and the same thing with that which is inoomiptible; if what is corruptible admits of uot being inherent therein. Either, then, substantially, or as inherent in substance, must that which is corruptible subsist in each of the things that are corruptible. But there is the same reasoning, likewise, ap- plical:^ to the case of that which is incorruptible;^ for both belong to things that possess a necessary existence. So fiir forth,%he«for.rBS one rTrimarily corruptible, and the other primarily incorruptible, so £gu* are they in opposition to each other; so that they must needs be generically diverse. ' It is evident, theref<we, that it is not possible, « _^ _ that there be such forms as some amrm; for m throws the such a case, as regards man, there will be one *^®*^ theory. who is corruptible, but another who is incorruptible, although forms are said to be the same in species with certain parti- culars, and not equivocal in respect of them: things that are diverse in genus, however, are at a wider interval from one another than those that are diverse in species.
BOOK X,' CHAPTER I.
That, indeed. Wisdom is a certain science i. Questions la conversant about first principles is evident from lofj'^ready**' the early portions of this work, in which doubts discussed. have been expressed respecting statements that have been put forward by others concerning first principles; one, how- ever, would feel doubtful as to whether it would be requisite 1 These words are worthy of note, and contain a hint that has been followed up by modem metaphysicians, e. g, Kant.
* Book X. — according to others book XI. — is occupied in discuE«iona that hav9 already been put forward in the previous portions of the Meta- physics. A glance at the contents will show this. Amongst other 'topics we have another refutation of Scepticism, in which Protagoras SB attacked by name. This subject has been already handled in book III. " Not, however," aa Mr. Maurice remarks, " to be passed over on tiiat account; for Aristotle's repetitions of himself, or the reports of hia diffsreiit pupils, generally clear away many difficulties."
ttS TBS VETAPHTSICS OF ABI810TLB. ][liOOK X..
to suppose Wisdom or Ontology to constitute one science »r many 1 For if it does constitute one science, there is, at Any rate, one science invariably of contraries; but first prin- ciples are not contraries. I^ however, it does not constitute one science, as of what quality must we posite these many sciences? Fui-ther, to speculate into demonstrative first, principles, is it the province of one or of many sciences ^ for if of one science, why, let me ask, is it the province of this mere than of any other whatsoever 1 but if such speculation belong to many sciences, what sort must we consider these, to be 1 Moreover, whether is there one science of all sub- stances,^ or not 1 for if there is not one science of all, it would be difficult to render an accoimt of what sort of sub- stances there is one science in existence; if, however, there is one science of all substances, it is an ob&cure point how it is admissible that there should be the same science of many sub-j stances. Further, the question arises as to whether demon- stration 2 is conversant about substances only, or also about accidents? for if demonstration be conversant, at least, about accidents, it is not conversant about substances. But if there is one demonstrative ^ science about accidents, and anothei about substances, what, may I ask, is the character of both, and which of the two constitutes Wisdom or Metaphysics? fof demonstrative wisdom is that which is conversant with acci dents; that, however, which is conversant with first principles is the wisdom that takes cognisance of substances. 2 'VHiat causes Neither, however, must we consider the scienpe* is ontology con- at present under investigation as a science re- oeme with gpecting the causes that have been already enumerated in our treatise on Physics. Far neither should we act thus in regard of " the final cause;" for a thing of this kind is that which is good: and this resides in practical things, and in those entities that are in motion; and this imparts motion in the first instance, for the end is a thing of this sort: but the imparter of motion in the first instance does not inhere in those things that are incapable of motion.
^ Although moBt of the Bubjects treated of in this book have been inveetigateci already, yet the analysis of motion, and the AristcteliMi theory of the Infinite, found therein, are quite new, ^ Vide Posterior Analytics, book II. chap. iii.
' Vide book V. chaps, ii. and iii.
* Vide book I. chaps, i. and ii tt. I,] WHAT IS THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF OITKJjOQT! 379 And, in general, one feels doubtful as to.,^ ^., whether the science now under investigation is subject-matter oonversant about sensible substances at all,^ or ^jjjj*^®""*'^'* not about these, but about certain other sub- stances? for if metaphysical science be conversant with sub- stances different from those cognisable to the senseSj it will be conversant either with forms or mathematical entities. As regards forms, then, it is evident that they have no exist- ence. But, nevertheless, one would feel doubtful, even though he should admit the existence of these forms,^ why, forsooth, as in the case of mathematical entities, the same truth does not hold good in regard of other things of which there are forms? Now, I say that they have placed mathematical entities, no doubt, as intermediate between forms and things eognisant by sense, as it were ^ certain third natures beside both forms and those things that are here — I mean, sensibles —but there is no third man, nor a third horse, beside both actual man, and actual horse, and singulars. And if, ou the other hand, these mathematical entities do not subsist in the manner they affirm, about what sort of entities are we to assert that the mathematician is engaged? for, surely, he is not engaged about those things that are here, — that is, about sensibles, — -for none of these constitutes the description of entity which the mathematical sciences investi- gate. Neither, certainly, is the science now under ^^ jg j^ mathe- investigation — I mean, Metaphysics — conversant maticai enti- about mathematical entities,^ for no one of these ^^^^ ^ possesses a separable subsistence. Nor, however, is it a science belonging to substances cognisant by the senses, for these are corruptible. And, in short, one would feel doubtful as to what sort of a science ^ belongs the investigation of the matter of mathematical entities; for neither does it belong to ^ This, in fact, might be set down as the chief point which Aristotle ■ itriying to settle in this Treatise, and towards which his conclusions Are ever verging. If we examine the connexion between the several books of the Metaphysics we shall perceive this.
^ As to the existence of forms, tA efSiy, this subject is frequently discussed, and made to serve the occasion of an attack upon the Ideal Theory of Plato. We have in books I. chap, ix., and XIL chaps, iv. and v., an elaborate refutation of this hypothesis.
8 Vide book IL * The subject of mathematical natures is discussed in book XII fhaps. ii and iii * Vide book V. chap. i.
tiSO THfi METAPHTBI08 OV ABISfOTLB. [BOpS It physical or natural scieDce, from the &ot that the entire attention of the Natural Philosopher is engaged ahout thoee things that contain in themselves the first principle of motioii and rest: nor, unquestionably, is it the province of a science that institutes an inquiry respecting both demonstratioii and scientific knowledge; for respecting this very genus it created for itself an investigation. It remains, therefore^ that thii proposed Philosophy of Ontology, or Metaphysics, should make these a subject of its inquiry.
4. Ismetaphy- -^^^t *gai^> OUC WOUld feel doubtful 88 tO aicai science whether it is requisite to consider the aeieoCQ about elements, Under investigation m the present Treatise ai TaaToixe*^? oouversaut about first principles — ^I mean, snoil as by some speculators are denominated elements 9 Theae^ however, have been regarded by all philosophers aa things that are inherent in composite natures. But it would rather appear to be a thing that is necessary that the scieooe of ontology, under investigation at present, ought to be' QaQ<t versant with universals; ifbr every rational principle, and every science, are conversant about universals, and not about the extremes^ of things. Wherefore, in this case ontologjr would be conversant about primary genera. 6. The TO ^p -^"^ these would constitute both entity taxi and the to 'iy unity: for these especially would be suppoeed to notice as pri- Comprise all existences, and m the most eminent raary genera, dcgi'ee to be assimilated unto first principlei^ oil account of their being classed in the category of thipga thai derive their primary existence from Nature: for when these have been con*apted, other things also are corrupted at thQ same time along with them; for everything amounts to entity and unity. As far forth, however, as it is necessary thfti differential qualities participate of. these, if one will ftdsQit the subsistence of these genera, — ^now no difference parti- cipates in the genus, — ^thus far, likewise, would it appear tbs^t we ought not to establish these either as genera or first prin- ciples. But, further, on the supposition that that which is more simple is more a first principle than that which is less simple, but the extremes of those things that descend frpm the genus are more simple than the genera, — for these are individuals, whereas the genera are divided into numoroua ' Vi4^ book II. obap. iii. ^nd book XII. chap, z.
ett.n.j AHttaiwo »hparisl« froii mnoulars? 881 species and such as are different, — hence species would ap- pear to be a first principle more than genera. As far forth, however, as species are liable to corruption in conjunction with their genera, the genera rather would seem to be more similar to first principles; for that which brings about the destruction of other things in conjunction with itself is a first principle.
These, then, and other such points are some of thobe questions that involve matter of doubt.
CHAPTER II.
Further, may the question be raised as to ^ j. there any. whether it is expedient to admit the existence of thing subsist- something besides^ and independent of singulars, {foniSagSars^ or not? but the science now under investigation is conversant with these. These are, however, infinite. Those things, at any rate, which have a subsistence independent of and beside singulars are, without doubt, either genera or species; but the science at present under investigation is not a science conversant about either of these; for the reacon why this is impossible has been already stated. For in ^neral, likewise, doth the following question involve a doubt — namely, as to whether it is necessary to suppose the existence of any substance separable j&om sensible substances and those which are here,' or whether this is not the case? but shall we say that these sensible things are entities, and that Wisdom is conversant aboiit these 1 for the fact is we seem to investigate some different science; and this stands forth as the point pro- posed by us for investigation. Now, what I mean is this, that our aim is to discover whether there is anything that essentially involves a separable subsistence, and which does not reside in any nature belonging to those objects that are cognisant by the senses 1 But, further, allowing that there is beside ^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ sensible substances any different substance, what sort are 'these sort of sensibles are those beside which it is •*°b"^*"' ^ This subject is discussed at intervals throughout the whol« Treatise; vide, e.g., book V. chap. i.
' This, I take it, means the objects with which we are conversant ixi this transitory scene, where the vast bulk of mankind are engrossed exclusively with things of sense. The phrase, then, is synonymous with r^ «i0'di}7a.
ins THB MMAFUTSICS OF ARISTOTCn [bOOK X, requisite to establish the subsistence of this substance % for why should one seek to establish its existence beside men rather than horses, or beside these in preference to the rest of the animal creation, or in general to inanimate things like* wise 1 Notwithstanding, the providing of different substanoee eternal in duration, equal in amount to substances that are cognisant by sense and subject to decay, would appear, per- haps, to Ml outside the province of the rational ^ sciences. 8. The absurd- ^^» however, the first principle now under ity of thinking investigation be not separable from bodies, nothingSplbie what Other would one admit as existing in pre- of a separable ferencc to matter? This, however, does not involve a subsistence in energy, indeed, but in capacity. Eather would species and form seem to be a first principle in a stricter sense of the word than this. Now, this is a thing that is subject to corruption: wherefore, in shorty there does not subsist an eternal substance that involves a separable existence as well as an essential subsistence. But such a position as this is absurd;^ for it appears to be the fact — and such are the subjects of inquiry at the hands nearly of all those that are most accomplished philosophers — that there is in subsistence a certain first principle and substance of this description; for how, let me ask,^ will there prevail order on the supposition that there is no subsistence of that which is eternal, and which involves a separable existence, and is permanent?
But, further, admitting that there is a certain 8omething^hat substance, and first principle, naturally of such fs separable, a description as we are at present investigating, frbearlhe and this ouc principle belongs to all things, and {SThiJi'gs^co?- ^^® ^^^ is the principle of those things that arQ Tuptibieasto etcmal, and those that are corruptible, the Incorruptible f question, in sucn a case, arises, why, on the sup- position of the existence of the same first prin- ^ It ia Aristotle's aim in this Treatise to combat such an enoneoiul Tiew as regards the subdivision of the sciences.
2 Could any words give stronger proof of the transcendental element to be found in the Aristotelian philosophy?
3 These words are most remarkable, and the principle they enuncitte has been elucidated in a popular way in the Bridgew&ter Treatiaes— by Chalmers, Whewell, and others — ^published in " Eohn's Scientifio Library."
CH. II.] ARE EXTTTT AND UNITT FIRST PRINOlfLES? 28S ciple, some things are eternal ^ amongst those that may be ranked under this first principle, but others are not eternal 1 for this constitutes the absurdity. If, however, there i's one first principle of things that are corruptible, and another of those that are eternal,-— if, indeed, the principle, likewise, of those that are corruptible be eternal, — we shall be in\'olved in similar perplexity; for why, on the supposition of the existence of an eternal first principle, are not those things that may be classed as efiects under this first principle eternal likewise? and, on the supposition of the existence of a corruptible first principle, there arises a certain other prin- ciple of this, and again a difierent one of that; and so thiB progression of causes goes on to infinity.
But if, on the other hand, one will seek to -.
establish the existence of both entity and unity j-^ and unity first as those things that appear in the most eminent p""*''?'®* ' degree to be immovable first principles, in the first place/ unless each of them signifies this certain particular thing and substance, how will they involve a separate subsistence, and an essential one] But it is respecting those eternal and original first principles of this description that we are engaged in our investigations in the present Treatise. Nevertheless, supposing both of them to signify this certain particular thing, and substance, all the entities will be substances;^ for entity is predicated of all things, and unity, also, of some. That all entities, however, are substances is an assertion that is fisJaa But, further, how can the position of those be ^ j,^^ ^^ ^. true who make out that unity is the first prin- that unity con- ciple, and that this constitutes substance, and JfaD^ce.**"^ who from unity and matter generate the first number, and say that it is the substance of these, — how, I say> does thig assertion of theirs admit of being true? for how ia it requisite intellectually to apprehend, as one, the duad and each of the other compound numbers? for on this point they neither say anything, nor would it be easy to make any assertion on the subject. Suppose, however, that any one will seek to establish, as first principles, lines, or the things that are connected consequentially with these — now, I * This question is discussed in "book II. chap. iv.
• Vide book II. chap, ii ' Some copies read, oWta.
S8i tBA ItfiTAP&TStOS O^ ABIOTOTLl. [bOOKX.
meaD, sur&oes such as are primary — ^yot these are not sub- Btances capable of a separate subsistence, but are sections and divisions; the former of surfisuses, but the latter o£ bodies: but points are sections and divisions of lines; and, further, they are the limits of these very same things, and all these are inherent in others, and there is no one of them that is separable. Further, in what way is it necessary for us to conceive the existence of a substance of unity and of a point f For of every substance is there generation, but of a point there is not, for a point amounts to division.
7. How, then, ia -^^ *^^> likewise, fomishes a subject of doubt; there a •cience namely, that evcry science should be convert it is not what is Bant about things that are universal,^ and about universal? that which is of such and such a quality, but that substance should not belong to things universal, but rather should constitute this certain particular thing, and that which possesses a separable subsistence. Wherefore, it we admit that science is conversant about first principles, how is it necessary to consider substance as the first prin-> ciple of things?
„,, Further, the question may be asked, is there thing beside anythmg besiQC entirety, or not? now, I mean by IT^Jiilkw^t entirety, matter, and that which subsists in con-» junction with this; for if, in fact, this be not the case, all things, at least, that reside in matter are subject to corruption. If, however, there subsists anything beside entirety, it would constitute the species and the form.^ In the case of what things, therefore, this would subsist, and in the case of what things it would not, it would be difficult to determine; for in the case of some things is it evident that the form is not a thing that is capable of a separate subsist* ence: as, for example, the form of a house is not separable from the house. And, further, there is the question whether first principles are the same in species, or in number? for il they are one in number, aU things will constitute these.
> Vide hook XIL Qh%). X. ' 7«<2e book YI. chap. viil.
OH. m.] UNITY OF ONTOLOGT AS ▲ soiviroa. 2BS CHAPTER IIL SiNOB the sciencQ of the philosopher^ however,^ i. The unity of is conversant about entity, so fer forth as it is en- ^^^^PI^H tity, and this uniyemUy, and not as i^gards my Z^o& one part, and since entity is multiferiously predi- JU^^^eS* ^ Gated, and not in one way merely — this being the matter. case if entity be predicated equivocally, and not according to anything that is common — ^it does not ML under the province of one science to inquire into it, (for there is not one genus of things of this kind;) but if it be predicated according to anything that is common, it would &11 under the notice of one scienca Now, it appears that it is predicated after the. „., ^. same manner as both what is medicinal and salu- trom the ana. brious; for, likewise, are both of these predicated Jj^®'"^®^" multifariously. And in this way each is predi- cated in respect of the one being somehow referred to medicinal art, but the other to health, and a third to something else; yet each is referred to the same thing. For a medicinal discourse, and a small knife, are denominated in respect the former of proceeding from medicinal science, but the other because it is serviceable to this art of medicine; and in like manner it is so with that which is salubrio\is: for a thing is termed thus partly because it is indicative of health, and partly because it is productive of it And the same mode exists in the case of other g ^^g yj^g. things: in the same way, therefore^ is denominated tration applied entity in its entirety; for each of them is styled *®***®^**^''- entity in respect of being a passion, or habit, or disposition, or motion, or something else of this sort, belonging unto entity, so far forth as it is entity. Since, however, there is a reduc- tion of eveiy entity to a cei-tain one thing, and something which is common, so of contrarieties, likewise, each will be 1 educed to the primary diflFerences and contrarieties of entity, whether multitude and unity, or similarity and dissimilarity, are the primary differences of entity, or whether there artt certain other differences of such; for let these stand over as subjects for future discussion.^ But there is no difference * Vide book III. chap. ii. for an examination into this point. ' Aristotle probably alludes to some other portion of his writiDgBj € g.hia *EK\oyr. r&v Ivay^iw, which has nut come down tc us.
Y66 ' THS METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [fiOilK X,.
or, what is the whether the reduction of entity be made ta same, the t6 '4,. qj^^[^j ^j. ^q ^^^^.y^ -poT cven if they be not the same, but something different, they are, at any rate, convertible terms; for both unity, also, in a manner consti- tutes entity, and entity constitutes unity. 4. The relation Since, howover, it is the province of one and 8c?e^ce"of con- ^^® Same scienco to speculate into all contraries, traries and pri- and sincc cach of thoso is predicated according to vation. privation, — although, as regards some contraries, at least, of which there is a certain medium, one would feel .perplexed as to how they are predicated according to priva- tion; as, for example, of the unjust and the just, — this being the case, concerniug all such contraries, I say, is it necessary, therefore, to posite privation as existing, not of the whole definition, but of the ultimate species; for instance, if one is a just man who, through a certain habit, has been from time to time obedient to the laws, the unjust man will not be alto- gether deprived of the entire definition of just man: but inasmuch as in respect of habitual obedience to the laws he is in some point or degree deficient, in this respect, likewise, will there be inherent in him a privation of this definition. And in the same manner is it the case with other things..._,.. But as the mathematician^ institutes for himfi% a science of Sell an inquiry regarding abstract quantities, — tratedhy the^^ ^^^ ^^ conducts his Speculations by removing out caseof mathe- of his Consideration all sensible natures, such as °^* ^^^ ' gravity and hghtness, and hardness, and its contrary, and further, also, heat and cold, and other sensible contrarieties, but he merely leaves remaining quantity and continuity — some of which pertain to one, but others are in reference to two, and others to three, dimensions — as well as the passive conditions of these, as far forth as they are quan- tities and continuous; and this being the case, the mathema- tician does not speculate into them in reference to anything else; and of some things he examines into their natures and positions, one in respect of another, and into those things that are inherent in these, but of others into their commen- 43urations and incommensurations, and of othera into their ratios )r proportions: but we, nevertheless, have established cne an 1 the same science as being conversant about all sub* * VuU book III. dasLfi, ii.
6ta.iV.J yjLTHKMATlOS, PHYSICS, AND METx\i HTSIOS. 2S7 Jects of this kind, I mean, the science of the geometrician, — in the same manner, therefore, is it the case in respect 04 entity likewise. For the things that are aoci- and of physics, dental in this, so far forth as it is entity, and *°^ duiectks. the contrarieties of this, as far forth as it is entity, it is not the province of a different science from Philosophy, that is, Ontology, to investigate; for to Physical or Natural Science may one ascribe the speculation of these, not as far forth as they are entities, but rather as far forth as they partake of motion. As to the sciences of the Dialectician, however, and the Sophist, they are sciences of the accidents, I admit, that reside in entities, but not so far forth as they are entities; nor do they speculate about entity itself, as far forth as it is entity. Wherefore, it remains that the Philosopher, or Metaphysician, should be a person qualified for speculating into the points we have just stated, in so fiir as they relate unto entities.