Wherefore, as it is said, it is impossible ^ that 'in^J^t^^'®;:^. there be a prodution of anything if nothing may supposes a pre-exist That certainly, therefore, a portion SeSl?^^"' * > ThiB is the great dogma Aristotle is endeayouring to establish, in order to erect tiiereupon a eyfitem of ontological science, — dHtwroi 182 THB MRTAFHTSIOS OF ABI8I0TLB. (BOOKn.
will exist necessarily is evident; for matter is that part, for this is inherent, and is itself produced. But then, as «uch, is it to be classed amongst those things that are ooa- tained in the definition. And in both ways we denominate the brazen circles what they are, speaking of both the matter that it is brass, and the form that it is such a figure, and this is the genus into which it is first posited. But a braiea circle involves matter in its definition. «. A miscon- But that from which, as from matter, some mSht\ri8e' things are formed is styled, when it is so formed, from this dog- not that from which they are formed, but k ma obviated. ^^^^ something else that is of thU; as, for example, a statue is called not a stone, but of stone or stony* And a man who is in a state of convalescence is not denomi- nated that from which he recovers back his health; and a cause of this is the following, that that arises from privatiQar and the subject which we call matter: as both a man and a person that is indisposed become healthy. Rather, however, is health said to arise from privation — as one in healtii from one that is indisposed — than from man. Wherefore^ a sick person is not denominated as one that is sound in health; but this is affirmed of man, and a man who is in sound health. And in regard of those things of which the privation is obscure and nameless, as in the case of the brass, whatever be the figure, or in the bricks and timbers of a house^ those things seem to arise from these: as, in the instance above adduced, one that is in health from a person that is indisposed. Wherefore, as neither that which is produced is called by the name of that from which it is formed, in the case of the instance above adduced, so neither in this instance is the statue called wood, but derivatively is classified as wooden, not wood, and as brazen, but not brass, and stony, but not stone; and a house also is spoken of as made of bricks, but not as bricks: since, if one carefully examines, he would not say absolutely that either is the statue produced from wood, or a house from bricks, on account of its being necessary that whatever ^ is produced from anything should be changed front that from which it is produced, but should not continue as it was before. Therefore, on account of this, indeed, the thipg is expressed in this manner.
> This is the sense put upon the&a words by Taylor.
OB. Tm.]^ KO GBNERATION Of VORX. 48S CHAPTER VIII.
SoTOB, however, that which is produced is pro- 1. No frenen. auced* both by something (now, I mean that JISTep'J^ whence also originates the first principle of gene- «<«•»• ration, that is, its efficient cause) and from something, (but kt this be not privation, but matter, for already has it been defined in what manner we have denominated this,) also must there be that which is produced; and this is either a sphere or a circle, or whatever else of the other things that may chance to present itself; as neither the efficient cause produces the subject, (I mean, the brass,) so neither does it make the sphere, unless by accident, because a bi*azen sphere is a sphere; but it does not produce the sphere itself. For the production of a certain thing of this kind is the produc- tion of this particular thing fi*om the eiitire subject. Now, I say, that to make the brass roupd is not to make the round or the sphere, but something different, such as this form in another thing. For, if the artist produces it, he would produce this fi*om sometl^ng else; for this would be the subject: as, for example, to make a brazen sphere; and this the artist makes in this manner because from this particular thing which is brass he forms this which is a sphere. If, iherefore, also, he produces this very thing, it is evident that tn like manner he will produce another; and the productions -will go on in a process ad infinitum, ' It is palpable, then, that neither form (or by. « ^ ^., Whatever name we must needs term form, as it what i» com- subsists in that which is cognisable to sense) is JlSter^and S reduced, nor is there a generation thereof, nor form is gen«- i this the essence or very nature of a thing; "****' for this is that which is produced in another subject either from Art, or from Nature, or potentiality, and the efficient cause it is which produces the existence of a brazen sphere; for it produces it from brass and a sphere: for into this par- ticular thing, which is the form, doth the efficient cause mould the brass, and this constitutes a brazen sphere. And if, in ■ ^ What Aristotle aims to establish is this, that it is not strictly true to say that naked form is generated, but that matter, in combination With a certain invariable form, is. This dogma may be regarded M a neoeasary flequence to the reasoning that has gone before.
184 THB MSTAFHTSICS OV ABI8TOTLE. [bOOK ft fihort, of the being or existence of sphere there exists a generation, it will be a something that is a generation fix>m a certain thing: for it will be necessary that what is prodnoed always be divisible, and that this should be this particular thing, and that should be something else: now, I mean that this should be matter, and that form. Therefore, if a sphere be a figure equal firom the centre to all points of its periphery, of this one part will be that in which that which produces will be inherent, and the other part that which resides in this part; but the whole is that which has been produced or generated: as, for instance, the brazen sphere. It is evident, therefore, from the statements that have been made, that what is denominated as form or as substance is not generated, but that the union ^ which is said to take place according to this is generated, and that in everything which is being produced matter is inherent, and that one part is matter, but the other form.
Whether, then, is there any sphere besides ratfft^\hings thcsc Components, or is there a house besides not the causes the bricks; or shall we say that if this were eitbe^p^ ^ ' the case neither would this particular thing ^wiU:^^^ ever have been produced, save that it ^ signifies a particular thing of this sort % This, however, also, is not defined; but it produces and generates such a particular kind of thing from this particular thing, and, when it has been generated, it is this particular thing with such a quality* And the whole of this particular thing is Callias or Socrates, just as this is a brazen sphere, and man and animal are, in genelral, as the brazen sphere. It is evident, therefore, that the cause of forms, (as some have been accustomed to denominate forms,) if there are certain natures of this sort in existence besides singulars, in no wise is useful towards both generations and substances; nor would essen- tial substances have a subsistence on account of these, at least, or, per wodtiw It is, accordingly, evident that in the case of ^Kwpiaru, some things, also, the generator is such as that 1 avvoZo^ is the word translated " union; ** it corresponds with tha Latin *'concursuB:" it was s term in astronomy employed to desigOAte what we call conjunction between two stars.
' I have followed the text in the Leipsic edition. Didot reads if differently; he omits the Srt after (i\Aa, and putfi a stop after oi^ «^ /«• IZ.] A QUESTION ABOUT AEKEBATION. 188 which is being produced or generated, not, I admit, the actual thing itself, at least; not so numerically, but specificallj, as may be obseryed to take place in natuml phenomena; for man generates man, unless something abnormal or contrary to nature be produced, as when a horse begets a mule. And with these is it in like manner; for that which would be common to a horse and an ass, namely, the most proximate genus, would not have a name imposed upon it, but both, perhaps, would be as a mule. Wherefore, it is plain that it is in no wise necessary to provide a form as an exemplar or model,^ (for in these, that is, in things sensible, especially, investigators from time to time have searched for them, for these same in an eminent degree are substances;) but for the generator it sufficeth to have produced, and to be the cause of the subsistence of form in matter. And the entire now of such a form in these things, such as flesh and bones, is Callias and Socrates, and different, no doubt, is a thing on account of the matter thereof; for matter in each thing is dif- ferent, but in form it is the same, for the form is indivisible.
CHAPTER IX.
CHAPTER IX.
Some one, however, may doubt, perhaps, why ^.^^ ^^^^ some things are produced by both art and from things are pro- chance, as health, but other things are not pro- and^hwlw.*'* duced in this way, as a house. Now, a cause of an* »ome ar« this is the following, — that the matter of these, which is the first principle of generation, consists in the ac- complishing and the production of something of those things that are artificially formed, in which there is inherent a certain portion of the thing, which matter is partly of such a kind as is capable of being moved by itself, and partly is not so; and of this one part is it possible to move in this par^ ticular way, but the other it is not possible; for many things involve the capacity of being moved by themselves, but not in this way: for instance, to leap. As regards those things, therefore, of which the matter is of such a kind, as stones, it is impossible for them to be moved in this way, unless b;f . ^ This same reasoning is put forward in book I. chap. viL, and in book XIL chap. iv.
:tS6 THE HSTAPHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [^OOK JL isometfaing else, — ^yet in this way, assuredly,^ — and it is w with fire. On account of this some things will not be with- out that which is in possession of art; whereas other things will be, fur they will be moved by those things which do not possess art, no doubt, but are themselves capable of beii^ moved either by other things which do not possess art, ot possess it partially. But it is evident, from the statements that have been made, that also all things, in a certain manner^ are generated from things that are equivocal, as those that have a subsistence from Nature, or from au equivocal portion,—- fi3r example, a house from a house, — or by reason of intellect; for art is form, either from a part or from that which posp flesses a certain part, if it be not produced according td accident For the cause of the production is an essential first j^ortion.
8. niustrations ^^^ *^® ^®** (which is involved in motion) has .of the forego- generated heat in the body, and this is, unques* ■ tionably, health, or a part of health, or there follows it a certain part of health, or health itself. Wherefore^ also, it is said to be a producer, because that produces health on which heat follows, and to which it is au accident Where- fore, as in the syllogisms substance is the first principle of all things, (for from the tiature of a thing are syllogisms,) so, also, in this instance, are generations. And, in like manner, also, with these are those things that are by Nature con<< stituted. For the seed produces as things that are con- structed from art; for it involves form in capacity, and that from which the seed originates is, in a manner, equivocal J for it is not necessary to investigate all things in this way^ as man is from man; for woman also is from man: wherefore,^ mule does not originate from mule, save unless there be an injury from mutilation. Thus as many things, however, as are being produced from chance — just as in that instance— are those the matter of which is capable, also, of being moved by itself with that motion which the seed effects; but those things the matter of which does not possess this capability, it is impossible can be produced in any other way except from themselves by generation.
' The MSS. differ as to the punctuation of this passage; some hav« a stop after /ueWoi, making it a question, and vcd koI rh irvp, the reply« I have followed Taylor and Didut.. ' .OH.Z.] A. QUESTION AS REGARDS DEFINITION. 187 Not only, however, does this reasoning con« s. Whatpiovei .ceming substance maxiifest the non-production of JJttion*o?fonn lorm, but, in like manner, oonoeming all that ftomthenaton are primary natures there is involved the same S';?£lS;?o^ reasoning in common, as of quantity, quality, and "* mtot tii* ,the rest of the categories. For as the brazen ^ ^^ **° **' sphere is what is produced, but not the sphere or the brasSi ftnd as it is so in the case of brass, if it is what is produced, ffor always it is necessary that there pre-exist matter and brm,) so, also, must it be in the case of ** the what smything is," or quiddity, and in the case of quality, and quantity, and similarly of the rest of the categories; for there quality is not produced, but such a sort or qutdity of wood, neither quantity, but such a measure or quantity of wood, or au animal of such a kind. But from these statements may we acquire what is a peculiarity of substance, namely, that there is a necessity that there should always pre-exist a different sub- stance, (I mean, one subsisting in a state of actuality,) which produces: as, for instance, an animal must pre-exist if an animal is produced; but this is not necessarily the case with quality or quantity, unless in potentiality merely.
CHAPTER X.»
CHAPTER X.»
But since definition is a sentence or expla- ]. igtheden- hation, and every sentence or explanation has "iJiJVI***" parts, and as a sentence is similarly related to the m that'of^the thing itself, as the part of the sentence to the part ^*»®*® ' of the thing itself, the doubt now suggests itself whether it is necessary that the definition of the parts should be inherent in the definition of the whole, or not? In the case of some things they appear to be as things that are inherent^ but in the case of others it is not so. For thus the defini- tion of a circle does not involve that of its segments; but the ' I have fbllowed the Paris edition of Bidet. Taylor seems to have read the passage in the same way.
* This chapter is most important; and though it would seem obscure, yet its apparent unintelligibility may be cleared away by bewv ing in mind that Aristotle's entire reasoning turns on the distmctioa between logical and material definition.
IBS THE HETAPHTSICS OF ARI8T0TLB. [bOOK VL definition of a syllable involves that of the letters of speecti: notwithstanding that the circle, also, is divided into segments^ as, likewise, is the syllable into letters or elements of speech. But, further, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute be a part of the right angle, and the finger of an animal, the acute would be a thing that is prior to a right angle^ and the finger to man.
s. The aflinn- Now, thoso do not scem to be prior; for in Btive of this the definition they are denominated from them, M regiu^s"^" and also are they prior in their being capable some rues, and of subsistence without One another: or shall we other* the ne- Say that part is denominated in many ways, of gative is true, ^jjich One mode is the measurement accord- ing to quantity? Let, however, the mode of the subsist- ence of this be omitted; but into those things of which substance is composed, as from parts, we must institute an investigation. If, therefore, the one be matter, but the other form, and the third that which is composed of these, and if substance be both matter and form, and that which consists from these, it is the case that also matter is termed in one respect a part of something, but it is the case that such is not so in another respect; but this is true as regards those things of which the definition of form consists: as, for instance, of hollo wness, indeed, the flesh is not a portion, for this is matter from which hollowness is pro- duced J but it is a certain portion of flatness of nose, and of the entire statue, no doubt, is the brass a part, but of that which is denominated as the form of the statue it is not so; for by form must we predicate, and so far forth as everything involves form: never, however, is the material to be essenti- ally predicated.
s. What it is Wherefore, the definition of a circle does that givesrise not iuvolvc that of its Segments; but that of ence uiustrat- a Syllable docs involve the definition of the *^- elements of speech, for the elements of the definition are parts of form, and are not the matter thereof: but the segments of a circle thus are parts — as matter — in which the circle is ingenerated; they are, I admit, nearer to form than the brass when roundness is ingenerated in the brass. Put it will be the case that neither all the elements of the syllable will be contained in the definition of syllable; as, fot OB. Z.] DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESnoIT. 189 instance, these waxen letters,' or those which are in the air, for now, also, are these a part of the syllable as sensible matter. For, also, it does not follow that because a line if divided into halves is corrupted, or^ a man when divided into bones, and nerves, and flesh, that therefrom they are in such a manner, on this account, composed as though they were parts of the substance, but that they are composed from them as from matter. And they are parts of the entire, to be sure; but they are not any longer parts of form, and of that about which the definition is concerned only. Wherefore, neither are they found in definitions. Of some definitions, indeed, therefore, will there be inherent the definition of parts of this kind, and of others it is necessary that it be not inherent, unless such be the definition of that which is taken together; ^ for, on this account, from these as from first prin- ciples do some things consist, into which they are corrupted, and others do not consist from these. Whatever things, in- deed, therefore, are assumed together are form and matter; as a flat nose or a brazen circle: those are corrupted into these, and matter constitutes a portion of them j but as many things as are not assumed along with matter, but involve no connexion with matter, as the definitions of form merely, these, however, are not corrupted either entirely, or by no means ^ in this way, at least. Wherefore, things that fall not under these are the first principles and parts of those^ but of the form are these neither parts nor first principles. And, on this account, a statue of clay is corrupted into clay^ and a sphere of brass into brass, and Callias into flesh and bones j and, further, a circle is corrupted into its segments, for there is something which is assumed along with matter; for equivocally is the circle predicated, both that which is predicated simply, and those that are singulars on account of there not being a proper name for singulars.
' This illustration makes the reasoning of this chapter quite plain. A syllable composed of letters of wax can be defined only materially; whereas, viewing it as made up of certain elements of speech, logical or formal definition is only in such a case applicable.
* This passage is differently punctuated in the Paris and Leipsie editions. I have followed the former; and Taylor seems to have used a similar text.
' a-wfi\nixfA(vov, %.e. an entirety composed of matter and form.
* 0^701 is the reading I have followed; ihe Leipeic edition, trndsk <(<w' 190 THE METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK Tt A more ex Therefore, indeed, also, has the truth now been piicit Aoiution declared, yet, nevertheless, let us express our- tto?;' fiJItTas selves more clearly ^ on resuming the subject As reprds the many things, therefore, as are parts of the defi- parts or of ^ ^ nitiou, and into which the definition is divided^ their gubse- these are prior, either all or some of them. But the definition of a right angle is not divided into ^e definition of an acute; but that of an acute angle is divided into the definition cf a right angle: for a person who defines an acute employs a right angle, for the acute is lesf than the right. In like manner, also, is it the case with a circle and semicircle, for the semicircle is defined by the circle, and the finger by the whole, for such a part of a maa is a finger. Wherefore, whatsoever parts involve such a rela- tion as matter, and into which, as into matter, the whole is divided, are things subsequent; but as many as belong to the relation of definition and of substance, which subsists according to the definition, are things that are prior, either all or some of them.
5 Tiiustration Now, since the soul of animals (for this is the of thu from substauco of that which is animated) oonstitut-es the soul, &c. ^YiQ substance according to definition, and their form and the very nature or essence of such a body, if, at least, the part of each thing be properly defined, it will not be properly defined without mention uf its appropriate function; and this, in the present case, will not subsist with- out sense. Wherefore, the parts of this, that is, of soul, are prior, either all or some of them, to the entire animal, and, doubtless, similarly is it with an individual thing. But the body and its parts are subsequent to this substance; and the substance is not divided into these as into matter^ but the entire is. To the entire, therefore, these are, in a wanner, prior, but, in a manner, are not prior; for neithw are they capable of subsisting in a state of separation; for neither does finger belong to an animal when disposed ia every way, but equivocally so termed is a dead finger. Now, some things perish along with the whole, and these are prin- cipal parts wherein, as first, are inherent the definition and ^ ^ Clearness, as already stated, in this matter depends on the die* tinction between matter and form, and how definition in one case ia framed in reference to the parts of a thing, anl in the other is net aa OILX.] ' SOLUTION OF IT. 191 the substance: as, for instance, the heart or brain, if mich bt the principal part, for it makes no difference which of these is of such a kind. But man and horse, and those that are so^ are found in singulars. And an universal substance does not subsist; but there will be a certa.n entirety composed from this reason or formal principle, and this matter as an universal: but as regards a singular consisting from ultimate matter, this is Socrates, in the present instance, and the case is similar with other things. Therefore, also, is defi« nition a portion both of the form (but by form I mean the essence or very natiLre of a thing) and of the universal that is composed from form and matter itself.
But the parts of definition are only the parts ^ g^^ ^^j of form; but a definition is of that which is regards the ' universal: for the being of a circle and a circle, tSng defined and the being of a soul and a soul, are the same entering the de^ thing. And of that which is entire now, as of this cu'de, — of any of the singulars, either sensible or intel« ligible, — (now, I mean by the intelligible, for example, th^ mathematical, but by the sensible such as are made of brass and wood,) of these, however, I say there is no definition, save that they are known by the interv^tion^ of the intellect or sense. And when they are removed away from actuality it is not evident whether they exist at all or do not exist, yet they are always expressed and made known by universal tiefinition. But the matter is unknown in itself. Now^ matter is partly sensible and partly intelligible; that which is sensible is such as brass and wood, and such as is movable; but intelligible matter is that which is inherent in things that are sensible: but not so fex forth as they are sensible as mathematical entities. How, indeed, therefore, ^is is so respecting the whole and part, and respecting the prior an4 subsequent, has been declared.
But as to whether a right angle, and a circle, 7. This soiu- Wid an animal, are prior to the parts into which tion adapted m. hey are divided, and of which they are composed? queL'on^^ > my reply to this question, when any one puts it, ^^^y mooted.
' These remind us of words uttered by Locke in regard of the acquisition of ideas of qualities through the instrumentality of per* •eption rather than diseuastoa Ofi d^niticMi. Vide Essay, &c book til. chap. iv.
192 THB MSTAFHT8ICS OF ARreTOTLA ^BOOKVfc