206 ARISTOTLE’S [Book MI on the ground of delivery; for written orations in- fluence more by means of their style than through the sentiment.
Now the poets, as was natural, began to make a stir upon the subject at first; for words are imita- tions, and the voice, of all our parts, is the most imitative’; on which account also these arts were constructed, both that of recitation, and of acting, and of others too. But as the poets, though what they said was very frivolous, appeared to acquire their reputation by means of their style; on this account the first style [of rhetoric] was formed on that of poetry, witness the style of Gorgias; and even at the present time the majority of ignorant people fancy tzat such orators speak most delight- fully: this however is not the case, but the style of poetry and that of prose is distinct, and the result shows it; for not even the writers,of tragedy them- selves any longer employ the same turn of diction, but just as they have passed from trochaic to iambic metre®, because the latter is most like prose of all the other metres; so have they also relinquished all those terms which are foreign to the style of convers- ation, with which however the early writers used to embellish [their works |, and which even at the pre- sent day are employed by those who write in heroic metre; wherefore it is ridiculous to imitate the tragedians, who in their own case no longer employ that turn of diction. ᾿ So that it is evident that we need not discuss with minuteness all points soever which it is possible to treat of under the head of style, but so many only as belong to such an art as we are speaking of: the other part of the subject has been spoken of in my treatise on Poetry.
® So that of course the poet, whose business was imitation, would immediately put in requisition these two most obvious sources of it.
® The trochaic metre occurs frequently in the plays of Ais- chylus, the most ancient of the tragedians extant, particularly in the Perse; as also in those of Euripides, especially in the Pheenisse and Orestes: but in those of Sophocles, rarely, if ever.
CHAP. 11. RHETORIC. 207 CHAP, If. On Excellence of Style as made up of single Words.
Let this then have been discussed: and let excel- 1. Excellence of style be-defined to consist in its being clear; lence of style de- (a sign of this is this, that the diction, uzless it make fned to be the sentiment clear, will not effect its purpose!;) and the τὸ neither low, nor above the dignity cf the subject, but °*?** in good taste; for the style of poetry indeed is not low, yet it is not becoming in prose.
Of nouns and verbs? those which are in general use 2. Words produce the effect of clearness: to prevent its being that are low, and to give it ornament, there are other nouns pega ἢ which have been mentioned in the Poetics, for a de- spicuity. parture [from ordinary acceptations] causes it to appear more dignified; for men are affected in respect of style in the very same way as they are towards foreigners and citizens. On which account you 3. To ele should give your phrase a foreign® air; for men are Yate style we must admirers of things out of the way, and what is an ob- use ξένα, 1 “ Perspicuity consists in the using of proper terms for the = zdeas or thoughts which he would have pass from his own mind into that of another man. It is this that gives them an easy entrance; and it is with delight that men hearken to those whom they easily understand; whereas what is obscurely said, dying as it is spoken, is usually not only lost, but creates a prejudice in the hearer, as if he that spoke knew not what he said, or was afraid to have it understood.”? Locke, Some ‘Thoughts concerning Reading and Study, vol. iv. p. 601.
? As Aristotle proceeds henceforth to a complete analysis of the subject of style, he first considers it in reference to the single words of which it is made up (ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε, § 5), which occupies him to the end of the fourth chapter. He then considers it as made up of whole sentences; the means of in- vesting these with dignity, of adapting them to the subject, of constructing them to please the ear, and as addressed to the tntellect; and concludes with enumerating their several ele- gancies. First, then, he considers the beauties of style as de- pending on single words.
* Should the epithet foreign, as applied to a quality of style, not be immediately apprehended, it may be well to recollect that it means the excellence opposed to the fault which we designate homeliness, Words to be but ject of admiration is pleasant*. Now in the case of metrical compositions, there are many things which produce this effect, and there are very becoming, be- cause both the subject and the person stand more apart [from ordinary life]; in prose, however, these helps are much fewer, for the subject is less exalted: since even in that art were a slave, or a mere youth, or [any one, in fact, in speaking] of mere trifles to express himself in terms of studied ornament, it would be rather unbecoming; but here too [as in poetry] the rule of good taste is, that your style be lowered or raised according to the subject. On which account we must escape observation in doing this, and not appear to speak in a studied manner, but naturally, for the one is of a tendency to persuade, the other is the very reverse®; because people put themselves on their guard, as though against one who has a design upon them, just as they would against adulterated wine. [Let your style then be such] as was the case with the voice of Theodorus as com- pared with that of the other actors®; for it appeared to be that of the character which was speaking, theirs however were foreign from the character. And the deceit is neatly passed off if one frame his nomen- clature upon a selection from ordinary conversation; the thing which Euripides’ does, and first gave the hint of.
As however nouns and verbs are [the materials | of which the speech is made up, and as nouns admit 5 Ubicunque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videtur, Quintil. Instit. x. 3. Artis est celare artem.
6 Harris seems to have had this passage in view when he wrote the following: “ ’Tis in writing as in acting; the best writers are like our late admired Garrick. And how did that able genius employ his art? Not by a vain ostentation of any -one of his powers, but ny ἃ datent use of them ail in such an -exhibition of nature, that, while we were present in a theatre, and only beholding an actor, we could not help thinking our- selves in Denmark with Hamlet, or in Bosworth Field with Richard.” Philolog. Ing. P. ii. c. 4.
7 In this practice, Euripides stands remarkably opposed to his predecessor Aischylu* CHAP. 11.} RHETORIC. 209 so many species as have been examined in the Poetics, out of the number of these we must employ but spar- ἐᾷ,