Vision in both eyes. Wherefore, not every man is good or (Bvil, or just or unjust; but also there are ^des of character intermediate between these.
CHAPTER XXIII; Possession^ is denominated in many ways; i. Four senM* in one way as the action of a thing according Jji^the^old to the nature of that thing, or according to the Sx^t^, or pctMt impulse of it. Wherefore, both a fever is said 1 Vide chapter xy. of the Categories.
l2 sion.
1 48 THB MKTAFHYSICS OF A^I&TOTLE. [bOOK J^^ to poaseas a man, and tyrants are said to possess states, and those that are clothed a garment. And in another way we term possession as that in whatever anything is inherent, M being receptive; as, for instance, the brass possesses the form of a statue, and the body possesses disease. And in another way we term possession as a thing that embraces the thin^ that are comprised; for wherein anything is com- prised, by this it is said to be possessed: as, for instance, we say that the vessel possesses moisture, and the city inhabit- ants, and the ship sailors; and so, also, the whole possesses the parts. And, further, that which hinders, in accordance with its own force, anything from motion or action is said to possess this very thing; as, for example, both the pillars possess the superincumbent weights, and just as the poets make Atlas^ to possess the heaven, so that it should otherwise fall upon the earth; as, also, certain of the physiologists * affirm. And in this way, likewise, is the connecting said to possess the things which it connects, as if they would otherwise have severally been separated according to their own proper force. And the being in anything is expressed in a similar manner with, and as a consequence upon, possession.
CHAPTER XXIV.
CHAPTER XXIV.
1. The phrase, "Thb being from anything" is said in one way TO elvai u to be that from which a thing is as from matter; edTfirst! fafus and this in a twofold respect, either according to proper sense. ^^^ £^^ geuus, or according to the last species: as, for instance, all liquids, in a way, are from water, and the statue is from brass. And in another way we consider "the ' For example, Hesiod in the Theogony, at line 517, "ArXas S* oipav6y cvphy ix^i, &C. The origin of this fable is variously given; perhaps the best account is« that Atlas was observed to frequent the tops of mountains, in order to observe the heavenly bodies, and thus indulge in his favourite studies of astronomy, and that from his fami- liarity with the celestial, men volunteered to assign to him this near connexion with the terrestrial globe.
' " Certain of the physiologists." Asclepius puts forward Anaxagoraa as one of these. A similar apprehension is mentioned on the part of the physicists by Aristotle, book YIIL chap. viiL; but Empedocles is the person alluded to there.
OB.ZZT.] PBOOESBIOV, PART. l49 being from anything*' as that which springs from the first moving cause; thus^ from what doth the battle arise? from invectiye, because such is a first principle of the battle. In another sense, however, is this defined as that frx)m what is composite, (I mean from matter and form,) as the parts from the whole, and the verse from the Iliad, and the stones from the house; foJ: form is an end to be sure, but that which possesses an end is finished. And in some respects it is as the species from a part; for instance, man is from biped, and % flyllable from a letter: for these^ are from those otherwise than the statue from the brass, for fix>m the matter cognisant k> the senses is the composite substance; but also form con- aists from the matter of the form. Some things are styled in this way as '* that from anything," and others, if they ■absist according to any part of these modes: as frx)m the &ther and mother the child, and from earth the plants, beoause they spring from some part of them.
And, lastly, is this styled as that which sub- 2. secondly, in sists after anything in time, as night is said to its derived be from day, and a storm from a caJm, because the one follows after the other. But of these some are so called in respect of possessing the power of mutual change, as also those particulars just now enumerated; but others only in respect of their being successive in time: as from the equinox is made a voyage, because it is made alter the equinox, and the Thargelia^ are from the Dionysia, because tiiey are celebrated after the Dionysia.
CHAPTER XXV.
A PART is said to be in one way that into | p^,^ ^^^^ which any quantity whatsoever may be divisible; of/i^pov.apart, for always that which is subtracted from quan- ^^^^ *** ' 1 rouTo is the Greek, that is, cTSm, which I have taken to refer to the two examples given.
^ Thargelia was a festival at Athens in honour of the sun, or, as others say, of the Delian Apollo, Phoebus, and Diana. It was called 80 from Uie firstfruits, 0apyij\M, which were carried about as one of the ceremonies of the solemn occasion. The Dionysia, or Ox^a, were celebrated in honour of Bacchus. For a full account of these festivals reference may be made to Potter's Greek Antiquities, book IL chap.
UO TBI MBTAPHTblUB OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT^ fcitj, so &r forth as it is quantity, is called a portion of tbat thing; thus, of three is the two in a manner called a part: and in another way that which measures it is called the part of things of this sort merely. Wherefore, two, in one way, is a part of three, as is stated, and in another 10 not 80. Moreover, those things into which the species of animal may be divided without quantity, these ako are called parts of this species. Wherefore, they say that species ar^ parts of the genus. We further caU those things parts into whatsoever anything is divided, or those things whereof the whole is made up, or the species, or that which involves the species, even as the brass is a part of the brazen sphere, or of the brazen cube, (but this is the matter wherein the form resides,) and an angle also is a part. Moreover, those things that are contained in the definition which manifests each thing, these also are parts of the whole. Wherefore, the genus is called a part also of the species, and in other respects the species is reg^ed a part of the genus.
CHAPTER XXVi.
1. Different A WHOLE is Styled, first, that from which is te^^whoie^* a^8e°* ^0 part of those things whereof the whole hkott explain- by nature is said to consist; and secondly, that ^^' which contains the things contained,^ so that they form one certain thing. And this is the case in a twofold way; for it is so either in such a manner that each may be one, or that one thing may arise from these. For the universal, indeed, and that which is predicated in general as being a certain whole, are universal in such a way as that the predication of each contains many things, and that all are- one as each predicated thing is; for example, man, horse, god, is individually one thing, because all are animals. And the continuous and the finite may we regard as a whole when there may be produced one thing from many things that are inherent, especially when this is the case in potentiality, but if not in energy.
* Some copies, e.g, the Leipsic edition, insert 4y ko2 before rh xt/n* •X^fitva I the sense is not altered. I have followed the Paris edition <^ Didot.
OaXXVIL] ENTIRKTT^ HUTILAUCN. 151 Now, of these very things rather are those, _,.
wholes which suhsist by nature than such as moce further are made by art; as also we say, in regard of the ui^iJ^^^f"^ one, that entirety is a certain unity. Further, seeing that quantity has a first principle, and a mean, and an extreme, of whatsoever quantities position does not cause a difference *'air' is predicated; but of whatsoever it does, a ^' whole ** is predicated; and as many things as admit of both, both "whole" and " all" are predicated. There are those things, however, whose nature abides the same in the act of trans- position; but not so with the form, as wax and a garment: for both whole and all are they styled, for they possess both. But water, and whatsoever things are moist, and number, are called "all," no doubt; yet number is not styled a whole, and water a whole, unless metaphorically. All those, however, are predicated thus of which the entire is predicated; as in the case of the one, in the case of these I say all things are predicated; as in the case of things divided we say all. this is number, and all these monads.
CHAPTER XXVII.* CHAPTER XXVII.* But the mutilated is styled, amongst quan- ^ ^^ titles, not every indiscriminate quantity, but it mutilated, must needs be itself divisible and a whole. For ed^n'^espw?"'* two things are not mutilated when either one the whole is being subtracted, (for both the mutilation and ^°'*"^ * ^^^' what remains nowhere are equal,) nor, in general, is ary number mutilated, for also must its substance needs remain: thus, if a goblet be mutilated, still must the goblet exist; but a number is no longer the same when a part is taken away. And, in addition to these, if also things may be of dissimilar parts, neither can all these be considered mutilated; for number is that which also contains dissimilar parts: as, for example, a duad, a triad. But, in short, none of those things of which the position does not make a difference is mutilated, as water or fire; but such must needs be muti- lated which have a substantial position. Further, things 1 Some of the remarks in this chapter might guide us in questionf i«lating to the subject of pergonal identity. Vi^ chap. ix.
152 THE METAPHTSICS 07 ABIStOTLE. [BOOX IV.
eontinuous must needs be mutilated; for harmony oonsiBtkig from things of dissimilar parts, indeed, also possesses position; but it does not become mutilated.
2 The part "^^^^ ^^ addition to these, neither are thos9 thatdeterminet things mutilated, whatsoever are wholes, by the fa nSlSy"5Mt privation of any part whatsoever mdifferently. of the whole For it is not necessary that either the princip^ erenty. parts of the substance,orthose that are taken away anywhere whatsoever, ^ould make what remains mutilated; as, for instance, if a goblet be bored it is not mutilated, but if its handle, or if any of its extremities, be, it is mutilated r and a man is not mutilated if he have fledi or spleen, but if he have an extremity taken away, and not every such indifferently; but should it be that which does not possess the power of reproduction when entirely taken away. Wherefore, bald persons are not mutilated.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
1 Genus defin- ^ENus is Styled 80 partly when there may be ed as the gene- a coutinuous generation of things that possess the^sara^spL^' *^® ^amc spccics; as, for instance, there is said cie< and of to be a gcuus of men, because as long as the generation of them may be continuous there would exist such. And it is that also from which things derive their being as the first disposing cause towards existence; for so are the EUenes styled the genus, and the lonians: the former as springing from Hellen, and the latter from lon,^ as the first generator. And rather are those things a genus that are from the generator than from the matter. For they are said to be the genus, also, that are from the female, as those from Pyrrha. Further, are they termed as the surfiice is called the genus of suoei^cial figures, and the solid of such as are soHd; for, as regards * Hellen was supposed to have been the son of Deucalion and Pyrrha; bis two sons, ^olus and Doras, gave their names to the two great sub* divisions of the Greeks, the.^k)lians and the Dorians, and his grand* son, Ion, to the lonians. As to the origin of the Greek nation, tht student may consult Niebuhr on Ancient History, Lectures XXL XXIL XXIII; Qrote, vol. I. pp. 110, sqq., vol. II. pp. 315, sqq.
.] afENUS, FALSEHOOD. US taoh of the figures, tli3 one is such a sar&ce, but the Gth^ is such a solid, and this is the subject in the differences^ which, of course, is the genus.^ Further, do we regard genus as that which first is inherent in definitions, which is predi* eated in the case of the essence of a thing the differences of which are called qualities. The genus, therefore, indeed, is denominated in thus many ways; partly according to the continuous generation of the same species, and partly accord* ing to the original moving power of the same species, and partly as matter; for that to which the difference and the quality belong; this constitutes the subject which we style matter. • And things are called diverse in genus of ^ ^^enthinw which the first subject is diverse, and in the case an said to be of which one is not resolved into another, nor ^5?®*^ both into the same, (as the form and the matter are something different in the genus,) and whatsoever things are denominated according to a different form of the predica- tion of entity; for some entities signify quiddity, and soma a certain quality of a thing, and some have a signification in accordance with our former division;^ for neither are these resolvable either into one another or into any one thing.
CHAPTER XXIX.
The false ^ is denominated in one way as i. The term a false thing; and, in regard of this, partly in &i8e, ^.Wot, the fact of its not being composed, or in the e^uiTiSentwitb impossibility of its being in a state of com- f*i^'' position; as the expression of the diameter being commen- surable, or of your being in a sitting posture; for of these the former is, indeed, always, but the latter sometimes false: fo£ thus are these not in being. For things are false as many as are in being, uo doubt, but yet are fitted by nature, to appear either not such as they are, or what they are not; as, for example, a rough painting and dreams; for these^ * I havd added these words from Taylor, to complete the Bense. ' In the division of the ten predicaments — the famous or « thai it found in the Categories, chap. iv. ' Vide chap. iii. of the Sophistical EleocM.
I5i THE METAPaY»lCS OF ABISTOTLE. [BOOS truly, are something, but not those things of which they cause an imagination or impression. Things, indeed, there* fore, are thus termed false either in respect of themselves not being, or in respect of the impression that is conveyed from them being that of a nonentity; and a false discourse is a discourse about nonentities, so far forth as it is false. 2 What laisity Wherefore, every £ilse definition, or discourse, indeflnition is employed about something that is different amounuto. ^^ ^^^^ ^£ which it would be a true dis- course; as the discourse about a circle is a &lse one when transferred to a triangle. Now, the discourse, or definition of everything is partly as one — namely, that explanatory of the essence; and it is partly as many, since, somehow, a thing itself, and this thin^, viewed as passive, may be regarded the same as Socrates and Socrates the musical. And a false discourse is a discourse simply about nothing.
• Wherefore, Antisthenes^ entertained a silly on the subjer? Opinion when he thought that nothing could be nition**'' **^' pre<iica*®<l> unkss one, in regard of one thing, . ' by a proper definition or discourse; the result of which statements was, that there can be no contradiction in existence, and almost no way of making a Mae assertion. It is possible, however, to express each thing not only in a discourse proper to itself, but also in that which belongs to a different thing, — falsely, no doubt, and altogether so: not- withstanding, then, is it possible to express the same, in a manner, also with truth; as, for instance, eight are twofold, from the definition of the duad. Some things, indeed, there-? fore, are denominated in this way false.
But a false man is called one who is ready and of the woni"'* disposed to admit false assertions of such a sort, false as appUed not ou account of anything that is different, but on account of their being false, and who, in the case of others, is the cause of the adoption of such false asser- tions; as also we say that those things are false as many as create a false impression.^ ' Antisthenes flourished about 896 B.O. He was the founder of the Qynics, and is too well known to require our dwelling longer on hii history. Vide Tonneman's Philosophy, pp. 91, 92, Bohn'a edition.
^ itxunaaiay. Vide note, p. & rai. 2XX.J AOCIBBNT. 15(f Wherefore, the reasoning in the Hippias of Plato ^ ^j^ ^^^^^ is sophistical, so &r as it endeavours to establish teracts a pw* that the same man is false and true. For one ^^^ *^* that is capable of deceiving he receives as false, and this person is one that is knowing and prudent; further, a man who is voluntarily worthless he pronounced a better man. Now, this falsehood he gathers by induction; for one that is lame voluntarily is superior to one that is so involun- tarily, considering the voluntary lameness as an imitation of lamenesa Since, if were he lame voluntarily he would, per- haps, be a worse individual, as this also would be the case as regards moral deportment CHAPTER XXX.1 An accident, however, is denominated as that, «, - «<i.«i...■»» ii*i*i^«l« Meanings Of which IS inherent m something, and which it is the word acci- true to affirm is so, yet not either necessarily, or JJ^^xX^ned' for the most part; as, for example, if any one in and illustrated. <liggii^ A furrow for a plant ^ould discover a treasure. This, then, would be an accident to the person engaged in digging the trench, namely, the discovery of the treasure; for neither does the one necessarily follow from the other, nor after it; nor, should one be occupied in planting, does he^ for the most part, find a treasure. And the case is the same should any one who is musical be white: since, however, this takes place neither of necessity nor as for the most part, we pronounce this an accident. Wherefore, since there is something which has a subsistence, and a subsistence in something, and some of these both in a certain place and, at a certain time, whatsoever would be so, indeed, but would involve no allusion as to why it was this particular thing, either now or here, such will be an accident: nor, doubtless, IS there any definite cause of what is accidental; but the cause of this is the casual or ordinary,^ and this is the inde- ' The Bignification of the accidental is also examined into in the Posterior Analytics, book I. chaps, iv. and vi, and in the Topics, book IV. chap. i.
^ The Leipsic edition has a full stop after rd rvx6y. I have fcUowed Didot; and Taylor appears to have used the vame text.
156 THE METAPHTSICS OP ABISTOTLB. [BOCIS T finite. Thus, it has been accidental to a certain indiyidual, his arriving at ^gina, if he has not left home for this pur- pose that he should go thither, but has been driven there by a storm, or captured by pirates. The accidental, doubtless, has been genei*ated, and will have a subsistence, not, how« ever, so fiur forth as itself is concerned, but as &r as some* thing else is; for the storm was the cause of his going to tht port he was not sailing for, and this was iBgina. And in another way is a thing called an accident; for example, in the way whatsoever things are inherent in each thing essen- tially, and yet are not contained in the substance of that thing, as in a triangle to have angles equal to two right angles. And accidents of this sort it is admissible should be eternal, yet this is not the case with any of those othars. The reason, however, of this may be found elsewhere.
BOOK \V CHAPTER I.
BOOK \V CHAPTER I.
1. The chief Thb first principles and causes of entities are «itl"nhl'!If.f under investigation; and it is evident that the as a science. mvcstigatiou regards the causes and nrst pnu- SSJs' "^Sns/'rA ciples of entities, so fer forth as they are entities. 6v, as such.' For there is a certain cause of health, and of a good habit of body, and of mathematical entities; likewise are there first principles, and elements, and causes; and in general, also, every science which is an intellectual one, or in any degree even partaking of the faculty of thought,^ is con- versant about causes and first principles, which we either more accurate or more simple, as the case may be. All o.* these, however, being descriptive of one particular subject, ^ Aristotle in this book, which stands sixth in some copies, proceeds to expand farther the fundamental notion of metaphysics as a science of entity. It harmonizes with physics, so far forth as both are ■peculatiYe; and under ontology must be ranked theology, as being ha its nature eminently speculative or theoretic.
* iidpoias. See note, p. 244 of the Orgacon, ^'Bohn's Classical Library.^ IBH. X.] FHTSIGS AND MflTAl*UYSIOS. ISl ftnd a particular genus, are engaged about this; but not con« oeming being or entity simply considered, nor so &r forth 88 it is entity: nor do they make any account of the sub- stance of a thing, but from this one particular subject, partly from Beme mc^ng this manifest, and partly assuming an hypothesis as to substance or qidddity; they, accordingly, demonstrate the things that are essentially inherent in the genus about which they subsist, either more necessarily or more feebly. Wherefore, it is evident that there is not a demonstration of substance, nor of 'Hhe what" a thing is, that IS, of quiddity, by means of an induction of such a kind; but there is some other mode of manifestation. In like manner, also, these sciences say nothing as to whether the genus about which they are engaged is or is not, on ac<iount of its belonging to the same faculty of thought or underBtauding» and of its making manifest the nature of a thing, and whether it is this particular thing.
But since, also, physical science* happens to YorUori be conversant about a certain genus of entity, proof of this (for about' such a sort of substance is it con- JSenwf*^*^*''^ versant in which is contained in itself the first principle of motion and of rest,) it is evident that it is neither practical, nor productive, that is, effective; for the first principle of things that are productive resides in the producer or efficient cause, whether that principle be mind, or art, or a certain capacity, but the first principle of things that are practical is free-will in the agent; for the same thing is an object of action and of free-wUl. Wherefore, if every dmnoetic &culty be either practical, or productive, or speculative, the physical dianoetic energy would be some speculative science; but speculative about such an entity as it is possible should have motion imparted to it, and about such a substance as, existing according to reason, for the most part has not a separable subsistence merely. It is requisite, and from the however, as regards the essence or formal cause, modeofdefi. and the definition how things are so, that this J/clT* *" ^^^' should not escape our notice, as without this knowledge, at least, the present investigation would be the * In the Physics Aristotle defines what ^(ktu is, and disouisea thi aabjeot of motion most fully and ably. Vide Physics, books I., III^ and VIIL accomplishing of nothing. But cf things that are defined, and to which the inquiry what they are belongs^ some subsist in such a manner as the flat-nose,* and some as the hollow. And these differ, since flat-nose is conceived along with matter, for, in truth, a flat-nose is a hollow-nose; but hol- lowness or ooncavity is without sensible matter. If, there- fore, all physical or natural things are predicated in the same way as flat-nose — as, for instance, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone^ in short, animal, leaf, root, bark; in short, plant (for the definition of none of these subsists without motion, but such invariably involves matter) — it is plain how it is necessary in physical inquiries to investigate the nature of a thing, and to define it, and why, also, it is the part of the natural philosopher to institute an inquiry concerning a certain soul, namely, such a soul as is not unconnected with matter; that therefore the physical dianoetic energy is speculative is and from the G'vident from these statements. But also the case of mathe- mathematical dianoetic energy is speculative also; ™** *'•• whether it is conversant, however, about entities that are immovable, and capable of a separate subsistence, is a point that at present is obscure: but that certain mathe- matical systems investigate certain entities, so &r as they are immovable, and so far as they have a separable subsistence, is clear.
s Then c - Now, if there is something that is eternal and si'ty of 8uch a Immovable, and that involves a separate subsistiogy°proved!***" ^^^^f ^* ^^ evident that it is the province of the speculative,^ that is, of the ontological, science to investigate such. It is not, certainly, the province of physical science, at any rate, (for physical science is conversant about certain movable natures,) nor of the mathematical, but of a science prior to both of these, that is, the science of meta- physics.^ For physical science, I admit, is conversant about things that are inseparable, to be sure, but ni)t immovable; ^ In adducing here this illustration of ffifxdr-ns "pugnoBedness," so frequently found in this and other parts of his works, Aristotle is preparing the way for demonstrating the necessity of some such science being in existence of that of ontology. Vide Mr. Id aurice's analysis of the Metaphysics, in his " History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy."
' These are remarkable wor^ and point out the connecting line between ontology and theology.
* I have supplied these words my tilf to complete the sense.
l] speoulative bouexoe threefold. Id4 and of mathematical science some are couversant about enti- ties that are immovable, it is true, ye!;, perhaps^ not sepa- rable, but subsisting as in matter. But Metaphysics^ or the First Philosophy, is conversant about entities irhich both have a separate subsistence and are immovable; and it is necessary that causes should be eternal, all without exception, but particularly these: for these are the causes of the things that are manifest or phenomenal amongst those that are divine.
Wherefore, according to this view of things, ^ Threefold there would be three speculative philosophies; division of namely, the mathematical, the physical, the!^^f ^^ theological. For it is not obscure that if what is divine^ exists anywhere, it resides in such a nature as this; and it is requisite that that should be the most honourable science which is conversant about a genus of things which is most entitled to pur respect. The speculative sciences, ac- cordingly, are more eligible than the rest of the sciences; and of such as are speculative, this science of metaphysics, now imder investigation, is more eligible than all the others* For one would feel a doubt as to whether at ^ jjointioiiDf all the first philosophy, or ontology, is universal, a'doubt as re- or conversant about a certain genus and one g^" **"*®' nature. For neither is there the same method of conducting our inquiries in the mathematical sciences; but geometry, in fact, and astronomy, are oonvei'sant about ^ certain peculiar nature: yet, in reply to this, I would say that pure mathematics universally ^ is common to all the branches of that science, and thus that the first philosophy universally is common to all the sciences. If, then, there is not some different substance besides those that consist by nature, the physical would be the first science; but if there is a certain immovable substance, this will be prior, and the subject of the first philosophy, and in this way will subsist uni- versally, because it is the first of the sciences; and it would be the province of this science of metaphysics^ or ontology, to * «tirep r6 0€7oy vmtpxoi This air of hesitation, here and elsewhere, in the mention of what is divine, has roused the suspicioTis of tliA Christian world as to the theological system of Aristotle; and has U4 many to brand him with the imputation of atheism.
' I have adopted Taylor's |Mraphrastic rendering of these word% ifiO THE XETAPllxmO» OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK ▼.
institute an inquiry respecting entity, tso far forth as it la entity, and respecting quiddity, or the nature of a thing, and respecting those things that universally are inherent in it, so &r forth as it is entity.
CHAPTER II.1 1. No science SixcE, howcver, entity, simply so called, is **?of th***** b ^®^<>'^i'^*®<l i^ many ways, of which one wa& divUioiitof" ' that which subsists according to accident, and vvaSia^^V,^ another that which is as a thing that is true,* and the non-being of which is as a thing that is false, and besides these, since these are figures of predi* cation; as, for example, quiddity, and quality, and quantity^ and the place where, and the time when, and whatever else there is that is significant in this way: further, besides all these, is there that which subsists in potentiality, and that which subsists in energy: since, however, 1 say entity is deno- minated in many ways; in the first instance, as far as regardis that subsisting according to accident, must we declare that respecting this there exists no speculation.*