* In objects that are cognised by our senses, what we perceive in matter moulded into such and such a form; and this presupposei •^ *»Mut.nce in which the thing resides, which it would be a contradic iuCtiA )a tonus to say could fall beneath the comprehension of sense.
te. 11.] SUBSTANCE C03MSED BY SENSE. 213 at another time indisposed: and in like manner, also, accord- ing to substance, a thing which now subsists in a state of generation is again, however, in a state of corruption, and that which is at the present time a subject, as this certain particular thing, yet is at some future period a subject as according to privation. And, doubtless, the rest of the changes follow upon this; yet this does not follow one or two of the other changes: for there is no necessity, should even anything involve local or topical matter, that this also involve matter, both such as is generable and corruptible. What, then, is the difference between simple production, and that which is not simple production, has been declared in our Treatise on Physical Phenomena.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
But since the subsistence of substance as a sub- i. what sen ject and as matter is admitted by philosophers, and ig^^ewed^S"*^* this is that which subsists in capacity, it remains energy; the that we should state what that substance is amongst Socritua on ^ sensibles which subsists as energy. Democritus, *^" voint. therefore, assuredly seems to be a person who considered that, in regard of this, there are three differences; for he was oif opinion that the subject-body and the matter were one and the same thing, but that the difference lay either in the rysmos,^ which is figure, or in the trope, which is position, or in the diathege, which is order.
But there appear nlany existing differences; 2. substance,!]» as, for example, some things are termed sub- ^^^*jhe sub- stance from the composition of matter: as, to jectofmany give an instance, whatsoever things are formed by ^»^'^"***'®'- mixture, such as mead, which is a mixture of honey and water; and others are termed so from a wooden fastening, as a chest;^ and others from a string, such as a bundle; and others from glue, as a book; and others from many of these; and others, again, are said to subsist from position, as a threshold and the lintel of a door: for these differ from ' This has been already noticed by Aristotle, in book L chap. iv. ' y6fji^ I have translated ** wooden fastening,'* on the auUiorlty ci liddell and Scott. Taylor readers it by the word ** naiL" SI 4 THE KETAPHTSICB OF ABIST0TL1E. [BOOK VH, circumstances of position in a certain respect; other things^ however, derive their being from time, as ^ dinner and break- fast, and some from place, as the winds. And some things are styled dififerences from the passive properties of sensibles; as, for example, hardness and softness, and thickness and thinness, and dryness and moistness: and some are so termed from certain of these qualities, and others from all of them; and, in general, some from excess, but others from defect. Wherefore, it is evident that the fact of a thing's sub- sistence is denominated in thus many ways, for a threshold is a threshold because it is situated thus, and its subsistence signifies that it has this position in this way; and the sub- sistence of ice signifies the fact of its congelation in this form. And the subsistence of some things will be defined by even all of these circumstances; and this because some things consist from the mixture of some things, but others ftx)ra their temperament, and some from their connexion, and some from their condensation, and some from their employ- ment of other difTerential qualities, as either the hand or foot. Therefore, must we take into consideration the genera of differences, for these will be the first principles of subsistence; as, for example, those things which have their sub- sistence in the more and the less, or the dense and the rare, and the other properties of this kind; for all these belong to excess and defect. If anything, however, has its subsistence in figure, or smoothness and roughness, all things will subsist in what is right-lined and curved. Now, to some things their subsistence will consist in their being mingled, and, in an opposite way, their non-subsistetlce will consist in not being mingled.
8. Certain de- It is, therefore, evident from these foregoing b^ Ariatou?^ Statements, that if substance is a cause of tha from the fore- Subsistence of each thing, that in these must be going points, sought the solutiou of the question what the cause of the subsistence of each of these is. Substance, in- ^ ^fTvvov Ka\ dpitnov, I have differed from Taylor, who translates these words "supper and dinner." A^^wov — Zitirivtiv — was regarded as the principal meal; and the Homeric use of the word &pi<rToy was to designate the morning meal, II. 24; 124 — and this harmonizes with its being a deriyatiye from ^pi, our " early." I know, howerer, that &purro In after times was made to signify the midday meal, or praudium, of ttts Romans.
CH. n ] BNEBQT IN SUBSTANCE. 215 deed, then, is not any of these, or a thing that is oonnected together; nevertheless, it subsists analogically in each thing. And as in substances whatsoever is predicated of matter is actual energy, this also in an eminent degree is the case with the other definitions; as, for example, if it be neces- sary to define a threshold, we will say that it is a piece of wood or stone situated in this way, and if a house, that it is bricks and timbers disposed in such or such a way; or, shall we further say that likewise the final cause exists in the case of some things? And if we are called on to define a lump of ice, we would reply, that it is water congealed or condensed in this form; and if symphony is to be defined, that it is a particular sort of mixture of the sharp and the fiat; and we must prooeed in the same manner with other things also.
It is evident, therefore, from these statements, 4. Different that there is of different matter a different J3J^*®i5^*5®",'a energy,^ and a different definition; for of some different things composition is the energy and form, ***®'8y- and of other things mixture, and of others something else of those particulars enumerated above. Wherefore, of persons engaged in defining things, those, on the one hand, who say what a house is, that it is stones, bricks, timbers, speak of the house in respect of potentiality or capacity, for these are matter; but those who say, in addition, that it is a receptacle preservative of goods and bodies, or that it is some other such thing, speak of the house in regard of its energy; and those who put both of these together, speak of the third substance — I mean, the substance composed of these, that is, of potentiality and energy.^ For the defini- tion that subsists by means of differences seems to be that of form and energy, but that which consists from things * To show what Aristotle meana by energy or activity, iv4py§ia, we iBtiBt bear in mind what has been already laid down touching the relation of matter and form; it is a sort of mediating princix)le between both, for where capacity exists there must be likewise some operating power to move such capacities into action. Now, this is precisely what takes place in the case before us. Matter, which is the capacity, is moulded into its several shapes by form, which is the energy. The thing may be well illustrated by the relation subsisting between yoli< tion and muscular action.
' As to the relation between capsjcity and enei^, we must refer tc book VIIL, where the subject is ducusBed at lar^ 216 TBJR METAPHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [dOOK TH, that are inherent appears to he the definition of matter rather. In Uke manner, also, does this consequence result unto the definitions which Archjtas^ admitted, for they are compounded of hoth together; as, for example, what is a lull { stillness in a mass of air; the air in this case is matter, hut the stillness is energy and substance: what is a calm t smoothness of sea; the subject in this case, as matter, is the sea, but the energy and form are smoothness. Now, it is evident, from what has been stated, what sensible substance is, and how it subsists; for the one thing is as matter, hut the other as form when it is^ energy: but the third is that which is composed of these.
CHAPTER I1I.8 1. Does the j^ is requisite, however, that we should not be the composite Ignorant that sometimes it escapes our notice theeSSr^^Md whether the name signifies the composite sub- fonnf stance, or energy, or form; as, for example, a house, whether it is a sign of that which is common to all houses, — viz. that it is a shelter composed of bricks, and rafters, and stones, disposed in this way, — or whether it is a sign of energy and form, because it is a shelter 1 in the instance of a line, also, whether the name signifies that it is a duad in length, or, because of its being the duad, is a sign of energy and form? * And, in the ciise of animal, whether it is soul contained in body, or soul simply, for soul is the substance and energy belonging to a certain body] And animal, also, would be ^ Archytas was a native of Tarentum, living about the same time with Plato. He was one of the most celebrated of the Pythagoric school^ and the first philosopher amongst them whose literary labours were committed to writing. Archytas was famous for his mechanical know led^^'e and inventions, and his name is immortalized in the poetry of Horace, 2Sth Ode, book I. Vide Tenneman's History of Philosophy, p. 65: Bohn'e edition.
^ Srav: some copies read Kai.
* The inquiry started in this chapter relates to whether we are to regard the name of a thing as being imposed upon it in reference to its being a compound, and from the operation of active power on CJipacity, or in reference merely to the active power itself, the «I5o$ ico) iripyna?
* 1 hAve filled up the eUipais here to complete the sense.
OH. ni.] IMPOBT OP THE NAUE OF A THING. 217 involved in both, not as what is predicated by one dt finitioD, but as in relation to one thing.
These, however, differ in relation to something ^ xws inquiry, else; but they in no wise contribute to the aiweiias advancement of the present investigation about gamrsort^^irre- substance,— I mean that substance which is cogni- levant to onto- saiit by sense; for the essence or very nature of a °^^' thing is inherent in the form and energy. For soul, I admit, and the being of a soul, are the same thing; but the being of a man, and the being man, are not the same thing; unless, likewise, the soul will be styled a man: and so the being of man will be the same, no doubt, in one respect, but not the same in another, with man. But the syllable does not appear to persons engaged in such investigations as consisting of the elements of speech and of composition, nor does a house seem to constitute both bricks and composition: and this supposition is made correctly, for the composition and the mixture of anything consist not from those things to which composition or mixture belongs. In like manner, also, it is not the case with anything else; as, for example, a threshold subsists from position, not position from a threshold, but the latter rather from the former; nor is a man animal and biped, but must needs be something which subsists besides these, if these are matter, and which is neither an element, nor from an element, but the substance; and the thing which they cake away they denominate matter: i^ then, this is a cause of existence, and if this is substance, they would term^ this actual substance. Now, it is necessary that this be either a thing eternal, or subject to decay without being reduced to decay, and be generated without going through a process of generation. But it has been demonstrated, and made appa- rent elsewhere, that no one produces form, nor generates it, but that this particular thing is produced, and that what is composed of these is generated. But whether there are sub- stances of things comptible capable of having a separate subsistence is in no wise evident as yet, save that thus much is plain, that it is not admissible with some things at any rate, such as cannot possibly subsist even beside certain par- ticulars, say a house or a utensil. Therefore, perhaps, indeed, ' I have followed Didot's text in omittingr the particle oil, which th« Leif sic editiou retaiiw 218 THB METAPHT8IC8 OF ARISTOTLE. (BOOK TH neither suoh are substances — I mean sensibles — ^nor are these very things substances in any respect, nor anything else that does not consist naturally; for one may consider Nature as alone the substance in things that are liable to decay. %, Rcftitatioii Wherefore, the doubt which the followers of cf Antisthenes, Autisthenes/ and persons similarly uneducated, fin^i^^ onhe indulged in, namely, that the nature of a thing 'uid<ut^*' **' cai^^iot be defined, involves some opportunity of ^ ^* a solution at present; for what they say is, that definition is a long sentence: but, certainly, as to the quality of a thing, what it is, though we cannot fi^me any definition, yet we can even give instruction of some kind or other on such point; as, take the case of silver, you may not be able to tell what it is, to be sure, yet you may say that it can be assimilated in its appearance to tin. Wherefore, it belongs, in &,ct, to a substance of which it is admissible that there be a definition and formal principle; as, for example, of that which is a composite nature, whether it be cognisant to the sense or the intellect But there cannot be such of those things from which these consist primarily, if the definitive reason has any signification in regard of anything, and it is necessary that the one be as matter, but the other as form.
4, This reason- N^w, it is likewise evident, on the supposition tag corrects that numbers are in a manner substances,^ why ScSoSs as^o i* ^s *^^*' *^®y subsist after this mode, and not the subsistence as Certain philosophers say, because they are a num ers. multitude Or aggregation of monads. For defi- nition, also, is a certain number, (for both it is divisible and resolvable into indivisible elements; for formal principles are not infinite,) and number is a thing of this kind. And just as when any of those things whereof number consists has been either subtracted from number or added to it, no longer is there the same number, but a different one, even though ever so little be subtracted or added, so, in like manner, neither will ^ The position of Antifitbenes amounts to an exaggerated statement of the truth, because there are some things that are incapable of defi- nition as far as we are concerned; for example, the divine or angelio nature.
' Aristotle already, in the first book, has been occupied in an exami- nation into the Pythagorean syatem about number, and resitmei thii subject in book XIL chap, vi OH. IT.] SUBSTANCES AND THEIR OOlfPONENT MATTER. 219 definition, nor the essence or very nature of a thing, be anj longer the same, when there is a subtraction or addition of anything. And it is necessary, further, as regards number, that there should be something through which it is one, which in the present case they cannot assign — I mean something through which it is one — if number is one thing. ^ For either it is not one thing, but is, as it were, a heap, or, if it is, it must be stated what that is which makes it to be one out of many thinga Definition, also, is one thing, and similarly neither in regard of this which is compounded out of many things can they make assertions in this way.^ And this result naturally takes place, for it is a consequence from the same reasoning; and the substance in this way is one thing, but not in such a way as some would make out who say, for instance, that it is a certain monad, or point, but that each is actuality, and a cer- tain nature. And as number involves neither the more and the less, so neither does that substance which subsists according to form; but, if this be the case, it is that which is connected with matter. Respecting, indeed, then, generation and cor- ruption, in regard of the aforesaid substances, in what manner it is admissible, and how it is impossible that they should take place, and regarding the reduction of definition into number, let the foregoing distinctions be set down thus far.
CHAPTER IV.8 As regards material substance, however, it is i. Each mate- necessary that it should not escape our notice SJiJ^s^J^** that, even though all things are fi:om the same peculiar matter primary nature, or the same things as those that "^^ °******' L prSmry, and though the sam^ matter bo as a first priu- ^ I have rendered the words in the text as literally as I can.
' I have followed Taylor's explanation of this passage. The puno* tnation in the Leipsio edition is different.
' Aristotle has already completed his observations as regards matter and form, and has shown, in respect of generation and corruption, that they are alone admissible in the case of what is a composite from both matter and form; and he now shows, seemingly in opposition to those who were searching up and down in the nature of things for soma primary element, how, even on the assumption of such bemg in exist> •nee, every material object has its own appropriate matter.
220 THE META^'HYSrrS OF ARISTOTLB. [iKX^K Tit ciple, for things that are generated, nevertheless, there is a certain peculiar^ matter of everything; for instance, the first matter of phlegm is the sweet, or the oily, and of bile, the bitter, or something else of this sort: but, perhaps, these, also, are from the same thing. And there are produced many substances of the same thing when one thing is the substance of another, as phlegm is from the fat and the sweet, if what is fat or oily be from what is sweet, and it is the case jthat it is from bile on account of the resolution of the component qualities into bile, as into their primary matter. For in a twofold way does one thing proceed from another, namely, either because it will be in the way of progression,* or of analysation into its first principle.
2. Different Now, on the Supposition of the existence of one things may be matter, it is possible for different things to be fhe sSne °™ generated by reason of the cause which imparts wh"re thl* motion, as both a chest and a bed are formed thing is diffe- from wood: of some things, however, the matter matter fs^Jften ^^ neccssarily different, when the things themselves different. are different; as, for example, a saw can never be made of wood, nor does it belong to the cause imparting motion to accomplish this, for it can never produce a saw of wool or of wood. But if, then, it is possible to make the same thing of different matter, it is evident that art and the first principle, as one that originates the motion in a thing, are the same; for if matter were different from that which imparts motion, the thing made or generated would also be different. When, therefore, one may investigate what the cause of a thing is — since causes are denominated in many ways ^ — it is necessary to mention all the contingent causes: as, for example, what is the cause of man as matter, that is, the material cause: is it the menstrual blood? and what is the cause, as that which imparts motion, or, in other words, the efficient cause: is it not the seed, then 1 and what is the cause as form, or the formal cause: is it not the essence, or very nature of the thing? and what is the final cause of his * olK€7a: this word might be translated " domestic."
* The Latin version renders this, " ex eo quod progredietur."
^ Aristotle means, of course, his fourfold enumeration of causea, found in the Physics, in the Posterior Analytics, and in more placet tiian one in the Metaf hyaiofl.
COEL IV.] RELAT ON BETWEEN THESE TWO. 221 fiTistence: is it not the end thereof? But, perhapn, both of these are the same. And it is requisite, also, to mention the most immediate or proximate causes. What is the matter of man? not fire or earth, but that which is matter peculiar or domestic to the natm^e of man.
Certainly, then, respecting physical and gener- g ^,,g ^^^^^^^ able substances, it is necessary to advance for- ingthusap- wards in our investigations in this manner, if JtJmce^thaUs one will advance correctly: since, in such a case, physical and R6P6rat)i6 Q06S both these causes, and causes of such a descrip- not appiy'to tion, are in existence, and if it be requisite to ^SclTthough have a knowledge of causes. Concerning physi- physical is ye: cal or natural substances, however, but such as ^^*^^ ' are everlasting, there is another mode of reasoning; for some of them, perhaps, do not involve matter, or do not invv^Ivr matter of this kind, but only that which is movable in place. And, therefore, as many as possess a natural subsistcitucr, but are not substance,^ these do not involve matter, but the Subject to them constitutes substance; as, for instance, what cause is there of an eclipse? say, what material cause is there? for no si'ch can be assigned, save that the moon is that whiicb is passive; and what is the cause of this phenomenon, as that which imparts motion and destroys light, that is, the efficient cause, the earth 1 The final cause, however, does not, perhaps, exist in this case: and the formal cause is definition; yet this is obscure, unless the definition be along with the cause: as, what is an eclipse 1 it is a privation of light. And if this addition be made, that this privation of light is occasioned by the earth intervening in the midst, this will be a definition in conjunction with the cause. But, in thiB case of sleep, it is obscure what is the first thing that is passive. Shall we say that it is the animal in its entirety? yes: but in what part does this passive condition arise 1 and what organ is it that first undergoes this passive change 1 is it the heart,^ or something else? then, there is the inquiry, by * ovaia: it is better, perhaps, to read tliis oua-Zt^, and trau^late the words thus: " but have not a subsistence substantiiilly."
^ This was the opinion of Plato, according to Alexander; at least, we iind this assertion in the Commentaries on this book of the Meta* physics attributed to Alexander: but Brandjs looks with suspicion oil all such as being the work of Alexander, beginning from book Y.
222 THE METAFHTBICS OF ABISTOTLE. [kOOK Ytt reason of what agency does this passive condition ensue) and^ in the next place, what is this passive condition — I mean, the condition that belongs to that particular organ, and does not belong to the whole body? shall we say that it is such and such a kind of immobility 9 be it so: but this is such because there is something to undergo an affection in the first instance.
CHAPTER V.i 1. The material And since some things are unconnected both wifeiScetothe ^*^ generation and corruption, and some are not generation of 80; as, for example, points — if they really subsist oontraries. — ^^^ |j^ general, specics and forms; (for it is not whiteness that is generated, but the white wood:) or, if also eveiything which is generated is generated from something, in such a case all contraries would not be generated from one another; but in a different way would white man be from black man, and whiteness from blackness: nor of eveiything is there matter; but of as many things as there is generation and mutual change; and as many things as are without altera- tion, or are not, of these there is not matter. It involves, however, a subject of doubt, how matter — I mean, that which belongs to each thing — stands in relation to contraries; for instance, if the body be healthy in capacity, and if the oppo- site thing to health be disease, whether shall we say that both subsist in capacity? Whether shall we, also, say that water in capacity is both wine and vinegar 1 Or shall we say that the body is matter of health according to its habit, and according to form; but that it is the matter of disease, according to privation,, and according to corruption, such as is contrary to Nature? „ ^,^ And another certain doubt is there, also, why •ubject for winc 18 not the matter of vinegar, nor vinegar m point! "**®°^^*' capacity, although vinegar is produced from this;* and, in respect of one tiiat is aUve, we may doubt ^^ Aristotle is led to the inquiry in this chapter from the investi- gations already pursued in regard of BivOfiis, * The difficulty comes to this — ^must we not regard water, for in« ■tance, as endued with the twofold potentiality of wine and vinegar, ai ft mibjert having a capacity for contraries?
OH. VI.J THE GENERATION OP CONTRARIES. 223 whether such is in potentiality a dead body, or is not; but the corruptions subsist according to accident: the actual matter^ however, of an animal, subsists according to corruption, as the capacity and matter of a dead body, and the water, also, of vinegar; for from these are they generated, as night from day. And as many things, therefore, as in this way undergo changes into one another, ought to revert back into matter; as, for instance, if from a dead body an animated one should be generated, it is requisite that the dead body should first be resolved into matter, in order that in this way an animated body might afterwards be generated from it; and, in like manner, vinegar must be resolved into water, then will wine in this way be produced.
CHAPTER VI.1 CHAPTER VI.1 But bearing upon the doubt mentioned above, i. how are we both respecting definitions and respecting num- {J^^ilfy of?©- bers, is. the question, what is the cause of finition in con- there being one? for of all such things as have?he piur^uy of many parts, and of which the whole is not, as it ^hatisdeflnedf were, a heap, but is something else, namely, an entirety, beside the parts, there is a certain cause, since also in bodies — in some indeed — contact is the cause of their being one, and in others viscosity or some other such passive qimlity. Now, definition is one discursus or sentence, not by a bond of con< nexion, as the Iliad, but in respect of being of one thing. What^ then, is it which makes man to be one thing, and why is he one thing, but not many things; as, for example, both animal and biped, and in the most eminent degree also, if, as some say, any animal in itself, and biped in itself, have a subsistence 1 For why is not man those very things, and why will men subsist, not according to participation of one man,2 ^j^^ tj^g participation of two things, both animal and biped? And, in general, therefore, man will not be one thing, but many things, namely, animal and biped. It is, therefore,