CHAPTER IX.2 But they who put forward ideas as causes, in 1. Piato-s their early investigations, indeed, to acquire the InJSives its a" ^ I have ventured thus to depart from the usual arrangement^ which makes ohapter IX. begin with these words.
* Aristotle now proceeds to examine into another system of tha Bupranaturalists, — namely, that of Plato: first, in respect of his theory rt;c:arding the substance of things; and secondly, respecting the first principles of things.
iS THE METAFHTSICS OT ABI8T0TLE. [BOOK t vocates in an causes of these entities, in the first place have incdnaistency. adduced Other things equal in number to these; ^ as if one, desiring to have reckoned certain things, when these were less numerous, would consider this impossible, but, by creating a greater numbw, should succeed in counting them; for almost equal, or not less numerous, are the forms than those things respecting which, in investigating their causes, they have advanced from these to those: for, according to each individual thing, there is a certain homonymous form, and, in addition to the substances, also, of other things, there is the unity involved in the notion of plurality, both in the case of these and of things that are eternal. 2. Aristotle'* Moreover,^ in the wa^_m_wMoh it is demgn- ?a1n8?the pSJ ®*^^®^ *^^* there are roros^liSordin^ tonic theory of of these Ttoth ttlB~stibsi8tence of forms become aprorent}" for, inde§d, _fi^m some there is no necessity, in ^ensfequence of the reasoning, that a syHo- gism arise: but from other things, also, — not of such as we should expect to find forms, — of these are there forms gene- rated. For according to the rational principles deducible from the sciences will there be forms of all things, of as many as there are sciences; and in accordance with the argument for ideas founded on the notion of unity involved in plurality, will there also be forms or ideas <»f n^ations: and according to the ability to understand something of what has been destroyed of things liable to decay will there also be forms, for of these there is a certain phantasm.
But further, as regards the most accurate of the argu- ments for the ideal theory, some of them, indeed, frame i^fiaa of things relative, pf which^iUiej do^jnat-48^ aQ.^£fiafi£lJJ^al..!.geE^ whereas othen^ 4iq^eak of.thfir&^b^fi^m third man.
* Aristotle first complains of the inconsistency of Plato; for he con- tends that, in proposing to assign the causes of sensibles, he diould have kept the phenomena of sensihles before his eyes, and not have devised, as he has done, a theory applicable to anything else save sensibles.
^ Aristotle here details his objections against the ideal system of Plato, which he strives to overthrow by turning the reasoning of Flato against himself. This same subject is handled by Aristotle in an able and somewhaJi similar attack ^of his upon the idaa^ theory, in book XIL shap.!▼• tH. IX.J BEFUTATION OV THE IDEAL THE JBT. 39 And, upon the whole, the theories respecting ^ ^xixthtx a^ forms overturn the things which tliey who affirm surdities irf- the existence of forms would wish should have pliitrairthMry a subsistence in preference to the subsistence of of ideas, the ideas; for it happens that the diiad ib not the first, but that the number is, and that the relative is, before the essen- tial: aiS alTWose consequences ensue, as many as certain, j wEo have followed up the opinions respecting forms — have set in contrariety to first principles. Further, also, according ' to the supposition in virtue of which we speak of the ex- istence of the ideas, not only will there be forms of sub- stances, but of many other things also; for, also, there is the one conception not only respecting substances, but also in the case of other substances; and there are sciences not only of substance, but of different things also, and innumerable other things of this sort occur: but according to neces- sity, and the opinions respecting forms, it follows, on the supposition that forms are things capable of participation, that there should be ideas of substances only: for not uc- cordmg toaccident are they participated in, but things must participate in this respect in each idea, so far forth as each idea is not predicated about the subject. Now, I mean, for example, that if anything participates in the twofold itself, this also is a participant in what is eternal, but accofding^ to,_accid(gpt, for it is accidental for the^twiQ&ld to be §teruaL Therefore, the forms will Ue substance.
For the same things, both here and there, signify sub- stance; or what will be the meaning of the assertion of the existence of a something that is Independent of senslbles, drawn from the argument founded on unity. Involved in the notion of plurality; and If there be the same form of the ideas, and of things that are participants of them, there will be something In common? for, by no means, In the case of perishable duads — and, indeed, most duads, but such as are eternal — Is the duad said to be rather one and the same, than In the case of this and one of some particular thing. But if there be not the same form there would be an homo-' nymy; and It wiU_ifi^j[ust like aa If one should call both Oalllas and a piece of woi^dH'man, disceminjg nb Community 'wEatever between theiu.*^ ' 1. The ideally- § 1. But most of all would one feel perplexed pothesisuseiesa ^g ^q what at alP the forms contribute, either to for the purpose.i i if is brought those things that are eternal amongst sensibles, piato fon^ or to things that are being produced and being corrupted. For neither are they to them a cause of any matioa...or,.Qhange_,^haifixer. But, truly, neither are they of any assistance, towards the science of other things (for neither are those the substance of these, Tor'in such a case they would be in these), nor do they contribute towards the existence of other things, inasmuch as they are not in- herent in things that are their participants, at least; for so, indeed, they would perhaps be supposed as causes, just as if the white were mixed with the white it might be called the cause of a white body. But, indeed, this theory is very easily overthrown, which Anaxagoras, indeed, first, and Eudoxus subsequently, and certain others, advanced; for it would be easy to collect together, also, many impossibilities in reference to such an opinion: but, truly, neither do other things sub- sist from forms in accordance with any mode of existence of those that are wont to be mentioned.
2. Three proofs But the assertion that these forms are exem- that forms are plars, and that the rest of entities participate in or modeis of ' them, is to spcak vain words, and to utter poetic created things, metaphors. For in what respect, may I ask does that which operates look towards the ideas as a model ^ for it is possible that anything whatever that is similar both should exist and be produced, and yet that it be not made like in reference to that to which it is similar. Wherefore, also, on the supposition of the existence and non-existence of Socrates, just such another one as Socrates is would be pro- duced. And, in like manner, is it evident that this would follow, even though Socrates were eternal; and, besides, there will be many exemplars of the same thing; wherefore, also, the forms — for instance, of man, such as animal ami biped, and at the sama time, also, ideal man — will have a subsistence. Further, not only of things sensible are forms the exemplars, but also of forms themselves; as, for ex- ample, the genus as a genus will be an exemplar of species; * Aristotle low proceeds to prove the utter irrelevancy of ideas as aocountiog for sensible phenomena. F?c2e Thomaa Aquinaa upon thii fection.
OH, IX.] PLA1X)'S BYSTEM OP FORM& 41 wherefore, ai exempLir and an image will be the same thing.
Further, it ^ ould seem impossible for the sub- 3. Fonns can-j stance to be separate from that of which it is "^ratdy fam J the substance; therefore, in what way can the things. I ideas, when they are substances of things, exist eepamtelj' ft»om them?
But in the Phsedo an assertion is made to this effect, — that the forms are causes of existence and of production. On the supposition, however, of the existence of forms, nevertheless, those things that are participants will not be produced, if there be not in existence that which is likely to be the origin of motion; and many other things are produced, such as i house and a ring, of which we do not say that there are forms. Wherefore, it is evident that it is possible, also, for other things both to exist and be produced from such causes, likewise, on account of which, also, arise those entities men- tioned just now.
§ 2. Moreover, if forms are numbers,^ how will i. six reasons they be causes'? whether is it because entities theorrorforma are different numbers, — as, for instance, this par- as numbers; — ticular man is this particular number, indeed, ^"^^^^^°"- and Socrates another, and Callias another, different from both, — in what respect are those, therefore, the causes of these? for neither will it make any difference whether those may be eternal, and these not so. But if it is because the things here are proportions or ratios of numbers, — as, for instance, a symphony, — it is obvious that there will be a certain one thing, at least, amongst those of which there are ratios or proportions. Now, if this is one thing — say matter — it is paJpable that the actual numbers, also, will be certain proportions of one thing with another; but I say, for example, if Callias is a proportion in numbers of fire, and earth, and water, and air, to certain other subjects will belong the same man likewise; and if the idea constitute a number, the ideal ' Aristotle still continues his attack upon the Platonic philosophy; as yet confining himself to Plato*s theory concerning the substances oi things, to the exclusion of that concerning the principles of things, which he considers in the next section. At present he confines hia censures to Plato's assertion of ideas being numbers, and to his cthei theories respecting mathematical magnitudes.
42 TUE METAPHYmCb OF ABaSTOTLE. [bOOK X.
man, also, — whether the idea may be a oertam number of not, — nevertheless, will be a ratio in numbers of certain jthinga without being himself a number; nor will there be a certain particular number on accoimt of these things.
Further, out of many numbflra. one number Bon, and an ob- results^^lxut JtTOm ^O^S hoW IS One fofm proo Kweredf"*** duced? And iT^rms are not produced from fdm^but firom the units that are in numbers — as, for instance, in the myriad — ^how is it with the subsistence of the monads) for if they are of the same species, many absurdities will ensue; but if they are not of the same spe- cies, neither will they be the same with one another, nor all the rest the same with all: for wherein will they differ, since they are impassive? for such statements as these are neither rational nor consonant with the imderstanding. And, more- over, it is necessary to establish a certain other description of number, regarding which arithmetic is conversant, and all such things as are termed media by some; and how, or from what principles, will these arise? or why will they be media between the things here and these) 3. Remaining Further, tho mouads which are in eoich dugd^ reasons. |^g ^jp^^^ some.pricHT duad, although such is im; possible. Further, why is there an aggregated number, as oncfttlttig] and further, in addition to the things that have been stated, if the monads are different, they ouglit to declare their opinions in this same way as those do, even as many as affirm the elements to be fourfold or twofold; for, also, each one of these mentions not what is common as an element — for example, body — but fire and earth, whether body is any- thing that is common or not But now, an assertion is made just as if the one were in existence as homogeneous fire or water; but if this be the case, numbers will not be sub- stances; it is, however, evident, that if unity itself be anything, and if this be a first principle, that unity is expressed in many ways, for that it should be otherwise is impossible.
♦ Two objec- ^^^^ *^®y ^^^ ^®^ ^^ ^^^"^^ substances to first tions against a principles Set down lengths, indeed, as consisting mathematical small and large, and a superficies as from what is broad and narrow, and a body from what is deep and low. In what way, however, will the superficies CH. IZ.] PLATO (JN FIRST PRINCIPLES. 43 involve a line, or the solid a line and surfaor, for the wide and th3 narrow are a different genus from deep and low? As, therefore, neither number is inherent in these, because the much and the few are different from these, so it is manifest that neither will anything else of those superior natures be inherent in those that are inferior. But, truly, neither is the wide a genus of the deep; for body would be a certain surface in this case. Further, may I ask from what will points be compounded) This genus, indeed, then, did Plato also oppose, as being a geometric dogma; but he used to call it the first principle of a line: and this he often set down, (I mean the existence of indivisible lines,) although of neces- sity there must be some limit to these; wherefore, from whatever principle a line is, therefrom also is a point.
§ 3. And upon the whole,^ seeing that wisdom i. piato's investigates into the cause, in respect of things *^o^ of fi"' that are manifest, this consideration, indeed, futedfn^six have we omitted; for we say nothing regarding ^*y*' the cause of the origin of the principle of change: but, thinking to mention the substance of these, we say that there are different substances; but in what manner those may be substances of these we ineffectually describe, for as to such being accomplished by participation — as also we have stated on a former occasion — there is no advantage gained in saying ttdST \Sfeither, ^yv^fe.. 9^^ ideas such causes as we see to be a cause to the sciences, on account of which both every mind and every nature operate; nor that cause which we affirm to\ be one of the first principles do forms in anywise toru;h upon; | but to men, in the present age, mathematics have become the philosophy; although they say that persons ought to culti- vate these sciences for the sake of other sciences.
But, further, one may suppose the subject-substance to be BS matter that is more mathematical, and rather to be con- verted into a predicable, and to constitute a difference of substance and of matter, — as, for instance, the great and the small, — just as, also, the natural philosophers mention the rare and the dense, saying that there are these primary differences of the subject, for these are a certain excess and defect.
^ Aristotle now proceeds to argue against Plato in his theory con* coming the first principles of things: first, "quoad principla easendl;" and secondly, "quoad principla cuguoscmdi** And respecting motion, if, indeed, these will constitute motion, it is evident that the forms will be moved; buc i< they are not, whence has motion ori^ginated ] for thereby the entii 3 investigation about Kature has been^abblisKed.
And what seems to be easy— njainely, fEe demonstration that all things are one— does not tarn out to be so; for, according to the interpretation, all things lo not become one, but a certain thing itself is one, if any one would grant that all things are sa: and neither would he allow this, unless one would admit the existence of a universal as a genus; but tbis, in some cases, is impossible.
But neither have those things that are after the numbers any grounds in reason, — ^namely, both lengths, and surfaces, and solids; nor is it so in regard of the mode of how they are, or shall be, or whether. they involve any capacity; for these cannot possibly be either forms (for numbers they are not), or media (for those are mathematical), or things that are corruptible: but these, again, appear as this certain other fourth genus different from those other three.
But, upon the whole, the investigation of the elements of entities, seeing that they are expressed multifariously, it is impossible for any persons to discover a solution of who have not divided them; and, especially, if they investigate in this manner from what sort of elements they are compounded. For action, or passion, or the wide, it is not, doubtless, possible to receive from some things of which these consist; but, if this were the case, it would be possible to receive them as subsisting from substances only. Wherefore, either to investi- gate or to think that you possess the elements of all entities is not true.
2. Plato's But how can any one learn the elements of all theonr of ideas things? for it is evident that it is not possible principiesofthe that he should be previously a person having JellonrigSSst prior knowledge thereof. For, as to one learning it. geometry, it is, indeed, possible to see beforehand other things; but of such things as the science consists of, and concerning which he is about to receive instruction, he can have no prior knowledge, so, also, is it in the case of other things. Wherefore, if there is a certain science of all things, as some affirm, nothing could this person know beforehand, tvery system of learning, however, subsists, or is attainabJeij rH. IX.] aristoiue's appfat. to antiquity. 49 by means of previous knowledge, either of all things, or of certain particular things: and either by demonstration is this accomplished, or by definitions; for those things whereof the definition consists it is requisite to understand beforehand, and that they be known. In like manner is it the case with knowledge by induction. But, truly, if also it happens that there is in our possession a congenital knowledge of things, it is astonishing how we, in possession of the most excellent of the sciences, are unconscious of such a treasure.
Further, how will any one know from what particulars all things consist, and how will this be manifest? for this also involves perplexity; for one would feel a doubt, just ns also concerning some syllable: for certain affirm that SMA is composed of S and M and A, but others eay that it possesses a different sound from its components, and none of those that are known.
Moreover, those things of which there is perception by sense, how could any one know if he were not furnished with the capacity of perceiving by sense? although one ought, if these are the elements of all things whereof they consist just as the compound sounds arise from their own proper elements.
That, therefore, all seem^ to seek the causes s.Aristotie's ca- mentioned in our Physics, and, besides these, ^^.f^l}^ fJVT^i that we have no other to adduce, is likewise from by a reference the foregoing statements evident. But the early ^°^"^^^i""y- philosophers, I admit, have treated of these causes. — ob- scurely, however; and, indeed, in a certain manner, all such four causes have been enumerated by speculators of an age prior to ours: and, in a certain manner, by no means has this been the case; for the eai'liest system of philosophy ^ concerning all things was like unto one articulating with ^ In the French edition of Aristotle's works, publi=?hed by Didot, tbero is another chapter, namely chapter X, made to commence at these words.
^ I have ventured to differ from Taylor in his translation of this passage, on the authority of the old Latin versions, which, I admit, in the case of Aristotle's works, is not a very firm foundation to build npou. Taylor's translation, however, I conceive to be unsupported by the Greek in Bekker's text. He regards the iroivrv <pi\oao<pia in the context as equivalent to ontology, and k« t' upxds, to ontology at ita tirst commencement.
16 VHB MBTAPHTSIGS OF ABI8T0TLB, [boOK r a stammer, inasmucb as it was new as regards first priAcipIe^ and a thing the first in its kind. For Empedocles says that a bone exists from form by the principle of composition; but this is the essence and the substance of that thing. But, truly, if this be admitted, in like manner, also, is it necessary that of both flesh, and everything else of the other things, there should subsist this principle of concretion, or that it should not subsist as a principle of anything at all; for on accoimt of this are both flesh and bone, and each of the other things, in existence, and not on account of the matter, which he says is fire, and earth, and water, and air. But, also, with any other, indeed, who would make these assertions, he would of necessity concur; but he has not expressed him- self with clearness respecting them. The case regarding such points, therefore, has been made evident on a former occa- sion; but as many doubts as any one might indulge in respecting these same, we will a second time enumerate; for perhaps we shall thereby acquire a &cility for having our- diffioidties resolved in reference to subsequent questions oi. doubt BOOK I. THE LESS.* CHAPTER I.
Sfeotlation s^pecting truth is partly difficult i. speenhitiv« and partly easy. And a proof is the following, JJI^y *eSir** that, in the pursuit of truth, neither is any one philosopher, in a way worthy of the dignity of the subject, able to attain this; nor can all investigators fail in reaching it, but that each says something to the point concerning Nature: and individually that, indeed, they add nothing or but little, to this speculation respecting truth, but fron all these collected together that there ensues something oi magnitude. Wherefore, if, indeed, it so seems to be the case, as we happen to say in the proverb, "Who will miss the door?" in this way, truly, would the speculation of truth be easy.
' This book, as to the title of which all are not af^reed, has given rise to some diBcassion amongst the commentators. Alexander Aphro* disiensis and Asclepius seem to think that it is, as set down in the Metaphysics, quite out of place; and Augustine Niphus appears to reganl it as a fragment of some larger work, — ** propter exiguitatem." That it is out of place here has been inferred from the fact of the conclu- sion of the first book and the beginning of this being wholly devoid of connexion, whereas it is quite the reverse with the first and third books compared with each other. It has been conjectured that it belongs in some way or other to the Physics; chiefly from the words which occur at the end, — "first must we investigate what Nature (^iVis) is." But notwithstanding, as Thomas Aquinas reminds us, this book is not entirely without reference to what has gone before. The science under investigation in the first book is the science of sciences, and makes universal truth the subject-matter of inquiry, which brings Aristotle, in this, to the consideration of truth in general. Forasmuch, however, as the term truth is employed in the same sense as theoretic philosophy, the latter is compared with practical philosophy. But, iudeed, a further proof of its connexion with the foregoing may bo found in the fact that dpxcti^ or first principles, are the theme of dis- cussion in both cases. Though, certainly, we must admit that the discussion about the infinite progression of causes, with Aristotle, should find its place in the physical rather than the metaphysical por- tion of his writings. Alexander. Asclepius, Nipbus, and Thomaa Aquinas, are well worth being ronnulted on this question.
48 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. jBOOK I.
I, Pa/*i) diffi- ^^* for philosophers to have a certain whole, cixit, and a and not to be able to have each some portion, indicates the dimcmty of it: and perhaps, also, from the fact that the difficulty arises in two ways, the cause of this may not be so much in things themselves as in us; for as the eyes of bats are to the light that follows the dawn of day, so also is the mind of our soul to those things which, above all, are naturally the most splendid.
nienforthe thosc whose opiuious oue may have fellowship fruthr*^^ °^ with, but also to those, moreover, who have enun- ciated their sentiments more superficially; for even these, likewise, contribute something, for they have pre- viously exercised our speculative habit.^ For if there had not been a Timotheus, we would not have had much melody; and unless there had been a Phrynis, there would not have been such a person as Timotheus. But, in the same manner, also, it is in the case of those who have declared their senti- ments concerning truth; for, indeed, from some of them we have inherited certain opinions: but others have been the causes of these becoming opinions of theirs. 4.The appiicabi- But it is corrcct, also, that philosophy should lity of ^*^e^re- be styled a science, speculative of truth.^ For to the present of Speculative science the end is truth, but of Investigation, practical scicnce, a work; for even though they may examine how a thing is, practical men do not investi- gate into the cause of that thing in itself, but in relation tc something else, and as connected with the present time: bu* we do not know the truth without the knowledge of cause. But, especially, is each thing that amongst other things according to which, also, there subsists in other things that which is synonymous, — ^as, for example, fire is a thing most * "Our habit." Alexander interprets the word e^« by ^tivafits (ca- pacity); for which, vide his commentary on the passai^e. What Aris- totle is aiming at, and illustrates from the case of Timotheus, is to show how previous discoveries in science bear on subsequent ones, and the procjressive character of truth. This point is beautifully put by Dr. Whewell in nis " Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences."
^ Aristotle having considered the speculation of truth in general proceeds to show how this consideration bears on the present inquiry His reasoning rests on the assumption of the words "truth," and " theoretic philosophy,*' being interchangeable terms.
OH. n.] THS PURSUIT OF TRUTH 4J hot; for also in the rest of entities is this a cause of their heat Wherefore, also, most true is that which is a cause to posterior natures of their being true. Wherefore, is it neoee- sary that the first principlegjDfJhiBies> a.lw)|jp existinj^jBhould klwft^be most true;^for not sometimes are they teue, neit&FIs anything the cause of being to those, but those are the cau3es of being in other things. Wherefore, as each thigg is disposed in. re^rd^gf existence, so, also, ia W.m. aigucd ^ truth.
CHAPTER II.1 CHAPTER II.1 But, truly, that there is, at least, some first 2. no infinity principle, and that the causes of entities are not »f «******r.,