And the subsistence of all things independent of these is manifest; for, imless discord were inherent in things, all things would have been one, as he says: for when they ^ Asdepius endeayours to exculpate Empedocles from the charges of Arifltotle, by protesting against the literal interpretation of the language of that sage; contending that it is purely symbolical, and in nowise destructive of eternal entities.
' I have followed the text of the French edition. Bekker read^ ^l auTov rov kv&s.
IH. IV.J ABB THB 0AU8B8 Ot THE8B THB flAHEt 71 would ba^e come together, then last in the conglomeration would stand discord.
Wherefore, also, it happens to him, in his 4. This proved system, that the Deity, who is supremely happy, (u^oVgoJl should be less prudent than the rest of beings, for he does not know all the elements, for he is not in possession of discord; but the knowledge of the like is through the like.^ "For, indeed, Bays he, by earth we see earth, and by water, water, And ether divine by ether, and through fire the ruinous fire^ And by concord, concord, and by gloomy discord, discord."
But, to return to the point from whence our dis- s. The insuf. bourse digressed. This, at all events, is evident, Empedociean that it happens, according to the theory of dogma. Empedocles, that discord is no more the cause of corruption than of existence; and, in like manner, that neither is harmony a cause of existence more than of corruption, for while collecting things into unity it is a cause of corruption to other things. And, at the same time, also, he mentions no cause of the actual transmutation, save that the thing is thus constituted by nature to take place. Mark his words: — " But when mighty discord^ was nourished in the members, And rose up to the honours of deified Time, who, holding The sway over them alternately, had, in the end, Surpassed the ample objects of Qod's adjuration."
As if, indeed, it were a thing necessary that a change should take place; but he does not bring to light any necessary cause. But, nevertheless, thus much, at least, he only asserts consistently, for he does not constitute some entities corruptible and others incorruptible, but all corruptr ible, except the elements. But the source of perplexity now * This was a favourite dogma in the theories of sensation put forward by the old philosophers. It is acquiesced in by Plato in the Timacus. Its source hns given rise to some questioning; it has been generally traced up to the Pythagoreans. Sextus Empiricus examines this point JQ the first of his books, " Contra Mathematicos," chap. xiii.
' I have thus differed from Taylor, who translates the word rcAti- <rfi4voiOj ** perfect,*' dfioifiaios atplvf ^* being with them vicissitudinary," and ropcXfjAarcu, ** preceded." Now, as to this last translation, I cannot conceive what led Taylor into such an error, if it was not his incorrect rendering of the old Latin version. Such a renderiog of the word, how« *yer, robs the passage of its entire meaning.
72 TBB METAJ^TSIGS OF ABlBTOTLE. [BOOK tL mentioned it this: why, if entities spring from the same source, some of tliem are incorruptible and some of them are not so? That, therefore, the first principles of things would not be the same, let this much suffice to have been spoken.
6. The position "^^^» ^^ *^® ^^ principles of things be different, that principle* one matter of doubt, indeed, is, whether these are different, ^j^ ^^jj y^^ incorruptible or corruptible? For if, indeed, they are corruptible, it is manifest that it ia requisite that these, also, should spring from certain entities; for all things perish into those from whence they derive their being. Wherefore, it happens that to principles there are other first principles that are prior; but this is impossible, both on the supposition of the progression being stationary, at some stage of its progress, and on the supposition of its going on to infinity. And, moreover, how will things perishable subsist if the first principles will be destroyed? but if these principles are imperishable, why, indeed, from these that are things imperishable will arise those that are perishable, but from the others those that are imperishable? for this is not reasonable, but either is impossible, or requires for its establishment much rational 'support. And, further, neither has any one attempted to enumerate difierent ones; but speculators assign the same first principles of all things — the first subject of doubt, however, they entertain slightly,* regarding it as something trifling.
§ 2. But, also, the most difficult point of all ^ to whe*ther"VntiSr ^^^^^^^ ^^^^j ^^^ *^® most uecessary for the dis- and unity are covcry of truth, is, whether entity and unity are SwStn*" substances of entities, and whether each of them reference to the not being anything else, this is unity and that is Physicists. entity; or whether it is uecessary to investigate what, at length, unity and entity are, as if another nature were the subject to these? For some, truly, in tliat way, and some in this, suppose their nature to be dis- posed. For Plato, indeed, and the Pythagoreans do not regard entity as anything different from unity, but that this ^ The word dirorpdryownv is a metaphor derived from dogs mangling axid destroying f'-Kl, if interrupted in devouring it.
' This subject has been ab'eady examined in book I., and is discusaed in other parts of the Metaphysioai OB. IV.J 7SST1TT AND UNITY VIEWED AS FRINOIPLEB. T9 is their nature that it should be the same th*ng for the substance to be one, and to be a certain entity. But amongst natural philosophers, Empedocles, for instance, as if con- ducting the inquiry to that which is more known, says that unity is entity. For he would seem to affirm that this is harmony^ — at least, this is a cause in his system of unity being found in all things. But others say that fire, and some that air, is this unity and entity from whence that entities both arise and are produced. So, in like manner, is it the case, also, with those who lay down the existence of more elements than these; for it is, hkewise, necessary for these to reckon unity and entity such things as whate-ver, at least, they affirm first principles to be. But it happens, unless one will set down the existence of unity and entity as a certain substance, that not any of the rest of the universals will have any subsistence, for these are uniyersal pre-eminently above all. But, if unity itself be not some particular thing, nor entity itself much less will there be any of the other things that will have a subsistence, except those denominated singulars. But, further, on the supposition of unity not being a substance, it is evident that neither would number have a subsistence, as a certain nature that has been separated from entities, for number constitutes the monad; but the monad is the same as some certain imit. But, truly, if, at least, actual unity and actual entity be a certain particular thing, it is necessary that tlie substance of that thing be entity and unity; for it is not any different thing that is universally predicated about them, but these very same things.
But, doubtless, if actual entity and actual 2,ThePhyiicist unity, at least, shall have any existence, much inerea»esthe doubt will arise how there wiU subsist anything qSSo„7i„'d" different from these. Now, I mean how there wiU learcs it mue- be more entities in existence than one. For any- '°**^* thing different from entity has no existence. Wherefore, according to the theory of Parmenides, it must needs happen that all entities are one, and that this one constitutes entity. But in both cases there is a difficulty; for even on the supposition whether unity, doubtless, be not substance, or whether any actual unity have a subsistence, it is impossible for number to be substance: but if, indeed, then, it has not t ^ Vide book IX. chap, ii m TEIB XETAPHT8I0S OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK H.
imbsistence, it hB.th been previously stated why; bac if it has. the same doubt presents itself respecting entity also: for from what will there be another one besides the one itself, for must not that necessarily be not one, for all entities are either one or many, each of which is one? Further, if unity itself be indivisible, according, indeed, to the axiom of Zeno,' nothing woidd there be having a subsistence. For that which neither when added nor subtracted makes anything greater or less, he affirms this not to belong to the category of entities, because entity is manifestly magnitude; and if it ia magnitude it is corporeal, for this, in every way, is entity. But the addition of such things, in one way, will make what is greater, and, in another, will not make anything so at fdl. As a surkce and a line make that which is greater; but a point and a monad, by no means, have this effect. But since this philosopher speculates clumsily,^ and it happens that there is something that is indivisible, wherefore, even in this way, also, hath one for him a certain reply as follows, — an addition of this sort will not make a thing greater, but will make it more; yet how, forsooth, from one, or more than one, of this kind will arise magnitude, for this is even like saying, that a line is made up of points 1 But, doubtless, if any one makes a supposition in this way, so that, as some say, from actual unity, and a something else that is not one, is com- posed number, not the less should it form a subject for investigation, why, and how, what is produced will one time be number, and another time, magnitude, if what is not one be inequality and the same nature. For neither is it mani- fest how from one and this nature, nor how from a certain number and this nature, magnitudes would arise.
^ The Zeno mentioned here by Aristotle was the famous Eleatio philosopher of that name, and the friend of Parmenides. There waa another Zeno, the founder of the school of the Stoics.
a ifMpriKeis. Taylor translates this word "importunately;" but on what authority I am unable to discover. The word literally applies to bodies, e.g. we say, irKoioy <popTut6ut to mean a ship of burden; and th«m it is metaphoricaUy transferred to persons, as meaning coaree or booiiihi iod awkward.
OB. v.] ABS NUMBERS FIRST FBINCIPLB8? 75 CHAPTER V.»
But a doubt connected with these is, whether i. The questior numbers and bodies, and surfaces and points, nSmb«?imd^ are certain substances or not? For if they are flgures.&c. tub- not, it eludes our comprehension what being ■'^*'**' is, and what the substances of entities are. For passive pro- perties, and motions, and relations, and dispositions, and ratios, do not appear to signify a substance of anything; for all these are predicated respecting a certain subject, and no one of them can be said to be this or that particular thing. But things which would seem particularly to signify sub- stance, namely, water, and earth, and fire, from which compounded bodies consist, the heats and colds of these and such like qualities are affections, not substances; but all the while the body, which undergoes these passive conditions, alone sustains them as a certain entity, and as being a certain substance. But, truly, both body is less substance than a superficies, and this latter than a line, and this than the monad and the point, for by these is body defined. And these, indeed, seem capable of existence with- out body; but the existence of body, without these, seems Impossible.
Wlierefore, the majority of speculators and our j. Appeal, on predecessors considered substance and entity to this subject, to be body, and the other things to be passive *"*^^'***y- properties of this;^ so that, also, the first principles — those of bodies — are the first principles of entities. Subsequent investigators, however, and they, too, persons that appeared endowed with more wisdom than these, supposed such to be numbers. As, therefore, we have said, unless these are substance, there is, upon the whole, no substance in existence, nor no entity, for the accidents, at least, in these it would notj truly, be worthy to call entities.
^ Aristotle now proceeds to examine this fundamental dogma with the Pythagoreans, which he has ah-eady discussed, partially, in book I., and resumes the consideration of in book XII. of the Metaphysics.
> This assertion is exemplified by what Aristotle has laid down in hia review of the Greek philosophy in booli I« 76 THK METAPHYSICS OF ABISTOTLR. [BOOK U.
8. Retumet tiM ^"* ^^> doubtless, this is acknowledged, that diseassionof dimensions and points are substance, rather this inquiry. ^^^^ bodies themselves, yet we do not perceive to what sort of bodies these would belong (for that they be inherent in things that fall under cognisance of the senses, this is impossible^; in this case, then, there would not be any substance m existence. Further, however, it appears that all these entities are divisions of body, one indeed, into breadth, and another into depth, and a third into length. But, in addition to these things, in like manner, there is in the solid every kind of figure whatsoever; so that^ if neither mercury is in the stone, nor the half of a cube in the cube, in such a way as has been defined, neither, in this case, would one surface exist iu body: for if this would be the case with anything whatsoever, it would be with that which would separate the half. Now, there is the same mode of reasoning in the case of a line, and a point, and a monad; wherefore, if body especially be substance, and if these are substance rather than this, and these have no existence, nor do certain substances exist, there eludes our comprehension what entity is, and what is the substance of entities. For, in addition to the statements that have been made, those irrational consequences relating to generation and corruption, also, take place. For, indeed, substance — when not previously existing it comes into existence now,^ or when it which for- merly had an existence afterwards ceases to exist — the sub- stance, I say, appears to undergo these affections, namely, production and corruption; but points, and lines, and sur&ces, cannot possibly arise or be destroyed, though sometimes these have a subsistence, and sometimes they have not. For when bodies mutually touch or intersect each other, at the same time that they touch they become one, and at the same time that they intersect they become two. So that points, lines, and sur&ices, when bodies are compounded together, have no subsistence, but then have been reduced to corruption: but when bodies are divided, these rise into existence, though pre- viously they had no existence. For a point, truly, that is indivisible is not capable of being divided into two; and, if ^ The student would do well to consult Mosheim's Dissertation on "A Creation out of Nothing;" to be found amongst his commentarieH •n Cudvorth.
they are produoed and destroyed, they are produced from something. But, in a similar way, is it the case respecting the present time, which is contained in duration; for neither does this admit of being generated and destroyed, but^ never- theless, inyariably seems to be a thing that is different, not that it is^ however, any particular substance. In like manner, also, it is evident that it is the case both respecting points, and lines, and sur&ces, for the reasoning is the same; for all these, in like manner, are either bounds or divisions.
CHAPTER VI. 1 But, upon the whole, would one feel perplexity,. ^. why also it is necessary to investigate into cer- other principiei tain other entities besides sensibles and media, for ^thematkaT* example, such as we posite as forms? For if it is entiuei and on this account, because mathematical entities, •*"•***••' indeed, differ from those that are here in a certain other respect, yet, in regard of there being many of them of the same species, there is no difference in this. Wherefore, the first principles of these will not be limited in numberi as neither of all the lines which are here are the first prin- ciples limited in number, but in species, unless one takes the principle of this particular syllable, or of this particular voice, and the first principles of these will be limited in number. In like manner, also, is it the case with things that are intermediate; for there, likewise, things of the same species are infinite. Wherefore, unless, in addition to sensi- bles and mathematical entitities, there are certain others, such as some call the forms, there will not be a substance one in number and species; nor will there be certain first prin- ciples of entities so many in number, but in species. If, then, this is necessary, the subsistence of forms, on this account, is necessary also. Hot even although they who make such' assertions do not propound their theories with distinctness, ^ This brings us to the dose of the examination of the doubts that had been started in the commencement of this book. Some of them are discussed with almost studied obscurity. They, however, strongly illustrate the state of ontological science in Aristotle's time, who maj be called its progenitor.
78 THB METAPHTSrCS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK Ili yet it is this which they aim at; and they must needs affirm this, that each of the forms is a certain substance, and that not one of them subsists according to accident But, doubt- less, if we posite the existence of the forms and of the first principles as one in number, but not in species, we have declared the impossibilities which must need come to pass. «. The mode of Ooutlguous, slso, to this inquiry is the question ^he subsistence whether elements subsist in potentiality,^ or in o p ncpes. g^jjj^ other manner? For if, indeed, in some other manner, there will be something else that is prior to first principles; for potentiality is prior to that cause: but it is not necessary that everything that is potential should be disposed in that way. But if elements are ex- istent in potentiality, it is admissible that none of the entities should have a subsistence; for it is possible for that to exist which not as yet has any existence: for, indeed, that which has no existence is being produced, but nothing of things that are impotential is produced.
8. Shall we pre- -^^ these doubts, then, is it necessary to dicate reality moot respecting first principles; and there re- ofsingiu^'st^' mains, also, the inquiry whether universak exist, or, as we say, singulars? For if, indeed, uni- versals exist, they will not be substances; for nought of those things that are general signify this particular thing, but a thing of such a sort; but the substance is this particular thing. But if it will be possible to exhibit this particular thing, and that which thereof may in common be predicated, in such a case many animals wHl Socrates himself be, and man and animal if each signify this certain particular thing, and that which is one. If, indeed, therefore, first principles are universal, these consequences take place; but if they are not universal, but are as singulars, they will not be objects of scientific knowledge; for the sciences are conversant about all things that are universal. Wherefore, will there be different first principles prior to principles, namely, those that are predicated universally, in case there is likely to be a science of them.
^ The subject of potentiality, or capaci^ in general, ib examined into more at large by Aristotle in book YIII.
BOOK IIP CHAPTER I.
Therb is a certain science which makes, as the ^^^ olject of its speculation, entity, as far forth as it is universal mU entity, and the things which are essentially in- J5d%*ot?S3tk berent in this. But this is the same with none euiar science of those which are called particular sciences; for ® '* none of the rest of the sciences examines univensally concern- ing entity so far forth as it is entity: but, cutting away a certain portion of it, they investigate what is accidental in r^ard of this; as, for example, the mathematical sciences. But, whereas we are in search of first principles and the top- most causes, it is evident that they must needs be absolutely of a certain nature. If, therefore, they, also, who investigate the elements of entities were accustomed to investigate these first principles, it is necessary, likewise, that the elements of entity should not have a subsistence according to accident, but so far forth as they are entities. Wherefore, also, must we ascertain the first causes of entity, so far as it is entity.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
Now, entity is spoken of in various senses, i.gigniflcations indeed, but in reference to one,^ and to one of entity or the certain nature, and not equivocally; but, in like manner, also, as everything conducive to health is termed ^ Some make this book to be book IV., instead of book III. Aris- totle now proceeds to lay before his readers what is to form the subject- matter of his treatise on Metaphysics, namely, entity, as such, or unity, with the ontologist an interchangeable term. The foregoing book was disputative, whereas this is explanatory. In the one he merely starts difficulties, whereas in the other he does not enumerate the doubt without deciding it one way or the other.
> The aim of Aristotle seems to be to show that the unity of meta- physical science is not destroyed by the multiplicity of subjects wfaidi f|dl under hs proyince.
^0 THI IfETAPHYSICS OF ABISTOTLB. [BOOK III BO in reference it health, partly, indeed, in its preserv- ii^ that state, and partly in giving rise to it, and partly in being an indication of health, and partly in being receptive of it; and, in like manner, as the medicinal is styled so ic reference to the art of medicine; for, indeed, a thing is called medicinal partly in reference to its possessing the medicinal power, partly in its being by nature adapted for the possession of such, and partly in its being the work of the medicinal art: and we sliall receive the predication of other things in a similar manner with these. Thus, however, is entity,^ also, spoken of in various ways indeed; but every entity in re- ference to one first cause: for some things, because they are substances, are styled entities; but others, because they are affections of substance; but others, because they are a way to substance, either as corruptions, or privations, or qualities, or things formative or generative, of substance, or of those which are spoken of in reference to substance, or the negations of any of these or of substance. Wherefore, also, the non- entity we pronounce to be non-entity.
«. Metaphysics -^ ^^^^^ there is one science of all things onegenenli pertaining to health, in like manner, also, is science. ^j^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^j^^^ things. For it is the province of one science to speculate concerning not only those things spoken of according to one, but also those spoken of in reference to a single nature. For these, also, in a certain manner, are spoken of in accordance with one. It is evident, therefore, that it is the province of a single science to speculate concerning entities, so far forth BJS they are entities. But in every respect is the science of ontology strictly a science of that which is first or elemental, both on which the other things depend and through which they are denominated. If, then, this is substance, the Philo- sopher or Metaphysician must needs be in possession of the first principles and causes of substances. Now, of every genus there is both one sense of each and one science; as, for instance, grammatical science is one, and speculates into all vocal sounds. Wherefore, to speculate into, also, the number of the species of entity, and the species of the species, belongs to a science one in kind.
^ The lubject of entity is fully discussed in the next book, chap, vil .OH. ILJ UNITT of 0NT0L06T AS A SCIBNCS. f\ ' I( therefore, entity and unity are the same 3. seienee of tbing, and one nature,^ from the fact of their ®°'*^^®*^ following each other as first principle and cause, unity, or the yet they are not manifested by a single defini- ''^ •*'• tion; there is, however, no difference, should we even Biake our suppositions in regard of them after a similar manner, nay, even rather is it for the advantage of the present inquiry. For it is the same thing, one man and the entity jnan and man; and »not anything different does it make manifest, according to a repetition of the expression, to say man is, and man and one man: but it is evident that there is no separation of being either in the case of production or corruption. But in like manner, also, is it the case with unity. Wherefore, it is manifest that addition in these implies the same thing, and that nothing different is unity from entity And, further, the substance of each thing is one not according to accident; and in like manner, also, is it the case with any entity whatsoever. Therefore, as numerous as are the species of unity,^ so numerous, also, are those of entity, into the nature of which it is the province of the same science in kind to investigate: now I speak, for instance, of sameness and similarity, and of the other things of this sort, and of those that are in opposition to these. And almost all contraries are reduced to this first principle. These points, however, have formed the subject-matter of our inquiries in our treatise styled, "A Selection of Contraries."
. And so many portions of philosophy are there as 4 -^^j^y j^ j, ^jj^^ there are, at least, substances. Wherefore, is it ontology has to necessary that there should be a certain first phi- gallon! m;ga^-" losophy, and one next in order belonging to these; {jj^j^ng;^ ^Uf^ for xmity and entity are things straightway involv- opposites and ing genera; wherefore, also, the sciences will follow <^o"*^^^^*- upon these. For the Philosopher or Metaphysician is as one that is styled a Mathematician, for his science also has parts; and there is a certain first and second science, and another next in order, in mathematics. But whereas it is the province of one science to investigate things that are in opposition, and I This position, as to the identity in signification of entity and unity •-wrA 6v, t6 I*', — is questioned by many.
^ The subject of unity is examined into in book IX.
Q 62 THE METAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLEL [bOOK III.
4nnce plurality is opposed to unity,^ it is also the province of one science to speculate into negation and priyation, on account of both kinds of inquiry being possible in the case of unity, of which there is the negation or the priyation, either absolutely affirmed that such does not reside therein, or in a certain genus thereof. In this case, indeed, therefore, the difference is present in unity with the exception of that which is inherent in negation, (for negation is the absence of that) And in privation, also, is there a certain subject nature of which the privation is predicated. Now, plurality is opposed to unity; wherefore, also, the things that are in opposition to those that have been mentioned — namely, both diversity, and dissimilarity, and inequality, and as many other qualities as are denominated either according to the same, or according to plurality and unity — ^it is the province of the science of metaphysics that we have alluded to, to examine into; among the number of which, also, a certain one is contrariety; for contrariety is a certain difference, but difference is diversity, e n,^...* Wherefore, since unity is spoken of in various