Now, all the causes just enumerated fall under g causes re- four modes the most evident. For, indeed, the duced into four elements of syllables, and the matter of things ™** *"' oonstruc^d by art, and the fire and earth, and all finch ^ This is an important distinction, and might be illustrated further fai the case of the growth of our active principles as well as morsl sentiments.
I 114 THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT.
bodies, and the parts of a whole, and the hypotheses of the conclusion, are causes, as that whereof other things are produced. But of these some are as the subject; as, for instance, the parts: but others, as the formal cause; for ex- ample, both the whole, and the composition, and the form. But the seed, and the physician, and the deliberator, and, in short, the maker, all are the causes of the principle of change or of stability. But the rest, as the end and the good,^ are causes of other things; for the final cause aims at being the best, and an end to the other things: let there be, however, no actual difference in saying a thing is good or appears good.
4. Modes of These causes, indeed, therefore, are so many causes further in suecics, but the modcs of causes are, doubtless, many m number; these, however, become less numerous by being reduced under heads. For causes are called so in many ways; and of those things of the same species, antecedently and subsequently, one thing is the cause of another; as, for example, of health the physician and the artisan, and of the diapason ^ the double and number, and always those things that comprise anything whatsoever of singulars. But, moreover, cause is denominated as the accident and the genera of these; as, for instance, of a statue, in one sense, Polycletus is the cause, and, in another, the statuary, because it is accidental with the statuary to be Polycletus: and the things embracing the accidental are causes; for instance, man is a cause of a statue, or also, in general, animal, because Polycletus is a man, and man is an animal. But also of the accidents one is more remote, and another more contiguous than others; for example, just as if the white and the musical should be termed a cause of the statue, but not merely Polycletus, or man. But besides all things, both those that are denominated appropriately or strictly, and those ac- cording to accident, some causes are denominated as things ^ As regards the r6 kyaJ96u viewed as a cause, Aristotle has alread;^ examined the subject in the first book. The Stagyrite ranks it as a final cause; and thus most wonderfully betmys his consciousness of the tie that binds moral and physical causes together. Vide Ethics, L i. sqq.; and Niebuhr e Lectures on Roman History, Lect. LXIL ' For the meaning of this word, vide p. 112.
OB. m.] THR TF.RM ELEMENT EXPLAINED. 113 endued with a capacity, but others as things energizing; ar» the cause of the house being built is the builder, or the builder considered as in the act of building. In like mannei with what has been stated will be mentioned, also, the causes in the case of which there are causes; as, for example, of this statue, as far forth as it is a statue, or, in general, of an image, or of this brass, so far forth as it is brass, or, in short, matter; and in the case of the accidents it is so in like manner. Further, also, these and those shall be predicated as connected together; as, for example, not Polycletus nor a statuary, but Polycletus a statuary. But, however, all these, at least, are six in number, yet are expressed in a twofold manner. For either as a singular are they denominated, oi as the genus thereof, or as the accident, or as genus of the accident, or as these connected together or simply expressed; further, all of them as energizing, or according to capacity. But thus far is there a dififereuce, that causes energizing and singulars,^ and those of which they are the causes, subsist at the same time and at the same time cease to be; as, for example, the person healing with that person that is being restored to health, and this person the builder with that which is being built. Not invariably, liowever, is this the case with regard to causes in capacity; for not at the tame time sink into decay the house and the builder.
CHAPTER III.
An element 2 is called that from which, as an i. Different inherent first principle and indivisible in species, J^"tem eie-**' something is compounded into a different spe- ment, or crot- cies; as, for instance, the elements of vo-ice are ***•*"• those things of which the voice is composed, and into which it is ultimately divided: those elements, however, no longer * The Leipsic edition inserts here the words aurd re 4<rri: they are omitted in some MSS., for they only perplex the sentence.
' In assignmg a different signification to the word " element " from that usually given to dpxht or first principle, Aristotle differed from Tb&les, and, no doubt, from other philosophers of antiquity. Tide Phitarch, De Placitis, lib. I. c 2; and Thomas Stanley, in his "History of PhiloBophy," who awards the cr«dit of this distinction to Plato^ part y. chap. yii. on Plato's Inventions.
l2 116 THE HETAFHTBICS OF ABISTOTLE. [bOOE IT.
are diyided into other voices different from them in species; but, even though they be divided, the parts would be of the same species; as, for example, the portion of water is water, but a portion of the syllable is not a syllable. In like manner, also, do the old philosophers,^ who enumerate the elements of bodies, say that they are those entities into which bodies are ultimately divided; but those no longer are divisible into others different in species; and whether such may be one or many, these they yet call elements. Simi- larly, also, are denominated the elements both of diagrams an(^ in general, those of demonstrations; for the primary demonstrations, and those that are inherent in many more demonstrations, themselves are styled elements of demon- strations: but of such kind are the first syllogisms, which are composed of three terms by means of the one middle. 2. Derived And, by a transference of the meaning, they meaning of heuco Call an element that which being one and vroixeiov, gijagji may be useful for many purposes; where- fore, also, what is small, and simple, and indivisible, is styled an element. Hence it has come to pass that those things which are most especially universal are elements, because each of them is one and simple, and is inherent in many things, or in all, or in as many as possible; and to some speculators it seems that the one and the point are first principles. Since, therefore, those things called genera are universal and indivisible, (for there is one definition of them,) certain persons call the genera elements; and that, too, in preference to difference, for the genus is more universaL For in whatsoever the difference resides, the genus also follows; but in what the genus resides does not, in every way, constitute the difference. Common, however, to all is the characteristic that the being of the element of each body is the first inherent quality in each.
^ We have a discussion akin to this in the third hook of Arietotle'i tixiatiiijid ** On the Heaven," chap, iii OH. IV.] NATURE DEFINED. 117 CHAPTER IV.
Natubb^ is called, in one way, the production j Diffg^nt n^. of things that are by Nature; as, for instance, if ceptations of one putting forth his Voice should articulate the ^otSiit!^"' letter U: and in another, as that from which, as being inherent, that which is being naturally produced is primarily formed. Moreover, Nature^ is the origin of the earliest motion in each of the things in itself subsisting by Kature, so far as it is this very thing. Now, those things are said to be produced by Nature as many as involve growth through another body, by means of contact and growth along with, or growth beside, just as embryos. But the being connascent differa from contact j for in the latter there must needs be nothing else besides the touch: but in things that are connate there is some one thing that is the same in both, which, instead of involving contact, causes them to be con- nascent, and causes them to be one according to what is con- tinuous and involving quantity, but not according to quality. Moreover, is that styled Nature from which, as its primary matter, there cither is or arises anything of the things that subsist by Nature, being without regular motion,^ and un- changeable from the power which belongs to itself; for instance, of a statue, or of brazen vessels, the brass is called the nature, and of wooden vessels the wood: but in like manner is it in the case of the rest. For each thing is from these, the pri- muiy matter remaining in a state of conservation; for in this way, also, do they affirm the elements of those things that are by Nature to constitute Nature; some saying that this is fire, but others, earth, and others, air, and others, water: but others asserting some other such thing, and others, some of these, but others, all of them.
' The distinctions laid down concerning the term Nature in this chapter are most important. It is this very word ipikris which stands for explanation in the opening chapter of the work "De Placitii Philosophorum/' generally ascribed to Plutarch Chssronensis.
' If the reader is curious to IcArn further the notions of the Peri- patetics respecting Nature, he will consult the second book of Aria* totle's Physical Auscultations.
* Two dilFerent readings are f nnd L& the MSS., namely, dplvfutn 09 tod dpi/BfjuoTw, 118 THE HETAFHTBICS OP ARfflTOTLE. [BOOK IT.
t. Empedocies' ' In another way, however, Nature is styled the NSSeaSwJiiTii Buhstance of things that exist by Nature; for in- ^^*)* stance, those who affirm that Nature is the earli« est synthesis, as Empedocles says that ** Nature is there of no one of entities, But merely mizturs and of things mixed, A change, and thus by men is Nature styled."
Wherefore, as many things, also, as by Nature exist or are produced, that being in existence already from which it is natural that they should arise, or should have their being, not as yet do we say that such is in possession of Nature, unless they have the species and the form. By Nature, then^ subsists that which is composed from both of these, as, for instance, animals and their parts. Nature, however, consti- tutes the primary matter, and this in a twofold sense, — either the primaiy in reference to a thing itself, or, upon the whole, the first; for example, of brazen works the first in reference to these is the brass; and water, perhaps, in general, if the primary matter of all things that are capable of being liquified be water. And Nature constitutes both species and substance; and this is the end of production. But now, metaphoricallj speaking and generally, every substance is called Nature for this reason, because Nature, also, is a certain substance, a. Nature in the Doubtlcss, from the things that have been ijrecise sense of stated, the earliest nature, and that termed so with precision, is the substance, — I mean of those things possessing the principle of motion in themselves, so far forth as themselves are such. For matter, in respect of its being susceptible of this, is styled Nature; and generations and the act of production are termed so in consequence cf their mo- tions being from this. And the first principle of motion, ia those things that by Nature subsist, is Nature, inherent as a first principle in a manner either potentially or \ctually 08. v.] THB TEBM. MEOKSSABT. 119 CHAPTER V.
Nboe3Sary^ is defined that without which, to a co-operating cause, it is not admissible for ineaningsof a thing to exist; as, for instance, respiration V^""'****^ and nourishment are necesstiy conditions for an animal: for without these it is impossible that an animal can ^st. And that is necessary without which it is not possible for what is good either to subsist, or to arise, or to cast aside any evil, or that any evil should be exterminated; for instance, the drinking a certain medicine is a necessary precaution against sickness, and the sailing to iEgina,^ against the loss of one's property. Further, the compulsory and compulsion are styled necessary; but this is that which constitutes an obstruction, and is capable of offering an hindrance to impulse and free-will.^ For what is compulsory is styled necessary: wherefore, also, is it a thing that is sad; as also Evenus* hau it:— " For everything necessary is a thing doleful."
^nd force, or compulsion, involves a certain necessity, as also Sophocles ^ says: — <' But force compels me to do these things."
And necessity seems to be a something that is inevitable, (correctly so,) for it is contrary to the motion that results ac- ' This is another very important word, and one which resoimds in the metaphysical controversies that have prevailed in the world. Aris- totle gives five acceptations of apayKutos: in the third of which he glances at its connexion with ethics.
* '' Sailing to iBgina." The allusion most likely in these words is to the fact that the citizens of Athens, with their property and effects, IV ere obliged, b. o. 480, to retire to ^gina, amongst other places, for fear of an expected invasion from the East. There is another reading beside fii) &irojBaX^, and that is Xva ^trikafiij: and, in this case, I would take it that Aristotle alludes to the favourable circumstances under which one could carry on trade, for instance, in iSgina, whose commercial advan* tagas were so well known, or even support oneself there, compared w th Athens, where a man was exposed to so much expense.
' Aristotle now gives the signification of the word wayKaios in its ethical aspect.
* It does not appear who this Evenus was. Asclepius merely says hi V^SAA sophist.
* Thie passage is taken from the Eleotra.
120 THE METAPHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLE. [bOOK IT.
cording to free-will, and according to the power of reasoning. Further, that which does not admit of being otherwise than it is, we say is in this way disposed as a necessary thing. And, according to this acceptation of the word^ what is necessary, and all the other things that are so, are also, in a manner, styled necessary; for the violent, or compulsory, is called necessary, either in regard of action or passion, at such times as when a person cannot make any move according to impulse, on ac- count of some constraining cause; so that this is a necessary impulse on account of which the thing could not be other- wise. And in the case of the co-operating causes of the prin« ciple of vitality, and the good, it is so in like manner; for when it is not admissible, on the one hand, to obtain, indeed, the good, and on the other, to live and to exist without cer- tain things, these things then are necessary, and this cause constitutes a cei*tain necessity.
2 Theprinci- Further, does demonstration belong to those pie of necessity things that are necessary,^ because it is not pos- iSonlt/auSi.^^ Bible that the things that are being demonstrated should be otherwise, if the thing be absolutely demonstrated; but causes of this are things primary, which it is impossible should subsist otherwise than they do; out of which is formed the syllogism. Of some things, truly, is there a different cause from themselves of their being necessary, but of others there is no such cause; but on account of these are other things that are from necessity. Wherefore, what is primary and what is absolute, or simple, are strictly neces- sary; for it is not possible that this can be disposed in many ways: therefore, neither can it subsist in different ways at different times; for on such a supposition would it now be disposed in many ways. If, therefore, there are certain things that are eternal and immovable, there is in them nothing compulsory or contrary to Nature.
' This is a quality ioherent in demonstrative truth, which has given rme to the controversy as to the justice of our being called to account for our vnteUecttuU assent even in matters of religion. Vide Bp. Butler^i Analogy, part II. chap, vi; Locke's Essay, book IV. chaps, xvii xviii CB.YL] UNITY DRFINKD. 121 CHAPTER VI.
Onb^ is called that which subsists as such i. on^tu, according to accident in one way, and in another, ^tingiiished that which subsists essentially. A thing is called aeeident"^md one according to accident; for instance, Coriscua i^^^mem- and what is musical, and the musical Coriscus: 'ng* of •• one for it is one and the same thing to say, Coriscus ^^ "* ***' and what is musical, as to say, Coriscus the musician; also, to say the musical and the just is one with saying the just musician Coriscus. For all these are called one according to accident; the just, indeed, and the musical, because thay are accidents in one substance; but what is musical and Coriscus, because either is an accident in the other. Like- wise, also, in a certain sense, the musical Coriscus is one with -Coriscus, because either of the parts of those that are in this sentence is an accident in tiie other; as, for example, what is musical in Coriscus and the musical Coriscus in just Coriscus, because one portion of either is an accident in the same one. For there is no difference whether what is musical is an accident in Coriscus, or Coriscus the just in the musical Coriscus. In like manner, however, will one be denominated according to accident, though it should be predicated of the genus, or of some universal names; as, for instance, if man were said to be the same with a musical man: for that it should be so either because the musical is an accident in the man being one substance, or because both are accidents in any one of those which are singulars, as in Coriscus; nevertheless, both are not inherent in the same manner, but the one, perhaps, as genus and in the sub- stance, and the other, as a habit or passion of the substance. Therefore, as many things as are expressed according to accident are styled one after this manner.
But of things denominated one essentially, 2. Definition*^ some are styled so on account of their being con- LcorSLg'to"' 1 We have dow laid before us the various significations that ty ha& The rd %v we must bear in mind is in metaphysics a synonyme with the T^ ov, and therefore equally with it, as Aristotle has already shown, thf •ubjeci-matter about which ontology is conversant. Vide books lU bap. iL and IX. chap. L 122 THE METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT iifferent modes tlouous; as, for instance, a bundle^ held together of continuity. |jy ^ string and a piece of wood by glue; and a line, even though it be curved, yet, if it be continuous, is called one; as 'also each of the parts of the body: for in- stance, a leg and an arm. Now, of these very things those are more one which by nature are continuous than those that are continuous by art. But that is called continuous of which the motion is one essentially, and also which it is not possible should be otherwise. And motiou is one when it is indivisible, and indivisible according to time; those things, however, are essentially continuous as many as are not one by contact; for if you were to place sticks touching one another, you would not say that these are one, either ona piece of wood, or one body, or anything else that is continu- ous. And, indeed, in general, things that are continuous are called one, even though they may have a curve, and still rather things that have not a curve; thus the leg and thigh are more one than the leg and foot together, because it is pos- sible that the motion of the leg and foot be not one. And the straight line is one rather than the curved line. But the curved, and that which has an angle, we call both one and not one, because it is admissible that both the motion of the whole should not be at the same time, and yet that at the same time should be the motion of a part f but part and the whole of a straight line are always at the same time in motion together, and no such portion as involves magnitude partly remains at rest and partly is in motion, as of a line that is curved. . „^, Further, in another way a thing is called one where the uiti- in respect 01 the subject bemg m species indifthelamef ''^ " ^®^®^* ^^ destitute of a difference. But things that are indifferent are those of which the form, according to sense, is indivisible, and the subject is either the first or the last in respect of the end. For both wine is called one and water one, so far forth as either is indi- visible according to the form; and all fluids are styled one, as ' ^ This word, which is sometimes erroneously written <l>dKfX\oi instead of tpiKeXos, means the same as the Latin " fasciculus," and in found in Herodotus, Melp. iv. 62.
^ I have followed Taylor's most clear and admirable translation of these words.
CH. Vl] ESSENTIAL UKITT. ]23 • oil, wine, and things that are soluble, because the ultimate subject of all these is the same; for all these are, in reality, water and air. But those things are styled one, also, of which the genus is one, differing by opposite differences. And all these are called one because one genus is the subject of the differences; for instance, horse, man, dog, is a certain one because all of them are animals; and, doubtless, they are one in some similar manner as the matter is one. These things, however, sometimes in this way are styled one, and some- times the superior genus is regarded one, which is deno- minated the same, if those higher up than these be the ultimate species of the genus; as, for example, the isosceles, to be sure, and the equilateral, are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles.
Further, are those things styled one the defi- 4 Things one nition of whatsoever of which, denominating the in respect of essence of them, is indivisible, as far as regards another definition signifying the being of the thing, for every actual definition is essentially indivisible. For so, also, both that which has undergone increase and diminution is one because the definition is one, as in the case of surfaces pos- sessing length and breadth the definition of the species is one. In general, however, are those things one of which and of percep- the perception is indivisible; I mean, that which **°°* perceives what the essence or formal principle is, and which cannot be separated either in time, or place, or definition; these most especially, I say, are one; and of these as many as are substances.
For, universally, whatever things do not in- 5. Further. volve division, so far forth as they have it not, senses^ofji;, or so far are they styled one; for example, if man, to its primary as far as he is a man, has not a division, he is »i8nific»^»o»- one man; and if an animal, as far as it is an animal, is indv visible, animal is one: but if magnitude, as far as magnitude is concerned, is indivisible, magnitude is one. The most things, no doubt, then, are styled one because some one different thing they either effect, or suffer, or possess, or because of their being relative to some one thing; but those things primarily denominated one are those of which the substance is one: one, however, either iu continuity, or species^ *yt 124 TlfB HETAPHTSIGS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOKIV.
definition; for also we reckon as plural^ or many, either those things that are not continuous, or those of which the form is not one, or of which the definition is not one. But, further, is it the case^ that we say sometimes that anything wliat- Boever is one, provided only it involves quantity and con- tinuity; and we sometimes say that it is not one, if it be not a certain whole, that is, if it does not possess one form; for instance, we would not say that in like manner a shoe is one, when looking at the portions of that shoe any way whatsoever put together, although there may be continuity involved therein: but if it be in such a position of its parts as to be in reahty a shoe, and to have a certain form, it would already then be one. Wherefore, also, of lines the circular is particularly one because it is entire and perfect.
6 The c«8en- ^^ *^® ^^^' howcvcr, the Very essence consists tiai quaiit> of in this, that it is the principle of a certain teated! *""*' number; for the first measure is the principle of each genus thereof; for that whereby, as primary, we make a thing known, this is the first measure of each genus: therefore, the first principle of that which may be known constitutes, in regard of each genus, the one. But the one is not the same in all the genera; for here it is diesis,^ and there a vowel, or a mute; but of gravity there is a different one, and of motion another. Everywhere, how- ever, is unity indivisible, either in form or in quantity. That, indeed, therefore, which is indivisible according to quantity, and so far forth as it is a quantity, (I mean, what is in every direction indivisible, and is without position,) this is called an unit or monad; but that which is in every direction indi- visible, and involves a position, is a point; and that which is divisible in one direction is a line, and that capable of a twofold division, a surface; but that which in every way and ^ I have omitted translating the word ^irc/, which is found in some Greek MSS., and thereby added conE^erably to the perspicuity of the sentence.
* The term SUcris occurs in other parts of Aristotle's works, e.g. in the Generation of Animals, book I. cap. xv., and in the Posterior Analytics, lib. I. cap. xxiii: in the former place it is employed as a term in physics, in the latter, as one in music, something the same as our demi-semi-quaver. It is explained in Mr. Owen's translation of th« Analytics, p. 298, in " Bohn's Classical library."
0H.Y2L] LOGICAL UNITT. 128 in three directions is divisible according to quantity is a body. And, conversely, that which is divisible in a twofold xespect is a sur&ce, and that in a single direction, a line, and that divisible everywhere in three directions is a body, but that divisible nowhere according to quantity, a point and a monad; the one, without position, a monad, and the other, with position, a point.