10 The highest rate of interest (τόκος) permitted among the Greeks appears to have been one third of the principal (ἐπίτριτος); the lowest rate which was usual was one tenth merely of the principal (ἐπιδέκατος): so that Mcrocles was less a villain than this ἐπιεικὴς, in the same ratio in which ten per cent. was less usurious than three and thirty. The meta- phor, however, is stated by some as resulting from the come parison of the ratio of chara:ter to the ratio of usury; and by others, from the application of the general word, πονηρεύεσθαι, to the transactions of usurers in particular. It will be ob- served, that in translating ἐπίτριτος, the round numbers have been taken.
1! Addison, too, classes certain of his fair readers (though certainly differently circumstanced from the daughters of Anax- andrides) under the metaphorical appellation of “‘ demurrers,” borrowed from the English legal nomenclature. See Specta- tor, No. 89.
12 Φειδίτια, the public tables of Lacedemon, remarkable for their plainness and frugality: so that, in saying that the only φειδίτια of Athens were its taverns, Diogenes conveyed a most. bitter sarcasm against the manners of its citizens, e on their guard, “ lest they rendered their very popu- lar assemblies so many rows;’”’ just as Isocrates, also, used the expression | of persons “ making a row in the general convention.” And as in the funeral speech [of Lycias], “ there was reason for Greece to shear her locks over the grave of those who fell at Salamis, since her liberty had been buried jointly with their valour:” for had he said that ‘‘ there was reason she should weep, her liberty having been buried with them;” it would indeed have been a metaphor, and have given personification; but the words, “their valour,” “her liberty,” convey a kind of antithesis. And, as Iphicrates said, ‘‘ The path of my arguments is through the midst of the actions of Chares:” the metaphor here is on similar ratios, and the expres- sion, ‘‘ through the midst,” produces personification. Also the saying, ‘‘ that he challenged dangers to be his allies against dangers,” is both a personification and a metaphor. And Lycoleon, pleading for Cha- brias, said, “ [ What, not pardon him] out of a respect for the suppliancy'* of his brazen statue:” for in the then crisis it was a metaphor, but not always; but the personification [was perpetual]; for pending his trial the statue acts as suppliant, the inanimate as an animated object,—‘ that memento of the exploits of the state.” Again, “ Making it their study, by every means, to think meanly;” [ this is metaphorical, | since study is with a view to advance [not to diminish }.
And the expression that “ God has kindled the intel- lect as a light in the soul;” for both in a certain sense illuminate.—“ For we put no period to our wars, but put them off;” since both putting off, and a peace of 13 Chabrias seems to have been the first who ordered his troops to assume a kneeling position in receiving the charge of an enemy: at the time when he adopted this manceuvre, he headed some Athenian troops auxiliary to the Beotians, and completely succeeded in repulsing the forces of Agesilaus. This improvement in tactics seems to have been so favourably received, that statues were decreed him to be erected in the attitude of kneeling. Ὁ δὲ Χαβρίας πολλῶν αὐτῷῴ πεπραγμένων κατὰ πόλεμον, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα ἐσημνεύετο τῷ στρατηγύματι, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου δοθείσας αὐτῷ καθίστανεν ἐχούσας τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα Diodorus Siculus, 15.
ταν CHAP XI.] | RHETORIC. 239 this description, are alike things of the future. And again, the declaring “that a truce was a trophy more splendid than those won in war; since the latter was the result of a trivial occurrence or a single accident, the former were the result of the whole tenour of the war;” for both [agree in being] indications of victory. And, that “states pay a heavy punishment to the censure of mankind;” for punishment is a sort of hurt consonant to justice "4, Thus, then, it has been stated that the elegancies result from metaphor constructed on similar ratios, and from personification.
CHAP. XI. Of Personification.
this effect results. I mean, i. that those expres- ae sions which represent the object as in action, do all the object of them produce the setting before the eyes: for in- — stance, the saying of “a good man,” that he is “a 2. cube!,” 15 ἃ metaphor; for both are perfect; but this does not personify: whereas the speaking of one as “having his prime yet blooming,” is a personification.
And this, “but you just as a thing let loose,” is a personification. And [in the line] “ Then the Greeks springing forth with their feet?;—” the expression, “springing,” is both a personification and a metaphor, for it expresses rapidity. Again, as Homer has in ‘4 We cannot forbear adding to this long catalogue the metaphor used by Herodotus, in speaking of the scheme for the defence of Peloponnesus, at the time of the Persian inva- sion, by throwing a wall across the Isthmus: his words are, that even many cloaks of walls would be insufficient;—ei καὶ “πολλοὶ τειχέων KIOQNES ἧσαν ἐληλαμένοι, x.T. ‘3 —_— * See the expression, Eth. Nich. book i. ο. 10.
3 Bee Eurip. Iph. in Aul. 80.
3. Meta- phors pro- duce it.
4. And similes, 5. Meta- phors to produce it must be appropri- ate, yet not ob- vious.
many places employed it, the putting inanimate things as animate, by means of a metaphor; and in all from their producing personification, they are approved; as in these instances?: ** Back to the plain still roll’d the shameless stone.” Again, “The arrow flew.” And, “ Eager to wing its way.” And, | * Deep fix’d in earth, eager their blood to drain,” And, ** Right through his breast th’ zmpetuous weapon sped.”
For in all these instances, the objects, from their being animated, appear personified; for the expres- sions, shamelessness, and eagerness, and the rest, are personifications. These, however, has he ap- pended by means of the metaphor from analogy: for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is he who is insensible of shame, to the object in regard to which he is so insensible. He does this, too, in his approved similes, in the case of inanimate objects; as, “The waves behind impel the waves before, Wide rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the shore*.”’ for he produces every thing in life and action. But. personification is an imitation [of nature δ].
But it is fitting to draw your metaphors, as has been stated, from terms which are appropriate and not obvious; just as in philosophy, also, it is the privilege of one who conjectures happily, to discern the point of similitude®; as when Archytas observes, “that an arbitrator and an altar are the same,” since 8 These passages severally stand as follows: (1.) Od. xi 597. (2.) Il. xiii, 587. (3.) Il. iv. 126. (4.) Il. xi. 573.
* Pope’s translation, Il. xiii. (of the original), line 799.
5 And, if an imitation, necessarily aa See this prin- ciple of pleasure stated, book i. c. 11, ὁ 23 ὁ In speaking of the fable, he attributed this faculty ot catching such features of resemblance as, without immediately striking, are yet appropriate (οἵκεια μὴ φάνερα), to” those of a philosophic turn of mind:—7ré ὅμοιον ὁ ὁρᾷν, ὅπερ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, Lib. ii, cap. 20, § 7.
CHAP. ΧΙ.] RHETORIC. 241 to both does the party who has been wronged fly for refuge. Or if one were to say, “that an anchor and a pot-hanger were the same;” for both are some- what the same, but they differ in the circumstance of suspending from above and below. Again, the expression, “the states have been levelled,” is the same in objects widely differing, equality both in power and in superficies.
Also the greatest number of elegancies arise from ᾿ metaphor, and from additionally deceiving the hear- er’; for the point becomes more clear that he has learnt something, from the meaning being the oppo- site [of what it was supposed ], and the mind seems to say, “ How true is this! I however was wrong.” And the elegancies of proverbial expressions arise from one’s meaning not what he says; for instance, the words of Stesichorus, that “the grasshoppers shall chirp on the ground®.” Also ideas neatly put enigmatically, are for the same reason pleasing; for there is an acquisition of knowledge, and a metaphor is introduced. Again, that embellishment which Theodorus calls, “saying out-of-the-way things;” _ this, however, occurs when the sentiment is paradox- ical, and (as he has it) does not square with previous opinion’; just on the same principle as in jokes, words submitted to a slight change. An effect which those jests also produce, which depend on the change 7 Besides the ornament of metaphor, by leading the hearer, throughout the sentence, to expect something very different from what you really mean, and undeceiving him only by the last word; e. g. ‘‘Quid hine abest nisi res et virtus!” Cic. de Orat. ii. 70. Here you expect a panegyric; the last word converts the whole into reproach. Of this description, too, are the following lines of Pope:— * Here thou, great Anna! whom three realms obey, Dost sometimes counsel take, and sometimes tea!”? Rape of the Lock, iil. 7.
The precept may be further illustrated by Porson’s insidious commendation of Blackmore’s poetry:—‘“‘ He will be read wren Homer and Milton are forgotten,—but not till then.”’
® Probably the English word humour would best designwa this quaintness of Theodorus.
R 6. They deceive the hearers agree@- ably.
Para- doxes.
Jests which are παρ᾽ ὑπό νοιαν.
7 Paw, 242 ARISTOTLE’S [Book πὶ of a letter, for they deceive [the hearer’s anticipation |: it happens also in metre; for it terminates not in the way in which the hearer supposed; thus, ἔστειχε δ᾽ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμετλα!"!
He proceeded wearing under his feet—chilblains ©. Whereas the hearer was imagining that “ sandals,” (πέδιλα), would be the word!!. This, however, as soon as it is uttered, ought to be clear. But these changes of a letter cause the speaker to say, not what the word expresses, but what its inversion signifies: as in the jest of Theodorus, on Nicon the lyrist, “Thee did a Thracian —” (Oparrn); for what. he pretends to say is, “ It annoys (Θράττει) you!?,” and deceives the audience; wherefore to one who has caught it, the joke is pleasing; since if one is not aware that he is a Thracian, it will not appear to be a beauty. Again, the expression, you wish him περσαι (i. 6. either ἐο side with Persia—to ruin him }, Both meanings, however, should be in point, and so also in the case of the elegancies; thus the saying, “ The sovereignty (ἀρχὴ) of the sea, was not the be- ginning (ἀρχὴ) of evils to the Athenians; since it was a gain to them.” Or, as Isocrates says, “ that its sovereignty (ἀρχὴ) was to the city a beginning © See note 1, at p. 88, of Carrington’s translation of Aris- tophanes’ Plutus; where a similar surprise arises from the use of ἔπινες instead of expivns.
11 This is sometimes aptly enough termed παρὰ προσδοκίαν, ba fling the expectation.
12 Nicon, it seems, was the son of a Thracian slave; and’ Theodorus, conveniently mistaking the word OpérrH for ΘράττεΙ, takes an opportunity of taunting him with his low birth. Θράττω, probably contracted from ταράττω. Vid. Blomfield in Aéschy}. Prom. Vinct. 649. There are on record two excellent replies to taunts of this nature; one made by Mnestheus, son of Iphicrates, who declared that he esteemed his mother above his father,—‘‘ Nam Pater, quantum in se fuit, Thracem me genuit: contra ea, mater Atheniensem;” (Corn. Nep. Iphic. 3;) where it should be observed, that Rut-. gersius, for contra ea mater, proposes to read cum Thraca ma- wr. The other is attributed to Timotheus, who having the condition of his mother as a Thracian slave thrown out rea him as a reproach, replied, “ But to her I owe it that I Conon’s son.” Atheneus, lib. xii CHAP. Xx.y RHETORIC. 243 (ἀρχὴ) of evils.” For in either acceptation, that in stated which one did not imagine he would say; and that it is true, is acknowledged. For to assert that a beginning is a beginning, shows no great wisdom; but he repeats [the word ἀρχὴ], not in this sense, but differently; and he does not repeat the same ἀρχὴ which he first said, but in a different sense. And in all these cases, if one introduce the term appropriately under an equivocation or metaphor, then there is wit; for instance, there is no bearing Baring}: here the speaker denies the correspond- ence of signification, but appropriately enough, if {the person alluded to] be disagreeable.” Again, * You cannot become more a stranger [ξένος], than becomes you as a guest [ξένος], or not in a greater degree than you ought, which is the same; and “ it becomes not a stranger [£évoc] always to be a guest Γξένος 1. For the meanings here also are different. The same, too, is that commended saying of Anax- andrides, “It is honourable to die before doing aught worthy death;” for it is the same as saying, “It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy to suffer death;” or, “ It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy [the punishment] of death; or, when he has not committed acts worthy that punishment.” Now the form of the diction of these sentences is the same; but in proportion as [the idea] happens to be enunciated in fewer words and with antithesis, in the same proportion is it more approved. And the reason is, that the information becomes by means of the antithesis, fuller; by means of brevity, more rapid. Such sentiments ought always to have either some one of whom they are said, or happiness of expres- sion (if what you say [would appear] earnest, and not mere idle remark); for it is possible to have one of those qualities without the other: for instance, “You ought to die without having committed an error;” [the sentiment is just enough], but [the ea- pression] is not elegant: “ A deserving man should 13 So, too, the Latins, Lepidus non lepidus.
8.
> 10. There should be some per- son to whom they must apply.
marry a deserving woman;” but this is not elegant'*; but if it possess both qualities at the same time, as “ It is worthy a man to die while he is not worthy of suffering death.” But in proportion as a sentence possesses the greater number of these orna- ments, in the same proportion does it appear more elegant; if, for instance, the words be metaphors, and metaphors of such a species, and if there be antithesis, and equipoise of clauses, and if it have personification.
Similes also, as has been uniformly stated in the forégoing, are in some way approved metaphors; for they always are expressed in two terms, like the ana- logical metaphor; thus, “the shield,” we say, “is the cup of Mars;” the bow, “ἃ stringless lyre.” Thus, then, persons express the metaphor not unaccom- panied; whereas the calling a bow, “a lyre;” οἱ a shield “a cup,” is without accompanying explan- . ation '®, And on this principle men construct their similes; for instance, that of a flute-player to an ape, and of a near-sighted person to a sputtering» 18. lamp; for both contract themselves. But the excellence will exist when there is a metaphor; for you may represent by a simile the shield as “ the cup of Mars,” and a ruin as “the rags of a house;” and the saying of Niceratus, that, ‘he was himself a Philoc- tetes bitten by Pratys,” as Thrasymachus drew the simile when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratys in a contest of rhapsodists!’, with his hair 14 As far as the expression is concerned, this instance seems to possess the necessary elegance; but it is deficient in the second requisite, viz. τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται.
15 The metaphor constructed on similar ratios (κατ᾽ ἀναλο- yiav) is here alluded to: see chap. 10, ὁ 7.
16 In the Poetic, he says that, in the case of the analogical metaphor, ““ sometimes the proper term is also introduced, be- sides its relative term;’’ and this, with a view to guard the metaphor from any incidrntal harshness or obscurity: with such an adjunct, the me’uphor ceases to be ἁπλοῦς; 6, δ. φιάλη “Apeos—thus expressed, the metaphor is οὐχ ἁπλοῦς; but if stated simply φιάλη, it is ἁπλοῦς, See Twining, notes 184, 189, on the Poetic.
17 With a view to eluciaate the simile of Thrasymachus, it j / cHar. xt.] RHETORIC. 245 long and disordered, and his person still neglected. In which points, if they be not neatly managed, the poets most frequently get hissed off, even should they in other respects stand high. I mean when the poet replies [to his particle of similitude thus], “Like parsley he has crooked legs.”—“ Like Phi- lammon on the bench, struggling with the ball” [or, with Corycus}. And all such expressions are si- miles; but that similes are metaphors has frequently been stated.
Proverbs also are metaphors from species to spe- cies: thus if any one, as though likely to experience a benefit, should himself introduce a measure and afterwards suffer loss from it, then one exclaims, “As the Carpathian fetched the hare'*!” for both parties have experienced the thing in point. Now the sources whence these elegancies are deduced, and the cause why [they are pleasing], has nearly been told you.
Again, hyperboles which are recognised are meta- phors; as that about a person with a black eye: “ You would have thought him a basket of mulber- ries;” for the part beneath the eye is somewhat suf- fused with blood: but this is greatly forced. But the [simile with the expression of similitude ] just as, so and so, is hyperbole, differing merely in the dic- tion. “Like Philammon on the bench struggling with the ball,” [becomes hyperbole thus;] “ You would have thought he was Philammon struggling with the ball.” ‘“‘ Like parsley he has crooked legs,” [thus arranged becomes an hyperbole;] “1 thought not that he had legs, but parsley stalks, so crooked were they.” But hyperboles suit with the temper- ament of the young, for they evince a vehemence of has been conjectured that the story of Philoctetes might have been the subject of this rhapscdical declamation.
18 The island of Carpathus being destitute of hares, one of the inhabitants brought over some of these animals, which proved so fatally prolific as to consume all the crops in the island; and the Carpathians became more anxious to extirpate them than they had ever been for their introduction, 14, And proverbs also.
15. So toa are hyper- boles.
lL. Differ- ent styles are suit- able to each sort oforatory.
2. The written style is most pre- cise; that of dis- putation most de- clamato- ry, and is of two kinds, ἠθικὴ, παβῃτι- Km, temper; (on which account the angry most frequently utter them; [thus Achilles in his wrath exclaims, | Though bribes were heap’d on bribes, in number more Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore, Atrides’ daughter never shall be led, An ill-match’d consort to Achilles’ bed; Like golden Venus though she charm’d the heart, Or vied with Pallas in the works of art. Pore.
The Attic rhetoricians, too, particularly employ this figure;) on which account for a man in advanced life to utter them is bad taste.
CHAP. XII.
That a distinet Style is appropriate to each Species of Rhetorre.
NEITHER ought it to escape us, that to each kind of rhetoric is adapted a peculiar style; for neither are the style which is adapted to writing and that of dis- putation the same, nor the style of deliberative and that of judicial rhetoric. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both [the first and the second}: for the one consists in knowing the purity of language; the other in the not being obliged to sit mute, if one wish to communicate any thing to others; the very predicament in which they who know not how to write are placed. But the style of writing is the most precise: that of disputation partakes more of declam- ation; and of it there are two species, the one conveys the impress of character, the other of feeling. And hence actors choose this description of drama, and the poets this sort [of actors]. But poets fit for perusal are carried about with us, like Chceremon, for he is as nicely finished as a rhetorician; and, of the Dithy- rambic poets, Licymnius.
Thus also, on comparing speeches together, these CHAP. XIte]} RHETORI. 247 adapted to writing appear jejune when delivered at disputations; while those of the declaimers, excellent as they were when delivered, seem mere common- place in the closet; and the reason is, that in disputa- tion [ these things] are appropriate enough. On which account, compositions framed for declamation, inas- much as, when abridged of their declamation, they do omission of connectives, and frequent repetitions, in a written style are justly exploded; yet in the style of disputation even the rhetoricians employ them, for they are adapted to declamation. Yet it is necessary 3.
in repeating the same thing to vary the expression; which indeed opens a way, as it were, to declamation: [e. g.] “This is he who robbed you; this is he who defrauded you; this is he who at last endeavoured to betray you.” Just as Philemon the actor used to do in the “ Gerontomania” of Anaxandrides, when Rha- damanthus and Palamedes speak; and in the opening scene of the “ Devotees” [in the recurrence of | the word J. For if one does not give these passages with declamatior, it becomes [a case in point with the pro- verb | “ Stiff as one carrying a beam.” And so also where connectives are wanting, “I came, I met, I besought him;” for you needs must give it with de- clamation, and not, as though simply saying one thing, enunciate it with the same manner and tone. ‘There is, moreover, a certain peculiarity which omissions of connectives possess; for it strikes one that, in an equal length of time, many things have been stated; for the connective makes many, one; so that if it be taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one will be many. It possesses, then, amplification; “I eame, I conversed with, I besought,” being many,— “ἢ seems to overlook all I have said, all I now say.” Homer is desirous of producing this effect in the lines: “ Three ships with Nireus sought the ‘Trojan shore, Nireus, whom Aglae to Charopus bore, /“éreus, in faultless shape',’’ etc. Pore.
‘ Tliad, ii. 67 Declama- tory com- positions whenread not produce their effect, appear ridiculous: thus, the appear ta culous, liberative style like sketch- ing, and not accu- rate. Judicial style more precise, Epideic- tic style more suited to writing. The judi- cial next, 6. Con- elusion of thesecond division, acil. λέξις, For of whom a great deal is said, that man must needs be spoken of frequently; and therefore if one be spoken of frequently, it appears that a great deal has been said of him. So that the poet mentioning him only once, by help of this sophism amplifies the cha- racter, and has excited a recolleetion of him, though he no where subsequently mentions him.
Now the deliberative style is exactly like sketch- ing; for in proportion as the erowd is larger, the view is taken from a greater distance; on which ac- count, in the one as well as in the other, productions of an exquisite finish are superfluous, and look worse than others. But the judicial is a thing of greater nicety: and in a still higher degree where it is be- fore a single judge; for least of all is this within the reach of rhetorical artifice; since the peculiar points of the case are more easily concentrated to the view, than what is merely external: and the heat of dis- putation is out of the question, so that the decision is fair and clear. And on this account the same speakers are not approved in all these kinds; but where there is most of declamation, there least of all is accuracy: this, however, is the case where power of voice is requisite, and particularly if a consider- able power.
The demonstrative style, however, is most adapted to writing; for its purpose is perusal: second to it [in this adaptation ] is the judicial.
But to draw any further distinctions on the sub- ject of style, that it ought to be pleasing and mag- nificent, is superfluous: for why should it be such rather than temperate and liberal, or if there be any other moral virtue? For that the foregoing rules will cause it to be pleasing is manifest, if indeed ex- cellence of style has been correctly defined:—for with a view to what must it be, [according to our definition, | “ clear and not mean, but.in good taste?” For should it become prosing, it is no longer clear, neither if it should be too concise. But it is plain that the mean is appropriate. And the foregoing precepts will cause its being pleasing, should the CHAP. XII.] RHETORIC, 249 ordinary expressions have been judiciously blended with the foreign, and should rhythm [not be want- ing], and the persuasive influence resulting from good taste.
The subject of style has then been treated”, as well generally, respecting all the species of rhetoric, as particularly, respecting each. But it yet remains to treat of arranyement.
CHAP. XIII. Of the Parts of a Speech.
Tue parts of a speech are two; for it is necessary to state the case about which it is, and to prove it. Wherefore for one, after stating, not to prove it, or to proceed to prove it without a previous statement, is out of the question: for whoever proves, proves something; and he who makes a previous statement, makes such statement with a view to subsequently proving it. And of these parts, the one is the state- ment, the other the proof; just as though! one were to make a division into problem and demonstration. But the divisions which they now usually make are ridiculous; for narration is a kind of peculiarity to judicial speeches alone; for how can there, in de- monstrative and deliberative speeches, be any narra- tion such as they speak of, or any reply, confutation of an adversary, or any peroration of points selected for display of character?
But exordium, contrast of argument, and recapi- tulation”, do then only occur in deliberative speeches 2 Thus ends the second branch of the grand division of the work;-πίστις--λέξις---τάξις. See the last note on book ii.
1 That is, to adopt the language of mathematicians, the statement corresponds to their problem, the proof to their de- monstration. It will readily be observed that πίστις is here used ἴῃ a sense different from that which it has hitherto pre- served.
2 Est et illud repetendi genus quod semel proposita iterat et dividit -— 1. Two parts of 8 speech, 2. State- ment. Proof.
8. Divi- sions ~ made by other writers censured, when an altercation happens; for, considered as ac- cusation and defence, they frequently [admit these branches], but not in their character of a piece of Perora- advice. But the peroration, moreover, is not an es- mon ner sential of every judicial; for instance, if the speech ys necessary. be a short one, or the case easy to be remembered. For it is usual to detract only from what is prolix. The necessary divisions, then, are the statement and the proof’. 4, Enu- The essential divisions then are these; but de cpio greatest number are, exordium, statement, proof, ofthem, peroration. The confutation of an adversary belongs to the proof; and the contrast of arguments is an amplification of one’s own, so as to be a kind of branch of the proof; for one who does this proves something: but not so either exordium or peroration; but [the latter] refreshes the recollection. 5. Nofur- But should one draw distinctions with regard to — these, that will be the case which the followers of to be Theodorus used to do, there will be a narration dis- drawn. —_ tinct from post-narration, and pre-narration, together with refutation, and post-refutation. But the writer should affix a title only after marking out a distinct species and difference‘, otherwise it becomes mere emptiness and trifling; just like Licymnius, who. in his treatise gives the titles, irruption—digrestzon— ramifications, ete.
Iphitus et Pelias mecum; quorum Iphitus eva Jam gravior, Pelias et vulnere tardus Ulixi. . Aeneid, ii 435. ἜΠΑΝΟΔΟΣ dicitur Greece, nostri regressionem vocant. Quintil. ix. 3, 36—apud Ern. Lex. Techn.
3 It should be carefully borne in mind, that Aristotle ad- mits only these two branches as essential to every speech. His reasons for superadding exordium and peroration will be developed in the sequel.
4 Without such a restraint, a rhetorician may go on ad im faitum drawing distincticns where no difference exists.
CHAP. XIV>] RHETORIC. 251 CHAP. XIV.
Of the Exordium, Now the exordium is the commencement of the 1. The speech; which in poetry is the prologue, and in the ΠΝ performances on the pipe, the prelude: for these are the pro- all commencements, and, as it were, an opening of logue and the way for what is to succeed. hae “i lude. The prelude, then, corresponds to the exordium of Prowmi- demonstrative speeches; for the performers on the pit. ° °.. pideictic pipe, using as a prelude any piece whatever which oratory they are able to execute with skill, connect the whole resembles by an inserted passage: and so in demonstrative bese ated speeches ought we to write; for the speaker ought, connected after stating whatever he lists}, straightway to em- with the ploy the insertion, and link it [to the body of the Pieee by speech]. Which indeed all do, having as their σιμον. model the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates: for #sthe ' there exists no very near connexion between Helen paced, and the artifices of sophists”. At the same time, if the exordium be out of the way of the subject, there is this advantage, that the whole speech is not of one aniform character. But the exordia of demonstrative 2. The speeches are derived from praise, or from blame, be σαν (like Gorgias in the Olympic oration,—“ Men wor- derived thy, O Greeks, of admiration among many;” for he from , es ae either of is eulogizing those who instituted the general assem- iho three blies: Isocrates, however, blames them, ‘“ because sorts of they distinguish by prizes the excellencies of person, °T#t°TY- while for those who are wise they propose no reward;”) and thirdly, from suggesting advice; for in- 3. stance, “‘—because it is fitting to honour the good,” on that account [the orator] himself also speaks the praises of Aristides, or such characters as neither enjoy reputation, nor are worthless, but as many as,