? In the Ethics (lib. viii. c. 10) democracy is not stated as a distinct form, but merely as a deviation (παρέκβασις) from timocracy, or πολιτεία ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων.
δ ολκβεσα βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς" ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι.
id.
* We find a remarkable proof of this in the account given by Herodotus of the anxiety of the Persians for the personal safety of. Xerxes after the battle of Salamis;—odé« οὕτω περὶ τῶν νεῶν ἀχθόμενοι, ὡς περὶ αὐτῷ Ξέρξῃ δειμαίνοντες, viii. 99. A remarkable expression occurs in Sophocles from which the same inference may be drawn; QCE&dipus, asking Creon why the murder of Laius had not been more fully investigated, thus expresses himself: Κακὸν δὲ ποῖον ἐμποδὼν, TYPANNIAOS “Ὅντω πεσούσης, εἶργε τοῦτ᾽ ἐξειδέναι ς-(Εαᾶϊρ. Tyran. 128.
3. Four orms, 4, Demo cracy.
Oligax- chy. Aristo- cracy.
Mon arcey.
5. Ends of each govern- ment “men fix their choice by reference to the end, that we 6 The speaker must know these con- stitution- al forms in order to impress the hear- ers with a good-will towards him.
must accurately distinguish the respective practices, laws, and interests of each form.
But as means of persuasion originate not in argu- mentative oratory alone, but in such also as bears an impress of character; for it is from the speaker’s ap- pearing a man of certain character that we trust him; that is to say, if he appears an honest man, or well affected®, or both: as this is the case, it will be ne- cessary for us to be masters of the character of each form of government; for the character which is pe- culiar to each, must needs be most available to per- suasion in addressing each. These points, however, will be ascertained by means of the same information; for the character will manifestly be conformable to the choice; now the settled choice has reference to the end.
Thus then have the objects which we ought to aim at in exhorting and dissuading, as probable or actu- ally in existence; the sources, too, out of which we must draw our means of proof on the subject of the expedient, and on the subject moreover of the cha- racter and legal principles belonging to the forms of government; and the means by which, and the manner how, we shall have facilities on such ques- tions: all these points have been discussed, so far as was within the scope of the present occasion. For accuracy of detail on these points has been observed in the Politics.
Where we may observe, that not simply is the person of the tyrant spoken of, but the very government itself, as though it had fallen with him.
δ It is required (lib. ii. c. 1) that he be further possessed of φρόνησις. Let it be remembered that these qualities must be evinced by the speech, and not simply be taken for granted from a previous knowledge of the man. See Pearson om the Creed, Art. i. p. 5. | OHAP. 1x.? RHETORIC. 67 CHAP. IX.
On the subject of Virtue and Vice, the honourable and dis- graceful;— Out of what considerations praise and blame are derwed.
Let us next speak of virtue and vice, and of the honourable and disgraceful; because these are the objects of the orator who praises or blames'; and because it will happen that, in speaking of these subjects, we shall at the same time throw light on the means by which we may ourselves be conceived to be of a certain turn of character, which was stated to be the second means of effecting belief; since we shall be able, by the application of the same points, to render ourselves or others deserving belief on the score of moral excellence. But as there frequently are instances, as well in sober earnest as without it, of praising not men or gods only, but even inani- mate objects, and any animal whatever, as it may happen; we must here, in the same way as before, ascertain propositions on these subjects also. Let us then, so far as may serve for a specimen, discuss these subjects.
That then is honourable, which, while it is an object of choice on its own account, is commendable also; or which, being good, is pleasant, simply be- cause it is good. But if the honourable be this, virtue must necessarily be honourable; for, being - good, it is commendable. And virtue, as it should seem, is a faculty tending to provide us with goods and preserve them to us; a faculty moreover capable of benefiting in many and important cases; of bene- fiting, in a word, every object in every respect?.
1 As praise is the proper reward of virtue, so are blame and disgrace proper to vice; in order that the world may be warned by the example of the one, and excited to emulate that of the other; ἀρετὰ γὰρ ἐπαινεομένη, δένδρον ws, ἀέξεται.
3. Aristotle never omits an opportunity of inculcating this wholesome lesson, that the practice of virtue conduces to our true witerest. Its necessity in bodies politic, as being emi- 1. The subjectsof _ Epideic- tic oratory discussed.
3. τὸ καὸ Adv de- fined in two ways.
4. Perfect virtue and its con- stituent parts are honour- able.
il.
The constituent parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, placability, prudence, wisdom; and it must needs be, that those virtues are the highest which are the most beneficial to others, if at least virtue be (as it was defined) a faculty capable of benefiting on this account, men honour in the greatest degree the just and brave; for justice and courage are useful to them, the one in war, and the other in peace®. Next is liberality; for the liberal are profuse, and do not wrangle with people about money, the object which the rest of the world hanker after more than any . thing. Now justice is the virtue by which each has his own, as the law prescribes: injustice, however, is that habit by which some take the property of . others in contravention to law. Courage, that by which men are ready to achieve honourable exploits in the midst of danger, conformably to the direction of and in subservience to law’: cowardice, however, . is its contrary. But temperance is a virtue by which men carry themselves so, in respect to the pleasures of the body, as the law directs; intemper- . ance, however, is its contrary. But liberality tends to benefit in pecuniary matters; stinginess is its contrary. Magnanimity is that virtue which is apt to confer important benefits; narrowness of soul nently τὸ σώζον τὴν πολιτείαν, is thus stated in another of his works: Ἔστι δ᾽ οὔθεν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πρᾶξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποῖον τίνα εἶναι, λέγω δὲ οἷον σπουδαῖον. Td δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. Magn. Mor. lib. i. ο. 1.
3 In the Ethics he places liberality first:;---φιλοῦνται σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. Eth. Nich. iv. 1. Courage may be ranked first, because on occasions we may be disqualified from the exercise of other virtues if this be wanting.
4 Consistently with the doctrine held in the Ethics, he does not admit every sort of daring to the praise of courage. For of some persons, whose daring is at first sight not incunsider- able, it is true, as Juvenal remarks— Justa pericli Si ratio est et honesta, timent pavidoque geMantur Pectore, nec tremulis possunt insistere plantis: Fortem animum prestant rebus, quas turpiter audent. Sat. vi. 94.
CHAP. 12.7 RHETORIC. 59 is its opposite. Magnificence is the virtue which produces grandeur in expenditures:—again, narrow- ness of scul and meanness are opposed. Prudence however is an intellectual virtue, by conforming to which men have the faculty of actually determining on the subjects of the good and evil®, which has veen mentioned as entering into happiness. - Enough has been said on the subject of virtue and vice in general, and of their constituent parts, to suit the present’ occasion: respecting the other points, there is no difficulty in discerning what they are; for it is plainly necessary both that the productives of virtue should be honourable (because they have re- ference to virtue), and also the fruits of virtue; of which kind are both the indications and actions of virtue; but as the indications and all actions or suf- ferings of a good man are honourable, it will neces- sarily follow that all exploits of courage whatever, and all indications of courage, that all conduct, in ἃ word, which has been marked with courage is honourable; and so of things just and conforming to justice, so far at least as actions are concerned: (but as relates to sufferings this is not the case 3 for in this single instance of all the virtues, does it occur that what is conformable to justice is not invariably honourable, but in the case of suffering punishment, that which is justly suffered is in a 5 Alluding to the division made in the Ethics of virtues into those of the ἐπιθυμήτεκον and λόγον ἔχον μέρος of the soul; the former whereof is the subject of the moral, the latter of the in- tellectwal virtues. Vid. Eth. i. 13.
ὃ Ἢ μὲν φρόνησις περὶ Ta ποιητέα ὅρους αὐτοῖς τιθεῖσα. Philo, p. 35, Allegor. ed. Par.
7 Those who have not read the Ethics will be surprised to hear that the virtues which he here cespatches in one section, should there occupy a book and a half. This popular discus- sion of them is, as far as it goes, conformable to the more phi- losophical view taken in the other treatise, except in respect to the criterion which is assigned of the comparative excellence ‘of each virtue, viz. μέγιστας εἶναι ἀρετᾶς Tas τοῖς ἄλλοις χρη- σιμώτατοις; and that stated § 23—ai ἀπολαύστικαι ἄλλοὶς “μᾶλλον, κι τ. λ. Such a test, however inadequate to the views of the philosopher, is good enough for the orator, since it is on¢ in which nine-tenths of the world will acquiesce.
14 Ta καλὰ enumer- ated.
18 17. Every thing free from the selfish principle is honourable.
higher degree disgraceful than what is unjustly§;) and so likewise in respect to the other virtues. Whatever actions have national distinctions as their reward are honourable, or whatever have such dis- tinctions rather than money. Whatever things, among those which are objects of choice, one does, not for his own sake. And whatever things which ab- stractedly viewed are good, one has achieved for his country’s sake, overlooking his own interest. Things good in their own nature; things which are good, but not to one’s self; every thing of that kind being chosen on its own account. Whatever things admit of being realized to one when dead, rather than in his life-time; for that which appertains to one in his life, rather carries the idea of its being for one’s self. Whatever actions are for the sake of others; for they are not so much for one’s own sake. And as many instances of successful management as occur where others are concerned, and where one’s self is not; and this particularly respecting benefactors, for it ‘then is just. Benefits, too, are honourable; for they at- tach not to one’s self. And the contraries of all cases in which men feel a delicacy; for men are sens- ible of delicacy both in mentioning, or doing, or in- tending any thing disgraceful; just as Sappho has expressed in verse on the occasion of Alczus’ saying, “1 would say something, but delicacy restrains me.” “If thou entertainedst a desire of speaking things either good or honourable, and were not thy tongue teeming with the utterance of some evil; shame had not suffused thine eyes, but thou wouldest havc spoken what was fit.” Objects for which men are, keenly anxious without being affected by fear, are: honourable; for men are thus affected respecting © 8 The passage from πάθη to ἀδίκως must be considered as a - note; and the words κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας---ὡσαύτως, considered as the conclusion of the sentence preceding it.
9 Victorius cites an anecdote of Themistocles, preserved by Cicero, as illustrative of this remark. ‘‘ Noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset: quis rentibusque respondebat, Miitiadis tropeis se e somno excitart.”* Tusc. iv. 19. It will be needless to remark, that ‘ noble CHAP. Ix.]} RHETORIC, 61 goods which tend to reputation. Those virtues and 22. their fruits are honourable in a higher degree, which belong to subjects naturally more excellent’; as, for example, those of a man are higher than those of a woman. And those which are of a nature to be en- 23. joyed by others, rather than by ourselves; the prin- ciple on which the just and justice are honourable.
Thus, the taking vengeance on a foe rather than 24. Re- the being reconciled; both because to compensate is;tue" #8 just, and what is just is honourable!!; and further, able. because it belongs to the courageous man never to be worsted, Both victory and national distinction are 25. of the number of things honourable; for they are desirable, though unattended by lucre, and evince more than ordinary virtue; and the memorials of one’s name; and what partakes of these respective characters more decidedly, is also more decidedly honourable. Again, things which do not follow one in his life; and whatever honour is attendant on; that which presents features of vastness; that, too, is honourable in a higher degree which belongs to one’s self alone, for it is longer remembered. And 26, possessions unattended by profit, for they are more becoming a gentleman!?; and whatever is peculiarly esteemed among each people, is honourable. Every Badges badge of what is held commendable in each nation; are hon- at Lacedemon', for instanee, it is honourable to wear το δ’ minds” alone can be sensible of this high excitement—¢ywvia. And Thucydides on hearing Herodotus read his History.
10 The greatness and dignity of all manner of actions is measured by the worthiness of the subject from which they eta and of the object whereabout they are conversant.
Ἢ This is a striking instance of that species of sophistry by which our unenlightened reason reconciles us to the gratifica- tion of our worst passions; and we should learn from it to slory in that heavenly wisdom which has taught us “ to de rood to those who hate us, to pray for those who despitefully use us and persecute us.”
12 ᾿Ελευθέρια, τὰ μὴ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν. See cap. v. § 7.
% This idea appears, in ancient times, to have been very prevalent; a singular instance of its influence is mentioned in Stobeeus: “ Παρ᾽ ᾿Ινδοῖς ἐάν τις ἀποστερηθῇ δανείου, ἢ παρα» καταθήκης, οὐκ ἔστι Koie:s’ ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν αἰτιᾶται ὁ πιστεύσωφ must re- gard ap- parent good qualities as real.
long hair!4, because it is the badge of a free man, since it is not easy for a man with long hair to do - any servile work. And the not exercising any vulgar craft; for it belongs to a gentleman not to live in dependence on another’. And we must take for granted that qualities, akin to real ones, are actually identified with them, and this with a view as well to praise as to blame; for instance, taking the cautious man to be a cold-hearted, designing fellow; or a sim- — pleton to be a good kind of man; and the man who is dead to feeling, to be of a mild disposition: and in a word, we must make a selection, invariably on the most favourable side, out of the qualities con- comitant on the character of each; making out the passionate and furious to be men void of all duplicity; and the self-willed to be magnificent and dignified: ‘ and such as are in excess, to be in the virtuous mean; the rash, for instance, to be brave; the pro- fuse, liberal!®; for it will both seem to be the case ὁ δὲ τεχνίτου πηρώσας χεῖρα ἢ ὀφθαλμὸν θανάτῳ ζημιοῦται, τὸν δὲ μέγιστα ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ βασιλεὺς κελεύει κείρασθαι, ὡς ἐσχάτης οὔσης ταύτης ἀτιμίας. Parr, pit. Serm. p. 146.
14 The Lacedemonians used to wear their hair long, in com- memoration of the victory obtained by Othryades and his two comrades over the three Argive champions, for the land at Thyrea. Herodot. i. 82. Or perhaps, being inconvenient to those engaged in servile occupations, length of hair might be considered as a badge of the more noble pursuits of the wearer. Collins has a fine allusion to this practice in the opening of his Ode to Liberty:— Who shall awake the Spartan fife, And call in solemn sounds to life The youths, whose locks divinely spreading, Like vernal hyacinths in sullen hue, — At once the breath of fear and virtue shedding, Applauding Freedom loved of old to view?
Among the Franks, the privilege of wearing the hair long was peculiar to the princes and their descendants, the rest of the nation being obliged tv shave the hinder part of the head. Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, c. xxxv. note 17, and Agathias quoted in Heraldic Anomalies, vol. i. p. 168.
45 Aristotle, in his Ethics, makes this remark of the μεγα- λόψυχος, observing, πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῇν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πρὸς φίλον" δουλικὸν γάρ. iv. 3. ᾿ 16 Horace recommends an innocent use of this sort of 905. phistry among friends, as a preservative of friendship— Ὄσττ » Liu mS Ὗ; CHAP. IXx.]} RHETORIC. 63 to the nine-tenths of the world, and will aiford room for deducing a piece of false reasoning out of the motives of the agent; for if one rush into danger where there is no necessity, much more should it seem that he will, where it is honourable!"; and if a man be lavish on all who fall in his way, surely he will also be so on his friends; for to benefit all is an excess of virtue. We ought to consider also before whom our panegyric is pronounced; for, as Socrates used to remark, “ It is no difficult thing to panegyrise Athenians in the presence of Athenians.” We must also assert that what is valued by each auditory, is to be essentially valuable; what, for instance, either Scythians or Lacedzmonians or philosophers value: and, in short, to refer to the class of things really honourable, whatever is held in esteem; since by virtue of their being so esteemed, they appear to approximate closely that class. Again, whatever is natural under such circumstances, for instance, if one’s actions be worthy of his ancestors or his own former achievements; since the additional acquisition of glory tends to happiness, and is honourable. Like- wise every action contrary to what is natural to one, so it be on one side of what is better and honourable; as when one in good fortune has been moderate, or magnanimous in adversity; or has become better and easier to be won over in proportion as he became greater. Of this nature was the appeal of Iphicrates, * From what beginnings to what have I attained!” And that of the Olympic conqueror, “ Formerly bearing on my shoulders a rough basket,” etc. And that of the epitaph by Simonides, “‘ Though daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants'’,” etc.
Vellem in amicitia sic erraremus, et isti Errori virtus nomen posuisset honestum, etc.
Opinor Hec res et jungit, junctos et servat amicos.
-" That is, under the direction of the law, ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικὸς τῷ νόμῳ. § 7.
“18 The epitaph was on Archedice, daughter of Hippias, and wife of Oantides, tyrant of Lampsacis. See Thucyd. vi. 59.
must see in whose presence, our coms menda- tion is held.
must show that the person raised as acted on prin- ciple.
ἔπαινος defined.
2 mon p.int of epideic- tic and de- liberative oratory.
But as commendation arises out of moral conduct, and it is a peculiar characteristic of the good man to act on principle 3, we must endeavour to put the ob- ject οὐ our commendation in the light of one who has acted on principle. Now his appearing to have acted so in many instances will be serviceable with a view to this; wherefore coincidences and fortuitous oc-: currences must be assumed as done on principle: and ᾿ should many and like circumstances be alleged, it will appear to be a sign of virtue and principle. Now commendation is language exhibiting greatness in the case of virtue; we should therefore give this further proof of the actions of him we commend, that they are of this character. Encomium”®, however, is of ac- tions; (and circumstances concur to the enforcing persuasion, as excellence of birth and education; for: it is probable that a person so brought up, will be of such a character;) and hence we pass encomia on those who have acted. And a man’s actions are signs of his habit; since we commend even the man who has not acted, if we believe him to be of such a character. But felicitation (μακαρισμὸς), and con- gratulation (εὐδαιμονισμὸς), are Synonymous the one to the other; but are not so to the other two: but felicitation comprehends them, just as happiness com- prehends virtue.
Demonstrative and deliberative oratory have one point in common; for whatever you would suggest to a man in giving advice, that, by a change of the dic- tion, becomes an encomium?!, When, therefore, we 19 See Ethics, lib, ii. c. 4. Δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ" πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδὼς. ἔπειτ᾽ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι᾽ αὐτὰ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἐὰν βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ" and, in fact, unless the καλὰ be done under some restriction of principle, mode, and propriety, they lose their character, as Zonaras has, on another occasion, observed: Ὅτι οὐ καλὸν ὅταν μὴ καλῶς γί- νηται: in Can. Apost. 66, quoted in Hooker, at the end of booki.
20 On the subject of ἐγκώμιον and ἔπαινος, see Eth. Nich. i. 12, where he is inquiring whether commendation or praise be more appropriate to happiness:—0o μὲν graves τῆς ἀρετῆς “πρακτικοὶ yao τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης" Ta δὲ ἐγκώμια τῶν Ep γων, ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν, καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. - 91: Laudes nonnulle ἃ voluntate bona cum reverentia Come ΄ CMAP. IX.] RHETORIC. 60 know what a man ought to do, and what kind of per- son he should be, it is necessary, if we would state this in the form of advice, to transpose and change the sentiment in its diction: for instance, suppose we are aware that we are not to think highly of goods obtained by chance, but of those obtained by our own means. ‘Thus expressed the sentiment has the force of a suggestion; but thus, of cemmendation, “think- ing highly, not of goods which were his by chance, but those obtained by his own means.” So that, when you wish to commend, see what you would suggest in advising; and when to advise, see what you would commend. But the diction will of neces- sity be reversed, when there has been submitted to change an idea which in one form is prohibitive, in another is not prehibitive.
We must avail ourselves also of amplification in many cases: thus, if a man has done a thing alone, or first, or with few to share it, or even if it bea thing which he has done more than any other; these all are circumstances of honour. The topic also which is deducible from times and seasons; these are circumstances contrary to what is natural. Also if a man has oftefh succeeded in the same thing; for this is a feature of greatness, and originates not in chance, but will appear to arise through his own means. Also if orations commendatory and exhorting to emulation have been founded and got up on his ac- count; if also he be one on whom an encomium was first passed, as it was on Hippolochus; and the hav- ing a statue set up in the forum first occurred to Harmodius and Aristogiton: and in the same way we use amplification with opposite views; and should you not abound in topics bearing on your subject himself, you should set him in comparison with others; which Isocrates used to do from his familiar- ity with judicial pleading. You should compare the juncta proficiscuntur, que sane laudum formula Principibus et Viris quibuscungue dignioribus debetur: Laudando precipere: cum scilicet apud illos predicando quales sint, humiliter mo neas quales esse debeant. Bacon’s Essays, De Laude.
ὴ Σ plification to be used; and comparison of person of whom you speak, with men of character; character. for it is a feature of amplification, and honourable, if he be better than the good.
39. Am- | Amplification falls in easily with demonstrative plification oratory; for its essence is the being above medi- siete ocrity. On which account we should make a com- oratory, parison with the generality of men, if we cannot with men of character; since the being above the 40, average seems to indicate virtue. In a word, of all the formule common to each branch of rhetoric, am-' plification best suits demonstrative; for the orator takes the actions for granted, and it thus remains Example only to invest them with greatness and beauty. Ex- ruts de- ample”, however, suits deliberative; because we iberative, ᾿. enthy- there decide, by arguing of the future from what has mem ju- gone before. Enthymem, however, suits judicial; eon °ra for by reason of its not being clear, the past most especially leaves room for assignment of reasons and’ demonstration. | 41. Nearly all the sources out of which praise and: blame are deduced, and on what sort of things we' ought to have an eye in praising and blaming, the’ means too by which encomia and reproaches are produced, are these: for being possessed of these points, 22 For the general principles upon which Examp es influ-' ence us, and their peculiar adaptation to deliberative cases, see book ii. chap. 20. Meanwhile let us anticipate our author’s. discussion of the subject, and quote a few words of a modern writer to show how completely this vehicle of proof is adapted ' to the purpose of the orator, whose demonstrations should al- ways be as little laboured as possible.—‘‘ Our lives in thig world are partly guided in rules, and partly directed by Cia, amples. To conclude out of general rules and axioms by dis- course of wit our duties in every particular action, is both’ troublesome, and many times so full of difficulty, that it maketh ἡ deliberations hard and tedious to the wisest men. Whereupon we naturally all incline to observe examples, to mark what others have done before us, and, in favour of our own ease, rather to follow them, than to enter into a new consultation, if in regard of their virtue and wisdom we may but probably think they have waded without error. So that the willingness. of men to be led by example of others, both discovereth and helpeth the imbecility of our judgment.” Hooker, Ecc. Pol. ' CHAP. %.f ‘RHETORIC. 81 their contraries are plain; for blame is deduced from the opposite sources.
CHAP. X.
The number and nature of the Sources out of which the Orator must construct his reasonings in Accusation and Defence, Ir will be for me next to speak of the number: and nature of the sources out of which the orator must construct his reasonings, touching accusation and de- fence. Now we must ascertain three points; one, what and how many are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly; the second, how themselves are disposed; and the third, towards persons of what character and of what disposition they do so act.
_ Let us then, after defining the acting unjustly, speak in order of the rest. Let the acting unjustly be defined to be, the voluntary! commission of hurt in contravention of law. Now law is either general or peculiar. The peculiar law I call that, by whose written enactments men direct their polity: the general, whatever unwritten rules appear to be recog- ‘ nised among all men. Men are voluntary agents in whatever they do wittingly, and without compulsion. Men, therefore, do not every thing on fixed princi- ple, which they do wittingly: but whatever they do on fixed principle, that they do wittingly; because no one is ignorant of that which he chooses on princi- ple. Now, the principles by whose motion men de- 1 Rewards and punishments do always presuppose some- thing willingly done well or ill; without which respect, though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is only a benefit and not a reward, the other simply a hurt and hot a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of man’s will, which is the root of all his actions, there groweth variety tn the sequel of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: Take away the will, and all acts are equal: That which we do not, and would do, is commonly accepted as done. Hooker, i. as 9, p. 299.
1, Judi- cial ora- tory con- sidered in three ways.
motives. ii. The disposi- tion of the agents, in. The- persons injured. justice dee fined. Division - ii, Par ticular, 4. Twa eauses of liberately choose to hurt and do evil in contravention τ Νς of law, are depravity and moral weakness”; for if pravity. @ny are depraved either in one or more respects, it is ii. Incon- in reference to that point, on which they are so de- unence. _ praved, that they are guilty of injustice. The illi- beral man, for instance, on the subject of money; the intemperate, touching the pleasure of the body; and the effeminate, respecting objects of ease; and the coward, respecting danger; (for it is by reason of fear that men abandon their comrades in. danger;) the ambitious man, on the score of honour; the hasty man, by reason of anger; the man eager to excel, on account of victory; the vindictive, for the sake of revenge; a silly man, owing to his being mistaken on points of right and wrong; a man of effrontery, from his contempt of character. And in other cha- racters in the same way each [goes wrong | respect- 5. ing his own particular weakness. But my meaning on these matters will be evident from what has been already said on the subject of the virtues, and from what hereafter will be stated on the subject of the passions. It merely remains for me to state on what account, how effected, and toward -whom, men do commit injustice. 6. The First, then, let us distinctly enumerate the objects, motives of which desiring, or which avoiding, we set about in- aay justice?: because it evidently should be considered from by the plaintiff how many, and what sort of those things, from a desire of which men wrong their neighbours, have an existence on the side of his ad- versary; and by the defendant again, what, and 3 Cf. James, chap. i. 15.
3 How complete an insight into the nature of man does this disquisition display; and how admirable a key is here afforded to all the operations of the human heart! This branch of knowledge has always been insisted on as essential to those employed in judicial investigations.—Thus, Bolingbroke, speaking of the education of lawyers, says, ‘‘ They must pry into the secret recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole moral world, that they may discover the abstract reasou of all laws,” etc. Stud. of Hist. p. 353: edit 4to.
what number of these things do not so exist. Now 7. the mo- ail men do all things either of themselves, or not of μελήρ: ΘΕ ΜΙΣ themselves. ‘The things which they do not of them- action, selves, they do either by chance, or from necessity; ‘and the things done by necessity, they do either by compulsion, or by nature. So that all things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again,