Can ‘you infer that the opposite feelings are consequent to these passions?
What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ὁ φθόνος?
What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ὁ ἔλεος?
Do you consider that the ὁ φθόνος and ἡ νέμεσις dispossess us of pity ἢ What kind of person must the orator show his adversary to be, when he wishes to excite indignation against him in his auditor?
Can you infer from its definition that the ἡ νέμεσις is felt at the virtues? (viii.)
You have stated that the ἡ νέμεσις and the ὁ ἔλεος are di- rectly opposed to each other, and are under the same genus; can you infer therefore, that if the ἡ νέμεσις is not felt at the virtues, the ὁ ἔλεος is not felt at the vices of others? - CHAP. X, Give the definition of the ὁ φθόνος.
What are the three distinct parts in this definition, which should be distinguished, to obtain a clear understanding of the τόποι ἢ 4 When Aristotle says that such persons are likely to feel envy as have equals, from which part of the definition does he infer this τόπος ὃ What kind of a person must an orator represent his adver- sary to be when he wishes to excite the ὁ φθόνος in the judge?
CHAP, XI.
Give the definition of the ὁ ζῆλος. Does the ὁ ζῆλος differ from the ὁ φθόνος ὃ In what respects do they differ?
»νγ νυ» Can the ὁ ζῆλος be felt at the vices of others?
To what genus of the ra πάθη does the ὁ ζῆλος belong?
Is the ἡ καταφρόνησις opposed only, or is it the contrary to the ὁ ζῆλος?
CHAP. XII.
Why is it necessary that an orator should consider the ra ἤθη of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes?
Does Aristotle use the expression τὰ ἤθη as implying only a certain disposition peculiar to men at a certain time of life, or as implying the ai ἕξεις, or the virtues and vices?
Are the τὰ ἤθη the effects, or are they only consequent tc the ai ἡλίκιαι and τύχαι of men?
You have stated that the orator should consider the ra ἤθη of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c.; un- der which of the three distinctions of πέστεις would you place this part of Rhetoric? (vide Riccobon in cap. xii. hujus libri.)
Do you consider that, when Aristotle treats of the ra πάθη, ae ἕξεις, and τὰ ἤθη, he considers them to have a relation to the three species of oration?
You stated in reply to a question in the former book, that. the ai ἡλέκιαι and τύχαι of men were not the true causes of ac- tions, but when added to the true causes, give additional weight to an argument in judicial inquiry, (vide Book I. chap. x.) do you consider that the orator should adapt his oration to the τὰ ἤθη of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c., in the demonstrative and judicial species?
What, generally speaking, are the ra ἤθη consequent to youth and old age?
What are the ra ἤθη consequent to the middle-aged?
Why does Aristotle treat of the ra ἤθη of the young and old before those of the middle-aged?
What, generally speaking, are the ra ἤθη of the noble, the rich, and the powerful!?
1 For a distinct enumeration of the τὰ ἤθη as far as the seventeenth chapter, the reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief, as a distinct exposition would swell these questions to an unnecessary length.
28 370 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS CHAP. XVIII.
What reason does Aristotle adduce in this chapter for his treating of the ra ἤθη ἢ Did Aristotle treat of any ἤθη in the first book of Rhetoric ἢ Why did he treat of the γα ἡδη cura τὰς πολιτείας in the first book?
Of the τόποι περὶ δυνατῶν καὶ ἀδυνάτων do you consider the τὸ γεγονὸς and τὸ ἐσόμενον both equally applicable to the judicial and deliberative species of orations?
CHAP. XIX.
The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief for an exposition of the τόποι in this chapter.
CHAP. XX, Are the παράδειγμα and ἐνθύμημα common to all the species of oration?
As Aristotle says that the παράδειγμα is like induction, ex- plain in what points they resemble, and in what they differ. (vide Riccobon in cap. xx. hujus libri.)
How many distinctions of παράδειγμα are there?
Into how many species is the τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, or matter in- vented by the orator, subdivided?
Explain what is meant by the species παραβολὴ?
When Cicero, in his oration against Catiline, says,—“ Quod si ex tanta latrocinio iste unus tolletur; videbimur fortasse ad breve quoddam tempus cura et metu esse relevati; pericu- lum autem residebit, et erit inclusum penitus in venis atque visceribus reipublice. Ut sepe homines egri morbo gravi cum estu febrique jactantur, si aquam gelidam biberint, primo relevare videntur; deinde multo gravius vehementiusque af- flictantur; sic hic morbus, qui est in republica, relevatus istius pena vehementius, civibus reliquis, ingravescet;” is this a παραβολὴ OF λόγος?
When Agrippa Menenius says, “Tempore, quo in homine, non, ut nunc, omnia in unum consentiebant, sed singulus membris suum cuique “~nsilium, suus sermo fuerat, indignatas ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 371 reliquas partes, sua cura, suo labore ac ministerio ventri om- nia queri: ventrem, in medio quietum, nihil aliud, quam datis voluptatibus frui; conspirasse inde, ne manus ad os cibum ferrent, nec os acciperet datum, nec dentes conficerent. Hac ira, dum ventrem fame domare vellent, ipsa una membra to- tumque corpus ad extremam tabem venisse. Inde apparuisse, ventris quoque haud segne’ ministerium esse: nec magis ali, quam alere eum, reddentem in omnes corporis partes hunc, quo vivimus vigemusque, divisum pariter in venas maturum, confecto cibo, sanguinem. Is this a παραβολὴ or λόγος?
Which of the two distinctions of the παράδειγμα do you consider most persuasive in deliberative oratory?
If the orator has not enthymems at command, how does Aristotle recommend him to use the παράδειγμα?
But if the orator has both enthymems and examples at command, which does he recommend should be placed before the other?
In the passage quoted from Cicero does he follow Aristotle’s precept or not?
Why is the παράδειγμα and its species, when placed before the enthymems, little adapted to a speech?
What advantage is gained by placing the παράδειγμα after the enthymem?
In placing the παράδειγμα after the enthymem will one be a sufficient proof, or are several requisite?
CHAP. XXI.
Give the definition of the 7 γνώμη.
Are the conclusions of enthymems ever γνώμαι How many subaltern genera of the ἡ γνώμη are there?
Into how many species is the subaltern genus ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου subdivided?
Into how many species is the other subaltern genus μετ᾽ ἐπιλόγου subdivided?
Explain what kind of yv@pa those are which require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος.
Explain what kind of γνώμαι those are which require the annexation of the ἐπίλογος.
You have stated that each subaltern genus is subdivided into two species would you be correct in saying that the 372 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS 150 species of the subaltern genus (ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου) require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος, because they were understood before uttered; and that the 2nd species of the same subaltern genus require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος, because they are under- stood as soon as uttered; and that the 8rd species of the subaltern genus (μετ᾽ ἐπιλόγου) are parts of enthymems: and that the 4th species of the same subaltern genus are essentially enthymems, and have the ἐπίλογος as it were inserted in them?
What division does Aristotle make with respect to the use of γνώμαι ὃ (i.)
On dubious and incredible subjects, which of the above species dues Aristotle recommend to be used?
On subjects not altogether incredible, but obscure, which of the above species does he recommend to be used? (vi. ai & ενθυμήματι καὶ μὲν.)
We now come to the third! use of γνώμαι (τίσιν ἀρμόττει): is the use of γνώμαι equally suited to all ages and conditions of persons?
Ought γνώμαι not universally true to be indiscriminately used in every part of a speech?
In what occasions then should γνώμαι of this description only be used, and ought they to have the ἐπέλογος?
Are yvwpa which are generally admitted to be true, ad- missible in every part of a speech?
Are the γνώμαι which contravene current sayings (παρὰ ra δεδημοσιευμέναις) equally admissible in every part of a speech ἢ On what occasions then is it fit that they should be used?
xiii. πᾶ will the τὸ ἤθος be made to appear βέλτιον?
Do I understand you to say “by being manifested in the diction, or by annexing the reason forthe received opinion?”
What advantages does the use of γνώμαι contribute to the orator?
When the orator wishes to give his speech an air of moral character by the use of γνώμαι, what principle must he mani- fest?
1 Aristotle has treated of the τίσιν ἀρμόττει first, in violation of his proposed arrangement in the beginning of the chapter.
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 373 In the following quotation from Demosthenes περὶ τοῦ Στεφάνοῦ 1 is there a γνώμη §?
"AXN ob διὰ ταῦτα προεῖντο τοὺς J hg saci: ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας καὶ τιμῆς ἤθελον τοῖς δεινοῖς αὑτοὺς διδόναι, ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς βουλευόμενοι. πέρας μὲν γὰρ. ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου ϑάνατος, κἂν ἐν οἰκίσκῳ τις αὑτὸν καθείρξας τηρῇ" δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγχειρεῖν μὲν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῖς καλοῖς, τὴν ἀγαθὴν προβαλλομένους ἐλπίδα, φέρειν δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν ὁ ϑεὸς διδῷ γενναίως.
To which species does it belong, and why does it not re- quire the annexation of the ἐπέλογος?
CHAP. XXII. XXIII. XXIV.
The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief on the subject of these chapters.
CHAP. XXV. XXVI.
You stated in reply to a question in the first book, that the πίστεις διὰ τοῦ δείκνυσθαι, &c., were divided into two species, ἐνθύμημα and παράδειγμα: what subdivision does Aristotle make of the ἐνθύμημα in the second book? (Book II. chap. xxii. 14.)
How many modes of the ἡ λύσις, or solution of arguments, are there?
Explain the different methods of starting an objection.
How is an εἰκὸς solvable?
How is a παράδειγμα solvable?
How is a τεκμήριον solvable ἢ How is ἃ σημεῖον solvable?
What reason does Aristotle give for not considering ei 70 αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν as τόποι ἐνθυμήματος?
How is a solution of them effected?
ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC.
BOOK III.—CHAP. I.
Wuat importance does Aristotle ascribe to the λέξις in rhee toric ὃ Does he ascribe any importance to the ὑπόκρισις?
In what does he consider it to consist? (iv.)
But why does he treat only of the λέξις when he ascribes importance to the ὑπόκρισις? (vi. and vii.)
Does he make any distinction between the style of poetry and orations?
CHAP, II.
Define the λέξεως ἀρετὴ, or excellence of style.
Why does Aristotle object to the too frequent use of γλώτταις or exotic words, πεποιήμενοις or newly-coined words, . and δίπλοις or compound words?
Is the orator obliged to confine himself to the use of the κύρια or words in common use, or is he at liberty to use the other species occasionally?
What advantage does the use of the κύρια contribute to “style?
What advantage does the use of the γλώτταις, &c. con- tribute to style when sparingly used? | ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS, 375 _ When Aristotle says that in the use of ornament we should seek to escape observation, and avoid a studied manner, what would be the consequence of the neglect of this twofold pre- cept? (iv.)
Does Aristotle lay great stress on the proper use of appro- priate metaphors in an oration?
For the selection of metaphors what precepts does Aristotle give? (ix. xii. xiii.)
From what sources then are appropriate metaphors de- duced ἢ (xiii.)
CHAP, III.
What nouns does Aristotle mention as contributing to a frigid style?
When do epithets render an oration frigid?
Is the too frequent use of appropriate epithets approved by Aristotle?
When do you conceive a metaphor and epithet unbecom- ing? (chap. ii. 9.)
CHAP. IV.
In what respect does the εἰκὼν differ from the μεταφορὰ?.
Why does Aristotle caution the orator against the too fre- quent use of the εἰκὼν?
Can the μεταφορὰ be enunciated as the εἰκὼν, and the εἰκὼν as μεταφορὰ?
How would you change a μεταφορὰ to an εἰκὼν?
On what principle must the εἰκὼν be constructed to be appropriate?
CHAP. V.
In what does excellence of style (λέξεως ἀρετὴ) consist?
On what does purity of style (τὸ ἑλληνίζειν) depend?
Do I understand you to say the first consists in the proper use of words, and the latter in their clear and proper arrange ment?
Why does Aristotle distinguish the ro ἑλληνίζειν, (chap. v.) the ὄγκος, (chap. vi.) and the τὸ πρέπον, (chap. vii.) from the ro σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως? (chap. viii.)
37€ ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS Do I understand you to say, because the first are essential to style, or by which it becomes calculated to effect per- suasion, and the latter only accidental to style, or contributing to give it elegance and beauty?
CHAP VI.
How is elevation of style (ὁ ὄγκος) attained ἢ CHAP. VII.
When will the τὸ πρέπον, or becoming in style, be attained ἢ You say that the τὸ πρέπον in style will be attained, if it be passionate, expressive of moral character, and suited to the subject; what do you mean by the τὸ ἦθος λέξεως? (vide Annotationes vii. 6. Vater.)
When Aristotle treats of the τὸ ἦθος in style, do you con- sider the τὸ ἦθος λέξεως as belonging to the ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, one of the distinctions of πέστεις in the first book?
In treating of the πέστις ἤθικη in the second book, and again in this book, on the subject of style, explain the three- fold manner in which Aristotle has treated of this distinction of πέστεις. (vide Riccobon in Lib. 11. cap. i. p. 153, and Lib. III. cap. vii. p. 246.)
When Aristotle says the style is becoming when adapted to the ἕξεις, what meaning do you attach to the word ἕξεις?
CHAP. VIII.
What precepts does Aristotle give on the ro σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως ὃ How many species of the ὁ ῥυθμὸς does Aristotle mention?
Of these, which is the only one, out of which it is impos- sible to construct any metre, and therefore appropriate?
Which of the two species of Pans is most proper for the commencement and the conclusion of a speech?
CHAP. IX.
Define the λέξις εἰρομένη and κατεστραμμένη.
How many species of the περίοδος are there?
In treating of the τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως What division does Aristotle make?
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 377 How many distinctions of the τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως are there?
Which of these is the most proper for orations?
How many species of the περίοδος are there?
What do you mean by a περίοδος ἀφελὴς?
Of the περίοδος which consists of clauses, what subdistinc- tion does Aristotle make? (7. 9.)
What is meant by the παρέσωσις and παρομοίωσις ὃ CHAP. X.
Does the invention of the ἀστεῖα and eddoxipovvra.of style belong to rhetoric?
What reason can you give from the first book of rhetoric that they do not? (Book I. chap. ii.) 3 Which do you consider.are the most approved ἀστεῖα and εὐδοκιμοῦντα of style?
Why are the simile and metaphor most approved?
Can you infer from Aristotle’s general inference that “ those beauties and elegancies of style are most approved which are the quickest in communicating information,” any particular rule for the selection of ἐνθυμήματα or arguments?
In treating of such ἀστεῖα as metaphor, simile, enthymem, and antithesis, why has Aristotle treated of antithesis as be- longing to the τὸ σχῆμα τὴς λέξεως, and the others κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου ἢ (chap. ii. 6; ix. 7.)
Enumerate the ἀστεῖα with which the orator should seek to grace his speech.
CHAP. XI.
How does metaphor differ from personification?
You have stated that such metaphors are most approved as are not too obvious; how will an orator avoid this fault in the selection of his metaphors, and at the same time render them more approved? (vi.)
When will a sentence be more elegant?
Do I understand you to say in proportion as it contains 8 greater number of these ornaments?
Are hyperboles and proverbs ever metaphors?
Do these contribute to the elegance of a sentence?
373 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS.
Does the use of hyperbole become the young as well as the old!
CHAP, XII.
What distinction of style does Aristotle first make when he wishes to ascertain the kind of style most adapted to each spe- cies of oration?
How many species of the λέξις ἀγωνιστικὴ are there?
To which species of oration are the λέξις ἤθικη and παθητέκη most adapted?
Which of the two species of oration, the judicial or deli- berative, require the greatest accuracy of style?
Does the λέξις ἀγωνιστικὴ Suit the demonstrative species?
Is nicety and precision essential in the judicial species, and what is the objection to too great nloety and precision in the deliberative species? | However ready we may be to acknowledge the wonderful acuteness and subtlety of Aristotle’s mind, in unfolding the whole art of rhetoric, his judgment of true wit, from the samples afforded in this chapter, con- vinces us, that he was a more profound philosopher than agreeable com- panion. We have therefore, perhaps prudently, refrained from noticing the witty spplivations of metaphor and hyperbole, which he has made, as some general questions on the λέξεις will be subsequently introduced.
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE SECOND PART OF RHETORIC.
In treating of the λέξις does Aristotle propose to consider first its nature and the matter of which it is formed? In doing this does he consider, Ist. ‘The matter of which it is composed as words; 2nd. Its forms—of which one is the essential or modifi- cation of the matter, by which it becomes adapted to its purpose of effecting persuasion; and another, which is the accidental, or the figure, or modification of the matter, by which it becomes adapted to its purpose of pleasing the ear: 3rd. Of the ἀστεῖον, or introduction of metaphor, apo- thegm, and wit ἢ Aristotle has hitherto treated of the nature of style and its modifications; what does he secondly, and lastly, propose to consider?
CHAP. XIII.
CHAP. XIII.
Enumerate the τά μέρη of orations. | Why does Aristotle object to more than the πρόθεσις and πίστις?
How many and what are the ra μέρη which Aristotle treats of?
Why has he treated of them when he set out with object- ing to them? | 380 GENERAL QUESTIONS To which cf the species of oration is the διήγησις peculiar?
Does the deliberative species always require as many parts as the judicial? and which are the parts which it does not require?
When does it require the προοίμιον (xiv. 11) ἀντιπαραβολὴ and ἐπάνοδος?
Is the ἐπίλογος always necessary in the judicial species ὃ Of how many parts will a judicial oration delivered by an accuser be composed?
Under which of these parts is the ra πρὸς αντίδικον or re- futation, and the ἀντιπαραβολὴ or contrast of arguments, in- cluded when the oration is delivered by an accused?
Why should they not be included in the προοέμιο» or ἐπίέ- λογος? (4.)
CHAP. XIV.
Give the definition of προοίμιον.
From what sources are the προοίμια in the demonstrative species drawn? (2.)
What ought to be the chief object of a judicial προοίμιον? (6.)
From what sources are judicial προοίμια drawn ἕ Who is most likely to draw the matter of his προοίμιον ἐκ -ov \éyovroc—the accuser or accused?
Turn to the oration against Verres (Act. Sec. Lib. iii.) and tell me from which of the sources Cicero’s exordium is drawn.
In which of the parts of a judicial oration, delivered by an accused, would the orator be most likely to have recourse to the πίστεις ἐν τῶ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος?
Are they admissible in all parts?
In which part of the oration does the accuser introduce the τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν?
What is the objection to their being mentioned in the προ- οίἰμιον ἢ?
In which part of the oration does the accused reply to the τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν f?
What is the orator’s object when his προοίμιον is drawn ἐκ τοῦ axpoarou? (7.)
Dees the deliberative species always require the προοίμιον?
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 38] CHAP. XV.
The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief for the τόποι on this chapter.
CHAP, XVI.
What kind of διήγησις does Aristotle prefer in the demon- strative species of oration?
May the proof and amplification be blended in this species? (vide Riccobon in cap. xvi. hujus libri.).
What is the objection to a continuous διήγησις (ἐφεξῆς) in this species?
In a judicial oration should the διήγησις be ἐφεξῆς or κατὰ μέρος?
What matter does the accuser naturally relate in his διή- γησις? (iv. line 6.)
How does the διήγησις of an accused differ from an ac- cuser’s?
What relation is there between the διήγησις and the riaric!?
On what points should an accused refrain from dwelling, and when should both the accuser and the accused dilate on circumstances in the διήγησις ἢ (8.)
Is it of consequence to the orator to vest himself with moral character, and to adapt his διήγησις to the πίστις, in order that the one may support the other.
Is it of consequence to the orator to vest himself with mo- ral character, (7,) and ought he to do this at the commence- ment of his διήγησις? (10.)
1 Quoniam narratio est rerum explicatio, et quedam quasi sedes ac fundamentum constituende fidei, ea sunt in ea servanda maxime, que etiam in reliquis dicendi partibus, que partim sunt necessaria, partim as- sumta ad ornandum. - Nam ut dilucide probabiliterque narremus, necessarium est; sed assumimus etiam suavitatem. Probabilis autem narratio erit, si personis, si temporibus, si locis ea, quee narrabuntur, consentient; si cujusque facti et eventi causa ponetur, si testata dici videbuntur, si cum hominum opi- nione, auctoritate, si cum lege, cum more, cum religione conjuncta, si probitas narrantis significabitur, si antiquitas, si memoria, si orationis veritas, et vite fides. Suavis autem narratio est, que habet admira- tiones, exitus inopinatos, interpositos motus animorum, colloquia person- arum, dolores, iracundias, metus, letitias, cupiditates. ‘Cicero, de Orator. Partit.
382 GENERAL QUESTIONS ᾿ Does the deliberative species of orations require a διήγησις? When is ἃ διήγησις used in this species? When it is used has it the resemblance to the παράδειγμα ὃ CHAP. XVII.
What are the four questions for proof in an accuser’s ora- tion?
Has the διήγησις previously prepared the judge?
Can you repeat the division which Aristotle made of ἐγκλήματα in the first book, (chap. xiii. 7,) and reconcile it with the questions to be proved by an accused as stated in this chapter, viz.
either ὅτι οὗ γέγονεν or ὅτι οὐκ ἔβχλαβε Or ὅτι οὐτόσονδε, ἢ ὅτι δικαίως? ' ‘Suppose the accuser charges the accused with a deliberative injury, what cause will he assign for the action done? (Book Suppose the accused is compelled by weight of testimony to acknowledge the commission of the act and hurt done, but denies the προαίρεσις: if he proved that the act was done μὴ é¢ αὗτον or ἐξ avayxne,—would it be a refutation of the ac- cuser!? (vide Book I. chap. x. 6.)
Suppose the accused acknowledges the act to have been done, and that act to have been hurtful, but denies the προαίρεσις, on which points will he dwell in the refutation?
What do you mean by refutation,” and is the refutation in a measure different from proof?
What chiefly constitutes proof in the demonstrative spe- cies? (3.)
What species of the πίστις διὰ τοῦ δείκνυναι is mostly used in the deliberative?
‘ Aut jure factum, depellendi aut ulsciscendi doloris gratia, aut pietatis, aut pudicitie, aut religionis, aut patrie nomine, aut denique necessitate, inscitia, casue Nam que motu animi et perturbatione facta sine ratione sunt, ea defensionem contra crimen, in legitimis judiciis, non habent, in liberis disceptationibus habere possunt. Cic. Orat. Partit.
? Ea que ad fidem faciendam pertinent in confirmationem et reprehen- sionem dividuntur. In confirmando nostra probare volumus; in repre- hendendo redarguere contraria. Quoniam igitur omne quod. in controversiam venit, id aut sit, necne sit, aut quid sit, aut quale sit, queritur primo conjectura, in altero definitio, in tertia ratio. Cic. Orat. Partit.
ON ARISTOTLE 5 RHETORIC. 383 Do you recollect any precepts which Aristotle gives on the use of enthymems as proofs?
Why should they not be used when the orator seeks to ex- cite the passions?
Why should they not be used é¢effc, or in a continued series?
To which of the three distinctions of πέστεις in the first ‘book, and to which species does Aristotle reduce the ra πρὸς divides How is the refutation effected by enthymenn? (Book II. chap. xxv. 1.)
Ought not an accuser to notice the objections which the accused is likely to bring forward before he states his own? _ Why should he not, and when is a violation of this order unobjectionable?
Ought the accused to refute his adversary before intro- ducing his own proofs?
What reason can you assign for this order in the proof?
Are γνώμαι admissible as proofs, and which species is the best? (Vide Book II. chap. xxi.)
CHAP. XVIII.
Can you mention any cases in which the orator may inter-. rogate with success?
Is the ἐρώτησις prudent on every question, and when is it not?
What answer is the best to an equivocal ἐρώτησις?
What distinction does Aristotle make between εἰρωνεία and βωμολοχία?
CHAP. XIX.
What does the orator propose to do in the ἐπίλογος?
Why should an accuser prefer the ἐπίλογος to the other parts of the oration, for exciting the passions and prejudices of his audience against his adversary?
Which part of the oration of an accused is opposed to the ἐπίλογος of an accuser?
In what kind of judicial cases will the ἀνάμνησις be used instead of τὸ εἰς ra πάθη τὸ; ἀκροατῆν κατασ-ῆσαι ὃ 384 GENERAL QUESTIONS.
Will every case admit of the excitement of the passions in the ἐπίλογος?
What kind of cases require the excitement of anger, hatred, and pity?
Is it necessary to the excitement of anger in the ἐπίλογος, that the orator should show in the πίστις that his adversary has acted with the ὀλιγωρία and its species?
Why is it? | Do I understand you to say because these are the στοιχεῖα out of which anger is excited? (vide Book II. chap. ii.)
Why does the conciliation of the hearer in the ἐπίλογος naturally follow the πέστις?
Why does amplification and extenuation naturally follow the τὸ κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατῆν?
Should the ἀνάμνησις be long or brief?
APPENDIX TO THE ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC, CONTAINING THE ORIGINAL DEFINITIONS.
BOOK I.
I.—1. RueErtoric corresponds with Logic, since ἀμφότεραι περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν, ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ. ἁπάντων ἐστ' γνωρίζειν, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης.
2. But since men do it not only εἰκῆ, but also διὰ συνήθειαν, ἀπὸ ἕξεως, εἴη ἂν αὐτὸ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν, and therefore τὴν airiay θεω- ρεῖν ἐνδέχεται. Consequently, there must be an art of Rhetoric.
3. But previous writers have done but little towards it, for. ai πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον" τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, and they have neglected enthymems, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως.
4, But appeals to the passions, οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, 5. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν" which is unjust, and avoided by the Areopagus.
6. The business of the pleader is only with the fact, ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, i} γέγονεν ἢ ov γέγονεν" not with the question of its importance.
7. Laws would therefore be best, if they could mark out (dcopiZery) all cases, and leave but little to the judges, both on account of the difficulty of getting many good men to legis- late, and because ai μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ σκεψαμένων γί- γνονται" αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογύου" and because the legislator does not judge for the present and particular case, but for the future and universal, and is therefore free from prejudice or passion.
9. Therefore the exordium, narrative, etc. have nothing to do with the art, as all that aims at making the judge ποιόν τινα, 2c 386 APPENDIX TO THE ANALYSIS 10. Although δημηγορικὴ is superior to δικανικὴ, all men prefer the latter, because it best admits of superfluity and false reasoning.
11. Now ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν" ἡ δὲ πίστις, ἀπόδειξίς τις" ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ, ἐνθύμημα" καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς, κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων" τὸ δὲ ἐνθύ- pnpa, συλλογισμὸς τις δῆλον δ᾽, ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίγνεται συλλογισμὸς, οὗτος καὶ ἐνθυ- μηματικὸς ἂν εἴη μάλιστα. But he must also know not Logic only, but the subjects (περὶ ποῖα) enthymems are, and their differences from the syllogisms of Logic. For τό re ἀληθὲς, kal τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι δυνάμεως ἰδεῖν" and from a natural aptness to discover truth, man has an aptness in conjecturing probabilities.
12. Rhetoric is useful, 1. διὰ τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τἀ- ληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων. 2. because, on account of the unscientific character of some hearers, ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοι- γῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις Kal Tove λόγους" 8. τἀναντία δεῖ. δύ- νασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, in order to confute ἄλλον χρώμενον μὴ δικαίως τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῖς, which Dialectic and Rhetoric alone can do. 4. ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχρόν" ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας.
18. The improper use of Rhetoric is an objection com- mon to all things except ἀρετή.
14. The business of Rhetoric οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν, τὰ πιθανὰ, and both τὸ πιθανὸν, καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον πεθανον, as in Dialectic. ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαι- ρέσε. Βαυΐῦ' ἴῃ Rhetoric ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ῥήτωρ" but in Dialectic, σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὗ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.
II.—1. Rhetoric is defined to be δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν" and that on any given sub- ject (περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος).
2, Τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔντεχνοι' ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω, ὅσα μὴ δι ἡμῶν πεπόρισται, ἀλλὰ προῦπῆρχεν᾽ οἷον μάρτυρες, βάσανοι, συγγραφαὶ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα" ἔντεχνα δὲ, ὅσσ διὰ τὴς μεθόδου καὶ Ov ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν" ὥστε δεὶ τούτων τοῖς μὲν. χρήσασθαι, τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν.
3. The ἔντεχνοι πίστεις are of three kinds. 1. ἐν τῷ ἤθει OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 387 τοῦ λέγοντος" 2. ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως" 3. ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ.
4, The first takes place when the speaker makes himself appear worthy of credit; the second, when the hearer is ex- cited with any feeling; the third, when a real or apparent truth is shown.
7. Rhetoric is οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς Διαλεκτικῆς, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας (i. 6. πολιτικῆς).
8. The means of persuading are either ἐνθύμημα = ῥητορικὸς συλλογισμὸς, OF παράδειγμα --Ξ ῥητορικὴ ἐπαγωγή, by one of which all men persuade.
9. Now, to show ὅτι ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων, οὕτως ἔχει, in Logic is ἐπαγωγή, but in Rhetoric παράδειγμα" but that, τίνῶν ὄντων, ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἣ καθόλου, ἣ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, is in Logic called συλχογισμὸς, but in Rhetoric ἐνθύμημα.
10. Although example is often used, yet enthymematic reasonings are most applauded (θορυβοῦνται).
11. As in medicine, universals are alone considered by Rhe- toric, and it is ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσϑαι εἰωθότων.
12. As the reader is supposed to be ἁπλοῦς, the ἀσυλλόγιστα are better than the συλλελογισμένα, for the latter are not εὐπα- ρακολούθητα διὰ τὸ μῆκος.
18. We can only reason from τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως.
14. But as there are but few ἀναγκαῖα which form rhetorical syllogisms, they are generally contingent (we ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). Hence ἐνθυμήματα are said to be ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων" But εἰκὸς is ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γιγνόμενον" οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ" ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς, ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. But of σήμεια, the one οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου" but the other ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος" and of these the ἀναγκαῖον is called τεκμήριον but the μὴ ἀναγκαῖον has no name to distinguish it.* 19. But παράδειγμα 1 is an ἐπαγώγη, but ἃ ὡς “μέρος πρὸς μέρος. ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ἦ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀυτὸ γενος, γνωρι- μώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἦ θατέρου.
* The best explanation of the difficulties of this passage will be found in Mansell’s Logic, Appendix, note E. Some useful illustrations will also be found in the notes to the translation, pp. 17—21.
2c2z 3&8 APPENDIX TO THE ANAL SIS 21. Those syllogisms are properly logical and rhetorical, which are of equal extent with the arts themselves, in refer- ence to which the τόποι are used. For these are common περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἴδει, SUCh as lesser and greater, etc. But the εἴδη are confined to their respective subjects; thus there are προτάσεις concerning physics, that are of no use in morals, etc.
The τόποι convey no specific knowledge, as they are περὶ οὐδὲν ὑποκείμενον, but the εἴδη, if well selected, will gradually produce a science distinct from the Dialectic and Rhetoric.
22. "Evdn = ai καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γένος ἴδιαι προτάσεις.
Τόποι = αἱ κοιναὶ ὁμοίως πάντων.
111.---ΞἸ. There are three εἴδη of Rhetoric, as there are three kinds of hearers, and the speech consists of three things; 1, ὁ λέγων. 2. περὶ ov λέγει. 3. πρὸς ὅν.
2. The hearer is either θεωρὸς περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, (the skill of the orator,) or κριτὴς, i.e. κριτὴς ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων, ἢ τῶν μελλόντων, the latter being ἐκκλησιαστὴς, the former δικαστής.
3. Hence oratory is thus divided:— Business. Time. End. προτροπὴ 0 μέλλων. συμφέρον 1. συμβουλευτικὴ and and ᾿ἀποτροπὴ. βλαβερόν. κατηγορία ὁ γενόμενος. δίκαιον 2, δικανικὴ and and ἀπολογία. ἄδικον. ἔπαινος ὁ παρὼν, butsome- καλὸν