many as are so expressed, as the white in Socrates, it is not possible should be infinite in an ascending series of productions in the case of man; as, for example, that in Socrates the white there should be some other different accident, for any one thing is not produced from all: nor, truly, in the white will be foimd any different accident; as, for instance, the musical: for, also, in no wise rather is this an accident in that, than that in this. And, at the same time, the distinction has been made that some things are accidents after this manner, but others, as the musical in Socrates. But as to as many things as are accidental in this way, such are accidents not in such a way as an accident in what is accidental; but this is the case with whatsoever is accidental in l\at other way. Wherefore, all things will not be spoken of according to accident; something, then, will there be significant, also, as of substance; and if this be so, it has been demonstrated that it is impossible that at the same time contradictions should be predicated of the same subject.
Further, if all contradictions are true at the lo. Ari«totie'g same time concerning the same thing, it is mani- v^"^thS^thU '' fest that all things will be one. For the same theory wou'd thing will it be, both a trireme, and a wall, and a ti^nS i^i^** man, if it is possible to affirm or deny anything theism. of everything, as there is a necessity for those to do who assert the opinion of Protagoras. For if, also, to any one a man seems not to be a trireme, it is evident that he will not be a trireme: wherefore, also, he is, if the contradiction be true. And, doubtless, comes to pass a saying of Anaxagoras: ^ ''at the same time subsist together all things," so that, in reality, nothing is one. The indefinite, therefore, they seem to speak o^ and, thinking that they mention entity, they talk about nonentity; for an entity in capacity, and not in actuality, constitutes the indefinite. But, doubtless, must we say to the authors of this hypothesis, that of everything either an affirmation or a negation must be predicated; for it would be ^ Aristotle alludes to the "Homoeomsry" of Anaxagoras, according to which no one body differed from another in its elementary compoair tion; and that what constituted the apparent diversity was the predo- minance of any one element over the rest; all of which he affirmed w«re contained equally in one substance as in another. Vide Cudworth, tU. III. p. 84; and Tenneman's History of Philosophy, p. 79, translated ill " Bohn's PhUological Library." t 94 THB MBTAPHTSIOS OF ARI&TOTLI. [bOOK IIL absurd if in each thing there will be inherent the negation of itself, but that the negation of what is difierent, and which is not inherent therein, will have no existence. Now, I say, for example, if it is true to assert of a man that he is not % man, it is manifest also that he is not a trireme; if, indeed, therefore, there is truth in the affirmation, there is a necessity that also there be truth in the negation: but if there is not truth in the affirmation, the negation, at least, of a trireme will more appertain to him than the negation of himself. If, therefore, that also be true, there will also be truth in the negation of the trireme; and if in the negation of this, in the affirmation also. And these consequences happen to those who make such a statement, even to the effect that it is not necessary to employ either affirmation or negation. For, if it is true that the same individual is man and not man, it is evident that such a one will be neither man nor not man; for of those two qualities there are two negations. But if that is one which is composed of both, this one would also be in opposition. 1. Fourth ar- Further, indeed, respecting all things it is so; gument, drawn ^^(j ^ thing will be wWtc and not white, and entity 3f affirmation and nonentity, and it will be so respecting the £i the^caw^of '^^ ^^ *^® assertions and negations in a similar the same sub- manner; or this will not be the case, but only ^^^' so regarding some, and not regarding others.
And if, doubtless, it were not so respecting all, these would be indisputable; but if it be true concerning all, again, no doubt^ in the case of whatsoever there is an assertion there will also be a negation; and in the case of whatsoever there is a negation there will likewise be an assertion; or in the case of whatsoever there is an assertion there will also be a negation; or of whatsoever, indeed, there is an assertion there is also a negation: but of whatsoever things there is a negation, of all such there will not be an assertion. And if this be so, there would be something indubitably a non- entity, and this will be a firm opinion; and if to be a non- entity be something both firm and known, more firm would be the opposite assertion. And if, in like manner, also, it is necessary that in the case of whatsoever things one employs a negation he should employ an affirmaton also, it would be true, undoubtedly, by dividing, to say either that a thing, for instance, is white^ and again that it is not white, or that CH. IV.j AND SUBVERTS TH8 NATURE OF TRUTH. 91 this would not be true. And if, indeed, it is not true, by dividing, to say so,^ he does not a&nn these things, and there is nothing in existence; but how can one speak of non- entities, or understand anything respecting them, or thus move forward in the paths of knowledge 1 And all things would be one, as it has been said heretofore, and both man, and god, and trireme, and the contradictions of them, will be the same. But if, in like manner, this be so in the case of each thing, in no wise will one thing differ from another; for if there will be a difference, this will be true, and a peculiarity of this. In like manner, also, if it is possible that he who makes the division should speak the truth, there happens that which has been declared. And to this reason we may subjoin the following: that all would speak the truth, and all would speak falsely, and one would acknowledge him- self to be speaking what is false. At the same time, however, it is evident that the investigation with such a person is con- cerning nothing; for he affirms nothing. For neither in this manner nor in that is the assertion made with such a one, but in this manner and not in this manner. And again, at least, with respect to these points he makes a negation of both, because the assertion is made that they are neither so in this manner nor not in this manner, but both in this manner and not in this manner; for, if this were not the case, there would now be in existence something that has been defined. Further, if when an assertion be true the negation be &lse,and if when the latter itself be true the affirmation be false, it would not be possible at the same time to assert and deny the same thing with truth. But, perhaps, persons will say that this is what has been laid down from the commencement Further, does one who supposes that in a,„ „,^^ manner a thmg either is so and so, or that it is ment, drawn not so, labour under a misapprehension? but he ofTmh!"**^" who thinks that it is both, does he speak truth, or can he verify his assertion? for if he affirms truth, what is the assertion, save that such is the nature of entities i and if he does not affirm the truth, but rather he speaks truth who makes a supposition in that way, entities, in such a case, would, in a certain manner, be now disposed thus; and would ' This reasoning must lead one to an assertion of «i^iHa«n^ wkick Aristotle regarrls as a contradiction in terms.
96 THE MSTAPHTSIC3 OF ABI8T0TLB. [bOOK ni this be true and not so at the same time, and jet, in reality not true? But if, in like manner, all both speak falsehooc and speak truth, it is not possible for such either to utter or to declare anything, for at the same time he says the same things and not the same things. But if he makes no s* op- position, but in the same way thinks and does not think, in what way will he be disposed differently fix)m plants? ^ U. Sixth arffu- Whence, also, it is especially manifest that no TO?hi M^mp. '^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ *^® ^®* ^^ ^® sceptics, or of those tion that one making this statement, is so affected. For why, better ttSiwi- ^^J I ^sk, docs he Walk towards Megara,^ but other. not remain still, thinking that he is actually walking! nor straightway, at dawn, does he proceed to a well or a precipice? if he may chance to meet with such, he, however, appears cautious, as not considering the falling into it to be not good and to be good in the same sense. It is evident, accordingly, that the one he considers preferable, but the other as not preferable. And, if this be the case, both the one he must needs consider a man and the other not a man; and the one thing sweet, and the other uut sweet. For not as of equal importance doth he investi- gate and regard all things, inasmuch as he thinks it better to drink water and to visit a certain person, and then seeks, in point of feet, for those very things. Although he ought to seek for all things with equal zest, if, in like manner, it were the same thing — I mean to say, both man and not man. But, as has been declared, there is no one who does not appear cautious in regard of the one set of things and not so in regard of the other. Wherefore, as it appears all men suppose that the case is absolutely so, if not concerning all things, at least, concerning what is better and worse. Now, if they do so not from scientific knowledge, but from opinion, much more must attention be paid to truth; just as also the health of one that is diseased must be looked after more than that of a person that is sound: for he that in- dulges in theory or surmise, compared with one possessed ol scientific knowledge, is not healthfiilly disposed towards truth.
* This is Didot's reading. The Leipsic edition has ray vetpvicdrtav.
^ Aristotle has shown that the position of his opponents is specu* Iktiyely false and he now illustrates its practical absurdities; which, oj oourse, are arguments against it.
OU v.] ITS PBAOTIGAL ABBUBPITnS& 97 Further, although as much as possible all j^ stvmih u- things should especially be so and not so, yet, at poMnt, lest- any rate, the more and the less are inherent in the ^imof mora nature of entities: for one would not say that two andie8s,To/ia\- and three were similarly even, nor does a person in the same manner assert an untruth who thinks four five, as he who thinks it a thousand. If, therefore, he be not deceived, in the same manner, it is evident that the other ia less deceived in this way, so that he affirms what is more true. If, therefore, that which is more true be more imme- diate to the truth, there would be something true, at least, to which what is more contiguous will be more true. And even if nothing should be true, yet now, at any rate, is there something that is more firm and more true than another; and so in this way would we be liberated from that intemperate theory aUuded to, and one which forbids the definition of anything mentally.
CHAPTER v.* CHAPTER v.* Now, from the same opinion originates also j The origin the theory of Protagoras; and in like manner of the hypo- is there a necessity that both of them should ^^Sl^^'^^^*" be or not be capable of verification. For if all things that seem so are true, and if all things that are a|^)arent are true, then must all things, at the same time, be true and false. For many entertain contrary opinions to one another; and those who do not happen to think the same with th^nselves they regard as victims to delusion; so that the same thing must needs be and not be. And, if this be the case, it is necessary that all things that seem so should be true; for opposite sentiments do they hold with one another who speak falsehood and who speak truth. If, then, things be so, all will speak truth: that from the same opinion, then, both of these theories originate is evident.
* Aristotle still continues his attack on these sceptics; and haying shown that the chief objection to this dogma lies in this, that if it be true contradictories must be true likewise, which is a logical impossi- bility, he now overthrows, on the same ground, the Protagorean hypo* thecia of the apparent being true.
F •98 THB METAFHYSIOtS OF ARISTOTLE. \BOOX m . There does not, however, exist the same method modes of man- of Conducting^ our controversy as regards all tiro?ersy%*itS ^^^^ philosophers, for some qf them require per- different adver- suasiou, and somo compulsiou. For as many, JnuSe^origin o^f indeed, as have formed opinions in this way from •?^r^*^*'^*™ doubt, the ignorance of these is remediable, for the refutation is directed towards not the theoiy, but the understanding; and as many as speak for ailment's sake, refutation is a cure also of these, both of that discourse which consists in voice,^ and of that which consists in names. But unto those persons who labour under doubt in this way has the opinion itself originated from sensibles; the opinion, I mean, that contradictions and things contrary subsist together, inasmuch as they see contraries arising frx)m the same thing. If, therefore, it is not possible that nonentity should come into existence, in a similar way, according to them, must the thing have pre-existed, namely, as both con- traries at once; as also Anaxagoras ^ says and Democritus, that everything was mingled in everything; for, also, this latter philosopher maintained that vacuity and fulness are similarly resident in any part whatsoever, although the one of these is entity and the other nonentity. s.Their dogmas Respecting, indeed, therefore, those who form as regards con- their Opinions from these data we will say true, and partly that lu a Certain manner they speak correctly, false. ^j^^j that in a certain sense they are involved in ignorance. For entity is spoken of in a twofold point of view; so that it is in a way admissible that something should arise from that which has no being, and that it is in a way not admissible that it should be so; and that the same thing at the same time should be an entity and a nonentity, but not according to the same entity; for in capacity, no doubt, is it admissible at the same time for the same thing to be contraries, but in actuality not so.
^ This is a wise course to pursue in the conduct of any philosophic disputation, and illustrates the thoroughly practical tendency of Aristotle's mind.
^ 4u T}7 <l>a)v^ \6yov. Aristotle means such a discourse as is explana- toi-y; and he therefore adds the words, r6v 4v ovofxdtriVf because every explanation is composed of terms; an expression here synonymouf with words.
' See the note on Anaza^ras in the preceding chapter y.] BBNBATIONAL OBiaiN OF SCEFTIOISIL M And, further, shall we deem them to suppose the existence of a certain other substance of entities in which is inherent •neither motion, nor corruption, nor generation at alL Aad^ in like manner, also, has the truth 4. Their aster- respecting the things apparent reached some ofThelppSSS speculators from sensibles.^ For they do not the r6 ^aiwoti*- consider it fitting that the true should be de- '"'^' cided by plurality or fewness; but the same thing seems sweet to some on tasting it, and to others bitter. Where- fore, if all persons were sick, or all beside themselves,^ but two or three were sound in health, or in possession of their mind, it would happen that these latter would appear to be ill and labouring under an aberration of intellect, but that the rest would not seem so. Further, to many of the rest of the animal creation ^ do contraries appear to be the same thing as well as to us; and to each very person with himself things do not always, according to sense, appear to be the same: which description of these, therefore, is true or false is obscure; for nothing the more is this true than that, but l)oth in like manner are affected as regards truth. Wherefore, Democritus says, at least, that, positively, either nothing is tine, or that, if it be so, that to us it is wrapped^ in obscurity.
But, upon the whole, on account of their sup- 5. The sensa- posing prudence, no doubt, to be sense,'^ and that JjJJJ^ ^^^^ °' this sense constitutes an alteration, these persons exemplified 'in affirm that the apparent, according to sense, is Em^doSS **' necessarily true; for from these sceptics both and others.
' Aristotle considers Protagoras as falling into his opinion from imperfect observation.
' Brown notices an illustration of Diderot's which seems borrowed from this passage. Vide Philosophy of the Himian Mind, yoL I. chap..
XYUL * Asdepios, fanciful enough, gives this as a reason why quails digest hellebore, and others of the featheiy tribe hemlock. It is a common remark, too, that animals have the most exquisite discernment in the discrimination of noxious or poisonous herbage in their pastures from what is salutary.
^ This sentence forcibly reminds one of words to tibe same import that are to be found almost in the opening of ''The Essay on the Himian Understanding," whore Locke explains to us the design of his treatise.
* Aristotle ingeniously accounts on this principle for the adoption of the Protagorean hypothssis by Empedocles and others. For those who eonsider ekvOritrts and ^6irnffa to be the same, m the Emp^dodeans did^ 100 THE MBTAPHTSIOS OF ABISTOTLB. fBOOKnt.
Empedooles and Democritns, and each of the other philoso- phersi, so to speak, have become entangled in opinions of this sort For Empedocles, also, asserts that those changing their habit change their prudence; witness his words:•— " For for the present counsel varies in men." And in other passages he says, that " As far as diverse men become, so far Is present, also, in them always diverse thought.** And Parmenides evinces the same mode of thinking; for instance, in the words: — " For as each has a tempering of graceful limbs. So present in man is mind. For the same thing With whatever thinks is the nature of limbs in men, Both every and all, for more than this is mind."
And the apothegm of Anaxagoras, also, is remembered amongst certain of his associates; namely, that entities are such to them as they may have supposed them. Now, they say that even Homer seems to have been in possession of this opinion, because he made Hector, alter he was deranged from the wound, to lie in a delirious state; as if even those of imsoimd mind were capable of exercising thought, indeed, but not the same thoughts as with those of sound mind. It is evident, therefore, if both be exertions of prudence, that also entities subsist in this way, and not in tins way, at the same time.
Wherefore, also, most difficult is that which lepsy the result, cnsues from this theory; for if they who par- Sg'obMrvafion tioularly pcrccived as true that which it is merely to ob- admissible should be true, (but these are they jects of sense. ^^^ especially seek after it and love it;) if these persons hold such opinions, and manifest such tenets respecting truth, how is it not becoming those to despair who attempt to philosophise? for the pursuit of things eluding their grasp would constitute the investigation of truth. But a cause of this opinion of theirs is the following: that from time to time they have examined into the truth, concerning entities, no doubt, but the entities they have sup- posed to be sensibles merely. Now, in these is inherent eonstitute the senses the criterion of truth; and the dogma of the truth of the apparent follows from this in the way of an easy con* sequence.
COL y.] ATTACK OH EQBBACSJTUS. 101 much of tie nature of the indefinite and that of entity, whicll subsists in such a manner as we have declared. Wherefore^ they speak naturally; but they do not speak things that are true. For so is it more in hsumony for them to speak after this manner than as Ef icharmus^ in his reply to Xeuc^hanes.
But, moreover, seeing the whole of this visible 7. secondly, nature in motion, but respecting what is being JJJ™ ^{J^ °®' changed seeing nothing verified, — ^regarding, at change. least, what is being changed altogether and everywhere, — they considered that verification was not a thing that is possible: for from this hypothesis blossomed that most extreme opinion of those philosophers mentioned just now; namely, that of those speculators who professed to adopt the philosophy of Heraclitus, and such as Oratylus^ held, who at last was of opinion that one ought to speak of nothing, but moved merely his finger; and who rebuked Heraclitus for saying that it is not possible to enter the same river twice: for be himself was of opinion that you could not do so once.
In reply, however, to this theory we will also g -,. „ say, that there is some foundation in reason for tic dogma^^not their supposing with these, that that which fjfe^nnfth^s undergoes a change, when it does change, may argued againVt not be considered as existing. This, however, ^ ^^® ^*^''* is a circumstance attended with doubtfulness, for the rejecting substance retains something of that which is rejected; and of tiiat which is being produced must there now necessarily exist something: and if, in short, it is \mdergoing corruption, there will subsist a certain entity; and if it is being pro- duced, there must needs be that from which it is produced, and by which it is generated, and that this process goes not on in a progression to infinity. Omitting, however, these argu- Qients, let us make those assertions following; namely, that ^ Epicharmus was a native of Cos, and a pupil of F^hagoras; he was also called a Megarian and Sicilian, from residence in those places. He was a comedian by profession; and, from the way Aristotle mentions him in the text, he seems to have made some scurrilous and imper- tinent attack upon Xenophanes. Vide Diogenes in the eighth book 01 his "Lives of the Philosophers," and Tenneman's History of Philo- sophy, p. 64, Bohn's edition.
' Cratylus, who is mentioned in the first book as suggesting ths Ideal Theory to Plato, is reported to have been a companion of Hera* elituB. Little or nothing is known about him. Taylor translate! i^7iyBi}(r€y, "r riginabed;" not givinc" quite the force of the word.
k'02 THB HETAPHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLB. [BOOK III not the same thing is the alteration according to quantity and according to quality; grant, indeed, that, as far as quan* tity goes, it does not abide the same; but it is according to form that we know all things. But, further, it is worth while reproving those who think thus, because, although knowing the number of sensibles themselves, and that in the case of the fewer number of sensibles this state of flux and mutation was to be found, they have yet manifested similsir sentiments respecting the whole heaven.^ For the place about us, of what is sensible, continues alone to subsist in a condition of corruption and generation; but this in no wise, so to say, is part of the universe: wherefore, more justly would it be, on account of the greater number of wit- nesses, to have acquitted these, than on account of these, the fewer, to have condemned those. And, further, is it evident that in reply, also, to these we may use the same ai^guments with those that have been originally laid down by us; for that there is some nature immovable has been demonstrated to their satisfaction, and has gained their assent. It happens, however, to those, at least, who say that a thing is and is not at the same time, to affirm all things to be in a state of rest, rather than of motion; for, on this hypothesis, there exists nothing into which anything is changed, for all things are inherent in alL 9. The truth of Regarding, however, the truth that not every- SguSu^^nst, thing that is apparent is true, in the first place, first, in the dif- indeed, it might be replied, that sense, to be sure, a«<r0>i(rir and IS uot deccitful m what &lls withm its own ^awraaia. pecuUar provluce, but that imagination is not the same with sense. It is worthy of consideration and wonder, in the next place, if they really are in doubt of this, whether mag- nitudes are so great, and colours such as they appear to those at a distance, or such as they appear to those that are near? and whether they are such as they appear to persons in health, or such as they appear to persons in sickness? and, in regard of weight, whether things more weighty are such as appear so to the weak, or such as seem so to the strong? and 1 Aristotle's idea of the heaven was, that it was endued with an eternal existence, and that the stars that rolled along its surface were either themselves actually guds, or the spheres where the gods residedi M the soul does in our bodies. Book VIII. e. viii.
OB. v.] THEOBT OF THIB APPABEMt AS TBUB. 109