véacs. proof available to rhetoric generally. Itis necessary "because syllogism, in general, is made up of propositions, and the enthymem is a syllogism made up of the propositions which have been mentioned.
8. And as it cannot be that what is impossible should ever heretofore have been done or should ever be done hereafter, but what is possible, only: as again it cannot be that what has not happened, or that what is never about to happen, ever should, the one have been already done, the other be about to be done: it becomes necessary for the deliberative, ju- dicial, and demonstrative orator to have propositions on the subject of possibility and impossibility; and on the questions, whether a fact has or has not hap- 9. pened, will or will not take place. And further, CHAP. IiI.] RHETORIC. 27 since all, as well in praising as in blaming, as well in exhorting as in dissuading, as well in accusing as in defending, attempt to evince not only the points I have mentioned, but likewise to prove respecting this good or bad, this honourable or dishonourable, this just or unjust, that it is, moreover, either great or small, whether speaking of the things independently, or comparing them respectively one with another: as this is the case, it is plain that it will be necessary to have propositions respecting the degrees of great and small, of greater and less, as well general, as pe- culiar to each division: what good, for instance, is greater or less, what deviation from justice, or what conformity to it; and so in the same way also re- specting the other subjects. The points then have been stated, respecting which it will be absolutely necessary to get at propositions. We must, after this, make a distinction between each of these respectively; the questions, for instance, about which deliberation is conversant; those, too, about which demonstra- tive rhetoric is concerned; and, thirdly, those about which judicial.
CHAP. IV.
The Questions relative to which that Orator should be tn possession of Propositions, who is about to advise on points of the highest concernment.
First, then, we must ascertain what kind of good or evil it is respecting which the deliberative orator gives his advice; for we have seen that it is not about every kind, but about such as may or may not befall us!, Such however as either has or will have an existence of necessity; such, again, as it is impossible should exist or be produced; respecting every such description [of good or evil] there never is any de- This limitation was established in cap. ii. § 12. He de- yelopes this point more fully, Nich. Eth. ii. cap. 3, 1. The delibera- tive orator advises on subjects, 2. not ne- cessary, ?
3. nor on all that are con- tingent; but where we appre- hend a ; power of perform- ance.
4. Minute discus- sions here to be avoided, as not in the pro- vince of rhetoric, δ. which is made np of the liberation: neither, in fact, is there about every one even of contingent subjects; for of goods which may or may not accrue”, some exist naturally, others are worth while to deliberate; but evidently [he is con fined to subjects ] about which men resolve; of which character are all such as are of a nature to be referred to ourselves, and the first principle of whose creation is in our own power; for in deliberation we carry on our views thus far, viz. till we shall ascertain whether the achievement of the object be possible to us or not, Now, to enumerate in accurate detail, and to di- vide into separate species, every subject about which men are wont to interest themselves; to enter more- over into minute distinctions conformable to the stand- ard of truth to the very utmost that the subject ad- mits it; these inquiries it is not necessary, on the present occasion, to institute, by reason that they be- long not to the art of rhetoric, but to some art whose province is, in a more peculiar manner, intellect, and truth*; and because many speculations more than are proper to this art have already been assigned to it. For that remark is true, which I have before made; that rhetoric is made up of the science of 2 Τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή. It may be well to remark of this expression, which has occurred so often already, and will much more frequently in the sequel, that it is Aristo- tle’s usual appellative for things contingent, things which may as well happen as not. He has himself defined it thus—Aéyw δ᾽ ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέν- τος δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον. Anal. Pri. lib. i. c. 13. I call that a contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such a supposition.
3 “Inciditur omnis jam deliberatio si intelligitur non posse fieri, aut si necessitas affertur.’”” Cicero de Orat. ii. For an account of things, δυνατὰ ἡμῖν, vid. lib. ii. c. 19.
4 Such minute research, as it tends rather to bewilder, must of necessity be excluded from rhetoric, which is always suposed to address an audience of ordinary abilities; ὁ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς, cap. ii. § 13; whereas such distinc. tions could on!y be appreciated by the philosopher and man of education.
CHAP. IV. ] RHETORIC. 29 logic®, and of that branch of the science of social life analytica.
which recognises the subject of morals; and it partly 274 ρος τ σον: litical 5ι1- resembles logic, partly the declamations of the 80- ences; phists: and in exact proportion as one shall attempt leg: to get up logic or rhetoric, not as they are general arts faculties, but as distinct sciences, he will unwittingly not asa do away their nature by his encroaching, in the act faculty | Mets. - but ἃ sci- of so tricking them out, upon sciences of certain defi- ence de- nite subject-matter, and not of words alone. Let us, viates however, even on the present occasion, discuss such pat the points as it is worth while to enlarge upon, and 7,” which still reserve the more full consideration for,, the science of social life: for nearly all the questions sions for on which men deliberate, and on which the delibera- the em- ‘. ployment tive orator harangues, those at least of the highest (ra aye- concernment, are in number jive®; and these are rative ora- questions of finance, of war and peace, and again re- tory. | πόροι.
specting the safeguard of the territory, and respect- ᾿ wikis ing imports and exports, and also respecting legisla- μοι. 3.
ture. pipiens So that it will be fitting that the orator, who is 5. bh πλόος about to give his advice on the subject of the finance 8. i. πό- of the state, be acquainted with its revenues, both ie a= 5 The analytical science seems to have been the analysis of arguments.
6. All society supposes Jaw (νόμοι) - the first object of which is the support of its inhabitants internally (τροφὴ); and the second tts territory externally (φυλακὴ); in maintaining which war (πόλεμος) must some time or other be unavoidable, and to carry that on, fixed revenues (πόροι) are requisite. We may observe, then, a regular gradation in these five questions; though in his examination of them Aristotle proceeds analy- tically, and takes that which first presents itself in civilized society; namely, the ways and means. Xenophon also, in his Memorabilia, represents Socrates as using nearly the same five ‘subjects and arrangement, when dissuading Glaucon, a young Athenian, from attempting politics too early. Perhaps Aris- totle may have borrowed the hint from him. Cf. Xenoph. Mem. lib. iii. c. 6: and a translation of the whole passage in the posthumous works of Dr. Franklin, vol. v. p. 77. Lond. 1819. The reader will find an instance of τροφὴ practised by the piratical states of Greece, in Thucydides, lib. i. c. 5, and of πόροι in the first tax levied at Rome, when the militia were ae into a standing army, during the war with Veii. Livy, i. lV.
9. ii, πό- λεμος Kal εἰρήνη. War and peace.
what and how great they may be; in order that, if any branch is overlooked, it may be added to the rest; and, if any be in default, it may be augmented.
Moreover he should be acquainted with the whole expenditure of the state, that if any expense be su- perfluous it may be curtailed; if any too high, it may be reduced. For men become more wealthy, not only by adding to their capital stock, but by detract- ing from their expenses as well. These, however, are points which we must not only learn from our own experience as individuals; but, with a view to de- liberation on these subjects, one ought to be qualified by a research into the discoveries made by other people.
Respecting questions of war and peace, the orator must needs be acquainted with the force of the state, how great it actually is already, and how great it admits of becoming; of what description also it is already, and what additions admit of being made to it. Moreover he should know both what wars the state has been engaged in, and how it has conducted them. ‘This must he needs know, not in relation to his own state only, but as regards frontier states also; particularly in the case of those with whom there is a likelihood of being at war, in order that toward the more powerful, pacific measures may be held, and that in regard to the weaker, it may rest with his own state to make war or not. He should also be acquainted with the description of force which belongs to each state, whether it resemble or differ? from his own; for it is possible, even in this respect, to secure an advantage to yourself, or to have one taken by the enemy. In order to all which things, the orator must necessarily have considered with at- tention the wars, not of his own state only, but those also of others, what has been their issue; for it is natural that from similar causes similar results should accrue.
7 See this point touched on by Pericles, Thucyd. i. 141 where he declares the Peloponnesians to be πολεμεῖν, μὴ πρὸν ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκεύην, ἀδύνατοι.
"CHAP. IV.] RHETORIC. 8.
Moreover as regards the safeguard of the terri- tory, it should not escape his attention how that is preserved; but he must be acquainted as well with the numbers,.as the nature of the garrisons, and with the positions of the strong holds: this it is impossi- ble that one not acquainted with the country should know. But known it must be, in order that if any garrison be weak, it may be reinforced; if any be unnecessary, it may be done away, and the force may rather maintain positions strictly adapted to defence.
Again, on the subject of provision, the orator should know how great a consumption is sufficient to subsist the state, and of what kind that is which arises at home, and what is imported; and those nations whose exports there is need of, and those to whose markets he wants to import his home produc- tions, in order that commercial treaties and agree- ments may be entered into with them. [All this should the orator be acquainted with], because it is absolutely necessary strictly to preserve your citi- zens from any ground of quarrel in two of their relations, viz. in respect to those physically their su- periors®, and those who may be serviceable in afore- mentioned points.
Thus much then it is absolutely necessary that the deliberative orator should be able to consider, in order to the security of the state; neither is an at- tention to legislation the least essential; for in its legislative enactments stands the safety of the state. And thus it becomes requisite, both that he should know how many forms of government there are, and what system of things is expedient for each; and what things, as well peculiar to the government, as opposite to it, have a natural tendency to destroy 105, I talk of a government being destroyed by ® He gives hints, § 9, about what is necessary, ὁπῶς πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείτους εἰρηνεύηται.
9 For a statement of the things, peculiar to democracy and oligarchy, which have a tendency to destroy them, see the speeches of Megabyzus and Darius, on the question of the coii- 10. iii. pv λακὴ. Safe- guard of the country.
τροφή. Provi- sion, i. 6. imports and ex- ports.
μοι. Le gisletion The ac- counts given by travellers of foreign states are also use- ful, things peculiar to itself; because.with the exception of the most excellent form of government, every other, by being relaxed or strained too much, de- stroys itself. ‘Thus a democracy, not only when relaxed, but even when overstrained, grows weaker, and thus will at last be brought an oligarchy. Just as hookedness or flatness of the nose, not only approach the mean in proportion as they relax from the excess, but also, when they become excessively hooked or flat, dispose the nostrils in such a way as no longer so resemble the nasal organ.
It is serviceable moreover with a view to legisla- tion, to apprehend not only what constitution is ex- pedient, by deriving your view from circumstances past, but to become acquainted also with the consti- tution of other states, and to what kind of constitu- tions what sort of measures are adapted. Thus it is plain, that accounts of travellers are of use with a view to legislation; for hence we are able to ascer- tain what the laws of other nations are; and with a view to debates on matters of state, the researches of those who write on human conduct are useful: all these points however form part, not of rhetoric, but of the science of social life. | So many then are the questions of highest con- cern touching which the deliberative orator must be in possession of propositions. We will, however again discuss the elements out of which it is proper to exhort and dissuade, as well on these as on other questions.
stitution fittest for Persia, after the assassination of Smerdis, the Magian usurper. Herodot. iii. 81, 82. See also Eth. Nich. viii. 10.
CHAP. V.
The Objects at which Orators should aim in exhorting or dissuading.— What Happiness is; and whence tts con- stituents are deduced.
NEARLY every one individually, and all men in ge~ neral, have some object, at which directing every aim, they both choose and avoid; and this, to speak sum- marily, is happiness! and its constituents. Let us then, for the sake of getting at a received standard, ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is; and what are its constituents; for on the subject of it, and what conduces to it, and of its opposites, exhorta- tion or dissuasion is always conversant; and this, be- cause we needs do the things whieh procure it or any of its constituents, or which render it greater from having been less, and refrain from doing the things which destroy or impede it, or produce its opposites.
Let happiness then be defined to be good fortune in conjunction with virtue?,—or, independency of life, —or, the life which is most pleasant, accompanied by security,—or, abundance of property and slaves, with power to preserve and augment it; for mankind al- low either one or more of these things to amount nearly to happiness. If then happiness be such as I have described, its constituents must necessarily be— Ist, noble birth*, many and excellent friends, wealth, a good and numerous offspring, a good old age; and moreover personal excellencies; as health, comeli- ness, strength, stature, ability in the games; character; 1 The end of deliberation is τὰ συμφέροντα, of action εὐδαιμονία.
3 The first of these is the opinion of the Socratic school; the second, of the Stoics; the third, of the Epicureans; the last, ee ise one. See a similar description, Hooker, v. ᾧ 76, 3. Of these, the first enumerated as far as “‘ character ’’ in- elusive, may be considered δυνάμεις: the two next, “‘ honour and good fortune,’’ as τίμια: the last, namely, ‘‘ virtue and its constituents,” as ἐπαινετὰ, according tv the mode of philo- sophic division mentioned in the Ethics, iib, i. ο. 12.
bd 3. Four defini- tions of it.
4, Goods are internal or exter- nal.
5. Exter- al nal. Ist. High birth. i. Na- tional.
ii. Indi- vidual.
6. Good offapring i, Publi: ii. Pri- vate.
—2nd, honour, good fortune;—3rd, virtue, and its constituents, prudence, courage, justice, temperance. Thus furnished, one would be most independent, were both external and internal goods his own; for besides these there are no others. But the internal goods are mental and personal; the external, noble birth, friends, wealth, and distinction. We deem, moreover, that power and good fortune ought to be present, for thus would life be most independent. Wherefore, let us ascertain what each of these advantages is.— Noble birth then is, in the case of a nation or state, their being aborigines‘, or at least ancient possessors, and for their first leaders to have been illustrious, ané indeed for many to have been born from among ther. illustrious on the score of things which men emulate. Considered in reference to individuals, noble birth is derivable from male or female ancestry, and legiti- macy on both sides; and, just as in the case of a state, to have had the first of their line well known on the score of virtue, wealth, or any other valued quality; and for many of their kindred to have been illustri- ous, as well men as women, as well young as old:-— we cannot be at a loss for the constituents of a good and numerous progeny. As referred to the common- wealth; a good offspring will be, youth who are nu- merous and accomplished. Accomplished in respect to personal excellence, as stature, comeliness, strength, ability in the games: and as to that of the mind, temperance and courage; these all, in their two di- visions, are excellencies of the young. In reference to individuals, a good and numerous offspring con- sists in your own children being numerous, and they, as well male as female, such as I have described, The excellence of females in regard to person, i8 beauty and stature; in regard to the mind, temper- ance and fondness for employment, without meanness: —and we ought, as well individually as collectively, * It was the boast of the Athenians that they were αὐτόχθο- yes; and in reference to this Cicero says of their state, “ Que vetustate ea est, ut ipsa ex sese suos cives genuisse dicatur.” Orat. pro L. Flacco.
Rows, twat. v.? RHETORIC. 30 in respect both to men and women, to see that each of these qualities exists. Since all states among whom the regulations regarding women are bad (as is the case among the Lacedzmonians), enjoy searcely the half of happiness.
The constituents of wealth are, plenty of money, 7. Wealth the being master of lands and seats, with the posses- ™¥St be, sion moreover of personal property of live stock and slaves, such as are remarkable for number, stature, and comeliness; and all these should be secure, and respectable, and useful. The useful are of that de- i. ἀσφα. scription rather which are profitable; the respectable, λῆ which conduce to enjoyment. But by profitable 1 gZo.¢. mean those out of which the rent arises; by those iii. χρή- conducing to enjoyment, all out of which arises no- °‘** thing (that’s worth mentioning at least) beyond their mere use. The definition of security is the having possession there, and in such a manner, that the enjoyment of the property is one’s own. The essen- tials of a property then exist, when the right of alienating is in one’s hands: I understand by aliena- tion either gift or sale. But, in a word, the being rich stands more in enjoyment than in possession; for the active employment and the use of such means is wealth.
Goodness of character is the apprehension of man- 8. Good-. kind, that you are a worthy person, or in possession as bah of something of such a kind that all men aim at it, i or at least the generality, or the good, or the well- judging. Honour is an evidence of your having a 9. Ha. character for beneficence; and those are honoured Οὔτ. with justice, and in an eminent degree®, whose bene- ficence has already been exercised: not but that he, too, is honoured who simply has the power to benefit. Beneficence relates either to the safety, and the causes, whatever they are, of the existence of its object, or to his wealth, or to any other goods whose acquisition is not easy, whether it be so generally, or at that place or time. For many meet with honour ——— 5 Aristotle’s οἱ εὐεργετηκότες may be found be.utifully enumerated in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chap. 44.
D2 &.
Health.
Beauty.
in consequence of things apparently trifling Εν but then _it is the manner or the time | of conierring “which is the reason. The constituent parts 0 “are sacrifices, —monumental inscriptions, in metre or prose,—rewards,—consecrated pieces of ground ®,— precedence,—public burial,—statues,—pensions from the state; those received among barbarians are— prostration,—giving place’. The presents also usual among each people are, with them, respectively marks of honour; for a present is at once the gift of pro- perty, and a mark of honour.. Wherefore it is that the avaricious are equally desirous of these, as the ambitious; because they convey to both that which they desire, since at once it is a property, the object which the avaricious desire, and includes honour, the object of the ambitious.
The excellencies of the body are health; and that in such a degree as for us to be exempt from sick- ness, while we have the free exercise of the body, For many are in a state of health, indeed, whom, like Herodicus®, no one would feel inclined to con- gratulate on the score of health, by reason of their depriving themselves of most, if not all, the enjoy- ments proper to man.
Comeliness is different according to the several ages. Now the comeliness of a youth, is the having a body useful in enduring toils, whether those of the course, or of personal exertion, himself being plea- sant withal to look upon with a view to delight. On which account those who practise the pentathlum-are most comely, inasmuch as they are formed for violent ® Instanced in the compliment paid to the memory of Brasidas at Am is Sead Thucyd. v. Hooker, y. § 34, p. 133; 7 Here nega τ we may mention a remarkable compliment paid to fallen valour by the civil law; a father of three sons was entitled to considerable immunities, which continued to him even after their death, if they had fallen in battle; “ Hi enim qui pro Republica ceciderunt in perpetuum per gloriam vivere intelliguntur.” Instit. lib. ii. tit. xxv. ὁ 1. Hocker, = age PR: exertion, and swiftness as well. But the comeliness of one who has attained life’s prime, is a person adapted to the fatigues of war, with an aspect to be looked upon with pleasure tempered by awe. That of the old consists in the body being capable of the fatigues which it needs must undergo, and exempt withal from pain, by reason that it has none of the afflictions by which an old age is disfigured. Strength 12 is the capability of moving another at will: you move another, of course, either by dragging, or shoving, or lifting, or crushing him; so that the man who is endowed with strength, is requisitely so for some, if not for all these purposes. Excellence of stature, is the exceeding the generality in height, substance, and breadth, in such a ratio as not, by reason of that excess, to render one’s motions more tardy. Gym- nastic excellence of person is made up of stature, strength, and speed; for the swift is also endued with strength: for he who is able to throw out his legs in a particular way, and move them rapidly, and in a forward direction, is fit for running; but he who can crush and grapple with an adversary, is fit for wrestling; while he who can send him for- ward by a blow, is the man for boxing: but if any be endued with the two latter qualifications, he is fit for a pancratiast; while he who has all three may contend in the pentathlum.
A good old age is an old age slow in approach, un- attended by pain; for neither is it a good old age if one grows rapidly old; nor if he does so slowly, in- deed, but painfully: this blessing, however, is of the number both of the excellencies of the body and of fortune. For one who is neither unmolested by sick- ness, nor endued with strength, will not be exempt from sufferings; and his days will be but few, and those not vcid of pain: nor without good fortune will he hold out at all. Indeed, independently both of strength and health there is means of long life; for many, without the excellencies of the body, are long-lived. But accuracy of statement on these sub- jects makes nothing tc our present purpose.
Strength.
ture.
14. Gyme nastic ex= cellence.
15. Goad old age.
Friends.
Good fortune.
tue.
Vir- In what number and excellence of friends consists is not doubtful, it having been distinetly stated, re- specting a friend, that he is a friend who exerts himself to do for another whatever he esteems good for him, solely for the other’s sake. He to whom many are so affected, has numerous friends; he to. whom worthy men, has excellent friends.
Good fortune is the accession, and actual pos-: session, either of all, of most, or the greatest of those: goods of which chance is the cause. Now chance is the cause of some things about which there are arts conversant®; of many things, too, unrecognised by art; for instance, of whatever things nature is ἃ cause; for it is possible that they should happen con- trarily to nature: for art is a cause of health; na- ture, of comeliness and stature. In a word, those goods. proceed from chance, about which envy is felt!” Chance is also a cause of those goods which baffle all calculation; when, for instance, one is handsome, the rest of whose brothers are ugly; or when every one else overlooked a treasure, and he found it; or if a weapon hit one’s neighbour and not one’s self; or if he alone, who used always to frequent a place, did not come there, while they who came then only were destroyed; for all such things appear to be pieces of good luck.
As to moral excellence, since that topic is most intimately connected with praise, we must lay down distinctions respecting it when we treat of the sub- ject of praise. It is then plain at what objects we ought to aim in exhorting, as likely to take place, or ® On the affinity of art and chamce, see Eth. Nich. vn. 4.— Τέχμη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχῃ τέχνην. Agatho.
The affinity appears to consist in this, that arts very often owe their origin to chance; as the capital of the Corinthian pillar. for instance, from a basket of acanthus flowers; and painting from tracing a shadow on the wall. Compare alse the Poetics, ch. vi. where he deduces poetry from the αὐτοσχεδιάσματα or extemporaneous effusions of its rude votaries.
" The subject of Epidesctic Khetoric.
ἼΗΑΡ. νεῖ RHETUnIt 33 already in existence; and what in dissuading, for they are the contraries of these.
CHAP. VL. Of the Good and Expedient treated generally.
SincE the expedient is the object proposed to the de- liberative orator, and as all form their conclusions, not about the end itself, but about the means con- ducive to that end; as moreover these are all things which are expedient in reference to human conduct {now every thing expedient is a good), we shall have to ascertain certain elementary propositions, on the subjects of the good and the expedient in general. Let good, then, be defined to be, 1. Whatever is an object of choice independently, for its own sake; 2.and for the sake of which we choose something else. 3. What every thing aims at', or every thing which has perception, or which has intelligence; or every thing would aim at, were it possessed of intel- ligence. 4. Whatever intelligence would award to each. ὅ. Whatever the intelligence conversant with every instance awards to each, that to each indi- vidual is his good. 6. That which being present, one is well dispesed and independent. 7. Independency. 8. Whatever produces or preserves such advantages?; 9. and that on which they are consequent. 10. What- ever, too, has a tendency to prevent or destroy their opposites. Now, things are consequent in two ways; for either they may be consequent simultaneously or subsequently.—Knowledge, for instance, is a conse- quent on learning subseguently; life is so on health simultaneously. Again, things are productive in 1 This principle, which he insists on even in his moral trea- tises, is peculiarly adapted for a test in rhetoric; where, if the subject be only reconciled to this standard of previous opinion, the end, persuasion, is forthwith answered.
1. The de- liberative orator ad- vises on “ the means,” therefore he must know the συμφέ- ρον.
2.
3. Conse- quences are two- fold.
Things are pro- ductive in three ways.
4. Indis- putable goods.
three ways*; first, in the way that the being healthy is productive of health, or as food is so of health,” or as exercise is, because usually it does produce health.
These things being laid down, it must be of course that acquisitions of good, and the exemptions from evil, are good; for on the one is consequent the non-possession of evil simultaneously; on the other, the possession of good subsequently.
And the acquisition of a greater instead of a less good; of a less evil instead of a greater; for this be- comes an acquisition of the one and an exemption from the other, in the ratio of the excess of the . greater above the less. The virtues also must of course be a good, for in reference to them are their possessors well-disposed4; they are also productive of goods, and bear on moral conduct: respecting each, however, severally what, and of what kind it is, - must be distinctly treated. It must be also that pleasure is a good, for all living things naturally de- sire it. Thus, too, things pleasant and honourable must needs be good; for the first are productive of pleasure; while, of things honourable, some are pleasant, and the rest are by themselves objects of choice on their own account. So that to speak οὗ. them severally, it must be that the following things are good.—Happiness; for it is both an object of choice by itself, and independent, and for the sake of it ἢ . we choose many things. Justice, courage, temperance, 3. First, continuous; second, discrete; third, contingent.
4 We may observe of Aristotle’s several enumerations of εἴδη, that he usually refers a few instances of earliest oeeur- rence to the respective definitions or axioms at the outset of the subject, by virtue of which they belong to the class to which he assigns them. Thus, in the enumeration of good here instituted, he refers to his general canons of goud which have just been admitted; 6. g. virtue may be classed among goods, by virtue of def. 5 and 7. It would be useful to pur- sue the comparison, if not throngh all the instances quoted, at least through the greater part of them; since it will at once serye the purpose of impressing on the memory his leading ex. amples, and of helping us to a fuller acquaintance with his theory.
CHAP. γῇ] ‘RHETORIC, 4) magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of that sort; for they are excellencies of the soul;—and health and comeliness, and things of that sort, for they are excellencies of the body, and productive of many things; health, for instance, both of pleasure and of life; and it seems, on this account, to be the very best possession, because it is the cause of two things, which the generality of men value most, viz. of plea- sure and life:—Wealth; because it is an excellence of possession, and productive of many things. A friend and friendship; for a friend is an object of choice independently, and productive of many advantages. Honour, character; for they are pleasant, and pro- ductive of much; and there is usually consequent on them the actual possession of the qualities, on ac- count of which the subject is honoured. Ability, in speaking and acting; for all such powers are produc- tive of good. Again, high genius, memory, readiness in learning, quickness of thought, and all such qualities; for these faculties are productive of good; and in the same way all the arts and sciences. And life; for were no other good consequent on it, of itself it is an object of choice. And that which is just, for it is a kind of general advantage. Such, then, are the things which are good, as it were confessedly. But in the case of questionable goods, your reason- ings will be deduced from these formule,—that of which the contrary is an evil, is itself a good; as is