should happen for one, in their commission to avenge a father or mother, as was the case of Zeno,) while the punishment leads merely t fine, banishment, or something of that kind; for both descriptions of persons act unjustly; however, they are not the same in character, but the very opposite. Persons, too, who have often escaped notice, or who have not been punished. People who have often met with ill success; for these, like persons engaged in warlike eeatane, are of a disposition to renew the contest.
very one also to whom the pleasant is immediate, while the painful is subsequent; or if the object be gain, while the loss is subsequent; for all incontiᾳ τι 8. Such as have means of conceal- ment.
9. Where there is great gain.
10. Where the pun- ᾿ ishment is only op- probrium, 11. The undetect- ed, The un- lucky.
12, Where the plea- sure is im: mediate.
some- times when re- mote.
14. Where another motive will be at- tributed.
15. Men in want. i. Who want ne- cessaries. ii. Who Men of bad cha- racter. 17. The persons exposed to injustice are: such as have the de- sired ob- ject.
18. The distant. The near, nent persons are thus affected: now incontinence is conversant about all objects whatsoever which men desire®. And on the contrary, persons are wont to act unjustly in cases where the painful or loss is immediate, but the pleasant and expedient is subse- quent, and slow in presenting itself; for continent persons, and such as have rather more practical wisdom, pursue objects of this kind. Wherever, too, a person may appear to have acted by chance, by necessity, natural bent, or habit; and, in a word, to be guilty of error, not of zajustice. Also in what- ever cases it may happen that one would meet with equity. Again, whatever persons are in want: now men are in want two ways; for either they want necessaries, like the poor; or something in excess, just as the rich’. People, too, of exceedingly good character, or such as are utterly destitute of charac- ter; the first, on the principle that they shall not appear the culprits; the last, that they shall not be a whit worse off as to character. Thus affected . In themselves, then, it is that men attack their neighbours.
But they act unjustly against persons, and on ac- count of objects, of the following descriptions. Per- sons who possess things which themselves are in need of, be it for necessaries, for superfluity, or for sensual enjoyment: people who are at a distance, and those who are near: for the means of getting at the one are quick, and the vengeance of the others is slow; as on those, for instance, who plunder Carthaginians®: and 6 Although incontinence, properly so called, is excited by a limited description of objects, yet there is a feeling analogous to, and, in the vague language of the world, synonymous with it, which may be excited by any objects whatsoever;—v7oAn7- Téov μόνον ἀκρασίαν Kal ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ. ἹΤερὶ δὲ θυμὸν, καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν. ἘΠῚ. Nich. vii. 4. This is another of the many instances, in which Aristotle supposes the rhetorician to take a popular view of his subject.
7 Exilis domus est ubi non et multa supersunt.
8. This may have been a proverbial expression for desig- pating any attack on a remote object; sinre, considered in Hor. Ep.
Guar. xn. | RHETORIC. 83 menu who are not cautious, nor apt to be on their 19. guard, but are of a disposition to repose confidence; for it is easy enough to elude all such. Also towards The indo~ such as are of an indolent turn; for to prosecute is the!e™*- part of a man who is strenuous. Against such also as Those ~to squabble about gain: and again, those who have sence of _ heen wronged by many already, yet without their pro- oe secuting; as though these were, in the words of the ”° proverb, “a prey to very Mysians’.” Both against 21. The “those-who never yet have been wrongéd, and those τοπροά.
he un- armed.
§ idea ‘hat they never shall be wronged, the last as though they should not be wronged any more: also 23. Those -against those who have had imputations thrown on in a their characters, or w it; for such -; ple, from a fear of the judges, do not take on themselves to effect persuasion, neither, in fact, ar able; of whic é o are disliked and en- vied. Men act unjustly also towards those against 23. Such they have any pretext, on_the part either he brea! " their ancestors, themselves or friends, that they have wrought ill, or intended it, either against themselves, or their anc » for whom they havea-re-— gard; for, as the proverb goes, ‘ ice wan an €xCcuse. gainst frien are acts of injustice committed; for against the first haga nemics, it is easy", against the others pleasant: also against reference to Greece under the then imperfect state of naviga- tion, Carthage was an object not easily got at.
9 The Mysians were so effeminate and unwarlike, that their neighbours made encroachments on their territory with im- punity, so that they became proverbial through Greece.
10 Some traits in the character of the Thessalian Menon, as given by Xenophon, will serve to illustrate Aristotle’s cata- _ togue of these objects of villany. Of Menon it was remarked, “ rots μὲν TON TIOAEMIQN κτήμασιν οὐκ ἐπεβούλευε" αὐ υλ πὸν γὰρ weTo εἶναι τὰ ΤΩΝ ®YAATTOMENQN AapBaver'— τὰ δὲ TON ΦΙΛΩΝ μόνος ᾧετο εἰδέναι ὅτι ῥᾷσπον᾽ A®YA AKTA Aau advew. Kai ὅσους μὲν ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ε ἐπιόρκους καὶ ἀδίκους, ὡς εὖ ὡπλισμένους ἐφοβεῖτο᾽ τοῖς δ᾽ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀσκοῦσιν ὡς ἀνάνδροις ἐπειρᾶτο χρῆσθαι. Anab. lib. ii. c. 6. οἷς Upon this principe the remark of Demonax was grounded The friendless. Those who are not elo- quent nor active.
25. Those who can- not afford to wait. 26. The unjust, 99. Our enemies, 20. Those just on the point those who are friendless, and those who are not of ability in speaking or acting; because these either do not at all attempt to prosecute, or are reconciled, or bring nothing to the point: also against those whom it will not pay to be waiting in watch for the sentence of court, or the payment of the fine; for instance, foreigners and mechanics; for people under these cir- cumstances are reconciled for a trifle, and are easily hushed. People, too, who themselves have been guilty of injustice in many instances, or in cases of the very character under which they now are wronged; because it appears to approximate in some degree to non-commission of injustice, when a person shall have ~ been wronged in a particular, in which he is himself wont to be guilty; it is, I mean, as if one were in- solently to assault the person of a man who is himself in the habit of being insolent. Those also get in- jured who have wrought ill, or who possessed, or do now possess, an inclination to do so, or who are about to do so; for the act involves what is pleasant and honourable; and it appears to approximate to non- commission of injury: those, too, in injuring whom, aman gratifies his friends, those he admires or loves, on whom he is in dependence, or, in a word, all at whose control he lives, and at whose hands it happens he will meet with equitable consideration. Men also wrong those with whom they have ground of quarrel, and have been previously at variance, as Calippus did in the case about Dion; for acts of this nature seem to approximate to a non-commission of injus- tice: and those who are on the eve of being injured by others, should we not do so ourselves; since this —E: λάσσω κακὰ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐ θροὺς δεδίοτες φυλάσσονται" τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀνεωγμένοι εἰσὶ, καὶ γίνονται σφαλεροὶ καὶ εὐεπιβοὺ- λευτοι. Nor did this escape the penetration of that keen ob- server of human nature, Tacitus: Quibus deerat inimicus, per amicos oppressi. Hist. i. 3. Pomponium Flaccum, veterem stipendiis, et arcté cum rege amicitia, eo datiorem ad Jallendum, ob id maxime Meesie prefecit. Ann. ii. 66. To this purpose, too, is the maxim of P. Syrus, Mage cavenda est amicorum invidia, quam insidiz hostium. See also Proe verbs, iil. 29 CHAP. X11] RHETORIC. ᾿ δὸ admits no longer any deliberation; just as Ζηο681- demus is said to have sent presents of cups 12 to Gelon _ after he had reduced some state, because he had gotten the start, himself being on the eve of attempting it. Injurers attack those, also, by injuring whom they will be enabled to do many acts of justice, as though they could easily amend their error; just as Jason the Thessalian said, ‘‘that in some particulars one must needs act with injustice, in order to his being able to do many deeds of justice 15: again, they attack people in those particulars, in regard to which, all or most persons usually act wrong; because here they think te meet with fellow feeling: in regard also to particulars easy to conceal, of which nature are arti- cles quickly consumed, victuals for instance; or ar- ticles admitting a ready change, either in shape, co- lour, or composition; or which it is easy to put out of sight in a variety of places; of which sort are articles easily portable, and hidden in small places; articles also the like to which, or some undistinguish- able from them, have previously been in the posses- sion of the individuals who thus violate justice. Men injure, moreover, in regard to such particulars, as the injured parties have a delicacy in mentioning; thus in assaults on females intimately connected, or on themselves, or on their children: in all cases, too, in regard to which the prosecuting party would appear litigious; of this nature are trifling things, and those in which people sympathize and forgive.
of being injured by others, 31. Those whom they can compen- sate.
32. Men injure where the articles are easy to conceal, le 34, Port- able.
35. Diffi- cult to be identified, Where the party injured feels a de- licaey in” alluding to the subject. Where it looks li- tigious te deman:i 12 The amusement of the κότταβος had become so popular justice.
at the Grecian banquets, that persons who practised it with superior dexterity were presented with rewards, κοτταβεῖα, supposed by some commentators to have been a sort of cups or vessels peculiarly adapted to the purposes of the game. See Meursius de Ludis Vet. Grec. p. 28, v. Κοτταβισμός. Vid. Athene, fol. 666, ubi de Cottabo. Critias ibid.: Κότταβος ἐκ Σικελῆς ἐστὶ χθονὸς, ἐκπρεπὲς ἔργον" Ὃν σκοπὸν ἐς λαταγῶν τόξα καθιστάμεθα. See Victorius, and also Barnes’s note on Frag. 105, in his edition of Anacreon.
‘8 Thus, too, the Jesuits contended that “ evil might.e done im order to produce good.”
The dispositions then under which, the objects for whose sake, and the person towards whom, men act unjustly, and why they do so, are nearly these which I have stated.
CHAP. XIII. Of Acts of Injustice, and Matters of Equity.
ComMENCING from this point, let me mark in detail all acts which conform to, or which violate justice. Now right and wrong have been defined in reference to two kinds of law, and in a twofold way also in re- gard to those persons to whom they refer'. Law?, now, I understand, to be either peculiar or universal; peculiar, to be that which has been marked out by each people in reference to itself, and that this is partly unwritten, partly written. I call that law uni- versal, which is conformable merely to dictates of na- ture; for there does exist naturally an universal sense of right and wrong’, which, in a certain degree, all Vid. Eth. Nich. v. 7.
3 The description of Law given by Demosthenes is, perhaps the most perfect and satisfactory that can either be found or conceived; Oi δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέ- gov βούλονται, καὶ τοῦτο ζητοῦσι" καὶ ἐπειδὰν εὑρεθῆ κοινὸν τοῦτο πρόσταγμα ἀπεδείχθη, πᾶσιν ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ νόμος, ᾧ πάντας προσήκει πείθεσθαι, διὰ πολλὰ, καὶ μά- λισθ᾽, ὅτι πᾶς ἐστὶ νόμος εὕρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον Θεῶν, δόγμα δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων φρονίμων, ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων. πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή" καθ᾽ Hv πᾶσι προσήκει ζῆν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πολει. The design and object of Laws is to ascertain what is just, honourable, and expedient; and when that is discovered, it is proclaimed as a general ordinance, equal and impartial to all. This is the origin of law, which, for various reasons, all are under an obligation to obey, but especially because all law is the invention and gift of Heaven, the sentiment of wise men, the correction of every offence, and the general compact of the state; te live in conformity with which is the duty of every individual in society. Orat. i. contr. Aristogit. Notes on Blackstone.
° This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and die- tated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any cHar. x111.] RHETORIC. 87 intuitively divine, even should no intercourse with each other, nor any compact have existed‘; which sentiment the Antigone of Sophocles enters uttering, that it was just, namely to bury Polynices, though de- nounced, since this by nature was a deed of justice: ““ ἘῸΓ by no means is it for this or the next day mere- ly that this maxim is in force, but for ever; nor is there any one who knows from whom it proceeded ὅ, And as Empedocles says on the subject of not slaying that which has life: for this maxim is not right here, and wrong there, “but a principle of law to all, it is extended uninterruptedly throughout the spacious firmament and boundless light.” And as Alcidamas remarks in the Messeniac oration.
As to the persons also in reference to whom right and wrong have been defined, a twofold distinction has been made®; for that which we ought to do and to leave undone, exists in reference either to the com- munity, or to an individual member of it. And hence we may, as regards acts of justice, and the contrary, violate justice or adhere to it in two ways; for we may do so in reference either to an individual, or Injusties against the com- munity.
to the community: for the man who is guilty of Injustice adultery, or of an assault, injuries some individual; but he who will not bear arms injures the community.
other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original. Blackstone, Comment. Introduct. ᾧ 2, p. 4].
* See the subject of natural law admirably illustrated in the first book of Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity, § 8, 9.
* Thus Lord Hale says of the common law of England, “ The original of the common law is as undiscoverable as the head of the Nile.” Hist. Com. Law, 55.
6 Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species,—private torongs and public wrongs. The former are an infringemen* or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are therefrom frequently termed ciyil injuries. ‘The latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, con- sepean Ἢ ὃ. community,” etc. Blackstone’s Commentaries, iii, ὁ.
against the indi- vidual, _ 4.
5.
6.
7.
9. We must know the definition of the va- rious acts of injus- téce.
Now as all acts of violating justice have been dis- tinguished, and as some of them are against the com- munity, and others against one or more individual members of it, let me, after reverting to what the suf- fering injustice is, explain the rest. Now to be injured, is to suffer injustice at the hands of a willing agent; for commission of injustice has been previously de- fined to be a voluntary act. As however it is neces- sary that the person injured should be hurt, and in- voluntarily hurt. Now what Awrt is will be evident from what has gone before; for things good and evil have been distinctly spoken of above, and voluntary acts also; namely, ihat they are all things done know- ingly. So that all grounds for complaint must exist, necessarily in reference either to the community, or to individual interests; the agent being either uncon- scious, or unwilling, or willing and conscious; and [in the last] of these cases, acting either on deliberate choice, or on the impulse of passion, Now I shall treat on the subject of anger in my discussion of the passions; but it has been above explained under what circumstances, and with what dispositions, men act on deliberate principle. | But as people, while they acknowledge their hav- ing acted in such a way, very frequently will not ac- knowledge the designation in the indictment, or the view of the case on which the indictment turns: a man will avow, for example, his having taken a thing, but not his having stolen it; that he struck the first blow, but yet did not zmsult; that he co- habited, but did not commit adultery, with the woman in question; or that he stole, but was not guilty of sacrilege, for it was not consecrated property; or that he did till beyond his boundary, but encroached not upon public land; or conversed with the enemy, but ‘was yet not guilty of treason: it will, for these reasons, be necessary to lay down definitions on these matters; as to what essentially constitutes theft, in- sult, and adultery; in order that, if we wish to show that they really do or do not exist, we may be able to set the right of the case in a true light. Now all OBAP. Χαμ. RHETORIC. 89 these questions, as to a matter being unjust and cri- minal, or not unjust, do in fact constitute the ground of inquiry; for the criminality and injustice of the act stands essentially in the deliberate principle on which it is done; and this sort of terms marks, over and above the matter of fact, the principle also of the agent; the terms, assault and felony, for instance; for because a man has struck another, he will not under all circumstances have assaulted him, but if he has done so with a view to something, as with a view to treat him with disrespect, or to his own gratification: neither, supposing a man has taken privily, has he been guilty, in every case, of larceny; but if he took it to the injury of another, or in order to appropriate it to himself, then indeed he has been guilty of larceny. The case too is similar respecting other terms de- signating crimes to what has been remarked respect- ing these.
But as there were two species of things right and wrong; for one was of written prescript, the other of unwritten law; now those on the subject of which the laws speak a written language have been treated of; and of those arising from unwritten law there are two kinds. And these are, the one class which is always in proportion to the excess of vice or virtue of the agent, on which are consequent either cen- sures and praises, or deprivation of rank and marks of distinction and public grants; thus, for instance, the being grateful to a benefactor, and the repaying with kindness one who has been kind to yourself, and the having an inclination to aid one’s friends, and whatever other duties are of this kind: the other class, are the supplement’ of the peculiar and written law of states; for the equitable should seem to be somewhat just. And equity is that idea οἵ justice, which contravenes the written law. And this con- _ 7°EITANO’POQMA νόμον, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. Ethics, v.10. ‘ The correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.” Grotius de Aiqui- ® We see in contracts, and ofher dealings which daily pass The un- written law is twofold;. ὑπερβο- λὴν ἀρε- τῆς καὶ κακίας.
li. τὸ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ γεγραμ- μένου ἕλ- λειαμα, or equity, tradiction happens, partly indeed against the will, and partly with the will of the legislator: it then happens against his will, when the question may have escaped his notice; but, with his will, whenever he has it not in his power accurately to’ make distinc- tion, but it is necessary that he pronounce univer- sally, though the case be not so absolutely without exceptions, but generally only. Thus also in respect to all cases about which, by reason of their infinitude, it is not easy to make distinctions; such, with regard to wounding with steel, are the distinctions as to the size and nature of the instrument, for an age would fail one in the enumeration. Be it then that the case admits not such distinctions, yet if one must needs enact a law respecting it, he cannot do otherwise than speak in general terms®; so that one who has so much as a ring on his finger, and lifts up his hand and strikes you, does by the letter of the written law stand guilty, and acts unjustly; but in real truth he does not act unjustly!°; and this is the equity of the between man and man, that, to the utter undoing of some, many things by strictness of law may be done, which Equity and HONEST MEANING forbiddeth. Not that the Law is unjust, but imperfect; nor equity against, but above the law, binding men’s consciences in things which the law cannot reach unto, Will any man say that the virtue of private equity is opposite and repugnant to that law, the silence whereof it supplieth in all such private dealing? No more is public equity against the law of public affairs; albeit, the one permit unto some, in special considerations, that which the other, agreeably with general rules of justice, doth tm general sort forbid. For, sith all good laws are the voices of right reason, which is the in- strument wherewith God will have the world guided, and im- possible it is that right should withstand right; it must follow that principles and rules of justice, be they never so generally uttered, do no less effectually intend, than if they did plainly express, an exception of all particulars, wherein their literal practice might any way prejudice equity. Hooker, Ὁ. v. § 9, p. 35.
9 Αἴτιον δ᾽, ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς" περὶ ἐνίων δὲ οὐχ οἷον τὲ ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. Arist. Ethics, v. 10. Compare the whole chapter with what is said above.
10 Not without singular wisdom, therefore, it hath been pro- vided, that as the ordinary course of common affairs is 418. posed of by general laws, so likewise men’s rarer incident nee cessities and utilities should be with special equity considered.
CHAP. XIII. ] RHETORIC. 91 case. Now if equity be what it has been stated to be, it will be evident what kind of things are equit- able, and what not so; also what kind of persons are not equitable. Since in whatever cases one is bound to have a fellow-feeling, these are all cases of equity. Again, equity is the not esteeming faults and crimes of equal guilt, nor accidents, and faults. Now acci- dents are whatever things happen against all calcula- tion, and proceed not from criminal principle; and faults are whatever things do not happen against cal- culation, nor proceed from criminal principle; but crimes are whatever things, not falling out contrary to calculation, proceed from criminal principle; for the things which are done through desire, proceed from criminal principle. Equity also is the having a sympathy for human failings; and the having an eye, not to the law, but to the lawgiver; and not to the language, but to the intention of the lawgiver!!. And not to the conduct, but to the principles of the agent; not to his conduct in one particular, but to its whole tenor. Not what kind of person he has been in this instance, but what he has always shown himself, or generally at least. The having, too, a remembrance of the good one has received, rather than of the ill; of the good one has received, rather than what one has done; though injured, to endure it patiently; to prefer a decision by argument, rather than by re- course to action: a wish to proceed to arbitration, rather than to judicial decision, for the arbitrator looks to what is equitable, the judge to what is law; and in order to this it was that arbitration was in- troduced, in order, namely, that equity might prevail. So far then for our distinctions on the subject of what is equitable.
t! Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf, which enacted, ‘‘ that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,’’ was held after long de- bate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit. Blackstone, Comment. Introd. § 2, p. 61. For a variety of such cases, see Rhet ad Herennium, lib. i. ὁ. ii. ete.
15. Equi- ty consists in fellowfeeling.
sympa- thy.
looking to the mo- tive more than the act.
19. Will- ingness to arbitrate, 1. Greater offences are those arising ; from _ greater principle.
2. Where the penal- ty is not equiva- lent.
8. Where the in- jured partyhath wronged himself in conse- quence.
CHAP. XIV, Of the Degrees of Guiit.
THOSE acts of injustice are greater in degree, which proceed from the greater principle of injustice!; and on this account the most trifling are the greatest; as the charge which Callistratus laid against Melenopus, that he had defrauded the builders of the temple in his accounts, to the amount of three half farthings of consecrated property; but in the case of justice, things are more or less just in a contrary ratio”. Now these criteria arise from the actions virtually exceeding; for he who stole three half farthings of consecrated money would cheat one in any thing. The degree of an act of injustice is decided then, sometimes on this principle, at otliers on that of the harm done. Those also are very flagrant, for which no punishment is an equivalent, but of which every one falls short; as also that which there is no means of healing; for such a case is difficult and impracti- cable: also where the injured party can get no re- dress in court; for the evil is without cure, because chastisement and a judicial sentence are a cure. If the party suffering, and who was wronged, hath grievously injured himself’; for then the man who did the wrong deserves punishment in a still greater degree; just as Sophocles said when pleading in be- half of Kuctemon, who, on being insolently assaulted, slew himself; “ that he would price the deed at no See Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, c. 44, at note 188. Mea- sure of Guilt, vol. viii. p. 98.
3 So much for the standard of injustice; for it is evident that any man who is sufficiently depraved to cheat you for a farthing, would not scruple to do so for a larger sum. But in the contrary habit of the mind, a contrary ratio holds, in the case of conforming to rules of justice—ré ἐλάχιστα, ἐλάχιστα; for a man may be very honest in minor transactions, who would not scruple to cheat you if a greater temptation were thrown in his way.
3 As in the case of Lucretia: her killing herself was an aggravation of the guilt of Tarquin.
CHAP. 21¥.} RHETORIC. 93 less cost than the sufferer had prized himself at.” Crimes, too, of which the present criminal has alone 4. Where been guilty, or he first, or very few besides. Also the oF the being frequently guilty of the same enormity. cae ἫΝ Any thing too on account of which new prohibitory first. and penal statutes have been sought out, and intro- | duced; as at Argos they punish any one on whose account a law may have been enacted, and those on account of whom the prison was erected. That act 5. The of injustice also is greater, which is of a more brutal jy character. That too which proceeds more immedi-: ately from malice aforethought. That too which, as they hear of, people are affected by dread, rather than compassion. And the rhetorical expedients for exaggeration are as follows;—“ he hath swept away or overleaped many principles of justice,” as oaths, the plighting of his hand, pledges of fidelity, and marriage contracts; for there is an excess by the ratio of many crimes. And its being on the very 6. Those spot where criminals receive punishment; which pee ee they do who bear false witness; for where would he o¢ ‘hints not be ready to act wrong, if at least he does so even ment.
in the judgment hall‘? Those deeds too on which shame is most especially felt. Also if the party has injured him at whose hands he has been benefited: for he is guilty in more than one way, both in that he does him wrong, and in that he did not good to him. Also the man who has violated the unwritten 7. Viola- principles of right; for it belongs to a man of supe- pect ne rior excellence to be just unconstrainedly; now what is of written prescript is done of necessity, but not so what is unwritten. Taking it in another way, it is a feature of aggravation if it be in violation of written and writ- law; for you may say, the man who is unjust in mat- τα ἊΝ ters where is room for apprehending punishment, and on which loss attends, surely would be likely to be 4 Among the aggravations of affrays by the law of England one is, ““ Where a respect for the particular place ought to re- strain and regulate men’s behaviour, more than in common ones; as in the king’s court, and the like.” Blackstone, b. iv.c 11, ὃ 1. ἄτεχνοι πίστεις.
2. Fivein number.
3. i. Laws.
4. Argu- ments for the orator to whom the writ- ten law is op- posed.
unjust in respect of matters on which no loss is con sequent. Thus, then, the greater and less degrees of injustice have been treated of.
CHAP. XV. Respecting Proofs originating independently of Art.
It comes next to the subject just treated of, for me to run over the proofs which are called inartificial; because these are peculiar to judicial oratory'. And they are five in number, viz. laws, witnesses, deeds, torture, oaths.