** The fame οὗ th’ Goddesses I ’Il first defend,— For Juno and 2 In this she first lays hold of the most silly point.— Thus much, then, of proof. But as to the effect of character, since the saying * See the Troades of Euripides, 969, where Hecuba, reply- ing to the defence made by Helen, lays hold of that part of it which seemed to insinuate that the three goddesses had been instrumental to her abandonment of her husband;—a point which, it wil. readily be perceived, was E’Y’EAETKTON, CHAP. XVII.] RHETORIC. 267 some things respecting one’s self, either is invidious, thespeakor involves prolixity, or a liability to contradiction; οὐ best ΠΟ ;; a vey and respecting another, either slander or rusticity;— py introit behoves one to introduce another as speaking: the ducing ἃ thing which Isocrates does in the speech respecting ‘r4 per- Philip, and in the Antidosis; and as Archilochus conveys reproof, for he introduces the father saying, in an iambic line respecting his daughter, “ There is not any thing which may not be expected, nothing which may be affirmed impossible on oath;” and Charon, the mechanic, in that iambic whose beginning is, “I regard not the wealth of Gyges;” and as Sophocles introduces Hzemon pleading in behalf of Antigone to his father, as though another character were speaking.
But it is necessary sometimes to alter the form of 17. En- our enthymems, and to make them into maxims!9: τῶν for example, “It behoves men of sense to come to sionally ta reconciliation while yet successful; for thus will be altered they be the greatest gainers.” But, in enthymematic rep στον form, it is thus: “ If persons ought then to be recon- ciled when the reconciliation will be most to their advantage and profit, they should be reconciled while yet they are successful.”
CHAP. XVIII. Of Interrogation and Ridicule.
Bor respecting interrogation, it is the happiest time 1. Inter for employing it when an admission has been made Tog@tion in such a way, that a single further question being be em- put, an absurdity occurs: thus Pericles asked Lam- ge te pon respecting the initiation to the rites of [Ceres] ἐπ ah. the protectress; and on his saying, “That it was not surdity possible for him, an uninitiated person, to hear it,” will re- -—he asked “Whether he knew himself?” when ™* See book ii. chap. 21, § 2.
2. ii, When your con- - elusion will be establish- ed by it.
3. iii. When the oppo- nent must contradict himself.
iv. When we reduce our oppo- nent to sophisti- cal an- swers. Caution as to in- terroga- tions.
5. How to answer an equivo- cal ques- tion.
i. By dis- tinction, ii. By an- ticipation.
he said he did, [Pericles subjoined, ] “ And how do you know who are uninitiated?”
Next to this is the crisis, when [of two points] one is clear, and it is manifest to the party putting the question, that his adversary will concede the other; for one ought, after having ascertained by inquiry the one proposition, not to interrogate fur- ther respecting the point which is clear, but state the conclusion. Just as Socrates, when Meletus denied that he believed in the gods, asked ‘‘ Whether he asserted the being of any demon?” When heal- lowed that he had, Socrates asked, ‘‘ Whether these demons were not either sons of the gods, or some- thing of divine nature?” And when he allowed it, “Ts there, then,” said he, “one who thinks that sons of the gods exist, and not the gods themselves?”’
Again, when one is likely to exhibit the adversary as speaking contradictions, or somewhat revolting to general opinion.
Fourthly, when he may not be able to rid himself 4. of the question otherwise than by a sophistical answer: for if he answer in this way, sat zt is, and is not, or partly is, and partly is not,—or, one way it is, another way is not; the hearers hoot him off, be- ing at a loss for his meaning.
Under any other circumstances do not attempt in- terrogation; for should the party interrogated start an objection to the question, you appear. to have been overcome: since it is not possible to put many questions by reason of the imbecility of the hearer, On which account we ought, as much as possible, to compress even our enthymems.
But one must give his answers to equivocal ques- tions with a distinction!, and not concisely; and to what seems a contradiction, by directly offering an explanation in the reply, before the interrogator can put the next succeeding question, or draw the in- ference he aims at; for it is no difficult thing to 1 See the answer of our Saviour to the captious question of the Pharisees,—‘‘ What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cesar, or not?"* Matt. xxii. 17—22.
PHAP, XVIII. J RHETORIC. 269 foresee on what the speech turns. Be this, however, and the means of answering, clear to us from the Topics. And as to a party drawing his conclusion, 6. iii. By if his question produce that conclusion, you are to ¢xPlaneassign the cause: as Sophocles, when questioned by Pisander, “ Whether it had been his opinion, as it had of the other commissioners, to establish the four hundred,” acknowledged that it had.— But how,” rejoined the other, “seemed it not to you to be wrong?” He said it did. “ Did you not, then, do that which was wrong?” “Yes, forsooth,” replied he, “for I had no better alternative.” And as the Lacedemonian, when called to an account respecting his ephorship, on having the question put, “ Whether the rest appeared to him to have perished justly,” _ said they did. “ Then,” retorted the other, “ did you not enact the same things as they?” And when he acknowledged that he had, “ Would not you also,” said he, “for they did this on a bribe; I did not, but merely from judgment.” Wherefore one ought not No quesafter the conclusion to put a further question, nor to (ἴθι to be Ξ ᾿ ᾿? put after put, interrogatively, the conclusion itself, unless the the contruth lies abundantly on our side. clusion. But with respect to Ridicule, inasmuch as it seems 7. Ridito possess a kind of use in disputation”, and as “one rie dea ought,” says Gorgias, “to mar the grave earnestness of our adversary by ridicule, and his ridicule by sober earnestness,” making the remark justly enough,—it has been stated in the Poetic? how many species of ridicule there are; whereof, some befit the gentleman, others do not: so that each must see to it that he take that which befits himself. But the playing a man off is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the former produces the ridicule for his own sake, the buffoon for that of another.
$ * Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius plerumque secat res.”” Hor, Sat. i. 10, 14.
must in- cline the hearers favour- ably.
2. ii, We lity me plify an diminish.
3. iii, We maust ex- cite the hearers.
4. iv. We must awaken the me- mory.
270 ARISTOTLE’S TBcoK ΗἹ, CHAP, XIX.
Of the Peroration.
THE peroration is composed of four things:—of get- ting the hearer favourable to one’s self, and ill-dis- posed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extenuation; and of placing the hearer under the ᾿ influence of the passions; and of awakening his re- iii, collection.
For after showing yourself to be on the right side, and your adversary on the wrong, it naturally follows to praise and blame, and to give the last finish. And one of two things the speaker ought to aim at, either to show that he is good relatively to them, [the audi- ence, | or is so absolutely; and that the other party is bad, either relatively to them, or absolutely. And the elements, out of which one ought to get up per- sons as of such characters, have been stated; both whence one should establish them as bad, and whence as good. Next to this, these points having been already shown, it follows naturally to amplify or diminish: for the facts must needs be acknowledged, if one be about to state their quantity; for the in- crease of bodies is from substances previously exist- ing. But the elements, out of which one must amplify and diminish, are above set forth.
Next to this, the facts being clear both as to their nature and degree, it follows that we excite the hearer to passion; such as are, pity, terror, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, and contentiousness: the elements of these also have been stated above.
So that it merely remains to awaken a recollection of what has been before stated. And this we are to do here, in the way in which some erroneous teach- ers say we should in the exordium: for in order that the facts may be readily perceived, they bid us state them frequently. Now there [in the exordium] in- deed we ought to state the case at full, in order that it may not be unknown to the hearer upon what the CHAP, XIx.] RHETORIC. 271 trial turns; here, however, [in the peroration,] merely the means by which it has been proved, and that summarily.
The commencement of the peroration will be, that 5. The one has made good what he undertook; so that it will FOO be to be stated, as well what one has adduced, as for assertthat what reasons. And it is expressed either by means the ora- of a juxtaposition with the adversary’s statements; jyoved and draw the comparison either between every point his point whatsoever, which both have stated relative to the He must ὃ. ΣῊΝ ‘i compare same thing; or else not by adirect opposition. “He, his argu- indeed, on this subject said so and so; but I so and ments so, and for such reasons.” Or, by a kind of banter- δάτηλαλῖνς Ἵ ς. 3, OL his op- ing: thus, “He said so and so, and I so and so.” ponent, And, ‘‘ What would he do, had he proved this, and heen not the other point!” Or by interrogation:—“What (ya? τ 5 ἐς ἄρα has not been fully proved on my side?” or, “ What terroga- has this man established?” Lither in this way, to. then, must the speaker conclude, or he must, in natural order, so state his reasoning as it was origin- ally stated; and, again, if he pleases, he may state distinctly that of the adversary’s speech. And, for 6. The the close, the style without connectives is becoming, oe ae in order that it may be a peroration, not an oration!: suitable I have spoken,—you have heard,—the case is in tothe pere your hands,—pronounce your decision 3, saint 1 See the conclusion of Lysias’ oration against Eratosthenes.
? It cannot fail of being observed how neatly Aristotle em- ploys this his concluding chapter, as at once an Lluastration of the subject and a farewell to the reader.
A BRIEF ΟΡ THE ART OF RHETORICK;} CONTAINING IN SUBSTANCE ALL THAT ARISTOTLE HATH WRITTEN IN HIS THREE BOOKS ON THAT SUBJECT.
BY THOMAS HOBBES, OF MALMSBURY.
REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION PRINTED AT LONDON IN 1682, ‘A A BRIEF OF THE ART OF RHETORICK.
BY THOMAS HOBBES.
BOOK I.—CHAP. I.
That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the Passions of the Judge; but chiefly in Proofs. And that this Art 1s Profitable.
WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse: some by chance; but some by method. This method may be discovered: and to discover Method is all one with teaching an Art. If this Art consisted in Criminations only, and the skill to stir up the Judges, Anger, Envy, Fear, Pity, or other affections; a Rhetorician in well ordered Com- monwealths and States, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the question. And that which the pleader is to shew, and the Judge to give sentence on, is this only: ’Z%s so: or not so. The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker; who judging of uni- versals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides, tis an absurd thing, for a man to make crooked the Ruler he means to use.
It consisteth therefore chiefly in Proofs; which are Infer ences: and all Inferences being Syllogismes, a Logician, if he τ ἃ 276 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE [BOOK!
would observe the difference between a plain Syllogisme, and an Enthymeme, (which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme,) would make the best Ahetorician. For all Syllogismes and Inferences belong properly to Logick; whether they infer truth or pro- bability: and because without this Art it would often come to pass, that evil men by the advantage of natural abilities, would arry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are Judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long Scientifical proofs, drawn from the principles through many Syllogismes; and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetoricall, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the vertue of well ex- pressing the mind.
CHAP. II. The Definition of Rhetorick.
RHETORICK, is that Faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any Subject to win belief in the hearer..
Of those things that beget belief; some require not the help of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which we in- vent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are in- vented by us.
The belief that proceeds from our Invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker; partly from the passions of the hearer; but especially from the proofs of what we alledge.
Proofs are, in Rhetorich, either Examples, or Enthymemes, as in Logick, Inductions, or Sylloqismes. For an Example — is a short Induction, and an Enthymeme a short Syllogisme; out of which are left as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer; to avoid pro- lixity, and not to consume the time of publick business need- lessly '.
1 And it might be added, in order to gratify the pride of the auditor by leaving it to him to supply the deficiency.
cma?. tir.” ART OF RHETORICK, 277 CHAP. ΠῚ. Of the several kinds of Orations + and of the Principles of Rhetorick.
Iw all Orations, the Hearer does either hear only; or judge also, If he hear only, that’s one kind of Gration, and is called De- monstrative, If he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come; or of that which is past.
If of that which is to come, there’s another kind of Oration, and is called Deliberative.
If of that which is past; then ’tis a third kind of Oration, called Judicial.
So there are three kinds of Orations; Demonstrative, Ju- dicial, Deliberative.
To which belong their proper times. Τὸ the Demonstra- ~ tive, the Present; To the Judicial, the Past; and to the Deliberative, the time to come.
And their proper Offices. To the Deliberative, Exhorta- fion and Dekortation. To the Judicial, Accusation and De- fence. And to the Demonstrative, Praising and Dispraising. - And their proper ends. To the Deliberative, to Prove a thing Profitable, or Unprofitable. To the Judicial, Just, or Un- just. To the Demonstrative, Honourable, or Dishonourable.
_ The Principles of Rhetorick out of which Enthymemes are .to be drawn; are the common Opinions that men have con- cerning Profitable, and Unprofitable; Just, and Unjust; Honourable, and Dishonourable; which are the points in the several kinds of Orations questionable. For as in Logick, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope of our proof, the Principles must be all infallible Truths: so in Rhetorick the Principles must be common Opinions, such as the Judge is . already possessed with: because the end of Rhetorick is vic- tory; which consists in having gotten Belief.
And because nothing is Profitable, Unprofitable, Just, Un- just, Honourable, or Dishonourable, but what has been done, or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible: and because there be degrees of Profitable, Unprojitable, Just, Unjust, Honourable, and Dishonourable; an Orator must be ready in other Principles; namely, of what is done and not 278 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE [Book 1.
done; possible and not possible; to come and not to come; and. what is Greater, and what is Lesser; both in general, and particularly applyed to the thing in question; as what is more and less, generally; and what is more profitable, and less pro- fitable, ete. particularly.
CHAP. IV.
Of the Subject of Deliberatives; and the Abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of Business of State.
In Deliberatives there are to be considered the Subject, where- in, and the Ends whereto the Orator exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.
The Subject is always something in our own power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to Rhetorick, but for the most part to the Politicks; and may be referred in a manner to these five heads.
1. Of levying of Money. 'To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know before-hand, the revenue of the State, how much it is, and wherein it consisteth; and alsc how great are the necessary charges and expences of the same This knowledge is gotten partly by a man’s own experience, partly by relations, and accounts in writing.
2. Of Peace and War. Concerning which the Counsellor or Deliberator, ought to know the strength of the Common- wealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be: and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and relations at home; and partly by the sight of wars, and of their events abroad.
3. Of the Safeguard of the Country. Wherein he only is able to give counsell, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the Garrisons.
4. Of Provision. Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State; - what Commodities they have at home growing; what they must fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abundance.
5. Of making Laws. 'To which is necessary so much Po- litical, or Civil Philosophy, as to know what are the several kinds of Governments; and by what means, either from withcHaP. v.] ART OF RHETORICK. 279 out or from within, each of those kinds is preserved, or de- stroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the several Governments in times past, by History; and part- ly by observing the Government of the times present in se- veral Nations, by Travel. } So that to him that will speak in a Councell of State, there is necessary this; History, Sight of Wars, Travel, Know- ledge of the Revenue, Expences, Forces, Havens, Garrisons, Wares, and Provisions in the State he lives in; and what is needful for that State, either to export or import. | CHAP. V.
Of the Ends which the Orator in Deliberatives, propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.
An Orator in Exhorting always propoundeth Felicity, or some part of Felicity to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in Dehortation the contrary.
By Felicity, is meant commonly, Prosperity with vertue, or a continual content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as we call good, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.
1. Nobility. Which to a State or Nation is, to have been antient inhabitants; and to have had most antiently, and in most number, famous Generals in the Wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a Family, which hath yielded most antiently, and in most number, men known to the World for vertue, riches, or any thing in general estimation.
2. Many and good Children. Which is also publick and private. Publick, when there is much youth in the State en- dued with vertue, (namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the mind, valour, and temperance). Pri- vate, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The vertues commonly resnected in Women, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind, Temperance, and Houswifery, without Sordidness.
3. Riches. Which is, Money, Cattel, Lands, Houshold- stuffe; with the power to dispose of them.
4. Glory. Which is, the reputatwn of Vertue, or of the 22) HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE "BOCK 1.
possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men: desire.
5. Honour, Which is, the glory of benefiting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another man’s safety, or riches. The parts of Honour are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, Sepulchres, Statues, publick Pensions, Adorations, Presents.
6. Health. Which is the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.
7. Beauty. Which is to different Ages different. To Youth, strength of body, and sweetness of aspect. To Full Men, strength of body fit for the Wars, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terror. To Old Men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.
8. Strength. Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together.
9. Stature. Which is then just, when a man in height, breadth, and thickness of body doth so exceed the mosi, as ne-+ vertheless it be no hindrance to the quickness of his motion.
10. Good old Age. Which is, that which comes late, and with the least trouble.
tl. Many and good Friends. Which is, to have many that will do for his sake that which they think will be for his good.
12. Prosperity. Which is, to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.
13. Vertue. Which is then to be defined, when we speak of Praise.
These are the grounds from whence we exhort.
Dehortation is from the contraries of these.
CHAP. VI. Of the Colours or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil.
In Deliberatives, the Principles, or Elements from whence we draw our Proofs, are common Opinions concerning Good and Evil. And these Principles are either Absolute, or Com- parative. And those that are Absolute, are either Disputable, ov Indisputable.
GHAP. V1.] ART OF &RHETORICK. 281 The Indisputable Principles are such as these: Good, is that which we love for it self.
And that, for which we love somewhat else.
And that which all things desire.
And that to every man which his reason dictates.
And that, which when we have, we are well, or satisfied.
And that which satisfies.
And the Cause or Effect of any of these.
And that which preserves any of these.
And that which keeps off, or destroys the contrary of any of these.
Also to take the Good, and reject the Evil, is Good.
And to take the greater Good, rather than the less; and the lesser Evil, rather than the greater.
Further, all Vertues are Good.
And Pleasure.
And all things Beautiful.
And Justice, Valour, Temperance, Magnanimity, Magnifi- cence; and other like Habits.
And Health, Beauty, Strength, etc.
And Riches.
And Friends.
And Honour, and Glory.
And Ability to say or do; also Towardliness, Will, and the like.
And whatsoever Art, or Science.
And Life.
And whatsoever is Just.
The Disputable Principles are such as follow: That is Good, whose contrary is Evil.
And whose contrary is Good for our Enemies.
And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.
And of which there cannot be too much.
And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed.
And that which many desire.
And that which is praised.
And that which even our Enemies and evil men praise.
And what good we prefer.
And what we do advise.
And that which is possible, is Good (to undertake).
And that which is easie.
282 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE [Book L And that which depends on our own Will.
And that which is proper for us to do.
And what no man else can do.
And whatsoever is Extraordinary.
And what is suitable.
And that which wants a little of being at an end. ‘And what we hope to master.
And what we are fit for.
And what evil men do not.
And what we love to do.
_CHAP. VII.
Of the Colours, or common Opinions concerning Good and Evii, comparatively.
THE Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives.
1. More, is so much, and somewhat besides.
2. Less, is that, which and somewhat else is so much.
3. Greater and more in number are laid only Comparatively to Less, and Fewer in number.
4. Great and Little, Many and Few, are taken Compara- tively to the Most of the same kind. So that Great and Many, is that which exceeds; Little and Few, is that which is ex - ceeded by the Most of the same kind.
Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely.
Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively, then, are these.
Greater Good is Many, than fewer, or one of those many.
And Greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind. And greater is that Good than another good, whose kind is greater than another’s kind.
And Greater is that from which another Good follows; than the Good which follows.
And of two which exceed a third, Greater is that which exceeds it most.
And that which causes the greater Good.
And that which proceeds from a greater Good, And Greater is that which is chosen for it self, than that which is chosen from somewhat else.
CHAP VII.J ART OF RHETORICK. 283 And the end Greater than that which is not the end.
And that which less needs other things, than that which more.
And that which is independent, than that which is dependent of another.
And the Beginning, than not the Beginning.
[Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good, or Evil, than that which is not the Beginning; and the End, than that which is not the End; One may argue from this Colour both ways: as Leodamas against Chabrias, would have the Actor more to blame than the Advisor; and against Callistratus, the Advisor more than the Actor. ] And the Cause, than not the Cause.
And that which hath a greater Beginning or Cause.
And the Beginning, or Cause of a greater Good or Evil.
And that which is Scarce, greater than that which is Plentiful; because harder to get.
And that which is Plentiful, than that which is Scarce; because oftener in Use.
And that which is easie, than that which is hard.
And that whose Contrary is greater.
And that whose Want is greater.
And Vertue than not Vertue, a greater Good. Vice, than not Vice, a greater Evil.
And greater Good, or Evil is that, the effects whereof are more Honourable or more Shameful.
And the effects of greater Vertues, or Vices.
And the Excess whereof is more tolerabl, a greater Good.
And those things which may with more honour be desired.
And the desire of better things.
And those things whereof the Knowledge is better.
And the Knowledge of better things.
And that which wise men prefer.
And that which is in better men.
And that which better men chuse.
And that which is more, than that which is less delightful.
And that which is more, than that which is less honourable.
And that which we would have for our selves and Friends, a greater Good; and the contrary a greater Evil. And that which is Lasting, than that which is not Lasting. And that which is Firm, than that which is not Firm, 284 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE / [Book L And what many desire, than what few.
And what the Adversary, or Judge confesseth to be greens is greater.
And Common than not Common.
And not Common tian Common.
And what is more Laudable. - And that which is more Honoured, a greater Good.
And that which is more Punished, a greater Evil.
And both Good and £vil divided than undivided, appear greater.
And Compounded than Simple, appear greater.
And that which is done with Opportunity, Age, Place, Time, Means disadvantagious, greater than otherwise.
And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto.
And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less.
And that which is nearest to the end designed.
And that which is Good or Evil to ones self, than that which is simply so.
And possible, than not possible.
And that which comes toward the end of our Life. ~ And that which we do really, than that which we do for show.
And that which we would be, rather than what we would seem to be.
And that which is good for more purposes, is the greater Good.
And that which serves us in great necessity.
And that which is joyned with less trouble.
And that which is joyned with more delight.
And of the two, that which added to a “third, makes se whole the greater.
And that which having, we are more sensible of.
And in every thing, that which we most esteem.
CHAP. VIII.
Of the several Kinds of Governments.
BecausrE Hortation and Dehortation concern the Common- wealth, and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evil; as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract, so we CHAP. VIII. | ART OF RHETORICK. 288.
must speak of them also in the Concrete; that is, of what is Good or Evil to each sort of Commonwealth in special.
The Government of a Commonwealth, is either Democracy, or Aristocracy, or Oligarchy, or Monarchy.
Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right, are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.
Aristocracy is that, wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best education, according to what the Laws prescribe for best.
Oligarchy is that, where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth.
Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the Government of all; which Government, if he limit by Law, is called King- dom; if by his own will, Tyranny.
The end of Democracy, or the Peoples Government, is Liberty.
The end of Oligarchy, is the riches of those that govern, The end of Aristocracy is good Laws, and good ordering of the City.
The end of Monarchy, or Kings, is the safety of the People, and conservation of his own Authority.
Good therefore, in each sort of Government is that which conduceth to these their ends.
And because belief is not gotten only by proofs, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of Commonwealth - ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to per- swade or diswade in matter of State. Their manners may be known by their designs; and their designs by their ends; and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the Politicks.
CHAP. IX. Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.
In a Demonstrative Oration, the subject whereof is Praise, or Dispraise; the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Honourable and Dishonourable.
In this place we anticipate the second way of getting be- lief; which is from the manners of the Speaker, For Praise, whether it come in as the principal business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same Principles. Which are these: 286 HOBBES’ BRIEF OF THE [poox 1 Honourable, is that, which we love for itself, and is withal laudable.
And that Good, which pleaseth us only because ’tis Good.
And Vertue.
Vertue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculty of doing many, and great things well.
The kinds of it are these; 1. Justice; which is a Vertue whereby every man obtains what by Law is his.
2. Fortitude; which is a Vertue by which a man carries himself Honourably, and according to the Laws, in time of danger. 8. Temperance; which is a Vertue whereby a man Governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law.
4, Liberality; which is a Vertue, by which we benefit others in matter of money.
5. Magnanimity; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to do great benefits.
6. Magnificence; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.
7. Prudence; which is an Intellectual Vertue, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity.
And Honourable, are the Causes, and effects of things Honourable.
And the Works of Vertue.
And the signs of Vertue.
And those actions, the reward whereof is Honour.
And the reward whereof is rather Honour, than Money.
And that which we do not for our own sakes.
And what we do for our Countries good, neglecting our own.
And those things are Honourable, which good of them- selves, are not so to the Owner.
And those things which happen to the dead, rather than to the living.
And what we do for other men, especially for Benefactors, And bestowing of Benefits.
And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.
And those things which men strive for earnestly, but withut fear of Adversary.
oHAP. IX. | ART OF RHETORICK. 287 And of the more Honourable and better men, the Vertues are more Honourable.
And more Honourable are the vertues that tend to other ‘eens benefit, than those which tend to ones own.
And Honourable are those things which are Just.
And Revenge is Honourable.
And Victory.
And Honour.
And Monuments.
And those things which happen not to the living.
And things that excel.
And what none can do but we.
And possessions we reap no profit by.
And those things which are had in honour particularly in several places.
And the signs of praise.
And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or mechanick.
And that which seems Honourable; Namely such as follow.
Vices confining upon Vertue.
And the extreams of Vertues.
And what the Auditors think Honourable.
And that which is in estimation.
And that which is done according to custom.
Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the Orator must shew, that he whom he praiseth, did what he praiseth unconstrain- edly, and willingly.
And he does so, who does the same often, Praise, is speech, declaring the magnitude of a Vertue, Action, or Work.
But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker, is a circular proof, To Magnify and to Praise, differ in themselves, as Felicity and Vertue. For Praise declares a mans Vertue; and Mag- nifying declares his Felicity..
Praise is a kind of inverted Precept. For to say, Do it be- cause ’tis good, is a Precept. But to say, He is good becausa he did it, is Praise.
An Orator in Praising must also use the forms of “μηρί cation; such as these: He was the first that did it.
Thea only man that did it.
288 ΠΡΌ 5 BRIEF OF THE [Boom ἃ, The special man that did it. He did it with disadvantage of time. - He did it with little help.
He was the cause, that the Law ordained Rewards and Honours for such Actions.
Further, he that will praise a Man, must compare him with others; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned, And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Ora- tion, than to any other. For here the Actions are confessed; and the Orators part is only this, to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster, CHAP. X. Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury, In a Judicial Oration, which consists in Accusation and De- fence, the thing to be proved is, that Znjury has been done: and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn, are these three: 1. The causes that move to Injury.
2. The Persons apt to do Fnjury.
3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer Injury.
An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contra: ry to the Law.
Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge, and without compulsion,: The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance, and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable. As the Co- vetous man does against the Law, out of an intemperate desire of Money.
All Actions proceed either from the doers disposition, or not.
Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance, by Compulsion, or by Natural necessity.
Those that proceed from the Doers disposition, are such as he does by Custom, or upon Premeditation, or in Anger, or out of Intemperance.